
Qass. 
Book. 



^S7 






WORKS 

PUBLISHED BY 

RICHAED GUIFFIN & COMPANY, 

A TREATISE ON 

THE INTELLECTTJAL POWERS OF THE HXTHAN MIND. 

BY THOMAS EEID, D. D., 

Late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. 

Crown 8vo, 5s. cloth. 



A MANUAL OF ROMAN ANTiaUITIES. 

BY WILLIAM EAMSAY, M.A., 

Professor of Humanity in the University of Glasgow. 

Third Edition, crown 8vo, 8s. 6d. cloth. 



A CYCLOPEDIA OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES. 

BY JOHN PEINGLE NICHOL, LL.D., 

Professor of Practical Astronomy in the University of Glasgow . , 

One large volume, Svo, 18s. cloth. 



THE VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

BY WILLIAM FLEMING, D.D., 

Professor of Moral Pliilosophy in the University of Glasgow. 

Foolscap Svo, 7s. 6d. cloth. 



AIRY'S TREATISE ON TRIGONOMETRY. 

EDITED BY HUGH BLACKBURN, M.A., 

Professor of Mathematics in the University of Glasgow. 

Crown Svo, 2s. 6d. cloth. 



A MANUAL OF CHEMICAL ANALYSIS. 

BY THOMAS ANDERSON, M.D., 

Professor of Chemistry in the University of Glasgow. 

In preparation. 



THE 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



" A^;^»j r^s TToti'hlva'icaS vi reov ovo/lcoctmv zria'ai'^ts.'' — 

" Nomina si nescis, perit et cognitio rerura." 

" He has been at a great feast of languages, and stolen the scraps. 
! they have lived long in the alms-hasket of words." 

Love's Labours Lost, Act v., Sc. 1. 

" If we knew the original of all the words we meet with, we should thereby be 
very much helped to know the ideas they were first applied to, and made to stand 
for."— Locke. 

" In a language like ours, so many words of which are derived from other lan- 
guages, there are few modes of instruction more useful or more amusing than that 
of accustoming young people to seek the etymology or primary meaning of the 
words they use. There are cases in which more knowledge, of more value, may be 
conveyed by the history of a word than by the history of a campaign."— Co^mcf^e's 
Aids to Reflection, Aplior. 12. 

" In words contemplated singly, there are boundless stores of moral and historic 
truth." — Trench on Study of Words, 12mo, Lond., 1853. 

" Jock Ashler, the stane-mason that ca's himsell an arkiteck— there's nae living 
for new words in this new warld neither, and that's anither vex to auld folks such 
as me." — Quoth Meg Dods {St. Ronan's Well, chap. 2). 

" A good dictionary is the best metaphysical treatise.' 

" Etymology, in a moderate degree, is not only useful, as assisting the memory, 
but highly instructive and pleasing. But if pushed so far as to refer all words to a 
few primary elements, it loses all its value. It is like pursuing heraldry up to the 
first pair of mankind." — Copleston's Remains, p. 101. 



THE 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY 



MENTAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL; 



QUOTATIONS AND REFERENCES; 



FOE THE USE OF STUDENTS, 



WILLIAM FLEMING, D.D, 

PROFESSOR OF jMOR\L PHILOSOPHY IN THE DNIYERSITY OF GLASGOW. 



LONDON AND GLASGOW: 
RICHARD GRIFFIN AND COMPANY, 

PUBLISHERS TO THE U^flVERSITY OF GLASGOW. 

1857. 



^^\ 



y^.^ 
,?^' 



Brown University 

aUL 1 7 1934 



BELL AND BAIN, PRINTERS, GLASGOW. 



PREFACE. 



The aim of tlie follo-sving work, as its title indicates, is 
humble. It is not proposed to attempt an adequate 
illustration of the difficult and important topics denoted 
I or suggested by the several vocables which are succes- 
sively explained. All that is intended is, to assist the 
student towards a right understanding of the language of 
philosophy, and a right apprehension of the questions in 
discussing which that language has been employed. In- 
stead of affixing a positive or precise signification to the 
vocables and phrases, it has been thought better to furnish 
the student with the means of doing so for himself — by 
showing whence they are derived, or of what they are 
compounded, and how they have been employed. In like 
manner, the qu.otations and references have not been 
selected ^vith the view of supporting any particular system 
of philosophy, but rather with the view of leading to free 
inquiry, extended reading, and careful reflection, as the 
surest means of arriving at true and sound conclusions. 

In our Scottish Universities, the study of pliilosophy 
is entered upon by those who, in respect of maturity of 



VI PREFACE. 

years and intellect^ and in respect of previous prepara- 
tion and attainment, differ widely from one another. To 
many, a help like the present may not be necessary. To 
others, the author has reason to think it may be use- 
ful. Indeed, it was the felt want of some such help, in 
the discharge of professional duty, which prompted the 
attempt to supply it. The labour has been greater than 
the result can indicate or measure. But should the 
YocABULAKY assist the yoLing student by directing him 
what to read, and how to understand what he reads, 
in philosophy, the labourer shall have received the hire 
for which he A^TOught. 



The College, Glasgow, 
Nov., 1856. 



THE 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



ABIIilTY and INAB 11. IT Y— (NATURAL and MoRAl). 

Ability (Nat.) is power to do certain acts, in consequence 
of being possessed of the requisite means, and being unre- 
strained in their exercise ; thus we say ability to walk, the 
power of seeing, &c. 

Inability (JVat.) is the opposite of this ; as when we say of 
a blind man, he cannot or is unable to see ; or when an 
object is too distant, we say we are unable to see it. 

Ability (Mor.) is the disposition to use rightly the powers 
and opportunities which God has given, as when it is 
written, '' It is a joy to the just to do judgment. " 

Inability (iflor.) is the want of a right disposition, as in 
those of whom it is written, '' They have eyes full of adul- 
tery, and cannot cease from sin." *' If there is ami:hing 
besides want of inclination which prevents a man from per- 
forming a particular act, he is said to be naturally unable 
to do it. If unwillingness is the only obstacle in the way, 
he is said to be morally unable. That which prevents a 
man from doing as lie will^ is natural inability. That which 
prevents him from doing as he ouglit^ is moral inability. '* — 
Day, On the Will, pp. 96, 97. 

This distinction is much insisted on by theologians. 
Natural inability, according to some, excuses from moral 
obligation. Moral inability is the ground of condemnation. 



2 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ABIIilTY— - 

Thus, tlie heatlieii cannot hear the gospel, for no preacher 
has been sent to them ; and their not hearing is not sin. 
But to the Jews our Lord said, '•'- Why cannot ye hear my 
speech ? Even because ye cannot hear my word." 

See this distinction upheld by Baxter {Catli, Theol.^ 
book i. and book iii., and MetJi.^ pars iii., c. 25), and 
impugned by Tappan {Doctrine of the Will^ applied to 
Moral Agency^ chap, iii., sect. 5 ; Doctrine of the Will as 
determined hy Consciousness^ chap, yii., sect. 3). 

ABSOIiUTX: (Ahsolutum^ from ah and solvere^ to free or loose 
from) — signifies what is free from restriction or limit. 

"We must know what is to be meant by absolute 
or cibsoluteness ; whereof I find two main significations. 
First, absolute signifieth j^e/yec^, and absoluteness^ perfection ; 
hence we have in Latin this expression — Perfectum est 
omnibus numeris absolutum. And in our vulgar language 
we say a thing is absolutely good when it is perfectly good. 
jS^ext, absolute signifieth free from tie or hond^ which in 
Greek is ^'roA?Af^gj/o!/." — Knox, Hist, of Reform.^ pref. 

"I fear 
My soul hath her content so absolute 
That not another comfort like to this 
Succeeds in unknown fate." — Othello, 

1. As meaning what is complete or perfect in itself, as a 
man, a tree, it is opposed to what is relative. 

2. As meaning what is free from restriction, it is opposed 
to what exists secundum quid. The soid of man is im- 

. mortal absolutely; man is immortal only as to his soul. 

8. As meaning what is underived, it denotes self-exist- 
ence, and is predicable only of the First Cause. 

4. It signifies not only what is free from external cause, 
but also free from condition, 

"0! pass not, Lord, an absolute decree, 
Or bind thy sentence unconditional! 
But in thy sentence our remorse foresee, 
And in that foresight this thy doom recall." 

Dry den, Annus Mirahilis. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHy. 6 

ABSOLiUTE— 

'' He means an infallibility ahsolute^ antecedent, un- 
conditionate^ sucli as will not permit the churcli to 
err." — Jeremy Taylor, Dissuasive from Popery^ part 2, 
introd. 

According to Sir William Hamilton (Discussions^ p. 13), 
''The unconditioned denotes the genus of which the 
infinite and the absolute are the species." 

As to our knowledge or conception of the absolute^ there 
are different opinions. 

1. According to Sir William Hamilton, ''The mind can 
conceive, and consequently can know, only the limited, 
and the conditionally limited. The unconditionally un- 
limited^ or the infinite^ the unconditionally limited^ or the 
absolute^ cannot positively be construed to the mind ; 
they can be conceived at all only by thinking away, 
or abstraction of those very conditions under which 
thought itself is realized ; consequently the notion of the 
unconditioned is only negative — negative of the conceivable 
itself." 

2. According to Kant, the absolute or unconditioned 
is not an object of knowledge ; but its notion as a regu- 
lative principle of the mind itself, is more than a mere 
negation of the conditioned. 

3. According to Schelling, it is cognizable, but not con- 
ceivable ; it can be known by a sinking back into identity 
with the Absolute, but is incomprehensible by conscious- 
ness and reflection, which are only of the relative and the 
different. 

4. According to Cousin, it is cognizable and conceivable 
by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, 
and plurality. 

Instead of saying that God is absolute and infinite^ 
Krause, and his admu'er, Tiberghien (Essai des Con- 
naissances Humaines^ pp. 738, 745), ascribe to Him Seite 
(selbheit) and Totality. Totahty or the Infinite manifests 
itself everywhere in nature. Nature is made up of wholes, 
and aU these constitute one whole. In spirit everjthing 



4 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ABSOI.UTE— 

manifests itself under tlie character of spontaneity or seite. 
Spirit always is what it is by its own individual efforts. 

All philosophy aims at a knowledge of the absolute 
under different phases. In psychology, the fundamental 
question is, have we ideas that are a priori and absolute? — 
in logic, is human knowledge absolute? — in ethics is the 
moral law absolute rectitude? — and in metaphysics, what is 
the ultimate ground of all existence or absolute being? 

See Edinburgh Review for October, 1829 ; Sir WiUiam 
Hamilton (Discussions) ; Tiberghien (Essai des Connais- 
sances Humaines) ; Whately (Logic ^ book ii., chapter 5, 
sect. 1). — F. Infinite, Unconditioned. 

ABSTIIVEIVCE (ahs teuere^ to hold from or off,) — '' is whereby 
a man refraineth from anything which he may lawfulK- 
take." — Elyot, Governour^ b. iii., c. 16, 

Abstinence is voluntarily refraining from things whicli 
nature, and especially physical nature, needs or delights in, 
for a moral or religious end. It corresponds to the A^nxov 
of the precept of Epictetus, Kuix^^ ^^' uttsxov ; Sustine et 
cibstine. The Stoics inculcated abstinence in order to make 
the soul more independent of the body and the things 
belonging to the body. — Christian abstinence is founded in 
humility and self-mortification. — F. Asceticism. 

ABSTRACT, ABSTRACTION (Ahstractio^ from aJ)s trahere, 
to draw away from; in Greek oi(pccips7is, is also called 
separatio and resolutio). 
Abstraction is leaving some things out of consideration and 
attending to others. — S. Bailey, Letters on Phil, of Human 
Mind, p. 87. 

Dobrisch observes that the term abstraction is used 
sometimes in a psychological, sometimes in a logical sense. 
In the former, we are said to abstract the attention from 
certain distinctive features of objects presented (abstrahere 
[mentem'] a differentiis). In the latter, we are said to 
abstract certain portions of a given concept from the 
remainder (abstrahere differentias), — ManseU, Prolego- 
mena Log., note, p. 2G. 



VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 5 

ABSTRACTION— 

Abstraction (Psychological), says Mr. Stewart (^Elements of 
the Philosophy of Human Mind^ chap, iv.), '4s the power 
of considering certain qualities or attributes of an object 
apart from the rest ; or, as I would rather choose to define 
it, the power which the understanding has of separating 
the combinations which are presented to it." Perhaps it 
may be more correctly regarded as a process rather than 
a poioer — as a function rather than a faculty. Dr. Keid 
has called it (Intell. Powers^ essay v., chap. 3) ''an 
operation of the understanding. It consists in the 
resolving or analyzing a subject (object) into its known 
attributes, and giving a name to each attribute, which 
shall signify that attribute and nothing more." Attributes 
are not presented to us singly in nature, but in the concrete 
or growing together, and it is by abstraction that we 
consider them separately. In looking at a tree we may 
perceive simultaneously its trunk, and its branches, and its 
leaves, and its fruit ; or we may contemplate any one of 
these to the exclusion of all the rest ; and when we do so 
it is by the operation of mind which has been called 
abstraction. It implies an exercise of will as well as of 
understanding ; for there must be the determination and 
effort to fix the energy of the mind on the attribute 
specially contemplated. 

The chemist really separates into their elements those 
bodies which are submitted to his analysis. The psycho- 
logist does the same thing mentally. Hence abstraction has 
been distinguished as real and mental. But as the object 
presented to the psychologist may be an object of sense or 
a.n object of thought, the process of abstraction may be 
either reaZ or mental. He may pluck off a branch from 
a tree, or a leaf from a branch, in order to consider the 
sensation or perception which is occasioned in him. And 
in contemplating mind, he may think of its capacity of 
feeling without thinking of its power of activity, or of the 
faculty of memory apart from any or all of the other facul- 
ties with which it is allied. 



" VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ABSTRACTION— 

Abstraction (r.ogical), " As we have described it," says Mr. 

Thomson {Outline of the Laws of Thought^ p. 107), ''would 
include three separate acts : first, an act of comparison^ 
which brings several intuitions together ; next, one of 
reflection^ which seeks for some marks which they all 
possess, and by which they may be combined into one 
group ; and last, one of generalization, which forms the 
new general notion or conception. Kant, however, con- 
fines the name of abstraction to the last of the three ; 
others apply it to the second. It is not of much conse- 
quence whether we enlarge or narrow the meaning of the 
word, so long as we see the various steps of the process. 
The word means a drawing away of the common marks 
from all the distinctive marks which the single objects 
have." 

"The process," says Dr. Whately (Logic^ book i., sect. 
6), "by¥/hich the mind arrives at the notions expressed 
by ' common ' (or in popular language, ' general ') terms 
is properly called ' generalization,' though it is usually (and 
truly) said to be the business of abstraction ; for general- 
ization is one of the purposes to which abstraction is 
applied. When we draw off and contemplate separately 
any part of an object presented to the mind, disregarding 
the rest of it, we are said to abstract that part of it. Thus, 
a person might, when a rose was before his eye or his mind, 
make the scent a distinct object of attention, laying aside 
all thought of the colour, form, &c. ; and thus, even though 
it were the only rose he had ever met with, he would be 
employing the faculty of abstraction ; but if, in contem- 
plating several objects, and finding that they agree in 
certain points, we abstract the circumstances of agree- 
ment, disregarding the differences, and give to all and 
each of these objects a name applicable to them in respect 
of this agreement, — i. e., a common name, as ' rose ;' or, 
again, if we give a name to some attribute wherein they 
agree, as 'fragrance,' or 'redness,' we are then said to 
' generalize.' Abstraction^ therefore, does not necessarily 



VOCABULARY OF PHLLOSOPHY. 7 

ABSTRACTION— 

imply generalization^ tliougli generalization implies ah- 
stractiony 

*' A person who had never seen but one rose," says Mr. 
Stewart (Addenda to vol. i.yPhil. of Hum. Mind)., "might 
yet have been able to consider its colour apart from its 
other quahties; and, therefore, there may be such a thing 
as an idea which is at once abstract and particular. After 
having perceived this quality as belonging to a variety of 
individuals, we can consider it without reference to any of 
them, and thus form the notion of redness or whiteness in 
general, which may be called a general abstract idea. 
The words abstract and general., therefore, when applied 
to ideas, are as completely distinct from each other as any 
two words to be found in the language. It is indeed true, 
that the formation of every general notion presupposes 
abstraction., but it is surely improper, on this account, to 
call a general term an abstract term, or a general idea an 
abstract idea." 

Mr. John S. Mill also censures severely {Logic ^ vol. i., 
2d edition, p. 35) the practice of applying the expres- 
sion " abstract name" to all names which are the result of 
abstraction or generalization, and consequently to all 
general names, instead of confining it to the names of 
attributes. He uses the term abstract as opposed to 
concrete. By an abstract name he means the name of an 
attribute — by a concrete name the name of an object. 
The sea is a concrete name. Saltness is an abstract name. 
Some abstract names are general names, such as colour; 
but rose-colour, a name obtained by abstraction, is not a 
general name. 

"By abstract terms, which should be carefully distin- 
guished from general names, I mean those which do not 
designate any object or event, or any class of objects or 
events, but an attribute or quality belonging to them, and 
which are capable of standing grammatically detached, 
without being joined to other terms : such as, the words 
roundness, swiftness, length, innocence, equity, health, 



8 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ABSTRACTION— 

whiteness. "—S. Bailey, Letters on Phil. Human Mind, 
p. 195. 

''When tlie notion derived from tlie view taken of any 
object," says Dr. Whately (Logic, book ii., chap. 5, 
sect. 1), "is expressed with a reference to, or as in con- 
junction with, the object that furnished the notion, it is 
expressed by 2i concrete term; as 'foolish' or 'fool;' 
when without any such reference by an abstract term, as 
'folly.'" And he adds in a note, "It is unfortunate that, 
some writers have introduced the fashion of calling all 
common terms abstract terms." 

A French philosopher has expressed himself on this 
point to the following effect : — " In every class, genus or 
species, there are two things which may be conceived 
distinctly, the objects united in the class, and the char- 
acters which serve to unite them. Hence it follows, that 
under every term which represents that ideal whole which 
we Q2^genus^ under the term ' bird,' for example, there are 
two different ideas, — the idea of the number of the objects 
united, and the idea of the common characters ; this is what 
is called the extension and the comprehension of general 
terms. Sometimes there is a word to denote the extension, 
and another word to denote the comprehension ; as ' mortals ' 
' and mortality.' And this has led some philosophers to 
say that there are general ideas which are concrete, and 
general ideas which are abstract — the latter referring only 
to the qualities which are common, and the former to the 
qualities and to the objects which possess them." 

"The mind," says Mr. Locke (Essay on Hum. Under., 
book ii., chap. 11, sect. 9), "makes particular ideas 
received from particular objects to become general, which 
is done by considering them as they are in the mind such 
appearances, separate from all other existences, and the 
circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any 
other concomitant ideas. This is called abstraction, 
whereby ideas taken from particular beings, become 
general representatives of all of the same kind; and 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 9 

ABSTRACTION— 

their names general names, applicable to whatever exists 
conformable to such abstract ideas." — See also book iv., 
chap. 7, sect. 9. 

In reference to this, Bishop Berkeley has said (Principles 
of Hum. Know,., introd., sect. 10), "I own myself able 
to abstract ideas, in one sense, as when I consider some 
particular parts or qualities separated from others, with 
which, though they are united in some object, yet it is 
possible they may really exist without them. But I 
deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive 
separately those qualities which it is impossible should 
exist separately ; or that I can frame a general notion by 
abstracting from particulars, as aforesaid, which two last 
are the proper acceptation of abstraction.'''' 

''It seems to me," says Mr. Hume (Essays., p. 371, n. c. 
edit., 1758), "not impossible to avoid these absurdities 
and contradictions" (see his Essay on Sceptical Philosophy)^ 
"if it be admitted that there are no such things as abstract 
in general ideas, properly speaking, but that all general 
ideas are in reality particular ones attached to a general 
term which recalls, upon occasion, other particular ones 
that resemble in certam circumstances the idea present to 
the mind. Thus, when the term 'horse' is pronounced, 
we immediately figure to om^selves the idea of a black or 
white animal of a particular size or figure ; but as that 
term is also used to be applied to animals of other colours, 
figures, and sizes, their ideas, though not actually present 
to the imagination, are easily recalled, and our reasoning 
and conclusion proceed in the same way as if they were 
actually present." 

In reference to the views of Berkeley and Hume, which 
are supported by S. Bailey in Letters on Phil. Hum. Mind, 
see Dr. Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers., Essay v., 
chap. 6). 

The Eev. Sidney Smith (Lectures on Mor. Phil.^ lect. 
iii.) mentions an essay on Abstraction by Dumarsais, and 



10 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ABSTRACTION— 

calls it an admirable abridgment of Locke's Essay, — V. 
Common, Concrete, Generalization. 

AbstractiTe (K.ii»wledge) and IntMltire. 

The knowledge of the Deity has been distinguished into 
abstractive and intuitive^ or knowledge of simple intelli- 
gence and knowledge of vision^ or immediate beholding. 
By the former mode of knowing, God knows all things 
possible, whether they are actually to happen or not. By 
the latter He knows things future as if they were actually 
beheld or envisaged by him, — Baronius, Metaphys.^ sect, 
xii., disput. 2. 

ABSUK1> (ah surdo^ a reply from a deaf man who has not 
heard what he replies to, or that which should be heard 
with deaf ears) — properly means that which is logically 
contradictory ; as, a triangle with four sides. What is 
contrary to experience merely cannot be called absurd^ for 
experience extends only to facts and laws which we know ; 
but there may be facts and laws which we have not observed 
and do not know, and facts and laws not actually mani- 
fested may yet be possible. 
Absurduiu (Keductio ad) — A mode of reasoning which was 
so called by Aristotle. In those sciences which depend upon 
definition and demonstration, as geometry, there is nothing 
intermediate between what is true and what can be shown 
to be self-contradictory or absurd. Hence it is that in 
geometry this mode of reasoning is much employed, by 
which, instead of demonstrating what is asserted, every- 
thing which contradicts that assertion is shown to be absurd. 
For if everything which contradicts a proposition be absurd 
or unthinkable, the proposition itself must be accepted as 
true. In other sciences, however, which do not depend 
upon definition, nor proceed by demonstration, the sup- 
posable and the false find a place between what is true 
and what is absurd. 

ACADEMICS. — '' There -are some philosophers who have made 
den}dng their profession, and who have even estabhshed on 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 11 

ACAl>E]n[ICS— 

that foundation the whole of their philosophy ; and amongst 
these philosophers, some are satisfied with denying certainty, 
admitting at the same time probability, and these are the 
new academics] the others, who are the pyrronliists^ have 
denied even this probability, and have maintained that all 
things are equally certain and uncertain." — Port Roy. 
Logic, part iv., chap. 1. 

The name is derived from the garden of Academus, in 
which Plato taught. 

The Academic school embraces a period of four ages, 
from Plato to Antiochus. Some admit three academies — 
first, that of Plato, 388 B.C. ; middle, that of Arcesilas, 244 
B.C. ; new, that of Carneades and Clitomachus, 160 B.C. 
To these some add a fourth, that of Philon and Charmides, 
and a fifth, that of Antiochus. But Plato and his true 
disciples, Speusippus and Xenocrates, should not be classed 
with these semi-sceptics, whose characteristic doctrine was 
TO 'TTidocuov^ or the probable. 

See Foucher (Dissertatio de Pliil. Academic.^ 12, Paris, 
1692) ; Gerlach (^Commentatio Exhibens de Prohahilitate 
Disputationes 4, Goett.) 
ACATAIiEPSY (a, privative; and KccTxTivixpig^ comprehension 
incomprehensibility) — is the term employed by Bacon (Adv. 
of Learning , Moffet's Trans., p. 140) to denote the doctrine 
held by the ancient academics and sceptics that human 
knowledge never amounts to certainty, but only to pro- 
bability. '' Their chief error," says Bacon, "lay in this, that 
they falsely charged the perceptions of the senses ; by doing 
Y/hich they tore up the sciences by the roots. But the 
senses, though they may often either deceive or fail us, yet 
can afford a sufficient basis for real science." Hence he 
says {Novum Organum^ b. i., aphor. 126), ''We do not 
meditate or propose acatalepsy^ but eucatalepsy^ for we do 
not derogate from sense, but help it, and we do not despise 
the understandmg, but direct it." Arcesilas, chief of the 
second Academy, taught that • we know nothing with 
certainty, in opposition to the dogmatism of the Stoics, 



12 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ACATAIiEPSY— 

who taught x,oiru7iY}xJ/iSi or the possibility of seizing the 
truth. All Sceptics and Pyrrhonians were called Acata- 
leptics. — 7. Academics. 

ACCIDENT (accidere^ to happen; in Greek, av^^iflriKog^ 
contingent) — is a modification or quality which does not 
essentially belong to a thing, nor form one of its con- 
stituent and invariable attributes ; as motion in relation to 
matter, or heat to iron. The scholastic definition of it is 
ens entis^ or ens in alio^ while substance was defined to be 
ens per se. 

Aristotle (Metapliys.^ lib. vi.) says, '' Suppose that in 
digging a trench to plant a tree you found a treasure, that 
is accident^ for the one is neither the effect nor the conse- 
quent of the other ; and it is not ordinarily that in planting 
a tree you find a treasure. If, then, a thing happen to any 
being, even with the circumstances of place and time, but 
which has no cause to determine its being, either actually, 
or in such a place, that thing is an accident. An accident^ 
then, has no cause determinate, but only fortuitous ; but a 
fortuitous cause is undetermined. Accident is also that 
which exists in an object without being one of the charac- 
ters distinctive of its essence ; such is the property of a 
triangle that its three angles are equal* to two right angles. 
Such accidents may be eternal ; accidents properly so called 
are not." 

A phenomenon may be constant, inherent in the nature 
of things, and in that sense essential, as the sparkling of the 
diamond in light, or the sinking of a stone in the water ; 
but an accident^ according to Aristotle, is that which neither 
occurs necessarily nor ordinarily. 

'-'•Accident^ in its widest technical sense (equivalent to 
attribute)^ is anything that is attributed to another, and can 
only be conceived as belonging to some substance (in 
which sense it is opposed to substance) ; in its narrower and 

* You do not define a triangle as a figure whose three angles are equal to 
two right angles; this is shown by demonstration. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 13 

ACCIDENT— 

more properly logical sense, it is a predicable whicli may 
be present or absent, the essence of the species remaining- 
the same ; as for a man to be ' walking,' or ' a native of 
Paris.' Of these two examples, the former is what 
logicians call a separable accident, because it may be 
separated from the individual (e. g.^ he may sit down) ; 
the latter is an inseparable accident, being not separable 
from the individual {i. e., he who is a native of Paris 
can never be otherwise) ; from the individual^ I say. 
because every accident must be separable from the 
species^ else it would be a property." — Whately, Logic, 
book ii., chap. 5, sect. 4, and mdex. — V- Substance, 
Phenomenon. 
ACROAMATICAr. (fr'om ccx,^oua9cci, to hear). — '' Aristotle 
was wont to di^dde his lectures and readings into Acroarna- 
tical and Exoterical: some of them contained only choice 
matter, and they were read privately to a select auditory ; 
others contained but ordinary stuff, and were promiscu- 
ously and in public, exposed to the hearing of all that 
would." — Hales, Golden Remains (on John xviii. 36). — 
V. Exoteric. 

''In the life of Aristotle, by Mr. Blakesley " (published in 
the Encyclop, Metrop.)^ '' it has been shown, we think most 
satisfactorily, that the acroamatic treatises of Aristotle 
differed from the exoteric^ not in the abstruseness or 
mysteriousness of their subject-matter, but in this, that 
the one formed part of a coiu'se or system, while the other 
were casual discussions or lectures on a particular thesis." 
— Mor. and Met, Pliil.^ by Maurice, note, p. 165. 

Some of the early Fathers adopted a similar distinction, 
in giving instructions to the Catechumens, beginners {KctroL 
yiyogt accorduig to sound — viva voce instruction), and the 
Teleioi (finished, or thoroughly instructed, from rs'hogy an 
end). 

This corresponds to the difference between the written 
law and the traditions of the elders. 

Plutarch (in Alexand.) and Aulus Gellius (1. xx., c. 4) 



14 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ACROAMATICAI.— 

maintaia that the acroamatic works had natural philosophy 
and logic for their subjects, whereas the exoteric treated 
of rhetoric, ethics, and pohtics. Strabo (1. 13, p. 608), 
Cicero {ad Aiticum^lS^ 19), and Ammonius Herm. (adCate- 
gor. Aristot.)^ maintain that they were distinguished, not by 
difference of subject, but of form ; the acroamatic being 
discourses, the exoteric dialogues. Simplicius (ad Cate- 
gor, in Proem.) thus characterizes the acroamatic in contra- 
distinction to the exoteric works, " distinguished by preg- 
nant brevity, closeness of thought, and quickness of tran- 
sitions," from his more expanded, more perspicuous, and 
more popular productions. 

Aristotle's lectures were of two kinds : scientific and 
popular ; acroamatic or acroatic^ and exoteric. The 
former were for the more advanced students and those 
who were capable of pursuing scientific subjects ; he 
delivered these in the morning. The latter were afternoon 
lectures to a much larger class, and treated of popular sub- 
jects, rhetoric, politics, and sophistics. — Lewes, Biograph. 
PJiiL, vol. ii., p. 107. 

. Buhle has a Commentatio de Libris- Arist.^ Exot. et 
Acroam.,inhis edit, of the works of Aristotle, 5 vols., 8vo, 
Deux Fonts, 1791, pp. 142, 143. 
ACT. — An act is Immanent or Transient. An immanent act 
has no efiect on anything out of the agent. Sensation is 
an immanent act of the senses, cognition of the intellect. 
A transient act produces an operation or result out of and 
beyond the agent. The act of writing and of building are 
transient acts — they begin with the agent, but produce 
results which may affect others. 

An act of the will is Elicit or Imperate. An elicit act 
of will is an act produced immediately by the will, and 
contained within it, as velle and nolle^ to determine to 
do or not to do. An elicit act of will is either volition^ 
which has reference to an end or ultimate object, or 
election^ which has reference to means. — V. Volition, 
Election. 



VOCABULARY OF THLLOSOPHY. 15 

ACT— 

An imperate act of icill is a moYement of body or mind 
following on a determination of will, as running after or 
running away, attending or not attending. Also an act 
done by others, when we order or forbid them to do, 
encourage or dissuade, assist or prevent. 

Act in Metaphysics and in Logic is opposed to power. Power 
is simply a faculty or property of an\-thing, as gravity of 
bodies. Act is the exercise or manifestation of a power 
or property, the realization of a fact, as the falling of a 
heav}' body. We cannot conclude from power to act^ a 
posse ad actum^ but from act to power the conclusion is 
good. 

Actions in Morals are distinguished, according to the manner 
of theu^ being called forth, into spontaneous or instinc- 
tive, voluntary or reflective, and free or dehberate ; 
according to the faculty from which they proceed, into 
physical, intellectual, and moral ; and according to the 
nature of the action and character of the agent, into 
right and wrong, virtuous or vicious, praiseworthy or 
blameworthy. 

Acts are perfect^ when done for themselves without respect to 
some other act, and imperfect^ when directed to another 
act. 

Action. — " The word action is properly applied to those exer- 
tions which are consequent on volition, whether the exertion 
be made on external objects, or be confined to our mental 
operations. Thus we say the mind is active when engaged 
m study." — Stewart, Outlines^ ]S"o. 111. 

Leibnitz (Nouv. Essais^ liv. ii., sect. 72) says, ''Tliere 
are only two kinds of' action of which we have any idea, 
\iz., movement and thinking." 

Action and Act are not spion^Tiious. 1. Act does not neces- 
sarily imply an external result, action does. We may 
speak of repentance as an act^ we could not call it an 
action. 2. An act must be individual; we may speak of a 
course of action. Lastly, act^ when qualified, is oftener, 
though not universally coupled with another substantive : 



16 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

ACT— 

action always by an adjective preceding it. We say a 
kind action^ but an act of kindness. A kind act might be 
admissible, though not usual, but an action of kindness is 
not used, though an action of great kindness might be. 
Deed is synonymous with act. 

An action was considered by Aristotle (Ethic. Nicom.^ 
lib. vii., c. 3) as a practical syllogism: — ^' As for instance, 
a person knows that dry food is good for every man, 
and that this is a man, or that such and such a thing 
is dry ; but as to whether this is such and such a thing 
either he does not possess the knowledge, or does not 
use it." 

In Morals, conscience gives the law ; this action is or is 
not conform to it — then comes the conclusion. 
Active. — That which causes change is active ; that which is 

changed is passive. — Taylor, Elements of Thought, 
Activity.— F. Will. 

Actual (jquod est in actu — to ov kcat' sus^ysia^u) — is opposed 
to potential. Before a thing is, it has a capacity of be- 
coming. A rough stone is a statue potentially^ when 
chiselled actually. 

Actual is also opposed to virtual. The oak is shut up 
in the acorn virtually. 

Actual is also opposed to real. My will, though really 
existing as a faculty, only begins to have an actual exist- 
ence from the time that I will anything. 
Actus Primus (in scholastic philosophy) — est rei esse. Actu^ 
secundus^ est rei operari^ or actus quidditativus^ and actus 
entitativus. 
A]>A0E: {ad agendum aptus) — a practical saying, fit for use, 
a rule of action. On the disagreement and similitude 
between adagies^ apophthegms^ and moral Vuaficii., see 
Erasmus, in his Prolegomena to his Adagia. 
ADJURATION (from ad-jurare^ to put upon oath.) — " Our 
Saviour, when the high priest adjured him by the living 
God, made no scruple of repljHbig upon that adjuration.''^ — 
Clarke, Works^ vol. ii., ser. 125. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 17 

AI>:?IIRATION. — ^'•^ye shall find that admiration is as 
superior to surprise and wonder, simply considered, as 
knowledge is superior to ignorance ; for its appropriate 
sionifieation is that act of the mind bv which we discover, 
appiove, and enjoy some unusual species of excellence." — 
Cogan, On tlie Passions^ part i., c. 2. 
AI>SClTlTlOUS (from ad-sciscere, to seek after) — that 
which is added or assumed. ''You apply to your h^-po- 
thesis of an adscititious spirit^ what he (Philo) says 
concerning this Trvivf/.ot htov. divine spirit or soul, in- 
fiised into man by God's breathing." — Clarke. Letter to 
Dodwell 
AESTHETICS {ciiuhoU-i perception or feeling.) — "That 
science which refers the first principles in the arts to 
sensation and sentiment, as distiaguished from mere m- 
struction and utility." 

The science of the beautiful and the philosophy of the 
fine arts. Various theories have been eutertauied as to 
the idea of the beautifiil. by Plato, Plothius, and Augus- 
tine. In modem times, the term cestlietics was first used 
in a scientific sense by A, Baumgarten, a disciple of 
Christian Wolf. In his jEstlietica^ 2 vols., 8vo, Frankf., 
1750-8, he considered the idea of the beautiful as an 
Ludistinct perception or feeling accompaming the moral 
ideas. Mendelsshon and others identified the idea of the 
beautifril with the idea of the good. Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson regarded the two ideas as intimately con- 
nected. At the close of the eighteenth century, cestlietics 
was scientifically developed in Germany by Kant, and has 
been zealously prosecuted by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. 
Besides the writings of these philosophers, consult Cours 
d^Esthetique puhlie 2')ar Ph. Damiron, 8vo, Paris, 1842. 
The Philosophy of the Beautiful^ by John G. MacYicar, 
D.D., Edin., 1855. Eeid's IntelL Powers^ essay viii., lib. 4. 
— V. Beauty, Ideal (Beau). 
AFFECTION. — '^ There are various principles of action ui 
man which have persons for their immediate object, and 
imply, in their very nature, oiu: being well or ill afiected to 



18 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

AFFECTION— 

some person^ or at least to some animated being. Such 
principles I shall call by the general name of affections^ 
wbetber they dispose us to do good or hurt to others." — 
Reid, Act. Pow.^ essay iii., part 2, chap. 3-6. 

They are usually distinguished into benevolent^ as esteem, 
gratitude, friendship ; and malevolent^ as hatred, envy, 
jealousy, revenge. 

This term is applied to all the modes of the sensibility, 
or to all states of mind in which we are purely passive. 
By Descartes {Traite des Passions^ art. 83) it is employed to 
denote some degree of love. — F. Love, Sensibility. 

AFFINITY is a relation contracted by or resulting from mar- 
riage ; in contradistinction to consanguinity^ or relation by 
blood. — V. Consanguinity. 

AFFIRMCATION {)tc&ra,poe,aig) — is the attributing of one thing 
to another, or the admitting simply that something exists. 
A mental affirmation is a judgment, when expressed it 
becomes a proposition. — V. Judgment, Peoposition. 

In Law, affirmation is opposed to oatK There are 
certain separatists, who, from having scruples as to the 
lawfulness of oath-taking, are allowed to make a solemn 
affirmation that what they say is true ; and if they make a 
false affirmation they are liable to the penalties of perjury. 

A FORTIORI. — An expression used in arguing from the 
greater to the less. ''He who hath given us His only 
begotten Son, will He not with Him also freely give us all 
things?" "If when we were enemies we were reconciled 
by the blood of the cross, how much more being reconciled 
shall we have peace with God ? " 

"In reasoning from analogy or comparison, if the case 
to be proved appears to be stronger even than the case 
with which it is compared, the analogy is called by schol- 
astic logicians an argumentum a fortiori. This kind of 
argument is often denoted in Scripture by the words ' How,' 
' How much more,' ' How much rather.' " — Logic for the 
Million, *' K ye being evil know how to give good gifts unto 
your children, how much more shall your Father which is 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 19 

A FORTIORI— 

in heaven give good things to them that ask him." (Matt, 
vii. 11.) "If God so clothe the grass of the field, which 
to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall 
he not much more clothe yon, O ye of little faith?" 
(Matt. vi. 30.) 

ACrENT {agens^ agere^ to act) — one who, that which, acts. 
'' Nor can I think that anybody has such an idea of chance 
as to make it an agent^ or really existing and acting cause 
of anything, and much less sure of all things." — ^AVollaston, 
Relig, of Nat,, 8, 5. 

Ai^iiEGORY.— F. Myth. 

AUIRITION (from amUre, to go about seeking place or 
power) — is the desire of power, which is regarded as one of 
the primary or natural desires of human nature. See Reid, 
Active Powers, essay iii., part 2, chap. 2. Stewart, Active 
Poivers, book i., chap, ii., sect. 4. 

ABIPHlBOIiOOY (ocu(pilSo'hicc, ambiguity) — denotes a propo- 
sition which presents not an obscure, but a doubtful or 
double sense. It is enumerated among the sophisms by Aris- 
totle, who distinguishes it from equivocatio, 6f^co!Jv,uicc, by 
which he understands ambiguity in terms taken separately. 
Amphiboly is applied by Kant to that Idnd of amphibo- 
logy which is natural, and consists in confounding pure 
notions of the understanding with objects of experi- 
ence, and attributing to the one characters and qualities 
which belong to the other ; as when we make identity, 
which is a notion a priori, a real quality of phenomena, or 
objects which experience makes known to us. 

ANAIiOO'V {oLvoLKoyioLy olvol and T^oyog) — has been defined, 
''The similarity of ratios or relations." "But in popular 
language we extend the word to resemblances of thmgs as 
well as relations. Employed as an argument, analogy 
depends upon the canon, the same attributes may be 
assigned to distinct, but similiar things, provided they can 
be shown to accompany the points of resemblance in the 
things, and not the points of difference." — Thomson, 0?//- 
line of Laws of Thought, p. 363, 1st edit. 



20 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ANAIiOOY— 

'^ Analogy does not mean the similarity of two things^ 
but the similarity, or sameness, of two relations. There 
must be more than two things to give rise to two relations ; 
there must be at least tliree^ and in most cases there are 
four. Thus A may be like B, but there is no analogy 
between A and B : it is an abuse of the word to speak so, 
and it leads to much confusion of thought. If A has the 
same relation to B which C has to D, then there is an 
analogy. If the first relation be well known, it may serve 
to explain the second, which is less known ; and the transfer 
of name from one of the terms in the relation best known 
to its corresponding term in the other, causes no confusion, 
but on the contrary, tends to remind us of the similarity 
that exists in these relations, and so assists the mind 
instead of misleading it." — Coplestone, Four Discourses^ 
p. 122, 8vo, London, 1821. 

'-'• Analogy implies a difference in sort, and not merely in 
degree ', and it is the sameness of the end with the differ- 
ence of the means which constitutes analogy. No one 
could say the lungs of a man were analogous to the lungs 
of a monkey, but any one might say that the gills of fish 
and the spiracula of insects are analogous to lungs." — 
Coleridge, Physiology of Life ^ p. 64. 

Between one man and another, as belonging to the same 
genus, there is identity. Between a flint and a flower, as 
belonging to diflerent genera, there is diversity. Between 
the seasons of the year and the periods of human life, or 
between the repose of an animal and the sleep of a plant, 
when we think wherein they agree, without forgetting 
wherein they differ, there is analogy. 

"When some course of events seems to foUow the same 
order with another, so that we may imagine them to be 
influenced by similar causes, we say there is an analogy 
between them. And when we infer that a certain event 
will take place in some other case of a similar nature, we 
are said to reason from analogy ; as when we suppose that 
the stars, like the sun, are surrounded with planets, which 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 21 

ANAIiOOY— 

derive from them light and heat. The word analogy is 
employed with strict propriety only in those cases where 
there is supposed to be a sameness in the causes of similar 
effects. When there is a mere similarity in effects or 
appearances, the word resemblance should be used. Re- 
semblances may be well adduced in illustration of an 
argument ; but then they should be proposed merely as 
similes, or metaphors, not as analogies^ — Taylor, Elements 
of Thought, 

"The meaning of analogy is resemblance (?), and hence 
all reasoning from one case to others resembling it might 
be termed analogical ; but the word is usually confined to 
cases where the resemblance is of a slight or indirect kind. 
We do not say that a man reasons from analogy when he 
infers that a stone projected into the air will fall to the 
ground. The circumstances are so essentially similar to 
those which have been experienced a thousand times, that 
we call the cases identical^ not analogical. But when Sir 
Isaac Newton, reflecting on the tendency of bodies at the 
surface of the earth to the centre, inferred that the moon 
had the same tendency, his reasoning, in the first instance, 
was analogical. 

"By some writers the term has been restricted to the 
resemblance of relations ; thus knowledge is said to bear 
the same relation to the mind as light to the eye — to 
enlighten it. But although the term is very properly applied 
to this class of resemblances, I think it is not generally 
confined to them ; it is commonly used with more latitude, 
except, indeed, in mathematics, when it is employed to 
designate the identity of ratios." — Sam. Bailey, Discourses^ 
p. 181, 8vo, London, 1852. 

"As ana /o^?/ is the resemblance of ratios (or relations), 
two things may be connected by analogy,, though they 
have in themselves no resemblance; thus, as a sweet taste 
gratifies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear, 
and hence the same word, ' sweet,' is applied to both, 
though no flavour can resemble a sound in itself To bear 



22 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

tliis in niind would serve to guard us against two very 
common errors in the interpretation of the analogical 
language of Scripture. — 1. The error of supposing the 
things themselves to be similar, from their bearing similar 
relation to other things. 2. The still more common error 
of supposing the analogy to extend farther than it does, 
or to be more complete than it really is, from not con- 
sidering in ivhat the analogy in each case consists." — 
Whately. 

'-''Analogy is a Greek word used by mathematicians to 
signify a similitude of proportions. For instance, when we 
observe that two is to six as three is to nine, this similitude 
or equality of proportion is termed analogy. And although 
proportion strictly signifies the habitude or relation of one 
quantity to another, yet, in a looser and translated sense, it 
hath been applied to signif)^ every other habitude, and 
consequently the term analogy all similitude of relations or 
habitudes whatsoever. Hence the schoolmen tell us there 
is analogy between intellect and sight ; forasmuch as 
intellect is to the mind what sight is to the body : and that 
he who governs the state is analogous to him who steers a 
ship. Hence a prince is analogically styled a pilot, being 
to the state as a pilot is to his vessel.* For the further 
clearing of this point, it is to be observed, that a twofold 
analogy is distinguished by the schoolmen, metaphorical and 
proper. Of the first kind there are frequent instances in 
Holy Scripture, attributing human parts and passions to God. 
When He is represented as having a finger, an eye, or an 
ear ; when He is said to repent, to be angry, or grieved, 
every one sees the analogy is merely metaphorical ; because 
these parts and passions, taken in the proper signification, 
must in every degree necessarily, and from the formal 
nature of the thing, include imperfection. When, therefore, 
it is said the finger of God appears in this or that event, 
men of common sense mean no more, but that it is as truly 
ascribed to God as the works wrought by human fingers 
* Vide Cajetaii, de Norn, Analog. > c. iii. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 23 

AIVAIiOOY— 

are to man ; and so of the rest. But the case is different 
when wisdom and knowledge are attributed to God. 
Passions and senses, as such, imply defect ; but in know- 
ledge simpl}', or as such, there is no defect. Ivnowledge, 
therefore, in the proper formal meaning of the word^ may 
be attributed to God proportionally, that is, preservmg a 
proportion to the infinite nature of God. We ma}' say, 
therefore, that as God is infinitely above man, so is the 
knowledge of God infinitely above the knowledge of man, 
and this is what Cajetan calls analogia proprie facta. — And 
after this same analogy we must understand all those 
attributes to belong to the Deity, which in themselves 
simply, and as such, denote perfection." — Berkeley, Min, 
Philosophy ^ dialog, -i. 
Analos^y aud ITIetaphor. — '"Analogy is the substituting the 
idea or conception of one thing to stand for and represent 
another on account of a true resemblance and con^espon- 
dent reahty in the very nature of the things compared. It 
is defined by Aristotle — Iooty]; th "Koy^ — an equality or 
parity of reason ; though, in strictness and truth, the parity 
of reasoning is rather biult on the similitude and analogy^ 
and consequent to them, than the same thing with them." 

'' Metaphor is a substitution of the idea or conception of 
one thing T\dth the t«rm belonging to it, to stand for 
another thing, on accoimt of an appearing similitude only, 
without any real resemblance and true correspondency 
between the things compared ; as when the Psalmist 
describes the verdm-e and fruitfulness of valleys by laughing 
and singing." — Cumberland, Enquiry^ prolegom., p. 29. 

"I am not of the mind of those speculators who seem 
assured that all states have the same period of infancy, 
manhood, and decrepitude that are found in individuals. 
Parallels of this sort rather fin*nish similitudes to illustrate 
or to adorn, than supply analogies from whence to reason. 
The objects which are attempted to be forced into an 
analogy are not found in the same classes of existence. 
Individuals are physical beings— conunouwealths are not 



24 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOFHY, 

ANAI^OOY— 

physical, but moral essences." — Burke, Letters on Regicide. 
Peace^ b. 4. 

Many fallacies become current tlirough false metaphorical 
analogies. See an example of false analogy (Butler, 
Analogy^ part i., chap, i.,) in the supposed likeness between 
the decay of vegetables and of living creatures. 
Analogy and Example. — Analogy is not unfrequently used 
to mean mere similarity. But its specific meaning is 
similarity of relations^ and in this consists the difference 
between the argument by example and that by analogy^ 
— ^that in the one we argue from mere similarity^ from 
similarity of relations in the other. In the one we argue 
from Pisistratus to Dionysius, who resembles him ; in the 
other, from the relation of induction to demonstration, to 
the corresponding relation of the example to the enthy- 
meme. — Karslake, Aids to Logic^ vol. ii., p. 74. 
Analog and ElxpeHence* — ''''Experience is not the mere 
collection of observations ; it is the methodical reduction of 

them to their principles ^ t? a to^?/ supposes this, but 

it goes a step farther. Experience is mere analysis. Analogy 
involves also a spithesis. It is applied to cases in which 
some difference of circumstances is supposed ; as for 
instance, in arguing from the formation of particular parts 
of one class of animals to the correspondence in another, 
the different nature, habits, circumstances, of the one class, 
are considered and allowed for, in extending the given 
observation." — Hampden, Introd, Mor. Pliil,^ lect. 5. 

In the schools^ what was termed the analogy of faith 
(see Bom. xii. 6), was showing that the truth of one 
scripture is not repugnant to the truth of another, or of the 
whole. '' Analogia vero est, cum Veritas unius scripturae 
ostenditur veritati alterius non repugnare." — Thorn.. 
Aquinas, Summ, Theolog.^ pars, prima, qu. i., art. 10. 

In Logic^ an analogous noun has only one signification, 
but admits of being applied in a modified or subordinate 
sense to objects which bear no more than an analogy or 
similarity to its original signification ; as the noun sting ^ of 



TOCABUL-IP.Y OF PHILOSOPHT. 25 

AAJlLOOX— 

an :iTi^n-:i'. 01 conscience, of an epigram. --A term is 
-r; :;.;;. V vrhose single signidcation applies with equal 
prvpi-ictv ::■ mrre than one object — as the kg of the table, 
the .V: 01 ihe cr^imiiL'' — AMiately, Logic, book iii., s. 10. 
In L: ::'.\ :lirce _: les of reasoning are called analogical. 

1. Fr in eiieci to aiiLse, or from cause to effect. 2. 
From means to ends, or from ends to means. 3. From 
mere reseniblaiice or concomitance. Condillac {Art de 
i? c r h: s 5 2:^^31 how these modes of reasoning all 

^'o:r. :he human beings aroimd us, who 
:;:e ::rmr:l Im; : v-v>'es (anahav of resemblance), who 
act as we ao: ho have the same 

organs (:•'■• r':: - . ^ ... Ic in all respects like 

ODTselves . - : :.:ies. 

Analogy and In duct iou. — • There are two requisites in order 
: > evei^r : o hm : - :v:_.Timent: — 1. That the two or seyeral 
r :: vr oned in the argument should be known to 

i»gicc iii iv^.c v: Ilc point ; for otherwise they could not be 
referable to any one class, and there would consequently be 
no ba^ to the subsequent inference drawn in the conclusion. 

2. That the condimon must be modified by a reference to 
the circumstances of the particular to which we argue. For 
herein consists the essentiardisf Inchon heticeen an aualog^ical 
and an inductim argument.^'^ — Hampden, Essay on PML 
Erid. of Christianity J pp. 60-64. 

Locke^ On Hum. Understand. j bookiy.. chap. 16. sect. 12 : 
Beattie's Ess-:"-; on Truth j part i., chap. 2, sect. 7 ; 
Stewart's Z": :;:t:^, yol. ii., chap. 4, sect. 4; Stewjurt^s 

A> AXYJiISi and !SiV>' THESIS i^xstsc "Kvoi^ trvv rt&mfAi, resolutio. 
— £ .r ?sition and recomposition. Objects 

of sensc ..light are presented to us in a complex 

state, bv.: :nly, or at least best luiderstand what is 

sunple. A : , :he yaried objects of a landscape I behold 
:i tree. I > :e it from the other objects, I examine 

ent parts — ^trunk, branches, leayes, &c., 
.v.... .-.^^ \.o.i.: Oiiir them into one whole I form a notion 



26 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ANALYSIS— 

of the tree. The first part of this process is arialysis^ the 
second is synthesis. If this must be done with an individual 
it is more necessary with the infinitude of objects which 
surround us, to evolve the one out of many, to recall the 
multitude to unity. We compare objects with one another 
to see wherein they agree ; we next, by a synthetical process, 
infer a general law, or generalize the coincident qualij^es, 
and perform an act of induction which is purely a synthe- 
tical process, though commonly called analytical. Thus, 
from our experience that bodies attract within certain 
limits, we infer that all bodies gravitate towards each other. 
The antecedent here only says that certain bodies gravitate, 
the consequent says all bodies gravitate. They are brought 
together by the mental insertion of a third proposition, 
which is, '' that nature is uniform." This is not the product 
of induction, but antecedent to all induction. The state- 
ment fully expressed is, this and that body which we know 
gravitate, but nature is uniform, this and that body repre- 
sent all bodies — all bodies gravitate. It is the mind which 
connects these things, and the process is synthetical. This 
is the one universal method in all philosophy, and different 
schools have differed only in the way of employing it. 
Method is the following of one thing through another. 
Order is the following of one thing after another. Analysis 
is real., as when a chemist separates two substances. Logical^ 
as when we consider the properties of the sides and angles 
of a triangle separately, though we cannot think of a 
triangle without sides and angles. 

Analysis and synthesis., abstraction and generalization., 
induction and deduction. In demonstrations which consist 
of a series of reasonings there is both analysis and synthesis. 
For an explanation of the processes of analysis and 
synthesis., see Stewart, Phil.., part ii., chap. 4. 

The instruments of analysis are ohservation and experi- 
ment ; of synthesis^ definition and classification. 

Take down a watch, ancdysis ; put it up, {synthesis. — 
Lord Brougham, Prelimin. Discourse^ part i., sect. 7. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 27 

*' Hac analysi licebit, ex rebus compositis ratiocinatione 
coUigere simplices ; ex motibus, vires moventes ; et in 
universum, ex effectis causas ; ex eausisque particularibus 
generales ; donee ad generalissimas tandem sit deventum." 
— ^Xewton, Optices^ 2d edit., p. 413. 
Analysis is decomposing what is compound to detect its 
elements. Objects may be compound, as consisting of 
several distinct parts united, or of several properties 
equally distinct. In the former view, analysis will divide 
the object into its parts, and present them to us succes- 
sively, and then the relations by which they are united. 
In the second case, analysis will separate the distinct pro- 
perties, and show the relations of every kind which may 
be between them. — Cardaillac, Etudes Element.^ torn. 1, 
pp.8, 9. 

Analysis is the resolving into its constituent elements of 
a compound heterogeneous substance. Thus, water can be 
analyzed into oxygen and hydrogen, atmospheric air into 
these and azote. — Peemans, Introd. ad Philosoph.^ p. 75, 
12mo, Lovan., 1840. 

Abstraction is analysis^ since it is decomposition, but what 
distinguishes it is that it is exercised upon qualities which b}' 
themselves have no real existence. Classification is syri- 
tJiesis. Induction rests upon analysis. Deduction is a 
synthetical process. Demonstration includes both. 

ANAIiYTlCS (t56 uuoe.'KvTix.»~)—\s the title which m the second 
century was given, and which has since continued to be 
applied to a portion of the Organ on or Logic of Aristotle, 
This portion consists of two distinct parts ; the First 
Analytics^ which teaches how to reduce the syllogism to its 
divers figures and most simple elements, and the Posterior 
Analytics^ which lays down the rules and conditions of 
demonstration in general. It was m imitation of this title 
that Kant gave the name of Transcendental Analytic to 
that part of the criticism of Pure Reason which reduces the 
faculty of knowing to its elements. 

ANIMA MUN1>I (soul of the world). — Animism is the doctrine 



82 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ANimA M[UNI>I— 

of the anima mundi as lield by Stalil. The lij^otliesis of a 
force, immaterial, but inseparable from matter, and giving 
to matter its form and movement, is coeval with the birth 
of philosophy. Pythagoras obscurely acknowledged such 
a force, but held that there was an infinitely perfect being 
above it. From Pythagoras it passed into the system of 
Plato, who could not conceive how pure spirit, the seat of 
eternal ideas, could act directly upon matter. He thought 
also that the world would be more perfect if endowed with 
life. The soul of the world was the source of all life, 
sensibility, and movement. The school of Alexandria 
adhered to the views of Plato, and recognized intelligence 
and Deity as above the anima mundi^ which in the system 
of the Stoics usurped the place of God, and even His name ; 
while Straton of Lampsacus called it nature. The hypothesis 
of the anima mundi was not entertained by the scholastic 
philosophers. But it reappeared under the name of the 
Archceus^ in the systems of CorneHus Agrippa, Paracelsus, 
and Van Helmont ; while Henry More recognized a prin- 
cijjium hylarchicum, and Cudworth a plastic nature., as the 
universal agent of physical phenomena, the cause of all 
forms of organization, and the spring of all the movements 
of matter. About the same time, some German divines, as 
Amos Comenius, and John Bayer, attempted to rest a 
similar opinion on Genesis i. 2, and maintained that the 
spirit which moved on the face of the waters still gives life 
to all nature. — Buddeus, Elem. Phil.., pars. 3, cap. 6, sect. 
11, 12, et seq. 

The doctiine of the anima mundi., as held by the Stoics 
and Stratonicians, is closely allied to pantheism ; while 
according to others this soul of the universe is altogether 
intermediate between the Creator and His works. 

See Timceus of Plato., 29 d. — 30 c. rou Koa/i^ov ^cdov 

Schellmg, De VAme de Monde., 8vo, Hamb., 1809. 

ANTECEDENT (antecedere., to go before). — "And the 

antecedent shall you fynde as true when you rede over my 



YOCABULAliY OF PHILOSOPHY. 29 

AI¥TECE1>JENT— 

letter as himself can not say nay, but that the consecusyou 
is formal." — Sir T. Move's Works ^ p. 1115. 

In a relation, whether logical or metaphysical, the first 
term is the antecedent^ the second the consequent. Thus 
in the relation of causality — the cause is the antecedent^ and 
the effect the consequent. 

In Logic, antecedent is the former of two propositions, 
in a species of reasoning, which, without the intervention 
of any middle proposition, leads directly to a fair con- 
clusion ; and tliis conclusion is termed the consequent. 
Thus, I reflect, therefore I exist. I reflect, is the antece- 
dent — therefore I exist, is the consequent. — Euler, Letters 
to German Princess, 
ANTKROPOIiOO-lf (cci/doco7rog and Tioyog., the science of man) 
— Among naturalists it means the natural history of the 
human species. According to Dr. Latham (Nat. Hist, of 
Varieties of Man^ Lond., 1830), anthropology determines 
the relations of man to the other mammalia ; ethnology., the 
relations of the different varieties of mankind to each 
other, (p. 559). The German philosophers since the time of 
Kant have used it to designate all the sciences which in 
any point of view relate to man — soul and body — individual 
and species — ^facts of history and phenomena of conscious- 
ness — the absolute rules of morality as well as interests 
material, and changing ; so that works under the general 
title of anthropology treat of very different topics. 

''• Anthropology is the science of man in aU his natural 
variations. It deals with the mental peculiarities which 
belong specifically to different races, ages, sexes, and 
temperaments, together vAth. the results which follow im- 
mediately from them in their application to human life. 
Under psychology., on the other hand, we include nothing 
but what is common to all mankind., and forms an essen- 
tial part of human nature. The one, accordingly, may 
be termed the science of mental variahles; the other, 
the science of mental constants.''^ — Morell, Psychology., 
pp. 1, 2. 



30 ' VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ANTHTBOPOMORPHISM {uv6^Q7rag^ man; f^ooCpn^ form) 
— " It was tlie opinion of the Anthropomorphites that 
God had all the parts of a man, and that we are, in this 
sense, made according to His image." — ^More, Def. of 
Cabhala^ c. 1. 

Melito, of Sardis, was the first Christian writer who 
ascribed body to Deity. The ascribing of bodily parts or 
members to Deity is too gross a delusion to call for 
refutation. But there is a spiritual anthropomorphism^ 
sometimes also called anthropopathy^ which ascribes to 
Him the acts, passions, sentiments, and proceedings of 
human nature. 

Among the early Christians there was a sect called 
Anthropomorphists, 

'' We ought not to imagine that God is clothed with a 
human body, as the Anthropomorphites asserted, under 
colour that that figure was the most perfect of any." — 
Malebranche, Search after Truth^ book iii,, chap. 9. 

Hume applies the name to those who think the mind of 
God is like the mind of man. 

''When it is asked, what cause produces order m the 
ideas of the Supreme Being, can any other reason be 
assigned by you Anthropomorphites^ than that it is a 
rational faculty, and that such is the nature of Deity?" — 
Dialogues on Nat, Relig.^ parts 4, 5. 
ANTICIPATION (Anticipation T^dhvi-^ig) — is a term which 
was first used hy Epicurus to denote a general notion 
which enables us to conceive beforehand of an object 
which had not yet come under the cognizance of the 
senses. But these general notions being formed by 
abstraction from a multitude of particular notions, were 
all originally owing to sensation, or mere generalizations a 
posteriori. Buhle {Hist, de la Phil. Mod.^ tom. i., pp. 87, 
88) gives the following account: — "The impressions 
which objects make on the senses, leave in the mind traces 
which enable us to recognize these objects when they 
present themselves anew, or to compare them with others, 
or to distinguish them. When we see an animal for the first 



VOCABULAPwY OF PHILOSOPHY. 31 

ANTICIPATION — 

time, the impression made on tlie senses leaves a trace 
which serves as a type. If we afterwards see the same 
animal, we refer the impression to the type abeady existing 
in the mind. This type and the relation of the new impres- 
sion to it, constituted what Epicm'us called the anticipa- 
tion of an idea. It was by this anticipation that we could 
determine the identity, the resemblance or the difference 
of objects actually before us, and those formerly observ^ed.'' 
The language of Cicero {De Nat. Deor..^ lib. i., cap. 
16) seems to indicate that by Epicurus the term tt^o- 
T^n-^ig was extended to what is supersensual, and included 
what is now called knowledge a priori, " Quae est enim 
gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat, sine 
doctrina, anticipationem quandam Deorum? quam appellat 
7rQo?,y}\p{v Epicurus, id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam 
informationem, sine qua nee intelligi quidquam, nee quarri, 
nee disputari potest." And according to Diogenes Laertius 
(lib. 7, sect. 51, 53, 54), the Stoics defined cr^oX>i'4//f to 
mean ''a natural conception of the universal." It would 
appear, however, that this definition was not adopted by 
aU. And Sir William Hamilton has said (Reid/s Worlcs, 
note A, p. 774) : ''It is not to be supposed that the koiuoci 
ivvoioit., (pv(jix.oit ^Qo7^n\pstg.f of the Stoics, far less of the 
Epicureans, were more than generalizations a posteriori. 
Yet this is a mistake, into which, among many others, 
Lipsius and Leibnitz have fallen in regard to the former." 
See Manuductio ad Stoicam Pldl.., lib. ii., dissert. 11. 
And Leibnitz, Noitveaiix Essais., pref. See also Kernius. 
Dissert, in Epicuri 'Tr^oTi'/rspig^ &c., Goett., 1736. 
Anticipation of Nainre is a phrase employed by Lord Bacon 
to denote a hasty and illicit generalization, as opposed to 
a due and gradual generalization, which he called an inter- 
pretation of Nature. — Pref to Nov, Organ. 
UVTINOMY (ar/T/, against ; uo^uog^ law) — the opposition of 
law or rule to another law or rule. 

^'K He once willed adultery should be sinful, aU His 
omnipotence will not allow Him to will the allowance that 



32 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ANTINOMY— 

His holiest people miglit, as it were, by His own antinomy or 
counter statute, live unreproved in the same fact as He 
Himself esteemed it, according to our common explainers." 
— Milton, Doct. and Dis. of Div.^ b. ii., c. 3. 

According to Kant, it means that natural contradiction 
which results from the law of reason, when, passing the 
limits of experience, we seek to know the absolute. Then 
we do not attain the idea of the absolute, or we overstep 
the limits of our faculties which reach only to phenomena. 
Then we may maintain by arguments equally valid, that 
the world is eternal and infinite, or that it had a beginning 
in time and is limited to space. 

That above all phenomena there is a cause absolutely 
free, or that all things are ruled by blind laws of nature. 
That there is a necessarily existing Being, or that all 
things are phenomenal and contingent. These are the 
antinomies of the pure reasoji. The antinomy of the 
practical reason is, that virtue ought to be happy, but 
cannot be so here. This is answered by the doctrine of a 
future state, which is a postulate of the practical reason. 
ANTIPATHY (jzuTi 'Trx&og., feeling against). — ^' There are 
many ancient and received traditions and observations 
touching the sympathy and antipathy of plants ; for that 
some will thrive best growing near others, which they 
impute to sympathy, and some worse, which they impute 
to antipathy.^'' — Bacon, Nat, Hist., sect. 479. 

According to Sylvester Rattray, M.D. {Aditus Novus ad 
Occultas Sympathice et Antipathice causas invenie7idas^ 12mo, 
Glasg., 1658,) there is antipathy and sympathy not only 
between plants, but also between minerals and animals. 

A blind and instinctive movement, which, without any 
appreciable reason, makes us averse to the company or 
character of some persons at first sight. An involuntary 
dislike or aversion entertained by an animate being to some 
sensible object. A man may have an antipathy to parti- 
cular smells or tastes, a turkey cock or bull to the colour 
red, a horse to the smell of raw flesh. Some are natural. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 33 

ANTIPATHY— 

others are acquired, as a surfeit of any food gives antipathy. 
Some are founded on sensation, others on sentiment. — 
Locke, On Hum, Understand.,, book ii., chap. 33, sect. 7, 8. 
— F. Sympathy. 
PARTE ANTE, and A PARTE POST. — These two ex- 
pressions, borrowed from the scholastic philosophy, refer to 
eternity ; of which man can only conceive as consisting of 
two parts ; the one without limits in the past, a parte ante ; 
and the other without limits in the future, a j^arte post. 
Both are predicable of Deity ; only the latter of the human 
soul. — F. Eternity. 
APATHY (oft, privative ; and -ra^o^, passion). — The absence of 
passion. ''T^Hiat is called by the Stoics apathy^ or dis- 
passion ; by the Sceptics indistm'bance, otrot^cc^ioc ; by the 
Molinists, quietism ; by common men, peace of conscience : 
seem all to mean but great tranquillity of mind." — Sir W. 
Temple, Of Gardening. 

As the passions are the springs of most of om^ actions, a 
state of apathy has come to signify a sort of moral inertia — 
the absence of all activity or energy. According to the 
Stoics apathy meant the extinction of the passions by the 
ascendency of reason. 

Niemeierus (Joh. Barth.), Dissert, de Stoicorum ofTrudsiu, 
&c. 4to, Helmst., 1679. 

Becnius, Dispp.^ libb. 3, uTiroihioc Sapientis Stoici. 4to, 
Copenhag., 1693. 

Fischerus (John Hen.), Diss, de Stoicis ccTrocduxg /also 
suspectis, 4:to, Leips., 1716. 

Quadius, Disputatio tritum illud Stoicorum paradoxon 
crggf Tng ocTTocdstocg expendens. 4to, Sedini, 1720. 

Meiners, Melanges,, tom. 2, p. 130. 
APHORISITI, determinate position, from o6(po^/^£/;/, to bound, 
or limit ; whence our horizon. — Coleridge, Aids to Reflec- 
tion,, vol. i., p. 16, edit. 1848: "In order to get the fiill 
sense of a word, we should first present to our minds the 
visual image that forms its primary meaning. Draw lines 
of different colours round the different counties of England, 

D 



34 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

AI»MOKISM— 

and tlien cut out eacli separately, as in the common play- 
maps tliat children take to pieces and put together, so that 
each district can be contemplated apart from the rest, as a 
whole in itself. This twofold act of circumscribing and 
detaching, when it is exerted by the mind on subjects of 
reflection and reason, is to aphorize, and the result an 
aphorism,'^'' 

A precise, sententious saying — e, g.^ ''It is always safe to 
learn from our enemies, seldom safe to instruct even our 
friends." 

Like Hippocrates, Boerhaave has written a book entitled 
Apliorisms^ containing medical maxims, not treated argu- 
mentatively, but laid down as certain truths. In civil law 
apJio7nsms are also used. 

The three ancient commentators upon Hippocrates, 
viz., Theophilus, Meletius, and Stephanus, have given 
the same definition of an apliorism^ i. e., ''a succinct 
saying, comprehending a complete statement," or a 
saying poor in expression, but rich in sentiment. The 
first aphorism of Hippocrates is, "Life is short, and 
the art is long ; the occasion fleeting ; experience falla- 
cious, and judgment difflcult. The physician must not 
only be prepared to do what is right himself, but also 
to make the patient, the attendants, and externals, co- 
operate." 

"The first and most ancient inquirers into truth were 
wont to throw their knowledge into apliorisms^ or short, 
scattered, unmethodical sentences." — Nov. Organ.., book i., 
sect. 86. And the Novum Organum itself is written in 
apliorisms, 

Heraclitus is known by his aphorisms^ which are among 
the most brilliant of those 

" Jewels, five words long, 
That on the stretched fore-finger of all time, 
Sparkle for ever." 

Among the most famous are, — War is father of all 
things, i. e., all things are evolved by antagonistic force. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 35 

APHORIS:?!— 

Xo man can bathe twice in the same stream, i. e., all things 
are in perpetual flux. 
APOJttEICTIC, AI»OI>EfCTICAI. (dTTO and hiKwa^cci^ to 
show). — '•'' The argumentation is from a similitude, therefore 
not apodicticJc^ or of evident demonstration." — Eobinson, 
Eucloxa^ p. 23. 

This term was borrowed by Kant from Aristotle {Analyt. 
Prior. ^ lib. i., cap. 1). He made a distinction between 
propositions which admitted of contradiction or dialectic 
discussion, and such as were the basis or result of 
demonstration. Kant wished to introduce an analogous 
distinction between our judgments, and to give the name of 
apodeictic to such as were above all contradiction. 
APOliOOfJE {wTToT^oyog, fcibula) — '' a novel story, contrived to 
teach some moral truth." — Johnson. 

"It would be a high relief to hear an apologue or fable 
well told, and with such humour as to need no sententious 
moral at the end to make the application." — (Shaftesbury, 
vol. iii., miscell. 4, c. 1.) It is essential to an apologue 
that the circumstances told in it should be fictitious. The 
difference between a jmrahle and an apologue is, that the 
former being drawn from hujnan life requires probabihty 
in the narration ; whereas the apologue being taken from 
inanimate things or the inferior animals, is not confined 
strictly to probability. The fables of ^sop are apologues. 
For an admirable instance of the Tioyo; or apologue^ see 
Coleridge's Friend^ where the case of the seizure of the 
Danish fleet by the English is represented in this form. 
APOliOG-Y (otTToXoy/flf, a defence made in a court of justice). — 
We have a work of Xenophon, entitled the Apology of 
Socrates^ and another with the same title by Plato. The 
term was adopted by the Christian fiithers, and applied to 
their writings in defence of Christianity, and in answer to 
its opponents. Tertullian addressed his Apologetic to the 
magistrates of Rome, the emperor Severus being theji 
absent. 
APOPHTIIEOM {u'TTO (p^iyycffdcci, cloqw\ to speak out). — A 



36 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

short and pitliy speech or saying of some celebrated man ; 
as that of Augustus, Festina lente, 

''In a numerous collection of our Saviour's apophthegms^ 
there is not to be found one example of sophistry." — 
Paley, Evidences^ part ii., c. 2. 

'' "We ask advice, but we mean approbation." — Lacon. 

The Lacedaemonians used much this mode of speaking. 
Plutarch has a collection entitled the Apophthegms of Kings 
and Generals^ many of which are anecdotes ; and also 
another entitled Laconica. 

'•'- Of Blackmore's (Sir Richard) attainments in the 
ancient tongues, it may be sufficient to say that in his prose, 
he has confounded an aphorism with an apophthegm.^''- 
Macaulay, On Addison^ p. 11. 

In Guesses at Truth (2d series, 1848), the saying of 
Demosthenes, that '' action was the first, second, and third 
essential of eloquence," is called an apophthegm, 
APPERCEPTION (self- consciousness). — " By apperception 
he (Leibnitz) understands that degree of perception which 
reflects as it were upon itself; by which we are conscious 
of our own existence, and conscious of our perceptions, by 
which we can reflect upon the operation of our own minds, 
and can comprehend abstract truths." — Eeid, Intell. Powers.^ 
essay ii., c. 15. 

''By apperception the Leibnitzio-Wolfians meant the 
act by which the mind is conscious immediately of the 
representative object, and through it, mediately of the 
remote object represented." — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid^s 
Works ^ note D*, sect. 1. 

'' Cousin maintains that the soul possesses a mode of 
spontaneous thought, into which volition and reflection, 
and therefore personality, do not enter, and which gives her 
an intuition of the absolute. For this he has appropriated 
the name apperception^ explaining it also as a true in- 
spiration, and holding, therefore, that inspirations come to 
man, not by the special volitions of God, as commonly 
believed, but fall to reason in its own right, thus consti- 



VOCABUL-\KY OF PHILOSOFHY. 37 

APPERCEPTION— 

nirmo- a 5cion::r:c organon of discoyery." — Macwar, 
E V?fMre, 8vo, Edin., 1858. Pp. 216. 

• c\.,.A. v : :e? a states apperception an act of the 

ego; and fron - . ne the siiperioritj of the latter is 
appareuT."— 31 ivl.ioliu. Translation of the Pure Eeason, 
note, p, "1. 
APPETITE. — '• The word appttttus, ti'om which that of appe- 
tite is derived, is applied by the Eomans and the Latinists to 
e sires in general, whether they primarily relate to the 
oody or not^ and with obyious propriety; for the piimi- 
tiTe signification is the seeking after whatever may conduce 
either to gratification or happiness. Thus Cicero observes, 
• Motns animorum diiplices stmt ; alteri^ cogitationis ; alteri, 
appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exqiiirendo maxime versatur; 
appetitiis impelht ad agendum.' By two powers of action 
being thus placed in contrast with each other, and the one 
apphed to thought simply, it is obvious that the other com- 
prehends every species of desire, whether of a mental or 
corporeal natiu'e. Metaphysicians also, who have written in 
the Latin language, use the word appetitu.s in the same 
latitude." — Cogan, On the Passions. voL i.. p. 15. 

In modem use, appetites refer to corporeal wants, each 
of which creates its compendent desire. But desne proper 
refers to mental objects- 

••The word cppcti'^. in common language, often means 
-i-V-C-s hguratively any strong desii'e," — 
13. :.:... . . " ■^'' i,. e. 1. 

As 0". \ •:;.', which are common to 

lis with :ne ; rues : ana ;,' *• r/k7/, which are proper to us as 
rational beings — so appetite is sensitive and rational. The 
st;nsitive appetite was distinguished into the irascible 
and the concupiscible. — Eeid, Actice Potrers. essay iii. ; 
Stewart. Active and Moral Powers, vol. i.. p. 14. 
Appetite and Instinct. — "Appetites have been called in- 
stinctive, because they seek then* own gratification with- 
out the aid of reason, and often in spite of it. They are 
common to man with the brute : but thev difier at least in 



38 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

APPETITE— 

oDe important respect from those instincts of the lower 
animals which are usually contrasted with human reason. 
The objects towards which they are directed are prized for 
their own sake ; they are sought as ends^ while instinct 
teaches brutes to do many things which are needed only as 
means for the attainment of some ulterior purpose. Thus 
instinct enables a spider to entrap his prey, while appetite 
only leads him to devour it when in his possession. 

'•'•Instinct is an impulse conceived without instruction, 
and prior to all experience, to perform certani acts, which 
are not needed for the immediate gratification of the agent, 
which in fact are often opposed to it, and are useful only 
as means for the accomplishment of some ulterior object ; 
and this object is usually one of pre-eminent utility or 
necessity, either for the preservation of the animal's own 
life, or for the continuance of its species. The former 
quality separates it from intelligence, properly so called, 
which proceeds only by experience or instruction ; and the 
latter is its pecuhar trait as distinguished from appetite^ 
which, in strictness, uses no means at all, but looks only to 
ends."— Bowen, Lowell Led., 1849, p. 228. 

''All the actions of man, which have been loosely con- 
sidered or described as instinctive, may be referred either 
to the power of organic life, that is, to mechanical forces, 
or to the teaching of experience, or to the class of appe- 
tites. Human nature shows no trace whatever of that mar- 
vellous power vmich governs the bee in the construction 
of its cell, and guides the migrating bird to its winter 
home. But man is the only being who is not under its in- 
fluence ; every other animal, from the noblest quadruped 
to the humblest insect, gives frequent indications of its 
presence and control." — Bowen, Lowell Led., 1849, 
p. 241. 
APPKEMEIVSION (appreJiendere, to lay hold of). — "By the 
apprehensive power, we perceive the species of sensible 
things, present or absent, and retain them as wax doth the 
print of a seal." — Burton, Anat. of Melancholy, p. 21. 



VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 39 

APPREHENSION— 

Here it includes not only conception or imagination, but 
also memory or retention. 

'•'' How can lie but be moved willingly to serve God, who 
liatli an apprehension of God's merciful design to save liim ! " 
—Barrow, Serm. 42. 

''It maybe true, perhaps, that the generality of the negro 
slaves are extremely dull of apprehension and slow of 
understanding." — ^Porteous, On Civilization of Slaves. 

Apprehension in Logic, is that act or condition of the 
mind in which it receives a notion of any object ; and which 
is analogous to the perception of the senses. Incomplex 
apprehension regm^ds one object, or several, without any 
relation being perceived between them, as a man, a card, 
&;c. Complex apprehension regards several objects with 
such a relation, as a man on horseback, a pack of cards, 
&c. — Whately, Logic, b. ii., ch. 1, v. 1. 

''^Apprehension is the Kantian word for perception, in the 
largest sense in which we employ that term. It is the 
genus which includes under it, as species, perception proper 
and sensation proper." — Meiklejohn, Translat. of Pure 
Reason^ note, p. 127. 
APPREHENSION awd COMPREHENSION. 

Apprehend asid Comprelieiid, — " We apprehend many truths 
which we do not comprehend. The great mysteries of our 
faith, the doctrine, for instance, of the Holy Trinity — we lay 
hold upon it (ad prehendo)., we hang upon it, our souls 
live by it ; but we do not take it all m, we do not compre- 
hend it ; for it is a necessary attribute of God that He is 
incomprehensible ; if He were not so He would not be 
God, or the bemg that comprehended Him would be God 
also. But it also belongs to the idea of God that He 
may be ' apprehended,' though not ' comprehended ' by His 
reasonable creatures ; He has made them to know Him, 
though not to know Him all, to ' apprehend ' though not 
to ' comprehend ' Him." — Trench, On Study of Words., p. 
110, 12mo, Lond., 1851. 
A PRIORI, and A POSTERIORI, — "There are two 



40 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

A PRIORI— 

general ways of reasoning^ termed arguments a priori and 
a posteriori^ or according to what is usually styled the 
synthetic and analytic method ; the one lays down some 
previous, self-evident principles; and in the next place, 
descends^ to the several consequences that may be deduced 
from them ; the other begins with a view of the pheno- 
mena themselves, traces them up to their original, and by 
developing the properties of these phenomena, arrives at 
the knowledge of the cause." — Ejng, Essay ^ pref, p. 9. 

By an a priori argument a conclusion is drawn from an 
antecedent fact, whether the consequence be in the order 
of time or in the necessary relation of cause and effect. By 
the argument a posteriori we reason from what is conse- 
quent in the order of time to what is antecedent, or from 
effect to cause. An individual may fall under suspicion of 
murder for two reasons : he may have coveted the de- 
ceased's property, or he may be found with it in his posses- 
sion ; the former is an a priori^ the latter an a posteriori 
argument against him. — ^Aristot., MetapJiys.^ lib, v., cap. 11. 
— V. Demonstration. 

^' Of demonstrations there are two sorts ; demonstrations 
a priori^ when we argue from the cause to the effect ; and 
a posteriori^ when we argue from the effect to the cause. 
Thus when we argue from the ideas we have of immensity, 
eternity, necessary existence, and the like, that such perfec- 
tions can reside but in one being, and thence conclude that 
there can be but one supreme God, who is the cause and 
author of all things, and that therefore it is contradictory 
to this to suppose that there can be two necessary indepen- 
dent principles, the one the cause of all the good, and the 
other the cause of all the evil that is in the world ; this is 
an argument a priori. Again, when the Manicheans and 
Paulicians, from what they observe in things and facts, 
from the many natural evils which they see in the world, 
and the many moral wickednesses which are committed by 
men, conclude that there must be two different causes or 
principles from whence each of these proceed ; this is 



VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 41 

A PRIORI— 

arguing a posteriori.''^ — Dr. John Clark, Enquirg into Evil, 
pp. 31-2. 

''The term a priori, by the influence of Kant and 
his school, is now very generally employed to charac- 
terize those elements of knowledge which are not ob- 
tained a posteriori — are not evolved out of factitious 
generalizations ; but which as native to, are potentially 
in, the mind antecedent to the act of experience, on 
occasion of which (as constitutmg its subjective condi- 
tion) they are first actually elicited into consciousness. 
Previously to Kant the terms a priori and a posteriori 
were, in a sense which descended from Aristotle, properly 
and usually employed — the former to denote a reasoning 
from cause to effect — ^the latter a reasoning from effect to 
cause. The term a priori came, however, in modern times, 
to be extended to any abstract reasoning from a given 
notion to the conditions which such notion involved ; hence, 
for example, the title a priori bestowed on the ontological 
and cosmological arguments for the existence of the Deity. 
The latter of these, in fact, starts from experience — from 
the observed contmgency of the world, in order to con- 
struct the supposed notion on which it founds. Clarke's 
cosmological demonstration called a priori, is therefore, so 
far, properly an argument a posteriori^ — Su' W. Hamilton, 
Reid's Works, p. 762. 

" By knowledge a prior i,"*^ says Kant (^Criticism of Pure 
Reason, Introd., sect. 1), ''we shall in the sequel under- 
stand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of 
experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. 
Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is 
possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience. 
Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure. Pure know- 
ledge a priori is that with which no empmcal element is 
mixed up. For example, the proposition, ' Every change 
has a cause,' is a proposition a priori, but impure because 
change is a conception which can only be derived from 
experience." 



42 VOCABXJLAHY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

" We have ordinarily more consideration for the demon- 
stration called propter quid or a priori^ than for that which 
we call quia or a posteriori ; because the former proceeds 
from universals to particulars, from causes to effects, while 
the latter proceeds in a manner wholly contrary. We 
must nevertheless see whether we have a right to do this ; 
since no demonstration a priori can have credence, or be 
received, without supposing the demonstration a posteriori^ 
by which it must be proved. For how is it, for example, 
that having to prove that man feels^ from this proposition, 
every animal feels — ^how, I say, will you establish the truth 
of this position, should some one hesitate to grant it, except 
by making induction of the individual animals, of whom 
there is not one that does not feel?" — Bernier, Ahridgment 
of Gassendi '-'- De F Entendement^^'' vol. vi., pp. 340-1. 

''If there are any truths which the mmd possesses, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, before and independent of 
experience, they may be called a priori truths, as belonging 
to it prior to all that it acquires from the world around. 
On the other hand, truths which are acquired by observa- 
tion and experience, are called a posteriori truths, because 
they come to the mind after it has become acquainted with 
external facts. How far a priori truths or ideas are pos- 
sible, is the great campus pliilosopliorum^ the great contro- 
verted question of mental philosophy." — Thomson, Outline 
of Laws of Thought^ 2d edit., pp. 68-9. 
ARCMiEUS — is the name given by Paracelsus to the vital 
principle which presides over the growth and continuation 
of living beings. He called it body ; but an astral lody^ 
that is an emanation from the substance of the stars, which 
defends us against the external agents of destruction till 
the inevitable term of life arrives. The hypothesis was 
extended by Van Helmont to the active principle which 
presides not only over every body, but over every particle 
of organized body to v/hich it gives its proper form. 

The word is used by More (^Antidote to Atheism^ pt. i., 
c. 11,) as synonymous with/orm. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 43 

AKCIIEIiOOY (Aoyog Tre^l TOiv u^x^^^ treats of principles, and 
should not be confounded with ArcJiceology (T^oyog Tg^i rav 
o(.^xmav) which treats of antiquities or things old. — See 
Alstedius (J. H.,) Scientiarum Omnium Encyclopcedia. — F. 
Peinciple. 

AK€HETYff»E (oc^xv]^ first or chief; and rvrog^ form) — a 
model or first form. — ''There were other objects of the 
mind, universal, eternal, immutable, which they called in- 
telhgible ideas, all originally contained in one archetypal 
mind or understanding, and from thence participated by 
inferior minds or souls." — Cudworth, J?i^e//. Syst.^ p. 387. 

'' The first mind is, according to this hypothesis, an arche- 
typal world which contains intelligibly all that is contained 
sensibly in our world." — Bolhigbroke, Essay iv., sect. 28. 

Cornelius Agrippa, in accordance with the philosophy of 
Plato, gave the name of Archetype to God, considered as 
the absolute model of all being. 

In the philosophy of Locke, the archetypes of our ideas 
are the things really existing out of us. " By real ideas, 
I mean such as have a foundation in nature ; such as 
have a conformity with the real being and existence of 
things, or with their archetypes.'''' — On Hum. Underst., b. 
ii., c. 30. 

ARGUMENT (arguere., from ot^yog^ clear, manifest — to show, 
reason, or prove) — is an explanation of that which is 
doubtful, by that which is known. '' Whoever will examine 
any correct argument, by reducing it to its syllogistic form, 
will find either, — Fh^st, That the premises are nothing but 
a simpler and commoner statement of the truth announced 
in the conclusion ; or, Secondly, That they are a mere 
analytical statement of it ; or, ThiixUy, That they are a 
synthetical (or generalized) statement, from which a par- 
ticular truth may be inferred in the conclusion." — Irons, 
Final Causes^ p. 112. 

The term argument in ordmary discourse, has several 
meanings. — 1. It is used for the premises in contradis- 
tinction to the conclusion, e. g.^ ''the conclusion which 
this argument is intended to establish is," &c. 2. It 



44 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

AROUMENT— 

denotes wliat is a course or series of arguments^ as when 
it is applied to an entire dissertation. 3. Sometimes a 
disputation or ^?/;o trains of argument opposed to each 
other. 4. Lastly, the various forms of stating an argu- 
ment are sometimes spoken of as different kinds of argu- 
ment^ as if the same argument were not capable of being 
stated in various ways. — Whately, Logic^ Appendix i. 

In strictly logical sense, the third operation of mind, 
reasoning, discussion, expressed in words, is argument. 
-—Whately. 

''In technical propriety argument cannot be used for 
argumentation., as Dr. Whately thinks, but exclusively for 
its middle term. In this meaning, the word (though not 
with uniform consistency) was employed by Cicero, Quin- 
tilian, Boethius, &c. ; it was thus subsequently used by the 
Latin Aristotelians, from whom it passed even to the Eamists; 
and this is the meaning which the expression always first, 
and most naturally, suggests to a logician." — Sir W. Hamil- 
ton, Discussions., p. 147. 
AROUMENTATION is opposed to intuition and consciousness, 
and used as synonymous with deduction by Dr. Price 
(Review., chap. 5). 

Argumentation or reasoning is that operation of mind 
whereby we infer one proposition from two or more pro- 
positions premised. — Watts, Logic, Introd. 

Argumentation must not be confounded with reasoning. 
Reasoning may be natural or artificial ; argumentation is 
always artificial. An advocate reasons and argues; a 
Hottentot reasons., but does not argue. Reasoning is occu- 
pied with ideas and their relations, legitimate or illegiti- 
mate ; argumentation has to do with forms and their regu- 
larity or irregularity. One reasons often with one's self; 
you cannot argue but with two. A thesis is set down — 
you attack, I defend it ; you insist, I reply ; you deny, I 
prove ; you distinguish, I destroy your distinction ; your 
objections and my replies balance or overturn one another. 
Such is argumentation. It supposes that there are two 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 45 

sides, and that both agree to the same rules. — Diet des 
Sciences Philosoph, 
ART (Latin ars^ from Greek apsry}^ strength or skill ; or from 
»pa, apto^ to fit, join, or make agree). 

Ars est ratio recta aliqiiorum operum faciendorum. — 
Thomas Aquinas. 

Ars est habitus cum recta ratione effectivus ; quia per 
precepta sua dirigit effectionem seu productionem operis 
extemi sensibilis. Differt autem a natura, quod natiu-a 
operatur in eo in quo est ; ars vero nunquam operatur 
in eo in quo est ; nisi per accidens, puta cum medicus 
seipsum sanat. — Derodon, Pliys.^ p. 21. 

Ars est methodus aliquid juxta regulas determinatas 
operandi. — Bouyier. 

Ars est recta ratio factihilium^ atque in eo differt a pru- 
dentia^ quas est recta ratio agihilium. — Peemans, Introd. ad 
Pliilosopli.^ p. 31. 

''We speak of art as distiQguished from nature; but art 
itself is natural to man. ... If we admit that man is 
susceptible of improvement, and has in himself a principle 
of progression and a desire of perfection, it appears im- 
proper to say that he has quitted the state of his naturcy 
when he has begun to proceed ; or that he finds a station 
for which he was not intended, while, like other animals, he 
only follows the disposition and employs the powers that 
nature has given. The latest efforts of human invention 
are but a continuation of certain devices which were prac- 
tised in the earliest ages of the world, and in the rudest 
state of mankind." — Ferguson, Essay on Hist, of Civ. 5oc., 
pp. 10-13. 

Art is defined by Lord Bacon to be '' a proper disposal 
of the things of nature by human thought and experience, 
so as to make them answer the designs and uses of man- 
kiad." It may be defined more concisely to be the adjust- 
ment of means to accomplish a desired end. — Stewart, 
Works., vol ii., p. 36, last edition. 

^'^ Art has in general preceded science. There were 



46 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ART— 

bleacMng, and dyeing, and tanning, and artificers in copper 
and iron, before there was chemistry to explain tlie pro- 
cesses used. Men made wine before there was any theory 
of fermentation ; and glass and porcelain were manufactured 
before the nature of alkalis and earths had been determined. 
The pyramids of ISTubia and Egypt, the palaces and sculp- 
tured slabs of Mneveh, the Cyclopean walls of Italy and 
Greece, the obelisks and temples of India, the cromlechs 
and druidical circles of countries formerly Celtic, all pre- 
ceded the sciences of mechanics and architecture. There 
was music before there was a science of acoustics ; and 
painting while as yet there was no theory of colours and 
perspective." — M'Cosh, On I)iv. Govern.^ p. 151. 

On the other hand, Cicero has said (JDe Oratore^ i., 41), 
"Mhil est enim, quod ad artem redigi possit, nisi ilie prius 
qui ilia tenet, quorum artem instituere vult, habet illam 
scientiam, ut ex iis rebus, quorum ars nondum sit, artem 
efficere possit." 

And Mr. Harris (Phil. Arrangements^ chap. 15) has 
argued — ' ' If there were no theorems of science to guide 
the operations of ar^, there would be no art ; but if there 
were no operations of art^ there might still be theorems of 
science. Therefore science is prior to art.^^ 

'^The principles which art 'mvolves^ science evolves. 
The truths on which art depends lurk in the artist's mind 
undeveloped, guiding his hand, stimulating his invention, 
balancing his judgment, but not appearing in the form of 
enunciated propositions. Art in its earlier stages is anterior 
to science, it may afterwards borrow aid from it." — 
Whewell, PJiil. of Induct. Sciences.^ vol. ii., pp. 275-6. 

If the knowledge used be merely accumulated experience, 
the art is called empirical ; but if it be experience reasoned 
upon and brought under general principles, it assumes a 
higher character and becomes a scientijic art. 

The difference between art and science is regarded as 
merely verbal by Sir WilHam Hamilton in Edin. Eev., 
N'o. 115. 



VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 47 

ART— 

On the other side, see Preflice of St. Ililaii-e's Transla- 
tion of ti'.e Orno.non. p. 12 : TThewelL Pl'.il. of Induct. 
Sciences, part ii., book ii., chap. 8. 

*' The distmction between science and art is. that a science 
is a body of principles and deductions, to explam the nature 
of some object matter. An art is a body of precepts with 
practical skill lor the completion of some work. A science 
teaches us to know, an art to do : the former declares that 
something exists, with the laws and causes which belong to 
its existence, the latter teaches how something may be 
produced.'* — Thomson, Outline of Laics of Thought, p. 16. 
2d edit. 

'' The object of science is knowledge : the objects of art 
are works. In art^ truth is a means to an end : in science it 
is the only end. Hence the practical arts are not to be 
classed among the sciences." — ^^\TieweU, Phil, of Induct. 
Sciences, aph. 2b. 

^^ Science gives principles, art gives rules. Science is 
fixed, and its object is intellectual: art is contingent and 
its object sensible.'" — Hanis. Dialogue on Art. 
ASCETICI^JI (cc7y.siu. to exercise : or cc7Kr,<7i:. exercise). — The 
exercise of severe vii'tue among the P^i-thagoreans and 
Stoics was so called. It consisted in chastity, poverty. 
watching, fasting, and retii'ement. 

•• The ascetics renoiuiced the business and the pleasiu-es of 
the age; abjm-ed the use of wine, of liesh. and of marriage. 
chastised the body, mortified them aftections. and embraced 
a life of misery, as the price of eternal happiness.'' — Gibbon, 
Hist., c. 37. 

See Zimmerman on Solitude. 

This name may be applied to every system which teaches 
man not to govern his wants by subordinating them to 
reason and the law of duty, but to stifle them entirely, or 
at least to resist them as much as we can ; and these are 
not only the wants of the body, but still more those of the 
heart, the imagination and the mind ; for society, the 
fannly, most of the sciences and arts of ci^-ilization are pro- 



48 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ASCETICISIW[— 

scribed, sometimes as rigorously as physical pleasures. 
The care of the soul and the contemplation of the Deity 
are the only employments. Asceticism may be distinguished 
as religious^ which is founded on the doctrine of expia- 
tion, and seeks to appease the Divine wrath by voluntary 
sufferings, and pliilosopliical^ which aims at accomplish- 
ing the destiny of the soul, developing its faculties, and 
freeing it from the servitude of sense. — Diet, des Sciences 
Phil. 

The principle of asceticism is described by Bentham 
(Introd. to Prin. of Mar. and Legislation^ ch. ii.) as ''that 
principle which approves of actions in proportion as they 
tend to diminish human happiness, and conversely dis- 
approves of them as they tend to augment it." But this is 
not a fair representation of asceticism in any of its forms. 
The only true and rational asceticism is temperance or 
moderation in all things. 

'' The Budhists believe that it is possible, by the perform- 
ance of certain ceremonies, and the observance of a pre- 
scribed course of moral action, to arrive at the posses- 
sion of supernatural powers." — Hardy, Easteim Monachism.^ 
p. 225. 
ASSENT (ad sentire — to think the same — to be of the same 
mind or opinion). — " Subscription to articles of religion, 
though no more than a declaration of the subscriber's assent^ 
may properly enough be considered in connection with the 
subject of oaths, because it is governed by the same rule of 
interpretation." — Paley, Mor. Phil.., b. iii., c. 22. 

Assent is that act of the mind by which we accept as true 
a proposition, a perception, or an idea. It is a necessary 
part of judgment ; for, if you take away from judgment, 
affirmation or denial, nothing remains but a simple concep- 
tion without logical value, or a proposition which must be 
examined before it can be admitted. It is also implied in 
perception, which would otherwise be a mere phenomenon 
which the mind had not accepted as true. Assent is free 
when it is not the unavoidable result of evidence, necessary 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 49 

ASSENT— 

when I cannot withliold it without contradicting myself. 
The Stoics, while they admitted that most of our ideas came 
from without, thought that images purely sensible could not 
be converted into real cognitions without a spontaneous 
act of the mind, which is just assent or belief, avyKaTot&ifjig. 
— Diet, des Sciences PhilosopJi. — V. Belief, Consent. 

" Assent of the mind to truth is, hi all cases, the work not 
of the understanding, but of the reason. Men are not con- 
\dnced by syllogisms ; but when they beheye a principle, 
or wish to believe, then syllogisms are brought in to prove 
it."— Sewell, Christ. Mor., chap. 21. 
ASSEIRTORIT (ad serere, to knit or join). — " But whether 
each of them be according to the kinds of oaths divided by 
the schoolmen, one assertory., the other promissory., to 
which some add a third, comminatory, is to me unknown." 
— Fuller, Worthies, Cornwall. 

Judgments have also been distinguished into the problem- 
atic, assertory, which imply no necessity, and the apodeictic, 

— V. Judgment, Oath. 

In Logic, assertion is the affirmation or denial of some- 
thing. — ^Whately, Logic, b. ii., ch. 2, sect. 1. 
ASSOCIATION (acZ sociare, to accompany). — -''Ideas that in 
themselves are not all of kin, come to be so united in some 
men's minds, that it is very hard to separate them ; they 
always keep company, and the one no sooner at any time 
comes into the understanding but its associate appears with 
it." — Locke, On Hum, Understand., b. ii., c. 33, sect. 5. — 
V. Suggestion, Train of Thought. 

*•' If several thoughts, or ideas, or feelings, have been in 
the mind at the same time, afterwards, if one of these 
thoughts return to the mind, some, or all of the others, will 
frequently return with it ; this is called the association of 
ideas.^'' — Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

''By the laio of continuity, the mind, when the chord 
has once been struck, continues, as Hume describes it, to 
repeat of itself the same note again and again, till it finally 
dies away. Bj association it falls naturally into the same 



50 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ASSOCIATIOI^— 

train of consecutive ideas, to whicli it lias been before 
accustomed. Imagine a glass so constructed that when 
the face placed before it was withdrawn, the image should 
still continue reflected on it for a certain time, becoming 
fainter and fainter until it finally disappeared. This would 
represent the law of continuity . Imagine that when a book 
and a man had been once placed before it together, it should 
be able, when the book was next brought alone, to recall 
the image of the man also. This would be the law of 
association. On these two laws depends the spontaneous 
activity of the mind."* — Sewell, Christ. Mor., ch. 14. 

"The law of association is this, — That empirical ideas 
which often follow each other, create a habit in the mind, 
whenever the one is produced, for the other always to 
follow." — Kant, Anthropology^ p. 182. 

"I employ the word association to express the effect 
which an object derives from ideas, or from feelings which 
it does not necessarily suggest, but which it uniformly re- 
calls to the mind, in consequence of early and long con- 
tinued habits." — Stewart, Works^ vol. ii., p. 449, 

'"'• Litelligitur per associaiionem idearum non qucevis natu- 
ralis et necessaria earundem conjunction sed quce fortuita est., 
aut per consuetudinem vel affectum producitur^ qua idece^ quce 
nullum naturalem inter se haheut nexum, ita copulantur^ ut 
recurrente una., tota earum catena se conspiciendum intellectui 
prceheat.''^ — Bruckerus, De Ideis. 

Locke, Essay., book ii., chap. 23 ; Hume, Essays., essay 
iii. ; Hartley, Observat. on Man ; Keid, Intellect. Powers^ 
essay iv. ; Stewart, Elements^ vol. ii., chap. 5 ; Brown, 
Lectures^ lect. xxxiii. 

''The influence of association upon morals opens an 
ample field of inquiry. It is from this principle that 
we explain the reformation from theft and drunken- 
ness in servants which we sometimes see produced by a 
draught of spirits in which tartar emetic had been secretly 

* See the use whicli Butler has made of these in his Analogy, ch. i. and 
ch. V. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 51 

ASSOCIATION— 

dissolved. The recollection of the pain and sickness ex- 
cited by the emetic, naturally associates itself with the 
spirits, so as to render them both equally the objects of 
aversion. It is by calling in this principle only that we 
can account for the conduct of Moses in grinding the 
golden calf mto a powder, and afterwards dissolving it 
(probably by means of liepar sulphuris), in water, and com- 
pelling the children of Israel to drink of it as a punishment 
for their idolatry. This mixture is bitter and nauseous in 
the highest degree. An inclination to idolatry, therefore, 
could not be felt without being associated with the 
remembrance of this disagreeable mixture, and of course 
being rejected with equal abhorrence." — Medical En- 
quiries^ by Benj. Eush, M.D., vol. ii., 8vo, Philadelphia, 
1793, p. 42. 

ASSUIflPTIOlV (assumere^ to take to). — "The unities of time 
and place arise evidently from false assumptions."— John- 
son, Proposals for ^ Sfc.^ Shakspeare. 

Of enunciations or prsemisses, that which is taken uni- 
versally is called the proposition^ that which is less universal 
and comes into the mind secondarily is called the assump- 
tion, — Trendlenburg, Notes in Aristot. 

Assumption^ in Logic, is the minor or second proposition 
in a categorical syllogism. 
ATHEISM (c«, priv. ; and hog^ God). — The doctrine that there 
is no God. 

'' We shall now make diligent search and inquiry, to see 
if we can find any other philosophers who atheized before 
Democritus and Leucippus, as also what form of atheism 
they entertained." — Cudworth, Intell. Syst.^ p. 111. 

The name Atheist is said to have been first apphed to 
Diagoras of Melos (or Delos), a follower of Democritus, 
who explained all things by motion and matter, or the 
movement of material atoms. The other form of atheism 
in ancient times was that of Thales, Anaximenes and 
Heraclitus, who accounted for all things by the different 
transformations of the one element of water. Straton of 



52 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ATHEISM— 

Lampsacus rejected the purely mechanical system of Demo- 
critus, and ascribed to matter a power of organization 
which gave to all beings their forms and faculties. Epicu- 
rus was the cotemporary of Straton, but the follower of 
Democritus, on whose system he grafted the morality which 
is suited to it. And the materialism of Hobbes and others 
in modern times has, in like manner, led to atheism. 

It is a fine observation of Plato in his Laws — that 
atheism is a disease of the soul before it becomes an error 
of the understanding. 

Leclerc, Hist, des Systemes des Anciens Athees. In Bihlio- 
theque Choisie. 

" To beheve nothing of a designing principle or mind, 
nor any cause, measure, or rule of things but chance, so 
that in nature neither the interest of the whole^ nor of any 
particulars^ can be said to be in the least designed, pursued 
or aimed at, is to be a perfect atheist,'''* — Shaftesbury, Inquiry 
Concerning Virtue^ book i., part 1, sect. 2. 

Hi soli sunt athei, qui m.undum rectoris sapientis consilio 
negant in initio constitutum fuisse atque in omni tempore 
acZmmzsiran.—Hutcheson, Metaphys.^ pars 3, c. 1. 

Atheists are confounded with Pantheists ; such as Xeno- 
phanes among the ancients, or Spinoza and Schelling 
among the modems, who, instead of denying God, absorb 
everything into Him. 

Atheism has been distinguished fi:'om Anti-theism ; and the 
former has been supposed to imply merely the non-recogni- 
tion of God, while the latter asserts His non-existence. 
This distinction is founded on the difference between unhe- 
lief and disbelief (Chalmers, Nat. Theol.^ i., 58), and its 
validity is admitted in so far as it discriminates merely 
between sceptical and dogmatic atheism. — Buchanan, 
Faith in God^ vol. i., p. 396. 

'' The verdict of the atheist on the doctrine of a God, is 
only that it is not proven. It is not that it is disproven. 
He is but an atheist. He is not an anti-theist.'''' — (Chalmers, 
ut supra). 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 53 

ATOM, ATOMISM (oc, priv. ; and ts,uusiu, to cut, that which 
cannot be cut or divided is an atom). 

" ]^ow, I say, as Ecphantus and Archelaus asserted th(^ 
corporeal world to be made of atoms^ yet notwithstanding, 
held an incorporeal deity, distinct from the same as the first 
principle of activity in it, so in like manner did all other 
ancient atomists generally before Democritus join theology 
aiid incorporealism with their atomical physiology." — Cud- 
worth, Intell Syst^ p. 2Q. 

'' Leucippus considered the basis of all bodies to consist 
of extremely fine particles, differing in form and nature, 
which he supposed to be dispersed throughout space, and 
to which the followers of Epicurus first gave the name of 
atoms. To these atoms he attributed a rectilinear motion, 
in consequence of which, such as are homogeneous united, 
whilst the lighter were dispersed throughout space." 

The doctrine of atomism did not take its rise in Greece, 
but in the East. It is found in the Indian philosophy. 
Kanada, the author of the system, admitted an infinite 
intelligence distinct from the world. But he could not 
beheve matter to be infinitely divisible, as in this case a 
grain of sand would be equal to a mountain, both being- 
infinite. Matter consists, then, of ultimate indivisible 
atoms ^ which are indestructible and eternal. Empedocles 
and Anaxagoras did not exclude mind or spirit fi[*om the 
universe. Leucippus and Democritus did. Epicurus 
added nothing to their doctrine. Lucretius gave it the 
graces of poetry. 

In all its forms, explaining the universe by chance or 
necessity, it tends to materialism or atheism, although 
Gassendi has attempted to reconcile it with a belief in God. 
— Stewart, Active Powers^ vol. ii., last edit., 369. — V. Mole- 
cule. 
ATTENTION {ad tendere, to apply the mind to an object). 

'' The natural reason of this rule is plain, for two differ- 
ent independent acts distract the attention and concernment 
of the audience." — Dryden, Pref. to Troilus and Cressida. 

'' When we see, hear, or think of anythhig, and feel a 



54. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOrHY. 

ATTENTION— 

desire to know more of it, we keep the mind fixed upon the 
object ; tMs effort of tlie mind, produced by tlae desire of 
knowledge, is called attention.''^ — Taylor, Elements of 
Thought. 

Attention is the voluntary directing of the energy of the 
mind towards an object or an act. It has been said by Dr. 
Holland (Mental Physiol.^ p. 14), that ''The phrase of 
direction of consciousness might often be advantageously 
substituted for it." It implies Will as distinct from Intelli- 
gence and Sensibility. It is the voluntary direction of the 
intelligence and activity. Condillac confounded it with a 
sensation of which we were passively conscious, all other 
sensations being as if they were not. Laromiguiere re- 
garded it as a faculty, and as the primary faculty of the 
understanding, which gives birth to all the rest. But we 
may do an act with attention as well as contemplate an 
object with attention. And we may attend to a feeling as 
well as to a cognition. According to De Tracy (Ideologie^ 
c. 11), it is a state of mind rather than a faculty. It is to 
be acquired and improved by habit. We may learn to be 
attentive as we learn to walk and to write. 

According to Dr. Reid, '' Attention is a voluntary act ; it 
requires an active exertion to begin and to continue it ; and 
it may be continued as long as we will ; but consciousness 
is involuntary, and of no continuance, changing with every 
thought." — Essays on Intellect. Powers ., p. 60. 

Attention to external things is ohservation. Attention to 
the subjects of our own consciousness is reflection. 

Attention and abstraction are the same process, it has 
been said, viewed in different relations. They are the 
positive and negative poles of the same act. The one 
evolves the other. Attention is the abstraction of the mind 
from all things else, and fixing it upon one object ; and 
abstraction is the fixing the mind upon one object to the 
exclusion of others. 
Attention and Thought. — Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, vol. 
i., p. 4, edit. 1848. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 55 

ATTENTION— 

'' By thougJit is here meant the voluntary' reproduction 
in our minds of those states of consciousness, to which, as 
to his best and most authentic documents, the teacher of 
moral or religious truth refers us. In attention^ we keep 
the mind passive ; in thought^ we rouse it into activity. 
In the former, we submit to an impression — we keep the 
mind steady, in order to receive the stamp. In the latter, 
we seek to imitate the artist, while we ourselves make a 
copy or duplicate of his work. We may learn arithmetic 
or the elements of geometry, by continued attention alone; 
but self-knowledge, or an insight into the laws and consti- 
tution of the human mind, and the grounds of religion and 
true morality, in addition to the effort of attention^ requires 
the energ}^ of thought. 
ATTRIBUTE (ad tribuere^ to apportion, to ascribe) is any- 
thing that can be predicated of another. 

"Heaven delights 
To pardon erring man ; sweet mercy seems 
Its darling attribute, which limits justice." 

Dryden, All for Love.^ 

Attributes (logical), refer not to a substance or real 
being, but to a subject. Consequently, attributes of this 
kind may express something different from qualities, if only 
they do not include a pure negation. Thus, in the famous 
proposition of Pascal : Man is neither an angel nor a 
beast, —the words which hold the place of the attribute 
represent neither a quality nor a positive idea . 

'' Attributes are usually distributed under the three heads 
of quality, quantity, and relation." — Mill, Logic. 2d edit., 
vol. i., p. 83. 

In the schools, the definition, the genus, the proprium, 
and the accident, were called dialectic attributes ; because, 
according to Aristotle (Topic^ lib. i., c. 6), these were the 
four points of view in which any subject of philosophical 
discussion should be viewed. 

'' A predicate, the exact limits of which are not deter- 
mined, cannot be used to define and determine a subject. 



56 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ATTfilBUTE — 

It may be called an attribute^ and conveys not the whole 
nature of the subject, but some one quality belonging to 
it. ^Metals are heavy,' 'Some snakes are venomous,' 
are judgments in which this kind of predicable occurs." — 
Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought^ 2d edit., p. 161. 

Attributes (real or metaphysical) are always real quali- 
ties, essential and inherent, not only in the nature, but even 
in the substance of things. '' By this word attribute^'''' said 
Descartes (in his letter to Regius), '' is meant something 
which is immovable and inseparable from the essence of its 
subject, as that which constitutes it, and which is thus 
opposed to mode,^'' Thus unity, identity, and activity, are 
attributes of the soul ; for I cannot deny them, without, at 
the same time, denying the existence of the soul itself. 
Sensibility, liberty, and intelligence, are but faculties. la 
God there is nothing but attributes^ because, in God every- 
thing is absolute, involved in the substance and unity of 
the necessary being. In Deo nan proprie modos aut quali- 
iates^ sed attributa tantum dicimus esse. — Descartes, Princip. 
Philosoph.^ i., n. 56. 

Attributes are belonging to the existence of the being to 
which they are ascribed. 

Marks or characters^ by being in some and not in others, 
mark or distinguish. 

Qualities are an answer to quale sit ens. 

Properties are when a being has some properties more 
than other beings. 

Modes or modifications are when a being, remaining 
essentially the same, acquires. or loses some marks. 

In man the essential mark is reason — attribute, capacity 
of learning — mode.^ actual learning — quality^ relatively to 
another more or less learned. — F. Quality, Mode. — 
Peemans, Introd. ad Philosoph.^ p. 6. 
AUTHENTIC — ''I oppose the word authentic to supposititious 
(or apocryphal), the word genuine to vitiated. I call a 
book authentic which was truly the work of the person 
whose name it bears. I call a book genuine^ which remains, 



VOCABULARY OF PHLLOSOPHY. 57 

AUTHENTIC— 

in all material points, the same as when it proceeded from 
the author."— Dr. Hill, Lectures^ vol. i., p. 17, (3d edit.) 
Dr. Dick appears just to reverse this definition. — Lectures^ 
vol. i., p. 52. 

In jurisprudence, those laws or acts are called authentic 
which are promulgated by the proper public officer, and 
accompanied with the conditions requisite to give them 
faith and force. 
AUTHORITY (The principle of). — " The principle of adopting 
the belief of others, on a matter of opinion, without refer- 
ence to the particular grounds on which the behef may 
rest." — Lewis, Oii Authority in Matters of Opinion^ p. 6.— 
F. Consent. 

Authority (The argument from). — It is an argument for 
the truth of an opinion that it has been embraced by all 
men, in all ages, and in all nations. Quod semper^ iibique 
et ah omnibus^ are the marks of universality, according to 
Yincentius Lirinensis. "This word is sometimes employed 
in its primary sense, when we refer to any one's example, 
testimony, or judgment ; as when, e. g.^ we speak of correct- 
ing a reading hi some book on the authority of an ancient 
MS., or giving a statement of some fact on the authority 
of such and such historians, &c. In this sense the word 
answers pretty nearly to the Latin auctoritas. It is a 
clahn to deference. 

'' Sometimes, again, it is employed as equivalent to 
potestas^ power, as when we speak of the authority of a 
magistrate. This is a claim to ohedience.^^ — Whately, 
Logic ^ appendix 1. 

U?ia in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturce putanda 
est. — Cicero, I., Tuscul. 

Multum dare solemus prcesumptioni omnium hominum : 
Apud nos veritatis argumentum est., aliquid omnibus videri. — 
Seneca, epist. 117. 
^^UTOCRASY (oivTog., self; and k^octsiv., to have power). — " Tlie 
divine will is absolute, it is its own reason, it is both the 
producer and the ground of all its acts. It moves not by 



58 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

AUTOCRASY— 

the external impulse or inclination of objects, but deter- 
mines itself by an absolute autocrasy y — South, vol. vii., 
ser. X. 

" God extends his dominion even to man's will, that great 
seat of freedom, that with a kind of autocrasy and supre- 
macy within itself, commands its own actions, laughs at all 
compulsion, scorns restraint, and defies the bondage of 
human laws or external obligations." — South, vol. i., 
ser. vii. — F. Autonomy. 
AUTOMATON (oivro/Lccirov^ that which moves of itself.) 
Automatic. — "The difference between an animal and automatic 
statue consists in this, that in the animal we trace the mechan- 
ism to a certain point, and then we are stopped, either 
the mechanism becoming too subtile for our discernment, 
or something .else beside the known laws of mechanism 
taking place ; whereas, in the automaton^ for the compara- 
tively few motions of which it is capable, we trace the 
mechanism throughout." — Paley, Nat, Theol.^ c. 3. 

''^ Automatic motions are those muscular actions which 
are not dependent on the mind, and which are either per- 
sistent, or take place periodically with a regular rhythm, and 
are dependent on normal causes seated in the nerves or cen- 
tral organs ol the nervous system." " Movements influ- 
enced simply by sensation, and not at all by the will, are 
automatic^ — Morell, Psychology^ p. 99. 

Leibnitz, tom. i., p. 156, has said, " anima humana est 
spirituals quoddam automaton^ In a note on this passage, 
Bilfinger is quoted as saving that automaton is derived 
from otvToc and f^cccd or f^cirzoi. to seek or desire. The soul 
is a being desiring of itself, whose changes are desired by 
itself; whereas the common interpretation of the word is 
self-moving. The soul, in strict propriety, may be called 
self- desiring, or desiring changes of itself, as having the 
principle of change in itself; whereas machines are impro- 
perly called self-moving, or self-desiring, or willing. 

" By the compound word ot.vrof/.oiroy {orctv avro f/^oirriv 
y5i/>7T^/) Aristotle expresses nature effecting either more 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 59 

AUTOMATON— 

or less than tlie specific ends or purposes to which her 
respective operations invariably tend." — Nat. Auseult.^ lib. 
ii., cap. 6 ; Gilhes, Analysis of Aristotle's Works ^ chap. 2. 
note. Xature operating kcctcc avf^lS:i3rr<og^ and producing 
effects not in her intention, is called ocvrofcccrou or chance, 
and art operating Kccra o-y^/3s/3i7%o^, and producing effects 
not in her intention, is called 7U)crj^ fortune. Thus, chance 
or fortune cannot have any existence independently of 
intention or design. 
Antomatism is one of the theories as to the activity of matter. 
See Stewart, Active Powers^ vol. ii., pp. 378, 379. 

AUTONOMY (ccvTo uoy.og^ to be a law to itself).— In the philo- 
sophy of Kant, autonomy is ascribed to the reason in all 
matters of morality. The meaning is, that reason is sove- 
reign, and the laws which it imposes on the ^tII are universal 
and absolute. Man, as possessed of reason, is his own law- 
giver. In this, according to Kant, consists the true 
character and the only possible proof of hberty. The term 
heteronomy is applied by him to those laws which are im- 
posed upon us by natm-e, or the violence done to us by our 
passions and our wants or desu'es. — V. Autoceasy. 

AUTOTBLEISTS (fityro^ Ssog). — Autotheistce c^ui nulla alia entia 
prseter se agnoscunt. — Lacoudre, Instit. PMlosopJi.^ tom. ii., 
p. 120. 

AXIOM (cA^ico/Lca^ from cchog^ worthy) — a position of worth or 
authority. 

Diogenes Laertius {Life of Zeno. ch. 48) explains an 
axiom., according to Chrysippus, as meanhig a proposition 
asserting or deming something. "It has received the 
name of axiom^ a^ico/iccc^ because it is either mamtaiaed, 
cc^iovT£)Ci.i or repudiated." 

"There are a sort of pro^oositions, which, under ^ the 
name of maxims and axioms^ have passed for principles of 
science." — Locke, On Hum. Understand.., book iv., ch. 7. 

"Philosophers give the name of axioms only to self- 
evident truths that are necessary, and are not limited to 
time and place, but must be true at all times and in all 



60 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

AXIOM— 

places. "-—Reid, Intellectual Powers^ essay ii., chap. 20 ; 
see also Sir William Hamilton's edition of Reid^ note A, 
sect. 5. 

Mr. Stewart {Elements^ part 2, ch. 1) contends that 
axioms are elemental truths necessary in reasoning, but 
not truths from which anything can be deduced. 

That all axioms are intuitive and self-evident truths, is, 
according to Mr. Tatham (^Chart and Scale of Truths chap. 
4), a fundamental mistake into which Mr. Locke (Essay ^ 
b. iv., chap. 7, sect. 1), and others (Ancient Metaphysics^ 
vol. L, b. v., chap. 3, p. 389, and vol. ii., p. 335), have 
been betrayed to the great injury of science. All axioms 
though not intuitive may, however, be properly said to be 
self-evident ; because, in their formation, reason judges by 
single comparisons without the help of a third idea or 
middle term ; so that they are not indebted to any othei^ 
for their evidence, but have it in themselves ; and though 
inductively framed, they cannot be syllogistically proved. — 
Ibid.^ chap, vii., sect. 1. 

This term was first supplied by mathematicians to a cer- 
tain number of propositions which are self-evident, and 
serve as the basis of all their demonstrations. Aristotle 
applied it to all self- evident principles, which are the 
grounds of all science (Analyt. Post.^ lib. i., chap. 2). Ac- 
cording to him they were all subordinate to the supreme 
condition of all demonstration, the principle of identity and 
contradiction. The Stoics, under the name of axioms^ 
included every kind of general proposition, whether of 
necessary or contingent truth. In this sense the term is 
employed by Bacon, who, not satisfied with submitting 
axioms to the test of experience, has distinguished several 
kinds of axioms^ some more general than others (JS'ovum 
Organum^ lib. i., aphor. 13, 17, 19, &c.) The Cartesians, 
who wished to apply the methods of geometry to philoso- 
phy, have retained the Aristotelian use of the term. Kant 
has consecrated it to denote those principles which are the 
grounds of mathematical science, and which, according to 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 61 

AXIOM— 

him, are judgments absolutely independent of experience, 
of immediate evidence, and vv^hich have their origin in the 
pure intuition of time and space. 



MMAVTW. — ''AH the objects we call beautiful agree in two 
things, which seem to concur in our sense of beauty. First, 
"\Vlien they are perceived, or even imagined, they produce 
a certain agreeable emotion or feeling in the mind ; and, 
secondly. This agreeable emotion is accompanied with an 
opinion or belief of their having some perfection or excel- 
lence belonging to them." — Reid, Intell. Powers^ essay viii., 
chap. 4. 

Beauty is absolute^ real^ and ideal. The absolutely beauti- 
ful belongs to Deity, The really beautiful is presented to 
us in the objects of nature and the actions of human life. 
The ideally beautiful is aimed at by art. Plato identi- 
fied the beautiful with the good^ to y.a'kav y-KK/.yofJou. 
But, although the ideas of the beautiful, of the good, 
and of the true are related to each other, they are 
distinct. There may be truth and propriety, or pro- 
portion in beauty — and there is a beauty in what is good or 
right, and also in what is true. But still these ideas are 
distinct. 

Dr. Hutcheson (^Inquiry Concerning Beauty^ Sfc.) distin- 
guishes beauty into '-'•absolute; or that beauty which we 
perceive in objects without comparison to ami^hing exter- 
nal, of which the object is supposed an imitation or picture ; 
such as that beauty perceived from the works of nature ; 
and comparative or relative beauty^ which we perceive in 
objects, commonly considered as imitations or resemblances 
of something else." According to Hutcheson, the general 
foundation or occasion of the ideas oi beauty is '''•uniformity 
amidst variety.'''' — Inquiry^ sect. 2. 

Berkeley in his AlcipJtron^ and Hume, in many parts of 
his works, make utility the foundation of beauty. But 
objects which are useful are not always beautiful, and 



62 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

BEAUTY— 

objects wMcli are beautiful are not always useful. That 
wbicli is useful is useful for some end ; that whicli is beauti- 
ful is beautiful in itself, and independent of the pleasure 
which it gives, or the end it may serve. 

On the question whether mental or material objects first 
give us feelings of beauty^ see Stewart {Active and Moral 
Powers^ vol. i., p. 279), Smith (Theory of Moral Senti- 
ments^ part 4., chap. 1), and Alison (Essay on Taste). 

Dr. Price, in his Review of Principal Questions in Morals^ 
sect. 2, has some remarks on natural beauty. See also the 
article Beauty in the Encyclopced. Brit.^ by Lord Jeffrey. 
Kames, Elements of Criticism,^ vol. i., chap. 3. Burke on The 
Suhlime and Beautiful. Knight's Enquiry into Principles of 
Taste. Sir Uvedale Price on The Picturesque^ with preface 
by Sir T. D. Lauder. 8vo, Edin., 1842. Stewart's Essays, 
part 2, Crousaz, Traite de Beau. Andre, Essai sur le 
Beau. — V. Esthetics, Ideal. 
BEINO (to ou — that which is — existence). 

'"'' First, thou madest things which should have being 
witbout life ; then those which should have life and being ; 
lastly, those which have being., life, and reason." — Bishop 
Hall, Contemplat. The Creation. 

^' This (being), applies to everything which exists in any 
w^ay, whether as substance or accident, whether actually or 
potentially, whether in the nature of things, or only in our 
notions ; for, even what we call entia rationis, or fictions of 
our minds, such as hippo-centaur, or mountain of gold, have 
a being ; even negation or privation have an existence ; 
nay, according to Aristotle,* we can say that nothing has a 
being. In short, whenever we can use tbe substantive 
verb is, there must be some kind of being." — Monboddo, 
Ancient Metaphys., book i., chap. 4. 

According to some (Diet, des Sciences Philosoph., art. 
Eire), we can have no idea of nothing ; according to others 
(Smart, Man. of Logic, 1849, p, 130), the knowledge of 

* To fx,'^ ov, Uidt fxvi <3v, (f)%{j.Zf.—MetnpJiys,^ lib. iv., c. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 63 

contraries being one, if we know what being is, we know 
what not being is. 

Being is either substance or accident. 

Substance is either matter or mind. 

Accident is divided by the other categories. — V. O^sTO- 

LOGY. 

BEIilEF— (That which we live by, or according to, or lief in 
German belieben^ from lubet^ that which pleases). 

'^ The first great instrument of changing our whole 
natiire, is a firm belief and a perfect assent to, and hearty 
entertainment of the promises of the gospel." — Bp. Taylor, 
vol. i., ser. xi. 

^^ Belief assent, conviction, are words which I do not 
think admit of logical definition, because the operation of 
mind signified by them, is perfectly simple, and of its own 
kind. Belief must have an object. For he who believes 
must believe something, and that which he believes is the 
object of his belief Belief is always expressed in language 
by a proposition wherein something is afiirmed or denied. 
Belief admits of all degrees, from the slightest suspicion to 
the fullest assurance. There are many operations of mind 
of which it is an essential ingredient, as consciousness, per- 
ception, remembrance. We give the name of evidence to 
whatever is a ground of belief What this e^adence is, is 
more easily felt than described. The common occasions 
of life lead us to distinguish evidence into different kinds ; 
such as the evidence of sense, of memory, of consciousness, 
of testimony, of axioms, and of reasoning. I am not able 
to find any common nature to which they may all be 
reduced. They seem to me to agree only in this, that they 
are all fitted by nature to produce belief in the human 
mind, some of them in the highest degree, which we call 
certainty, others in various degrees according to circum- 
stances." — Keid, Intell. Poiv.^ essay ii., chap. 20, and In- 
quiry., chap. 20, sect. 5. 

'' St. Austin accurately says, ' We know what rests upon 
reason ; we believe what rests upon authority.'' But reason 



64 YOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

itself must rest at last upon autliority ; for the original data 
of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily 
accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond 
itself. These data are, therefore, in rigid propriety, leliefs 
or trusts. Thus it is, that in the last resort, we must 
perforce, philosophically admit, that helief is the prim- 
ary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate 
ground of helief. We are compelled to surrender the 
proud InteUige ut eredas of Abelard, to content ourselves 
with the humble Crede ut intelligas of Anselm." — Sir William 
Hamilton, Reid's Works^ note A, sect. 5. — V. Feeling, 

&TOWLEDGE, OPINION. 

See Guizot, Meditations^ &c. Quel est le vrai sens du mot 
Foi^ p. 135. 8vo, Paris, 1852. 

To believe is to admit a thing as true, on grounds suffi- 
cient, subjectively ; insufficient, objectively. — Kant, Crit. de la 
Raison Prat,., p. 11. 

'' The word believing has been variously and loosely 
employed. It is frequently used to denote states of con- 
sciousness which have already their separate and appro- 
priate appellations. Thus it is sometimes said, " I believe 
in my own existence, and the existence of an external 
world, I believe in the facts of nature, the axioms of 
geometry, the affections of my own mind," as well as " I 
believe in the testimony of witnesses, or in the evidence of 
historical documents." 

'' Setting aside this loose application of the term, I pro- 
pose to confine it, First., to the effect on the mind of the 
premises in what is termed probable reasoning, or what I 
have named contingent reasoning — in a word, the pre- 
mises of all reasoning, but that which is demonstrative ; 
and. Secondly., to the state of holding true when that 
state, far from being the effect of any premises discerned 
by the mind, is dissociated from all evidence." — Bailey, 
Letters on Philosoph. of Hum. Mind. 8vo, 1851, p. 75. 
MENEVOX.ENCE (bene volentia., good-will). — ''When our 
love or desire of good goes forth to others, it is termed 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 66 

good-will or henevolencey — Cogan, On the Passions^ part 7, 
sect. 2, chap. 3. 

Bishop Butler has said (sermon i., On Human Nature)^ 
that '^ there are as real and the same kind of indications 
in human nature, that we were made for society and to do 
good to our fellow-creatures, as that we were intended to 
take care of our own life and health and private good." 
These principles in our nature by which we are prompted 
to seek and to secure our o^vn good are comprehended 
under the name of self-love, and those which lead us to 
seek the good of othei-s are comprehended under the name 
of benevolence. The term corresponding to this among the 
Greeks was (piT^ocp^^o'Tricc^ among the writers of the New 
Testament ocyc^Tryi^ and among the Bomans humanitas. 
Under these terms are comprehended all those feelings and 
affections which lead us to increase the happiness, and 
alleviate the sufferings of others, while the term self-love 
includes all those principles of our nature which prompt us 
to seek our own good. According to some philosophers, our 
own good is the ultimate and only proper end of human 
actions, and that when we do good to others it is done with 
a view to our own good. This is what is called the selfish 
philosophy, which in modern times has been maintained by 
Hobbes, Mandeville, Kochefoucault, and others. The 
other view which is stated above in the words of Butler has 
been strenuously defended by Cumberland, Hutcheson, 
Adam Smith, and Beid, throughout their writings. 
KliASPHEMY (from fiTiccTrrco^ loedo^ to hurt). — '-'' BT^iAaCpn^ioc 
properly denotes calumny^ detraction^ reproachful or abusive 
language^ against whomsoever it be vented." — Campbell, 
On the Gospels^ Prelim. Dissert, ix., part 2. 

As commonly used, it means the wanton and irreverent 
use of language in reference to the Di\dne Being or to his 
worship and service.* This is an offence against the light 
of nature, and was severely condemned by ancient ethical 

* Augustine said,— Jam vulgo blasphemia noii accipitur nisi mala verba de Deo 
dioere. 



66 YOCABULARY OF'. J'HILOSOPHT. 

BI-ASPHEMY— 

■BTiters. Among the Jews, UaspAemy was punished by 
death, (Levit. xxiv. 14, 16.) And by t^jhe laws of many Chris- 
tian nations it has been prohibited m: ,\der heavy penalties. 
So late as the end of the seventeentlit century, a man 
suffered death at Edinburgh for blaspheiW^y.—See Amot, 
Crim. Trials. 

Blasphemy differs from sacrilege, in that th.e former con- 
sists in using language, the latter m some overt act. 
BODY.—" The primary ideas we have peculiar to hoQ^y^ as con- 
tradistinguished to spirit, are the cohesion of solid i,,,nd con- 
sequently separable parts, and a power of commuiiicating 
motion by impulse."-Locke, Essay on Hum. Underhand., 

book ii., chap. 23. , -v 

'■'■Body is the external cause to which we ascnbe i,ui. 
sensations."-Mill, Logic, 2d edit., vol. i., p. 74. 

Monboddo {Ancient Metaphys., book n., chap. 1), distu. 
guishes between matter and body, and calls lody matte, 
sensible, that is, with those qualities which make it percep- 
tible to our senses. This leaves room for understandmj 
what is meant by a spiritual lady, <t^^» ^pivfc^riK,,, o- 
which we read 1 Cor. xv. 44. He also calls body, " matte 
with form," in contradistinction to " first matter," which u 
matter without form. _ 

Body is distinguished as physical, mathematical, and 
metaphysical. Physical body is incomplete ov complete. 
Incomplete as in the material part of a Hvmg being ; thus 
man is said to consist of body and mind, and life is some- 
thing different from the bodily frame in animals and vege- 
tables. Complete, when composed of matter and form as 
all natural bodies are. Mathematical body is the threefold 
dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness. Metaphysical 
body is body as included under the predicament of substance, 
which it divides with spirit.-V. Mattkk, Mind, Spirit 
BONVm, when given as one of the transcendental properties ot 
being, means that God hath made all things m the best 
possible manner to answer the wisest ends, or that no thmg 
is destitute of its essential properties, wHch metaphysicians 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 67 

call perfections. Perfections are distinguislied into absolute 
and relative, the former making the nature to which they 
belong happy, and excluding all imperfection; the latter 
belonging to inferior natures, and not excluding imperfec- 
tion, but affording help and relief under its effects. — Hut- 
cheson, MetapJiys.^ pars i., cap. 3. 

Boumu Morale, or what is good, relatively to man, was distin- 
guished into honum jucundum^ or what is calculated to give 
pleasure, as music ; honum utile^ or what is advantageous, 
as wealth ; and honum honestum^ or what is right, as tem- 
perance. These may be separate or conjoined in human 
actions. 

Boimni Summiiiu — the chief good. — This phrase was employed 
by ancient ethical philosophers to denote that in the prose- 
cution and attainment of which the progress, perfection, 
and happiness of human beings consist. The principal opm- 
ions concerning it are stated by Cicero in his Treatise De 
Finihus. 

Tucker, Light of Nature^ has a chapter (27 of vol. i.), 
entitled '' Ultimate Good," which he says is the right 
translation of summum honum. 

According to Kant, '' virtue is not the entire com- 
plete good as an object of desire to reasonable finite 
beings ; for, to have this character, it should be accom- 
panied by happiness, not as it appears to the interested 
eyes of our personality, which we conceive as an end of 
itself, but according to the impartial judgment of reason, 
which considers virtue in general, in the world, as an end 
in itself. Happiness and virtue then, together, constitute 
the possession of the sovereign good in an individual, but 
with this condition, that the happiness should be exactly 
proportioned to the morality (this constituting the value of 
the individual, and rendering him worthy of happiness). 
The sovereign good, consisting of these two elements, 
represents the entire or complete good, but virtue must 
be considered as the supreme good, because there can 
be no condition higher than virtue ; whilst happiness, which 



68 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

BONUM— 

is unquestionably always agreeable to its possessor, is not 
of itself absolutely good, but supposes as a condition, a 
morally good conduct." 
BIIO€Al&l>. — '' I make use of all the hrocardics^ or rules of 
interpreters ; tliat is, not only what is established regularly, 
in law, but what is concluded wise and reasonable by the 
best interpreters." — Jeremy Taylor, Preface to Ductor 
Dubitantium, 

'' To the Stoics and not to the Stagirite, are we to refer 
the first announcement of the hrocard. In intellectu nihil 
est^ quod non prius fuerit in sensu^ — Sir Will. Hamilton, 
Reid's Works^ note A, p. 772. 



CAPACITY- 

"If heaven to men such mighty thoughts would give, 
What breast hut thine capacious to receive 
The vast infusion? " — Cowley,, ^^e Davideis, h. 4. 

" Is it for that such outward ornament 
Was lavish'd on their sex, that inward gifts 
Were left for haste unfinish'd, judgment scant, 
Capacity not raised to apprehend, 
Or value, what is best 
In choice, hut oftest to affect the wi'ong."— 

Milton, Samson Agonistes, 

-''The original power which the mind possesses of being 
taught, we call natural capacity; and this in some degree 
is common to all men. The superior facility of being 
taught, which some possess above the rest, we call genius. 
The first transition or advances firom natural power, we 
call proficiency; and the end or completion of proficiency, 
we call habit. If such habit be conversant about matter 
purely speculative, it is then called science ; if it descend 
from speculation to practice, it is then called art ; and if 
such practice be conversant in regulating the passions and 
affections, it is then called moral virtue.'''' — Harris, Philo- 
soph. Arrange.^ chap. 8. 

'' From habit, necessarily results power or capacity (in 
Greek Ivuocj^i;), Avhich Aristotle has distinguished into two 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 69 

CAPACITY— 

kinds. The first is the mere capacity of becoming anything. 
The second is the power or faculty of energizing^ according 
to the habit when it is formed and acquired ; or, in other 
words, after the thing is become and actually exists, which 
at first was only in the capacity of existing. This, Aristotle 
illustrates by the example of a child, who is then only a 
general in power (sv ^vvuf/.n)., that is, has the power of 
becoming a general. But when he is grown up and has 
become a general, then he has the power of the second 
kind, that is, the power of performing the oflice of a gene- 
ral." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ b. i., chap. 4. 

"There are powers which are acquired by use, exercise, 
or study, which are called habits. There must be some- 
thing in the constitution of the mind necessary to our 
being able to acquire habits,^ and this is commonly called 
capacity.^'' — E-eid, Intell. Pow.^ essay i., chap. 1. 

Dr. Keid did not recognize the distinction of power as 
active or passive. But capacity is a passive power, or 
natural receptivity. A faculty is a power which we are 
conscious we can direct towards an end. A capacity is 
rather a disposition or aptitude to receive certain modifi- 
cations of our consciousness, in receiving which we are 
passive. But an original capacity^ though at first passive, 
may be brought under the influence of will and attention, 
and when so exercised it corresponds to a mental power, 
and is no longer a pure receptivity. In sensation, we are 
in the first instance passive, but our capacity of receivuig 
sensations may be employed in various ways under the 
direction of will and attention, or personal activity. 
CARDlNAXi (The) Virtues, prudence, temperance, fortitude, 
and justice, were so called from cardo^ sl hinge ; because 
they were the hinges on which other wtues turned. Each 
one of them was a fons et principium^ from which other 
virtues took their rise. 

The four cardinal virtues are rather the necessary and 
essential conditions of virtue, than each individually a 
virtue. For no one can by itself be manifested as a \irtue. 



70 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CARDINAIi— 

without the other three. — Thurot, De V Entendement^ torn, 
i., page 162. 

This division of the virtues is as old as moral philosophy. 
It is found in the teaching of Socrates as recorded by 
Xenophon, with this difference, that evas/Se^cc or regard to 
the Deity holds the place of prudence or knowledge, which, 
united to virtue, forms true wisdom. Plato notices tem- 
perance, fortitude, and prudence, and in connection with 
or arising out of these justice, which he considered not as 
the single virtue of giving all their due, but as the perfec- 
tion of human nature and of human society. The term 
justice had been employed in the same large sense by 
Pythagoras, and the corresponding term righteousness, is 
used in Scripture to signify not one virtue, but all the 
virtues. The four cardinal virtues are alluded to in the 
Apocrypha, Wisdom^ viii., 7. 

The theological virtues are faith, hope, and charity ; which 
being added to the cardinal^ make the number seven. 

'•'' Justice, temperance, fortitude, and prudence, the old 
heads of the family of virtues, give us a division which 
fails altogether ; since the parts are not distinct, and the 
whole is not complete. The portions of morality so laid 
out, both over-lap one another, or are undistinguishable ; and 
also, leave parts of the subject which do not appear in 
the distribution at all." — Whewell, Sysiemat, Mor.^ lect. iv. 

Clodius, De Virtutihus quas Cardinales Appellant. 4to, 
Leips., 1815. Plethon, De Quatuor Virtutihus Cardinali- 
hus. 8vo, BasL, 1552. 
CASUISTRY is a department of ethics—" the great object of 
which is to lay down rules or canons for directing us how 
to act, wherever there is any room for doubt or hesitation." 
— Stewart, Active Powers^ b. iv., chap. 5, sect. 4. 

To casuistry^ as ethical or moral, belongs the decision of 
what are called cases of conscience — that is, cases in which 
we are under obligation, but cases which from the special 
circumstances attending give rise to doubt whether or how 
far the obligation may be relaxed or dissolved— such as 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 71 

CASUISTRY— 

the obligation to keep a promise obtained by fraud, or 
extorted by force. 
CATAliEPSY, — " The speculations of Berkeley and Boscovich 
on the non-existence of matter, and of Kant and others 
on the arbitrariness of all our notions, are interested in, 
for they appear to be confuted by, the intuitions of cata- 
leptics. The cataleptic apprehends or perceives directly 
the objects around her ; but they are the same as when 
realized through her senses. She notices no difference ; 
size, form, colour, distance, are elements as real to her 
now as before. In respect again to the future, she sees it, 
but not in the sense of the a,nnihilation of time ; she fore- 
sees it ; it is the future present to her ; time she measures, 
present and future, with strange precision — strange, yet 
an approximation, instead of this certainty, would have 
been more puzzling. 

'' So that it appears that our notions of matter, force, 
and the like, and of the conditions of space and time, apart 
from which we can conceive nothing, are not figments to 
suit our human and temporary being, but elements of 
eternal truth." — Mayo, On Popular Superstitions^ p. 125. 
8vo, 3d edit., Edin., 1851. 

How far is the argument in the foregoing passage 
affected by the fact, that in sleep and in dreams we have 
sensations and perceptions in reference to objects which 
are not within the reach of the senses ? 

The paradox of Berkeley may be confuted in two ways : — 
First, by a Reductio ad absurdum ; second, no single ex- 
istence can effect any change or event, and a change or 
event of some kind there must be, in order to create those 
sensations or states of mind in which consciousness consists. 
There must, therefore, be something in existence foreign 
to ourselves, for no change, in other words, nothing which 
stands in the relation of cause and effect, is conceivable, but 
what is the result of two existences acting upon each other. 

See Sir Gilbert Blane on Muscular Motion^ p. 258, 
note. 



72 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CATEOOHY (KciTcc izysi^Biy^ to bring together, or, xccTocyc- 
^2/1/, to accuse, to attribute). 

" So again, tbe distribution of things into certain tribes^ 
wMch we call categories or predicaments^ are but cautions 
against tlie confusion of definitions and divisions." — Bacon.. 
Adv. of Learning., b. ii. 

The categories are the highest classes to which all the 
objects of knowledge can be reduced, and in which they can 
be arranged in subordination and system. Philosophy 
seeks to know all things. But it is impossible to know 
all things individually. They are, therefore, arranged in 
classes, according to properties which are common to them. 
And when we know the definition of a class, we attain to a 
formal knowledge of all the individual objects of knowledge 
contained in that class. Every individual man we cannot 
know ; but if we know the definition of man, we know the 
nature of man, of which every individual of the species 
participates ; and in this sense we may be said to know all 
men. This attempt to render knowledge in some sense 
universal, has been made in all ages of philosophy, and ha& 
given rise to the categories which have appeared in various 
forms. They are to be found in the philosophy of Eastern 
nations, as a classification of things and of ideas. The 
categories of the followers of Pythagoras have been pre- 
served by Aristotle in the first book of his Metaphysics, 
Those ascribed to Archytas are now regarded as apocryphal^ 
and as having been fabricated about the beginning of the 
Christian era, to lower the reputation of Aristotle, whose 
categories are well known. They are ten in number, viz., 
— ovaioi-., substance ; 'ttogov., quantity : 'Traiou^ quality ; Troog 
Ti^ relation ; -^rojy, place ; ^org, time ; %,sio^c&i^ situation ; 
sx,stu^ possession, or manner of holding ; Trosiu., action ; and 
'TTOLax^iv-t sufiering. The Mnemonic verses which contain 
them, are : — 

Arbor sex servos ardore refrigerat ustos 
Cras rure stabo, sed tunicatus ero. * 

* A humorous illustration of the categories is given by Cornelius to his pupil 
^lartinus Scriblerus. Calling up the coachman, he asked him what he had s«en at 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 73 

CATEOORY— 

The categories of Aristotle are both logical and meta- 
physical, and apply to things as well as to words. Regarded 
logically, they are reducible to two, suhstance and attribute. 
Regarded metaphysically, they are reducible to heing and 
accident The Stoics reduced them to four, viz., sub- 
stance, quality, manner of being, and relation. Plotinus 
attempted a new system. But the categories of Aristotle 
were acquiesced in till the time of Bacon, who recom- 
mended observation rather than classification. Descartes 
arranged all things under two great categories^ the absolute 
and the relative. In the Port Royal Logic ^ seven cate- 
gories are established. In more modern times the catego- 
ries of Kant are weU known. They are quantity, quality, 
relation, and modality. But they are purely subjective, 
and give merely a classification of the conceptions or judg- 
ments of the understanding. In the history of philosophy, 
the categories have been successively a classification univer- 
sal of things, of words, of ideas, or of forms of thought. 
And a complete theory of classification, or a complete 
system of categories is still a desideratum. — Monboddo, 
Origin of Lang.^ vol. i., p. 520, and Ancient Metaphys., b. 
iii., chap. 1. — V. Predicament, Universal. 

Mr. Mill (System of Logic ^ I. iii., ult.), gives the follow- 
ing classification of all nameable things. 

1. Feelings or states of consciousness. 

2. The minds which experience these feelings. 

3. The bodies or external objects which excite certain 
of these feelings, together with the power or properties 
whereby they excite them. 

4. The successions and co-existences, the likenesses and 

unlikenesses, between feelings or states of consciousness. 

tlie bear-garden ? The man answered he had seen t^YO men fight for a prize ; one 
v/as afair man, a sergeant in the Guards; the other blaclv, a butcher; the sergeant 
had red breeches, the butcher blue; they fought upon a stage about four o'clock, 
and the sergeant wounded the butcher in the leg. Mark (quoth Cornelius) how the 
fellow runs through the predicaments— men (substantia) — two (quantitas)—Mv and 
black (qualitas)— sergeant and butcher (relatio)— wounded the other (actio et pussio 
—fighting (situs)— stage (ubi)— four o'clock (quando)—'h\\ie and red breeches 
(habiiKs). 



74 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CATEOORY— 

A categorical proposition is one wMcli affirms or denies 
a predicate of a subject, absolutely, and without any hypo- 
tbesis. — Whately, Logic^ b. ii., cbap. 2, sect. 4. 

A categorical answer is an express and pertinent reply 
to a question proposed. 
CAUSAIilTY, CAUSATION, CAUSE. 

CAUSE.— 

"He knew the cause of every maladie, 
Were it of cold, or hot, or moist, or drie." 

Chaucer, Prologue, v. 421. 

" The general idea of cause is, that without which 
another thing called the effect, cannot be ; and it is divided 
by Aristotle {Metaphys.^ lib. 5, cap. 2), into four kinds, 
known by the name of the material^ the formal^ the efficient^ 
and the Jinal. The first is that of which any thing is made. 
Thus brass or marble are the material causes of a statue ; 
earth, air, fire, and water, of all natural bodies. The formal 
cause is the form, idea, archetype, or pattern of a thing ; 
for all these words Aristotle uses to express it. Thus the 
idea of the artist is the formal cause of the statue ; and of 
all natural substances, if we do not suppose them the work 
of chance, the formal cause are the ideas of the divine 
mind ; and this form concurring with the matter, produces 
every work, whether of nature or art. The efficient cause 
is the principle of change or motion which produces the 
thing. In this sense the statuary is the cause of the statue, 
and the God of nature the cause of all the works of nature. 
And lastly, the final cause is that for the sake of which any 
thing is done. Thus the statuary makes the statue for 
pleasure or for profit ; and the works of nature are all for 
some good end." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys,^ b. i., 
chap. 4. 

In Metaphys.^ lib. i., cap. 3, Aristotle says we may dis- 
tinguish four kinds of causes. The first is the form pro- 
per to each thing. To r/ nv uvoci. This is the quidditas of 
the schoolmen, the causa for malis. The second is the mat- 
ter and the subject. Tj^ v>vyi jcqci to vTroKHf^iuov^ causa 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 70 

CAUSAIilTY 

materialis. The third is the principle of movement which 
produced the thing. A^x"^ '^^s fciYiaiO)^^ causa efficiens. The 
fourth is the reason and good of all things ; for the end of all 
phenomena and of all movement is good. To 6u euiKcc x.(x,l 
rocyctQou^ causa finalis. The sufficient reason of Leibnitz, 
which he, like Aristotle, thought to be essentially good. 

In Metaphys.^ lib. iii., cap. 2, Aristotle says, '' It is pos- 
sible that one object may combine all the kinds of causes. 
Thus, in a house, the principle of movement is the art and 
the workman, the final cause is the work, the matter the 
earth and stones, and the plan is the /or/Ti." See also Nat. 
Auseult.^ Hb. ii., cap. 3, quoted by Harris concerning Art. 

p. 24:. 

In addition to these four causes, Dr. Gillies (^Analysis of 
AristotWs Works^ chap, ii., note, p. 100), says, '' The 
model or exemplar was considered as a cause by the Pytha- 
goreans and Platonists ; the former of whom maintained 
that all perceptible things were imitations of numbers ; and 
the latter, that they owed their existence to the participa- 
tion of ideas ; but wherein either this imitation or this par- 
ticipation consisted, these philosophers, Aristotle observes, 
omitted to show." 

Seneca, in Epist. ^^ and 67, explaius the common and 
Platonic divisions of causes ; and arraigns both, because he 
conceived that space, time, and motion, ought to be in- 
cluded. 

Sir W. Hamilton (Reid^s Works^ p. 690, note), says, 
*' The exemplary cause was introduced by Plato ; and was 
not adopted by the schoolmen as a fifth cause in addition to 
Aristotle's fom\" 

It is noticed by Suarez and others. 

According to Derodon (De Prcedicamentis^ p. 114), 
material and formal causes are internal^ and constitute the 
essence of a thing ; efficient, final, and exemplary causes 
are external^ that is, out from or of the essence of a thing. 
The material cause is that, ex quo^ any thing is, or becomes. 
The formal cause is that, />er quod. The efficient cause is 



76 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CAUSAIilTY— 

that, a quo. The final cause is that, propter quod. And 
the exemplary cause is that, ad cujus imitationem res Jit. 

When the word cause is used without an adjective, it 
commonly means, active power, that which produces 
change, or efficient cause. 

Suarez, Rivius, and others, define a cause thus : — Cau- 
sam esse principium per se influens esse in aliud. 

'' A cause is that which, of itself, makes any thing begin 
to be." — Irons, Final Causes., p. 74. 

We conceive of a cause a;S existing and operating before 
the efiect which is produced. But, to the production of an 
effect, more causes than one may be necessary. Hence it 
has been said by Mr. Karslake {Aids to the Study of Logic, 
vol. ii., p. 43), "The cause of a thing is that antecedent 
(or aggregate of antecedents), which is seen to have an 
intimate connection with the effect, viewed, if it be not 
itself a self- determining agent, in reference to a self-acting 
power, whose agency it exhibits." And some, instead of 
the word cause., would prefer in many cases to use the word 
concauses. 

'' Though the antecedent is most strictly the cause of a 
tiling being ^ as, e. g.^ the passage of the moon between the 
earth and the sun is the cause of an eclipse, yet the effect is 
that which commonly presents itself to us as the cause of 
our knowing it to he. Hence, by what seems to us a strange 
inversion of cause and effect, effect was said to he a cause^ 
a causa cognoscendi., as distinguished from a causa essendi^ 
the strict cause.'''' — Karslake, Aids to Study of Logic ^ vol. ii., 
p. 38. 
CAUSAIilTY and CAUSATION. 

" Now, if there be no spirit, matter must of necessity 
move itself, where you cannot imagine any activity or 
causality^ but the bare essence of the matter, from whence 
the motion comes." — H. More, Immortality of the Soul^ 
book i., chap. 6. 

" Now, always God's word hath a causation with it. He 
said to him. Sit, that is, he made him sit, or, as it is here 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 77 

CAUSAIilTY— 

expressed, he made him sit with a mighty power." — Good- 
win, Works^ vol. i., part 1, p. 406. 

Causality^ in actu primo^ is the energ}^ or power in the 
cause* by which it produces its effect ; as heat in the fire. 
Causality^ in actu secundo^ is causation or the operation of 
the power by which the cause is actually producing its 
effect. It is, influxus ille^ a quo causa influit esse in effec- 
tum quce distinguitur a parte rei^ tam a principio. quam a 
termino^ sive ah effectu^ ad quem tendit. " The changes of 
which I am conscious in the state of my own mind, and 
those which I perceive in the external universe, impress me 
T\dth a coniiction that some cause must have operated to 
produce them. There is an intuitive judgment involving 
the simple idea of causation.''^ — Stewart, Philosoph. Essays^ 
i., chap. 3. 

From the explanation of these terms, it appears that a 
cause is something which not only precedes^ but has power 
to produce the effect. And when the effect has been pro- 
duced, we say it is in consequence of the power in the 
cause ha^dng operated. The belief that every effect implies 
a cause, or that every change is produced by the operation 
of some power, is regarded by some as a primitive belief, 
and has been denominated by the phrase, thef principle of 
causality. Hume, and others, however, have contended 
that we have no proper idea of cause as implpng power to 
produce, nor of any necessary connection between the 
operation of this power and the production of the effect. 
All that we see or know is mere succession, antecedent and 

* Tlie idea of the reason is not to be confounded with that of causality. It is a 
more elevated idea, hecause it applies to all orders of things, while causality extends 
only to things in time. It is tme we speak sometimes of the eternal cause ; but thus 
thp idea of cause is sjTionymous with that of the reason. This idea of the reason 
expresses the relation of a being or thing to what is contained within it ; in other 
words, the reason expresses the rapport du contewnU au contenu, or the reason is 
that whose essence encloses the essence and existence of another thing. We thus 
arrive at the conception of all being contained in God, who is th supreme reason. 
— Ahrens, Cours de Psychol, torn, ii.— F. Eeason. 

t Lord Bacon {Nov. Organ., book ii., sect. 14), says, " Tliere are some things 
ultimate and incausable." 



78 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CAUSAIilTY— 

consequent ; but having seen things in this relation, we asso- 
ciate them together, and imagining that there is some vincu- 
lum or connection between them, we call the one the cause, 
and the other the effect. Dr. Thomas Brown adopts this 
view with the modification that it is in cases where the ante- 
cedence and consequence is invariable that we attain to the 
idea of cause. Experience, however, can only testify that the 
succession of one thing to another has, in so far as it has been 
observed, been unvaried^ not that in the nature of things it 
is invariable. Mr. Locke (Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book 
ii., chap. 21 and 26), ascribes the origin of our idea of cause to 
our experience of the sensible changes which one body pro- 
duces on another, as fire upon wax. Our belief in an exter- 
nal world rests partly on the principle of causality. Our sen- 
sations are referred to external objects as their causes. Yet, 
the idea of power which is involved in that of cause, he 
traces to the consciousness of our possessing power in our- 
selves. This is the view taken of the origin of our idea of 
cause by Dr. Reid. '' In the strict philosophical sense, I 
take a cause to be that which has the relation to the effect 
which I have to my voluntary and deliberate actions ; for I 
take this notion of a cause to be derived from the power I 
feel in myself to produce certain effects. In this sense we 
say that the Deity is the cause of the universe." — Corre- 
spondence of Dr. Reid^ p. 77. And at p. 81 he has said, " I 
see not how mankind could ever have acquired the concep- 
tion of a cause, or of any relation beyond a mere conjunc- 
tion in time and place between it and its effects, if they 
were not conscious of active exertions in themselves, by 
which effects are produced. This seems to me to be the, 
origin of the idea, or conception of production." 

By origin, however. Dr. Reid must have meant occasion., 
At least he held that the principle of causality, or the belief 
that every change implies the operation of a cause, is a 
natural judgment, or a priori conviction, necessary and 
universal. But if the idea of a cause be empirical and 
grounded on experience, it may be difficult to show how a 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 7^ 

CAL'SAIilTi:— 

higher origin can be claimed for the principle of causality, 
!Mr. Stewart has expressed himself in language equivalent 
to that of Dr. Eeid. And Maine de Biran (Xouvelles Con- 
siderat. sur le Rapport du Physique et du Moral de Vhomme^ 
8vo, Par., 1834, pp. 274, 290, 363, 402), thinks that the true 
origia of our idea of cause is to be found in the activity of 
the will, or m the consciousness that we are causes, or have 
in ourselves the power of producing change. Having found 
the idea of power within the sphere of consciousness, we, by 
a process which he calls natiu-al induction, project this idea 
into the external world, and ascribe power to that which 
we call cause. According to Kant we have the idea of 
cause, and also the belief that every commencing pheno- 
menon implies the operation of a cause. But these are 
merely forms of our understanding, subjective conditions of 
human thought. In conformity with a pre-existing law of 
our intelligence, we arrange phenomena according to the 
relation of cause and effect. But we know not whether, 
independently of our form of thought, there be any reality 
corresponding to our idea of cause, or of productive power. 
The view that the idea of cause is furnished by the fact of 
our being conscious of possessing power, meets the idealism 
of Kant, for what gTeater reality can be conceived than a 
fact of consciousness ? But if experience of external pheno- 
mena can be accepted as the origin (or rather as the occa- 
sion) of our notion of change, and if consciousness of 
internal phenomena can be accepted as the origin (or 
rather as the occasion) of our notion of power to produce 
change, the idea of a necessaiy and universal connection 
between change and the power which produces it, in other 
words, a behef in the principle of causality, can only 
be referred to the reason, the faculty which apprehends, 
not what is contingent and passing, but what is permanent 
and absolute. 

'^ Cousin's theory- concerning the origin of idea o1l caus- 
ality is, that the mind, when it perceives that the agent and 
the change vary in cases of personal agency (though here 



80 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

lie is not very explicit), several times repeated : while the 
relation between them, viz., the strict idea of personal 
causation, never varies, but is necessary, that the mind 
abstracts the invariable and necessary element from the 
variable and contingent elements of the fact, and thus 
arrives at the idea of causality.''^ — Essay on Causality^ by 
an Undergraduate, 1854, p. 3. 
^^ Causation is not an object of sense. The only experi- 
ence we can have of it, is in the consciousness we have of 
exerting some power in ordering our thoughts and actions. 
But this experience is surely too narrow a foundation for a 
general conclusion, that all things that have had or shall 
have a beginning, must have a cause. This is to be admit- 
ted as a first or self-evident principle." — E,eid, Intell. Pow,^ 
essay vi., chap. 6. 

But Locke has said (Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book 
ii., chap. 21, sect. 4), '' The idea of the beginning of 
motion we have only from reflection on what passes in 
ourselves, where we find by experience, that barely by 
iviUing it., barely by a thought of the mind., we can move 
the parts of our bodies which were before at rest." 

See Cousin, (Euvres Prem. Ser.^ tom. i., cours. 1817, and 
Hist, de Philosoph. Mod.., sect, 19. See also on the various 
theories as to the origin of our judgment of cause and eifect, 
Sir Will. Hamilton, Discussions., app. 1. 
CAUSES (Final, ]>octriiae of). — When we see means indepen- 
dent of each other conspiring to accomplish certain ends, 
we naturally conclude that the ends have been contem- 
plated, and the means arranged by an intelligent agent ; 
and, from the nature of the ends and of the means, we 
infer the character or design of the agent. Thus, from the 
ends answered in creation being wise and good, we infer 
not only the existence of an Intelligent Creator, but also 
that He is a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness. This 
is commonly called the argument fi^om design or from, final 
causes. It was used by Socrates (see Xenophon, Memora- 
bilia), and found a place in the scholastic philosophy. But 



YOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 81 

CAUSES— 

Lord Bacon has said (JDe Aug. Scient^ lib. iii., cap. 5), 
that the inquiry into^naZ causes is sterile. And Descartes 
maintained that we cannot know the designs of God in 
creating the universe, unless he reveal them to us. But 
Leibnitz, in maintaining the principle of sufficient reason, 
upheld the doctrine of Jinal causes, and thought it equally 
applicable in physics and in metaphysics. It is true that 
in physical science we should prosecute our inquiries with- 
out any preconceived opinion as to the ends to be answered, 
and observe the phenomena as they occur, without forcing 
them into the service of an hypothesis. And it is against 
this error that the language of Bacon was directed. But 
when our contemplations of nature reveal to us innumer- 
able adjustments and arrangements working out ends that 
are wise and good, it is natural to conclude that they have 
been designed by a cause sovereignly wise and good. IsTot- 
withstanding the doubts as to the logical validity of this 
argument, which have been started by Kant, Coleridge, 
and others, it continues to be regarded as the most popu- 
lar and impressive mode of proving the being and perfec- 
tions of God. And the validity of it is implied in the 
universally admitted axiom of modern physiology, that 
there is no organ without its function. We say of 
some things ia nature that they are useless. All we can 
truly say is, that we have not yet discovered their use. 
Every thing has an end to the attaiament or accomplish- 
ment of which it contiaually tends. This is the form in 
which the doctriae of Jinal causes was advocated by Aris- 
totle. With him it was not so much an argument from 
design, as an argument against chance. But if things do 
not attain their ends by chance it must be by design. 
Aristotle, it is true, was satisfied that ends were answered 
by tendencies in nature. But whence or why these ten- 
dencies in nature, but from an Litelligent Author of 
nature ? 

''K we are to judge from the explanations of the prin- 
ciple given by Aristotle, the notion of a Jiiial cause, as 
G 



82 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CAUSES— 

originally conceived, did not necessarily imply design. 
The theological sense to which it is now commonly re- 
stricted, has been derived from the place assigned to it in 
the scholastic philosophy; though, indeed, the principle 
had been long before beautifully applied by Socrates and 
by the Stoics to establish the truth of a Divine Providence. 
Whenever, indeed, we observe the adjustment of means to 
an end, we seem irresistibly impelled to conclude that the 
whole is the effect of design. The present acceptation, 
therefore, of the doctrine of final causes^ is undoubtedly a 
natural one. Still it is not a necessary construction of the 
doctrine. With Aristotle, accordingly, it is simply an in- 
quiry into tendencies — an investigation of any object or 
phenomenon, from considering the ' iV2x.ot tov^ the reason 
of it in something else which follows it, and to which it 
naturally leads. 

His theory of final causes is immediately opposed to a 
doctrine of chance, or spontaneous coincidence ; and must 
be regarded as the denial of that, rather than as a positive 
assertion of design. He expressly distinguishes, indeed, 
between thought and nature. He ascribes to nature the 
same working in order to ends, which is commonly re- 
garded as the attribute of thought alone. He insists that 
there is no reason to suppose deliberation necessary in 
these workings of nature, since it is '' as if the art of ship- 
building were in the timber, or just as if a person should 
act as his own physician." — Hampden, Introd. to Mor, 
Phil.., lect. iv., p. 113. 

''The argument frovQ. final causes^'''' says Dr. Reid (IntelL 
Powers^ essay vi., chap. 6), "when reduced to a syllogism, 
has these two premises : — First, that design and intelhgence 
in the cause may, with certainty, be inferred from marks or 
signs of it in the effect. This we may call the major 
proposition of the argument. The second, which we call 
the minor proposition, is, that there are in fact the clearest 
marks of design and wisdom in the works of nature ; and 
the conclusion is, that the works of nature are the effects 



► 



VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 83 

CAUSES— 

of a wise and intelligent cause. One must either assent to 
the conclusion, or deny one or other of the premises." 

Hampden, Introd. to Mor, Phil.., p. 110-113 ; Irons, 
Doctrine of Final Causes^ 8vo, Lond., 1856. The argu- 
ment from design is prosecuted by Paley, in Nat. Theology: 
Bridgewater Treatises; Burnett Prize Essays^ &c. 
Causes (Occasional, Doctrine of). — This phrase has been em- 
ployed by the Cartesians to explain the commerce or mode of 
communicating between mind and matter. The soul being 
a thinking substance, and extension being the essence of 
body, no intercourse can take place between them without 
the intervention of the First Cause. It is Deity himself, 
therefore, who, on the occasion of certain modifications in 
our mind, excites the corresponding movements of body; 
and, on the occasion of certain changes in our body, 
awakens the corresponding feelings in the mind. This 
theor}', which is involved in the philosophy of Descartes, 
was fully developed by Malebranche, Eegis, and Geulinx. 
Laforge limited the theory to involuntary movements, and 
thus reconciled it in some degree to experience and com- 
mon sense. Malebranche's doctrine is commonly called 
the '' vision of all things in God" — who is the "hght of all 
our seeing." 

According to this theory, the admirable structure of the 
body and its organs is useless ; as a dull mass would have 
answered the pm-pose equally well. 
CERTAINTY, CERTITUDE (Certum (from cerno)^ propria 
idem sit., quod deer etiim ac proinde firmum. Yossius). 

''This way of certainty by the knowledge of our own 
ideas, goes a little farther than bare imagination ; and I 
believe it will appear that aU the certainty of general truths 
a man has, lies in nothing else." — Locke, Essay on Hum. 
Understand.., book iii., chap. 4. 

" Certain., in its primary sense, is applied (according to 
its etymolog}' from cerno)^ to the state of a person's mind; 
denoting any one's full and complete conviction; and 
generally^ though not always, imph-ing that there is sufli- 



84 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CERTAINTY-^ 

cient ground for such conviction. It was thence easily 
transferred metonymically to the truths or events^ respecting 
which this conviction is rationally entertained. And un- 
certain (as well as the substantives and adverbs derived 
from these adjectives), follows the same rule. Thus we 
say, ''It is certain, &c., meaning that we are sure ; whereas 
the fact may be uncertain and certain to different indivi- 
duals. From not attending to this, the words uncertain and 
contingent have been considered as denoting some quality 
in the things themselves — and chance has been regarded as 
a real agent." — ^Whatley, Logic^ appendix 1. 

'' Certainty is truth brought methodically to the human 
intellect, that is, conducted from principle to principle, to 
a point which is evident in itself. It is the relation of truth 
to knowledge, of God to man, of ontology to psychology." 
Tiberghien, Essai des Connais, Hum.^ p. 35. 

" In accurate reasoning, the word certain ought never to 
be used as merely synonymous with necessary. Physical 
events we call necessary^ because of their depending on 
fixed causes., not on known causes ; when they depend also 
on knoivn causes, they may be called certain. The vari- 
ations of the weather arise from 7iecessary Sind fixed causes., 
but they are proverbially uncertaia." — Coplestone, Re- 
mains., 8vo, Lond., 1854, p. 98. 

When we affirm, without any doubt, the existence or 
non-existence of a being or phenomenon, the truth or 
falsity of a proposition, the state in which our mind is we 
call certainty — and we say of the object of knowledge that 
it is evident or certain. According to the mode in which 
it is attained, certainty is immediate by sense and intuition, 
and mediate by reasoning and demonstration. According to 
the grounds on which it rests it is called metaphysical., when 
we firmly adhere to truth which cannot be otherwise. 
Such as the first principles of natural law, or the difference 
between right and wrong. Physical., when we adhere to 
truth which cannot be otherwise, according to the laws of 
nature, but which may be by miracle ; as, fire will certainly 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 85 

CERTAINTY— 

burn — although it did not burn the Hebrew youths (Dan., 
chap, iii.) Morale when we adhere to truth which is in 
accordance with the common order of things, and the 
common judgment of men — although it may be otherwise 
without a miracle. 

Moral certainty may amount to the highest degree of 
probability^ and to all practical purposes may be as influ- 
ential as certainty. For it should be observed that pro- 
bability and certainty are two states of mind, and not two 
modes of the reality. The reality is one and the same, but 
our knowledge of it may be probable or certain. Pro- 
bability has more or less of doubt and admits of degrees. 
Certainty excludes doubt and admits neither of increase 
nor diminution. 

Certainty supposes an object to be known, a mind to 
know, and the result of a communication or relation being 
established between them which is knowledge ; and certain 
knowledge or certainty is the confidence with which the 
mind reposes in the information of its faculties. Self-con- 
sciousness reveals with certainty the different states and 
operations of our own minds. We cannot doubt the reality 
of what our senses clearly testify. The operations of me- 
mory may give us certainty as to the past. Eeason reveals to us 
first truths with intuitive certainty. And by demonstration 
we ascend with certainty fi:om one truth to another. For to 
use the words of Thomas Aquinas (De Veritate)^ " Tunc 
conclusiones^ pro certe^ sciuntur^ quando resolviintur in prin- 
cipia^ et ideo^ quod aliquod per certitudinem sciatur^ est ex 
lumine rationis divinitus interius indito^ quo in nobis loquitur 
Deus^ non autem ab homine exterius docente^ nisi quatenus 
conclusiones in principia resolvit^ nos docens, ex quo tamen 
nos certitudinem non acciperemus^ nisi in nobis esset certitude 
principiorum^ in quce conclusiones resolvuntury 

" The criterion of true knowledge is not to be looked 
for any where abroad without our own minds, neither in 
the height above, nor in the depth beneath, but only in our 
knowledge and conceptions themselves. For the entity of 



86 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CERTAINTY— 

all theoretical truth is nothing else but clear intelligibility, 
and whatever is clearly conceived, is an entity and a truth ; 
but that which is false, Divine power itself cannot make it 
to be clearly and distinctly understood, because falsehood 
is a non-entity, and a clear conception is an entity; and 
Omnipotence itself cannot make a non-entity to be an 
entity." — Cudworth, Eternal and Immutable Mor,^ book 
iv., chap. 5. 

''The theories of certitude may be reduced to three 
classes. The Jirst places the ground of certitude in reason ; 
the second in authority ; the third in evidence ; including, 
under that term, both the external manifestations of truth, 
and the internal principles or laws of thought by which we 
are determined in forming our judgments in regard to 
them."— Buchanan, Faith in God^ vol. ii., p. 304. 

'' De veritatis criterio frustra labor antur quidam : quum 
non alia reperienda sit prceter ipsam rationis facultatem^ aut 
menti congenitam intelligendi vim,''"' — Hutcheson, Metaphys.y 
pars, i., cap. 2. 

Protagoras and Epicurus in ancient times, and Hobbes 
and the modem sensationalists, have made sense the 
measure and ground of certainty, Descartes and his fol- 
lowers founded it on self-consciousness, Cogito ergo sum^ 
while others have received as certain only what is homolo- 
gated by human reason in general. But certainty is not the 
peculiar characteristic of knowledge furnished by any one 
faculty, but is the common inheritance of any or all of our 
intellectual faculties when legitimately exercised within 
their respective spheres. When so exercised we cannot but 
accept the result as true and certain. 

But if we are thus naturally and necessarily determined 
to accept the knowledge furnished by our faculties, that 
knowledge, according to Kant, cannot be proved to be 
absolute, or a knowledge of things in themselves, and as 
they must appear to all intelligent beings, but is merely 
relative, or a knowledge of things as they appear to us. 
Xow, it is true that we cannot, as Kant has expressed it, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 87 

CERTAINTY— 

objectify the subjective. Without rising out of human 
nature to the possession of a higher, we cannot sit in judg- 
ment on the faculties of that nature. But in admitting that 
our knowledge is relative^ we are merely saying it is human. 
It is according to the measure of a man. It is attained by 
human faculties, and must be relative, or bear proportion 
to the faculties by which it is attained. In like manner, 
the knowledge of angels may be called angelic, but this is 
not to call it uncertain. We may not know all that can be 
known of the objects of our knowledge, but still, what we 
do know, we may know with certainty. Human knowledge 
may admit of increase without being liable to be contra- 
dicted or overturned. We come to it by degrees, but the 
higher degree of knowledge to which we may ultimately 
attain, does not invalidate the lower degree of knowledge. 
It rests upon it and rises out of it, and the ground and 
encouragement of all inquiry is, that there is a truth and 
reality in things which our faculties are fitted to apprehend. 
Then' testimony we rejoice to believe. Faith in their trust- 
worthiness is spontaneous. Doubt concerning it is an after- 
thought. And scepticism as a creed is self-destructive. 
He who doubts is certain that he doubts. Omnis^ qui utrum 
sit Veritas^ dubitat^ in se ipso habet verum^ unde non dabitet. 
— Augustin, De vera Religione. 

Etiam qui negate veritatem esse^ concedit veritatem esse; si 
enira Veritas non est., verum est., veritatem non esse. Thomas 
Aquin., Sum. TheoL ; Savary, sur la Certitude., 8vo, Paris, 
1847. — V. Evidence, Criterion. 
CHANCE. — Aristotle defines chance to be a '' cause not mani- 
fest to human reasoning." Ao^g/, /lcsu^ cciricc v] rvxri, ulrMv 
OS ocu&^a7:iUYi Oiotifoicc. — Phys.^ ii., 4. 

'' Many things happen, besides what man intends or 
pmposes ; and also some things happen different from what 
is aimed at by nature. We cannot call them natural things, 
or from nature, neither can we say that they are from 
human intention. They are what we call fortuitous events, 
iiud the cause which produces them is called chance. But 



88 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAIVCE— 

they have all respect to some end intended by nature or by 
man. So that nothing can be more true than what Aris- 
totle says {PJiys.^ lib. ii.), that if there were no end 
intended, there could be no chance. 

'•'- A man digs a piece of ground, to sow or plant it ; but, 
in digging, he finds a treasure. This is beside his inten- 
tion, and therefore it is said to be by chance. 

''When a hanging wall falls upon a passenger and 
crushes him, the destination of nature was only, that the 
stones of the wall being no longer kept together by the 
cement, should fall to the ground, according to their 
natural movement ; so that the crushing " of the man was 
something beside the purpose of nature, or 'ttx^cc (pvatv.''' — 
Monboddo, Ancient. Metaphys^ book ii., chap. 20. 

As to Aristotle's views of fortune and chance^ see Picco- 
lomineus, Philosoph. de Moribus^ 1583, p. 713. 

Chance is opposed to law in this sense, viz., that what 
happens according to law may be predicted, and counted on. 
But everything has its own law and its proper cause ; and 
chance merely denotes that we know not the proper cause, 
nor the law according to which a phenomenon occurs. 

An event or series of events which seems to be the result 
neither of a necessity inherent in the nature of things, nor 
of a plan conceived by intelligence, is said to happen by 
chance. 

'' It is not, I say, merely in a pious manner of expression, 
that the Scripture ascribes every event to the providence of 
God ; but it is strictly and philosophically true in nature 
and reason, that there is no such thing as chance or acci- 
dent ; it being evident that these words do not signify any- 
thing that is truly an agent or the cause of any event ; but 
they signify merely men's ignorance of the real and imme- 
diate cause." — Clarke, vol. i., sermon xcviii. 

'^ If a die be thrown, we say it depends upon chance 
what side may turn up ; and, if we draw a prize in a lot- 
tery, we ascribe our success to chance. We do not, how- 
ever, mean that these effects were produced by no cause, 



VOCABULAPcY OF PHILOSOPHY. ^9 

CHANCE— 

but only that we are ignorant of the cause that produced 
them.** — Arthiu', Discourses, p. 17. 

CHARITY (ccyxTrr^, as One of the theological i-irtues, is a 
principle of prevailing love to God, prompting to seek his 
glory and the good of our fellow-men. 

Sometimes it is used as synommious with brotherly love. 
or that piinciple of benevolence which leads us to promote, 
in all possible ways, the happiness of others. 

In a more resmcted sense it means almsgiving, or rehev- 
mg the wants of others by communication of oiu* means 
and substance. 

CHASTITY is the duty of restraining and governing the appe- 
tite of sex. It includes pinity of thought, speech, and 
behaviom'. Lascivious imaginings, and obscene conversa- 
tion, as well as incontment conduct, are contrary to the 
duty of cJiastitij. 

CHOICE. 

"The necessity of contiaually choosing one of the two, 
either to act or to forbear acting, is not inconsistent with 
or an argiunent against liberty, but is itself the ver}' essence 
of hberty." — Clarke, Attributes^ prop. 10. 

For the principle of deliberate choice^ Aristotle thought 
that the rational and irrational shoidd conciu', producing 
'•orectic intellect." or •• dianoetic appetite," of which he 
emphatically says. — ** And this principle is man.'* — Catholic 
Philosophy, p. 4:6. 

O f/^i'j r,ov; ov (pccivsroa Kivav ccusv o^s^zcog. — Aristotle. 
Voluntas est quce quid cum ratione desiderat, — Cicero. 
]Mr. Locke says. *• The will signifies nothing but a power 
or ability to prefer or choose." And in another passage he 
says. •• The word preferring seems best to express the act 
of vohtion ; yet it does not precisely, for though a man would 
prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it?" 
— By Jonathan Edwards {Essay on Freedom of WilL sect. 
1), choice and volition are completely identified. But, in 
popular language choosing or preferring may mean, 1, A 
conclusion of the understanding ; as when I say — I prefer 



90 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. / 

CHOICE— 

or choose peaches rather than plums ; i. 6., I reckon them 
a better and safer fruit. 

2. A state of inclination or sensibility . as — I prefer or 
choose plums rather than pears ; that is, I like them better ; 
or, 

3. A determination of will : as — I prefer or choose pears, 
meaning, that with the offer of other fruits, I take this. 

It is only in the latter sense that choice and volition are 
the same. 

'' Choice or preference^ in the proper sense, is an act of 
the understanding ; but sometimes it is improperly put for 
volition, or the determination of the will in things where 
there is no judgment or preference ; thus, a man who owes 
me a shilling, lays down three or four equally good, and 
bids me take which I choose. I take one without any 
judgment or belief that there is any ground of preference ; 
this is merely an act of will, that is, a volition." — Corres- 
pondence of Dr, Reid^ p. 79. 

CHREMATISTICS (x^vi/^oi^ substance) is the science of 
wealth, or as it is more commonly called, Political 
Economy, or that department of social science which treats 
of the resources of a country, and of the best means of 
increasing them, and of diffusing them most beneficially 
among the inhabitants, regarded as individuals, or as con- 
stituting a community. 

CIVII.ITY or COUKTEOUSNESS belongs to what has been 
called the lesser moralities. It springs from benevolence or 
brotherly love, and manifests itself by kindness and con- 
sideration in manner and conversation towards others. It 
is distinguished into natural and conventional. It is opposed 
to rudeness. Dr. Ferguson says civility avoids giving 
offence by our conversation or manner. Politeness seeks to 
please. — Knox, Essays^ No. 95. 

CliASSlFlCATION {yCkviaLq^ classis^ from x.ol'Kuv., to call, a 
multitude called together). 

'' Montesquieu observed very justly, that in their classifi- 
cation of the citizens, the great legislators of antiquity 



I 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 91 

CliASSIFICATIOlV— 

made the greatest display of their powers, and even soared 
above themselves." — Bxirke, On the French Revolution. 

'' A class consists of several things coming under a com- 
mon description." — Whately, Logic^ book i., sect. 3. 

'' The sorting of a multitude of things into parcels, for 
the sake of knowing them better, and remembering them 
more easily, is classification. When we attempt to classify 
a multitude of things, we first observe some respects in 
which they differ from each other ; for we could not classify 
things that are entirely alike ; as, for instance, a bushel of 
peas ; we then separate things that are alike, and bring 
together things that are similar." — Taylor, Elements of 
Thought. 

A methodical arrangement of the divisions and sub-divi- 
sions of any whole is called classification. 

Classification is the arrangement of things in genera and 
species. 

" In every act of classification^ two steps must be taken ; 
certain marks are to be selected, the possession of which is 
to be the* title to admission into the class, and then all the 
objects that possess them are to be ascertained. When 
the marks selected are really important and connected 
closely with the nature and functions of the thing, the 
classification is said to be natural; where they are such as 
do not affect the nature of the objects materially, and 
belong in common to things the most different in their 
main properties, it is artificial.''^ — Thomson, Outline of Laws 
of Thought, 2d edit., p. 377. 

The condition common to both modes of classification^ 
is to comprehend everything and to suppose nothing. But 
the rules for a natural classification are more strict than 

* Abstraction, generalization, and definition, precede classification ; for if we wish 
to reduce to regularity the ohservations we have made, we must compare them, in 
order to unite them by their essential resemblances, and express their essence with 
all possible precision. We might classify a library by dividing the hooks into his- 
tory and philosop?ii/. History into ancient and modern; ancient, according to the 
people to whom it referred, and modern into general, particular, and individual, 
or memoirs. These divisions and subdivisions might be called a classification. 



92 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CliASSIFICATION— 

for an artificial or arbitrary one. We may classify objects 
arbitrarily in any point of view in which we are pleased to 
regard them. But a natural classification can only proceed 
according to the real nature and qualities of the objects. 
The advantages of classification are to give a convenient 
form to our acquirements, and to enlarge our knowledge 
of the relations in which different objects stand to one 
another. A good classification should — 1st, Rest on one 
principle or analogous principles. 2d, The principle or 
principles should be of a constant and permanent character. 
3d, It should be natural, that is, even when artificial, it 
should not be violent or forced. 4th, It should clearly 
and easily apply to all the objects classified. 

The principles on which classification rests are these : — 
1st, of generalization ; 2d, of specification ; and 3d, of con- 
tinuity, — q. V. 

Classification proceeds upon observed resemblances. 
Generalization rests upon the principle, that the same or 
similar causes will produce similar effects. 

COIililOATION OF FACTS in Induction, is a phrase em- 
ployed by Dr. WheweU to denote the binding together 
groups of facts by means of some suitable conception. 
The conception must be capable of explanation or defini- 
tion, not indeed of adequate definition, since we shall have 
to alter our description of it fi:'om time to time with the 
advance of knowledge, but still capable of a precise and 

clear explanation Conceptions not wholly 

correct may serve for a time for the colligation of/acts^ and 
may guide us in researches which shall end in a more exact 

colligation As soon as facts occur which a 

conception is inadequate to explain, we unite it or replace 
it by a new one. — Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, 
2d edit., p. 353. 

COMBINATION and CONNECTION of IDFAS are phrases 
to be found in book ii., chap. 33 of Locke's Essay ^ in which 
he treats of what is more commonly called association of 
ideas, — q. v. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 93 

co:tibiivations of ideas— 

Combinations of Ideas. — The phrase association of ideas 
seems to have been introduced by Locke. It stands as the 
title to one of the chapters in his Essay on the Human Under- 
standing. But in the body of the chapter he uses the 
phrase combination of ideas. These two phrases have 
reference to the two \iews which may be taken of the train 
of tlwugJit in the mind. Li both, under ideas are compre- 
hended all the various modes of consciousness. In treating 
of the association of ideas, the inquin' is as to the laws 
which regulate the succession or order according to which 
one thought follows another. But, it has been observed, 
that the various modes of consciousness not only succeed in 
some kind of order, but that they incorporate themselves 
with one another so as to fonn permanent and almost in- 
dissoluble combinations. 

Suppose, that, in eating an apple we had made use of a 
fruit knife ; a connection comes to be established in our 
minds between an apple and a fruit knife ; so that when 
the idea of the one is present, the idea of the other also 
will appear ' and these two ideas are said to be associated 
in the way o^ combination. 

Or. the s-ame kind of connection may be established 
between two feelings, or between a cognition and a feeling, 
or between a feeling and a volition, — between any two or 
more mental movements. 

In cutting an apple, we may have woimded our finger ; 
and, afterwards, the sight of an apple will raise a sense or 
feeling of the woimd. Having eaten of honey, we have 
afterwards suffered pain ; and, when honey is again pre- 
sented, there will be a feeling of dislike, and a purpose to 
abstain from it. 

The association^ which thus takes place between different 
mental movements, is more than mere juxta-position of 
separate things. It amoimts to a perfect combination or 
fusion. And, as in matter, compoimds have properties 
which are not manifested by any of the component parts, 
in their separate state, so it in is mind : the result of various 



94 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

COMBINATIONS OF IDEAS— 

thoughts and feehngs being fused into one whole, may be to 
produce a new principle, with properties diiFering from the 
separate influence of each individual thought and feeling. 
In this way, many secondary and factitious principles of 
action are formed. 

COMMON SENSE is a phrase employed to denote that degree 
of intelligence, sagacity, and prudence, which is common 
to all men. , 

'' There is a certain degree of sense which is necessary 
to our being subjects of law and government, capable of 
managing our own affairs and answerable for our conduct 
to others. This is called common sense^ because it is com- 
mon to all men with whom we can transact business. 

''The same degree of understanding which makes a man 
capable of acting with common prudence in life, makes him 
capable of discerning what is true and what is false in 
matters that are self-evident, and which he distinctly 
apprehendi." — Eeid, Intell. Powers. 

''It is by the help of an innate power of distinction that 
we recognize the differences of things, as it is by a contrary 
power of composition that we recognize their identities. 
These powers, in some degree, are common to all minds ; 
and as they are the basis of our whole knowledge (which 
is, of necessity, either affirmative or negative), they may be 
said to constitute what we call common sense,'''' — Harris, 
Philosoph, Arrange.^ chap. 9. 

COMMON SENSE (The Philosophy of) is that philosophy 
which accepts the testimony of our faculties as trustworthy 
vnthin their respective spheres, and rests all human know- 
ledge on certain first truths or primitive beliefs, which are 
the constitutive elements or fundamental forms of our 
rational nature, and the regulating principles of our 
conduct. 

" As every ear not absolutely depraved is able to make 
some general distinctions of sound ; and, in like manner, 
every eye, with respect to objects of vision ; and as this 
general use of these faculties by being diflused through all 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 95 

COJttrriON SENSE— 

individuals, may be called common hearing and common 
vision, as opposed to those more accurate energies, peculiar 
only to artists ; so fares it with respect to the intellect. 
There are truths or universals of so obvious a kind, that 
every mind or intellect not absolutely depraved, without the 
least help of art, can hardly fail to recognize them. The 
recognition of these, or at least the abihty to recognize 
them, is called uovg Kotuog common sense^ as being a sense 
common to all except lunatics and idiots. 

^•Further, as this power is called x,oivog uovg, so the 
several propositions which are its proper objects, are called 
'7:(io7<Yi'^£ig or pre-conceptions, as being previous to all other 
conceptions. It is easy to gather from what has been said 
that those Tr^oT^rr^sig must be general, as being formed by 
induction ; as also natural, by being common to all men. 
and previous to all instruction — hence, therefore, their 
definition. A pre- conception is the natural apprehension 
of what is general or universal." — Harris, On Happiness^ 
page 46. 

A fundamental maxim of the Stoics was, that there is 
nothing in the intellect which has not first been in the 
sense. They admitted, however, natural notions, which 
they called anticipations^ and artificial notions formed in us 
by the understanding. They also recognized notions which 
all men equally receive and imderstand. These cannot be 
opposed to one another ; they form what is called common 
sense. — Bouvier, Hist, de la Pliilosopli.., tom. i., p. l-iQ. 
8vo, Paris, 1844. 

''A power of the mind which perceives truth, not by 
progressive argumentation, but by an mstinctive and in- 
stantaneous impulse ; derived neither from education nor 
from habit, but from nature ; acting independently upon 
our will, whenever the object is presented, according to an 
established law ; and, therefore, not improperly called a 
sense., and acting in the same manner upon all mankind ; 
and, therefore, properly caUed common sense., the ultimate 
judge of truth" — Beattie, Essaij on Truths p. 36-42. 



96 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

COMMON SENSE— 

'' Common sense^''^ says Mens. Jaques, {Mem. de VAcadem.^ 
Roy. des Sciences Mor, et Pol.., torn, i., p. 349, Paris, 
1841), '4s tlie unanimous sentiment of the whole human 
race, upon facts and questions which all may know and 
resolve — or, more precisely, it is the ensemble (complement) 
of notions and opinions common to all men of all times and 
places, learned or ignorant, barbarous or civilized. Spon- 
taneity, impersonality, and universality, are the character- 
istics of truths of common sense ; and hence their truth and 
certainty. The moral law, human liberty, the existence of 
God, and immortality of the soul, are truths o^ common sense,''"' 
On the nature and validity of the common sense philo- 
sophy, see Reid^s Works by Sir W. Hamilton, appendix, 
note A. ; Oswald, Appeal to Common Sense ; Beattie, Essay 
on TrutJi^ &c, 

COIWEMON TERM is one which is applicable in the same sense 
to more than one individual object; as ''river," which 
may be predicated of the Thames, the Rhine, &c. Com- 
mon terms are therefore called predicables. — Whately, 
Logic.) book i., sect. 6. — F. Abstraction. 
COMPARISON is the act of carrying the mind from one object 
to another, in order to discover some relation subsisting 
between them. It is a voluntary operation of the mind, 
and thus differs from the perception or intuition of rela- 
tions, which does not always depend upon the will. The 
result of comparison is knowledge, which the intellect 
apprehends ; but the act is an exercise of attention volun- 
tarily directing the energy of the mind to a class of objects 
or ideas. The theorems of mathematics are a series of 
judgments arrived at by comparison, or viewing different 
quantities and number in their relations. The result of 
comparison is a judgment. — Diet, des Sciences PMlosoph. 
COMPASSION — V, Sympathy. 
COiriPIiEX.' — " That which consists of several different things, 
so put together as to form a whole, is called complex. 
Complex things are the subjects of analysis. The analysis 
of complex notions is one of the first and most important 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOiSOPHY. 97 

■ - "c ; of the understanding/' — Taylor^ Elements vf 

C07lPBEHE\5ilO>' --neiini the act of comprehending or tiilly 

.::: IcrsT-ir.!: ._ : / :"::iect or idea. For the sense in which 
i: - ■.:^..: Vy 'V.;- L:,i^-i;--. I". Exi-vsiox. 
COXCEIVIXG and APPREBLE3fI>I3f€;, or UXDER- 
!^TAJV1>I>'0. — Iv, r : . jins his essay on Conception by 

i v::::^. ' ~. : :^-:nding^ and under' 

,: , re common words 

i^r - of the understandinsr 



t :: ^ ^ - ked by Mr. Mansell 

;7 . 1- i^/.iii^i: vi must be distin- 

^ V la mere i as irom a mere 

: ning ol worLii.* Combinations of 

_ 1 i :5iible, may be expressed m kn- 
- inteiiig: 7 vie is no difficulty in 

_ he ineai i:_ : :-r phrase bilinear figure ^ 
T _ _ is intelligible, though the 

On the other hand, though all 
: : . : — :_ rlnation, yet all imagination does 
i: : ::./ > ; : .r :i :: I: ::;^^^ ; oonception of a horse. I 
L-iM-: :::: :::_ c ; - :j.: :^^ ::::;_; :f the several attributes 
constitutiz. : :i:e animal, but I must also be 

able to c:: :. -ir^c :\,urio\:ii»^$,\ji a representative image, 
that Ls. : r.lize them. This, however, is not mere 

■ :- \ : _' :ively to a concept. I 

- 5 \ f Tvith the mind's eye. 

.: : : ■ . ^ : ^ _-: ssing the attributes 

k1 ^. r " V- - ^ - -i ^y :lic name expressive of 

them. B i: ; i -i_-:i is possible without ^^^ 
relation. My iniiid ii::iy recall a sensible impression on 
whose constinienr feat ivs I have never reflected, and re- 
latively I ::ever formed a concept or applied 
a name, i , : ild be possible in a being without 
any power of distinguishing or comparing his presentations ; 

^ These hxwe been confionnded hx Aldrich, and Reid, and others^ 
H 



98 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONCEIVINCJ— 

it is compatible with our ignorance or forget fulness of tlie 
existence of any presentations, save the one represented 
by the image. Conception, in its lowest degree, implies at 
least a comparison and distinction of this from that. Con- 
ception proper, thus holds an intermediate place between 
the intuitive and symbolical knowledge of Leibnitz^ being a 
yeriiication of the latter by reference to the former." 

"The words conception^ concept^ notion^ should be limited 
to the thought of what cannot be represented in the imagi- 
nation, as the thought suggested by a general term. The 
Leibnitzians call this symbolical^ in contrast to intuitive 
knowledge. This is the sense in which conceptio and con- 
ceptus have been usually and correctly employed." — Sir 
W. Hamilton, Reid^s Works ^ p. 360, note. 
CONCEPT, A, " Is a collection of attributes, united by a sign, 
and representmg a possible object of intuition." — ^Mansell, 
Prolegom^ Log., p. 60. 

It was used, or conceit as synonymous with it, by the 
older English writers. See Baynes, Essay on Analytic of 
Log. Forms., 8vo, Edin., 1850, pp. 5, 6; Sir Will. Hamil- 
ton, Reid's Works., p. 393. 

Kant and his followers, while they reserve the word idea 
to denote the absolute products of the reason, and intuition 
to denote the particular notions which we derive from the 
senses, have applied the word concept (begriff) to notions 
which are general without being absolute. They say they 
are of three kinds, — 1. Pure concepts^ which borrow nothing 
from experience ; as the notions of cause, time, and space. 
2. Empirical concepts., which are altogether derived from 
experience ; as the notion of colour or pleasure. 3. Mixed 
concepts., composed of elements furnished partly by experi- 
ence, and partly by the pure understanding. See Schmid, 
Dictionnaire pour servir aux ecrits de Kant., 12mo, Jena, 
1798. 

A concept is clear., when its object, as a whole, can be 
distinguished from any other ; it is distinct., when its several, 
constituent parts can be distinguished from each other. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 99 

CONCEPT— 

The merit of first pointing out these characteristics of tht- 
logical perfection of thought is ascribed to Leibnitz. See 
Meditationes de Cognitione^ Veritate et Ideis. 
CONCEPT, CONCEPTION (conceptus^ conceptio = to notio or 
notion). — '' Conception consists in a conscious act of the 
understanding, bringing any given object or impression into 
the same class with any number of other objects or impres- 
sions, by means of some character or characters common to 
them all. Concipimus^ idest^ capimus hoc cum illo — v/e take 
hold of both at once, we comprehend a thing, when we have 
learnt to comprise it in a known class." — Coleridge, Church 
and State^ Prelimin. Kem.. p. 4. 

'^ Conception is the forming or bringing an image or idea 
into the mind by an effort of the will. It is distinguished 
from sensation and perception^ produced by an object pre- 
sent to the senses : and from imagination^ which is the 
joining together of ideas in new ways ; it is distinguished 
from memory^ by not having the feeling of past time con- 
nected with the idea." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

According to IMr. Stewart {Elements of Philosoph. of 
Hum. Mind^ vol. i., chap. 3), conception is "that faculty, 
the business of which is to present us with an exact 
transcript of what we have felt or perceived," or that 
faculty, whose province it is "to enable us to form a 
notion of our past sensations or of the objects of sense 
which we have formerly perceived." But what Mr. 
Stewart would thus assign to the faculty of conception 
belongs to imagination in its reproductive frmction. Hence, 
Sir Will. Hamilton has said {Discussions^ p. 276), "Mr. 
Stewart has bestowed on the reproductive imaguiation the 
term conception ; happily, we do not think ; as both in gram- 
matical propriety and by the older and correcter usage of 
philosophers, this term (or rather the product of this ope- 
ration, concept) is convertible with general notion^ or more 
correctly, notion simply, and in this sense is admu-ably ren- 
dered by the Begriff (which is, grasped up) of the Germans." 

"A concept or notion" is defined to be "the cognition 



100 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONCEPT— 

or idea of the general attribute or attributes in whicli a 
plurality of objects coincide." This involves the percep- 
tion of a number of objects, the comparing of them, the 
recognition of their points of similarity, and their subjective 
union by this common attribute. 

See Baynes, Essay on the Analytic of Logical Forms^ 8vo, 
Edin., 1853, pp. 5, 6. 

CONCEPTION sometimes signifies the act of the mind in 
conceiving, sometimes the thing conceived, which is the 
object of that act. — Reid, WorJcs^ p. 393. 

This last should be called concept^ which was a term in 
use with the old English philosophers. 

CONCEPTION and IMAGINATION. — ''Properly and 
strictly to conceive is an act more purely intellectual than 
imagining^ proceedmg from a faculty superior to those of 
sense and fancy, or imagination, which are limited to 
corporeal things, and those determined^ as all particulars 
must be, to this or that, place, time, manner, &c. When as 
that higher power in man, which we may call the mind^ can 
form apprehensions of what is not material (viz., of spirits 
and the affections of bodies which fall not under sense), 
and also can frame general ideas or notions, or consider 
of things in a general way without attending to their par- 
ticular limited circumstances, as when we think of length 
in a road, without observing its determinate measure." — 
Oldfield, Essay on Eeason^ p. 11. 

"It is one thing to imagine and another thing to con- 

j ceive. For do we conceive anything more clearly than our 
thought when we think? And yet it is impossible to m- 

I agine a thought, or to paint any image of it in the brain." 

\ — Port Roy. Logic, part 1, chap. 1. 

'' The distinction between conception and imagination is 
real, though it be too often overlooked and the words 
taken to be synonymous. I can conceive a thing that is 
impossible, but 1 cannot distinctly imagine a thing that is 
impossible. I can conceive a proposition or a demonstra- 
tion, but I cannot imagine either. I can conceive under- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 101 

CONCEPTION— 

standing and will, virtue and vice, and other attributes of 
mind, but I cannot imagine them. In like manner, I can 
distinctly conceive universals, but I cannot imagine them." 
— Eeid. 

Imagination has to do only with objects of sense, con- 
ception with objects of pure thought. The things which 
we imagine are represented by the mind as individuals, as 
some particular man, or some particular horse. The things 
of which we conceive are such as may be denoted by general 
terms, as man, horse. 

^'The notions" (or conceptions) which the "mind forms 
from things offered to it, are either of single objects, as of 
* this pain, that man, Westminster Abbey ;' or of many 
objects taken together, as ' pain, man, abbey.' " Notions 
of single objects are called intuitions^ as being such as the 
mind receives when it simply attends to or inspects (in- 
tuetur) the object. Notions formed from several objects 
are called conceptions^ as being formed by the power which 
the mind has of taking things together (concipere^ i. e., 
caper e hoc cum illo). 

" On inspecting two or more objects of the same class, 
we begin to compare them with one another, and with 
those which are already reposited in our memory ; and we 
discover that they have some points of resemblance. All 
the houses, for example, which come in our way, however 
they may differ in height, length, position, convenience, 
duration, have some common points ; they are all covered 
buildings, and fit for the habitation of men. By attending 
to these points only, and abstracting them from all the 
rest, we arrive at a general notion of a house, that it is a 
covered building fit for human habitation ; and to this 
notion we attach a particular name, house, to remind us of 
the process we have gone through, and to record its results 
for use. The general notion so formed we call a concep- 
tion; the common points we observed in the various ob- 
jects are called marks or notes ; and the process of observ- 
ing them and forming one entire notion from them is 



102 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONCEPTION— 

termed abstraction,'^ — Thomson, Outline of Laws of 
TJiougJit, p. 105. 
CONCEPTION and Il>EA. — By conception is meant the simple 
view we have of the objects which are presented to our 
mind ; as when, for instance, we think of the sun^ the 
earthy a tree^ sl circle^ a square^ thought^ heing^ without 
forming any determinate judgment concerning them ; and 
the form through which we consider these things is called 
an idea.^^ — Port Roy. Logic, 

" The having an idea of a thing is, in common lan- 
guage, used in the same sense (as conceiving)^ chiefly, I 
think," says Dr. Reid, "since Mr. Locke's time." 

'' A conception is something derived from observation ; not 
so ideas^ which meet with nothing exactly answering to them 
within the range of our experience. Thus ideas are a priori^ 
conceptions are a posteriori ; and it is only by means of the 
former that the latter are really possible. For the bare 
fact, taken by itself, falls short of the conception which may 
be described as the synthesis of the fact and the idea. 
Thus we have an idea of the universe, under which its 
different phenomena fall into place, and from which they 
take their meaning ; we have an idea of God as creator, 
from which we derive the power of conceiving that the im- 
pressions produced upon our minds, through the senses, 
result from really existing things ; we have an idea of the 
soul, which enables us to realize our own personal identity, 
by suggesting that a feeling, conceiving, thinking subject, 
exists as a substratum of every sensation, conception^ 
thought." — Chretien, Essay on Log, Meth,^ p. 137. 

''Every conceptions^'' said Coleridge (Notes on English 
Divines^ 12mo, 1853, vol. i., p. 27), ''has its sole reality 
in its being referable to a thing or class of things, of which, 
or of the common characters of which, it is a reflection. 
An idea is a power, ^vyccf/,ig i/os^oc^ which constitutes its 
own reality, and is, in order of thought, necessarily ante- 
cedent to the things in which it is more or less adequately 
realized, while a conception is as necessarily posterior." 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 103 

CONCEPTION— 

Conception is used to signify — 1. The power or faculty 
of conceiving, as when Mr. Stewart says, *' Under the 
article of conception I shall confine mysehf to that faculty 
whose province it is to enable us to form a notion of our 
past sensations, or of the objects of sense that we have 
formerly perceived." 

2. The act or operation of this power or faculty, " Con- 
ception^'''' says Sir John Stoddart {Univ. Gram. mEncyclop. 
Metropol.^^ '' which is derived from con and capw, expresses 
the action by which I take up together a portion of our sen- 
sations, as it were water, in some vessel adapted to contain 
a certain quantity." 

'' Conception is the act by which we comprehend by 
means of a general notion, as distinguished both from the 
perception of a present^ and the imagination of an absent 
individual.^'' — North Brit. Rev.., Xo. 27, p. 45. 

3. The result of the operation of this power or faculty ; 
as when Dr. 'Whewell says {Pref. to the Philosoph. of the 
Induct. Sciences^ p. 13), '' our conceptions are that, in the 
mind, which we denote by our general terms, as a triangle, 
a square number, a force." 

This last signification, however, is more correctly and 
conveniently given by the word concept^ i. e., conceptum^ or 
id quod conceptum est. 
CONCEPTUAIiISM is a doctrine in some sense intermediate 
between realism and nominalism., q. v. Have genera and 
species a real independent existence ? The realist answers 
that they exist independently ; thai: besides individual 
objects and the general notion from them in the mind there 
exist certain ideas ^ the pattern after which the single 
objects are fashioned ; and that the general notion m our 
mind is the counterpart of the idea without it. The 
nominalist says that nothing exists but things, and names 
of things ; and that universals are mere names, y7«/;/6" venti. 
The conceptualists assign to universals an existence which 
may be called logical or psychological, that is, independent 
of single objects, but dependent upon the mind of tlie 



101 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONCEPTUAMSM— 

thinking subject, in whicli they are as notions or concep- 
tions. — Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought^ 2d edit., p^ 
112. 

Dr. Brown, while his views approach those of the concep- 
tualists^ would prefer to call himself a relationalist. — See 
Physiol, of Hum. Mind^ p. 295. 

Cousin, Introd. Aux Ouvrages Inedits d''Ahelard^ 4t07 
Par., 1836, p. 181. 

Reid, Intellect. Povjers^ essay v., chap. 6, with Sir W. 
Hamilton^'s note, p. 412. 
CONCliUSION. — ^When something is simply affirmed to be 
true, it is called a proposition ; after it has been found to 
be true, by several reasons or arguments, it is called a con- 
clusion. ''Sloth and prodigality will bring a man to 
want," this is a proposition; after all the arguments have 
been mentioned which prove this to be true, we say, '•'• there- 
fore sloth and prodigality will bring a man to want ; " this 
is now the conclusion. — Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

That proposition which is inferred from the premises of 
an argument is called the conclusion. — Whately, Logic ^ h, 
ii., ch. 3, sect. 1. 
CONCRETE (con-crescere^ to grow together), is opposed to 
abstract. A concrete notion of an object is the notion of 
an object as possessed of all its qualities, and such as it 
exists in nature. An abstract notion may be the notion of 
any particular quality viewed separately from its object. 
The notion of a tree as consisting of trunk, branches, and 
leaves, as it naturally exists, is a concrete notion. The 
notion of the trunk regarded separately, or of the leaves, 
or of the colour of the leaves, is an abstract notion. 

A concrete notion is the notion of an object as it exists 
in nature, invested with all its qualities. An abstract 
notion, on the contrary, is the notion of some quahty 
or attribute separated from the object to which it 
belongs, and deprived of all the specialties with which 
experience invests it ; or it may be the notion of a sub- 
stance stripped of all its qualities. In this way concrete 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 105 

CONCKETE— 

comes to be synonymous with particular^ and abstract with 
general. 

The names of classes are abstract, those of individual.'? 
concrete; and from concrete adjectives are made abstract 
substantives. — V. Abstract. 

A concrete name is a name which stands for a thing, as 
this table. 

An abstract name is a name which stands for an attri- 
bute of a thing ; as, This table is square. — Mill, Logic. 
CONDITION — {Conditio., fere sumitur pro qualitate qua quid 
condi^ id est fieri. — Yossius. Or it may be from con or 
co-dare., i. e., something given or going along with a cause). 

A condition is that which is pre-requisite in order that 
something may be, and especially in order that a cause may 
operate. A condition does not operate, but, by removing 
some impediment, as opening the eyes to see ; or by apply- 
ing one's strength in conjunction with another, when two 
men are required to Hft or carry a weight, it being a condi- 
tion of their doing so that their strength be exerted at the 
same time. A condition is prior to the production of an 
effect ; but it does not produce it. It is fire that burns ; 
but before it burns it is a condition that there be an ap- 
proximation of the fire to the fuel, or the matter that is 
burned. Where there is no wood the fire goeth out. The 
cause of burning is the element of fire, fuel is a con-cause, 
and the condition is the approximation of the one to the 
other. The impression on the wax is the effect — the seal 
is the cause ; the pressure of the one substance upon the 
other, and the softness or fluidity of the wax are conditions. 

'' By a condition,^'' says Mr. Karslake (Aids to Logic. 
vol. ii., p. 43), '4s meant something more negative, whereas 
a cause is regarded as something more positive. We seem 
to think of a condition rather as that whose absence would 
have prevented a thing from taking place ; of a cause, rather 
as that whose presence produced it. Thus we apply, per- 
haps, the word cause rather to that between which and the 
result we can see a more immediate connection. If so, then 



106 VOCABULARY OF nilLOSOPHY. 

CONOTTION— 

in this way, also, every cause will be a condition^ or ante- 
cedent, but not every antecedent will be a cause. The 
fact of a city being built of wood will be a condition of its 
being burnt down : some inflammable material having 
caught fire will be the cause." 

A conditional proposition is one which asserts the depen- 
dence of one categorical proposition on another ; as. If the 
Scriptures are not wholly false, they are entitled to respect. 
A conditional syllogism is one in which the reasoning de- 
pends on such a proposition. — Whately, Logic^ b. ii., ch. 4, 
sects. 3 and 6. 

CONJUOATE. — Words of the same stock or kindred, as wise^ 
to he wise^ wisely^ are called conjugate or paronymous words. 

CONNOTATlVJE, A, or attributive term is one which, when 
applied to some object, is such as to imply in its significa- 
tion some attribute belonging to that object. It connotes^ 
i. e., notes along with the object (or implies), something 
considered as inherent therein; as "The capital of France," 
"The founder of Home." The founding of Rome is, by 
that appellation, attributed to the person to whom it is 
applied. 

A term which merely c?enotes an object, without implying 
any attribute of that object, is called absolute or non-conno- 
tative ; as Paris, Romulus. The last terms denote respec- 
tively the same objects as the former, but do not, like them, 
connote (imply in their signification) any attribute of those 
individuals. — Whately, Logic^ b. ii., ch. 5., sect. 1. 

CONSANOUIJVITY (co-sanguis^ of the same blood) is defined to 
be, vinculum personarum ah eodem stipite descendentium^ the 
relation of persons descended from the same stock or 
common ancestor. It is either lineal or collateral. Lineal 
consanguinity is that which subsists between persons of 
whom one is descended in a direct line from the other ; as 
son, grandson, great grandson, &c. Collateral relations 
agree with the lineal in this, that they descend from the 
same stock or ancestor ; but differ in this, that they do not 
descend the one from the other. John has two sons, who 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 107 

rOlVSAlVOUIIVITY— 

have each a numerous issue ; both these issues are linea Uy 
descended from John, or their common ancestor ; and the}' 
are collateral kinsmen to each other, because all descended 
from this common ancestor, and all have a portion of his 
blood in their veins, which denominates them consan- 
guineous. — V. Affinity. 
COIVSCIENCE (con-scientia^ joint or double knowledge) means 
knowledge of conduct in reference to the law of right and 
wrong. 

According to some, conscience takes cognizance merely 
of our own conduct. Thus Bishop Butler has said (sermon 
i., On Hum, Nature): ''The principle in man by which he 
approves or disapproves of his heart, temper, and actions, 
is conscience — for this is the strict sense of the word, though 
it is sometimes used so as to take in more." 

Dr. Rush (Inquiry into the Influence of Physical Causes 
upon the Moral Faculty, p. 3), has said : '' The moral 
faculty exercises itself upon the actions of others. It ap- 
proves, even in books, of the virtues of a Trajan, and 
disapproves of the vices of a Marius, while conscience con- 
fines its operations to our own actions." 

''The word ^consciences does not immediately denote 
any moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove. 
Conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of some such 
faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having 
acted agTceably or contrary to its directions." — Smith, 
Theory of Mor, Sent.^ pt. 7, sect. 3. 

" Conscience coincides exactly with the moral facult}', 
with this difference only, that the former refers to om^ own 
conduct alone, whereas the latter is meant to express also 
the power by which we approve or disapprove of the conduct 
of others." — Stewart, Active and Moral Powers^ pt. 1, ch. 
2. — See also PaAiie, Elements of Mor. Science^ 1845, p. 283. 
By these writers conscience is represented as being the 
function of the moral faciJty in reference to oiu' own con- 
duct, and as giving us a consciousness of self-approbatitni 
or of self-condemnation. 



108 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONSCIENCE— 

By a further limitation of the term, conscience has been 
regarded by some as merely retrospective in its exercise ; 
and by a still further limitation as only, or chiefly, punitive 
in its exercise, and implying the consciousness of our having 
acted wrong. 

But of late years, and by the best writers, the term 
conscience^ and the phrases moral faculty, moral judgment, 
faculty of moral perception, moral sense, susceptibility of 
moral emotion, have all been applied to that faculty, or 
combination of faculties, by which we have ideas of right 
and wrong in reference to actions, and correspondent feel- 
ings of approbation and disapprobation. This faculty, or 
combination of faculties, is called into exercise not merely 
in reference to our own conduct, but also in reference to 
the conduct of others. It is not only reflective but pro- 
spective in its operations. It is antecedent as well as subse- 
quent to action in its exercise ; and is occupied de faciendo 
as well as de facto. — See B;eid, Active Powers^ essay iii., 
pt. 3, ch. 8. 

In short, conscience constitutes itself a witness of the past 
and of the future, and judges of actions reported as if pre- 
sent when they were actually done. It takes cognizance 
not merely of the individual man, but of human nature, and 
pronounces concerning actions as right or wrong not merely 
in reference to one person, or one time, or one place, but 
absolutely and universally. 

With reference to their views as to the nature of conscience 
and the constitution of the moral faculty, modern philo- 
sophers may be arranged in two great schools or sects. 
The diflerence between them rests on the prominence and 
precedence which they assign to reason and to feehng in the 
exercise of the moral faculty ; and their respective theories 
may be distinctively designated the intellectual theory 
and the sentimental theory. A brief view of the principal 
arguments in support of each may be found in Hume's In- 
quiry concerning the Principles of Morals^ sect. 5. 

CONSCIOUSNESS (con-scire^ con-scientia^ joint knowledge, a 



VOCAEUL-^.Y OF PHILOSOPHY. 109 

roNSCiorsNESs— 

knowledge of one thing in connection or relation with 
another). 

Sir William Hamilton has remarked (Discussions^ p. 110, 
note,) that " the Greek has no word for conscious7i€ss,^' 
imd that '-TertnllLan is the only ancient vi-ho uses the word 
conscientia in a psychological sense, corresponding with our 
consciousness,''^ — Reicfs Worlds, p. 775. 

The meaning of a word is sometimes best attained by 
means of the word opposed to it. Unconsciousness, that is, 
the want or absence of consciousness, denotes the suspen- 
sion of all our faculties. Consciousness, then, is the state 
in which we are when all or any of oiu* faculties are in 
exercise. It is the condition or accompaniment of every 
mental operation. 

The Scholastic definition was, perceptio qua mens de 
presenti suo statu admonetur. 

" Consciousness is the necessary knowledge which the mind 
has of its own operations. In knowing, it knows that it 
knows. In experiencing emotions and passions, it knows 
that it experiences them. In willing, or exercising acts ot 
causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This 
is the common, universal, and spontaneous consciousntss.'^ 
. . . -'By consc^iousness more nicely and accm*ately defined. 
we mean the power and act of self-recognition : not if you 
please, the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and 
volitions : but the mind knowing itself in these.'* — Tappan, 
Doctrine of the Will hy an Appeal to Consciousness, chap. 2, 
sect 1. 

••Sensation, remembrance, simple apprehension, and con- 
ception, with ever}' other actiuil energy- or passion of the 
mind, is accompanied by an inward feeling or perception of 
that energy- or passion, and that feeling or perception is 
consciousness." — Encyclop. Brit., art. Metaphysics. 

^Ir. Locke has said (Essay on Hum. Understand., book 
ii., ch. 1), ••It is altogether as intelligible to say that a 
body is extended without parts, as that an}-thing thinks 
without being conscious of it. or perceivmg that it does so. 



110 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. m\ 

CONSCIOUSNESS— Si 

They who talk in this way, may, with as much reason, 
say that a man is always hungry, but that he does not 
always feel it; whereas hunger consists in that very 
sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one 
thinks !" 

''We not only feel^ but we know that we feel; we not 
only act^ but we know that we act ; we not only think^ but 
we know that we think ; to think, without knowing that we 
think, is as if we should not think ; and the peculiar quality, 
the fundamental attribute of thought, is to have a conscious- 
ness of itself. Consciousness is this interior light which 
illuminates everji^hing that takes place in the soul ; conscious- 
ness is the accompaniment of all our faculties ; and is, so to 
speak, their echo."— Cousin, ffis^. of Mod. Philosophy vol. i., 
pp. 274-5. 

On consciousness as the necessary form of thought, see 
lecture v. of the same volume. 

That consciousness is not a particular faculty of the mind, 
but the universal condition of intelligence, the fundamental 
form of all the modes of our thinking activity, and not a 
special mode of that activity, is strenuously maintained by 
Amadee Jacques, in the Manuel de Philosophies Partie Psycho- 
logique ; and also by two American writers, Mr. Bowen 
in his Critical Essays^ p. 131, and Mr. Tappan. This view is 
in accordance with the saying of Aristotle, ovx, iajiv AioHoig 
octaQnaiag — there is not a feeling of a feeling. And that of 
the schoolmen — " Non sentimus^ nisi sentiamus nos sentire — 
non intelligimus nisi intelligamus nos intelligerey " No man,'" 
said Dr. Reid, ''can perceive an object without being con- 
scious that he perceives it. No man can think without being 
conscious that he thinks. " And as on the one hand we cannot 
think or feel without being conscious, so on the other hand we 
cannot be conscious without thinking or feeling. This would 
be, if possible, to be conscious of nothing, to have a con- 
sciousness vfWioh was no consciousness, or consciousness Yrith- 
out an object. " Annihilate the object of any mental 
operation and you annihilate the operation ; annihilate the 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. Ill 

i CONSCIOUSNESS— 

,! consciousness of the object, and you anniliilate the ope- 

! ration." 
This yiew of consciousness^ as the common condition 
11 under which all our faculties are brought into operation, or 
I of considering these faculties and their operations as so 
I many modifications of consciousness^ has of late been gene- 
I rally adopted ; so much so that psychology, or the science 
li of mind, has been denominated an inquiry into the facts 
of consciousness. All that we can truly learn of mind must 
be learned by attending to the various ways in which it 
becomes conscious. None of the phenomena of conscious- 
ness can be called in question. They may be more or 
less clear ; more or less complete ; but they either are or 
are not. 

In the Diet, des Sciences PMlosoph.^ art. Conscience^ it is 
maintained that consciousness is a separate faculty, having 
self^ or the ego^ for its object. 

Instead of regarding consciousness as the common con- 
dition or accompaniment of every mental operation, E-oyer 
Collard among the French, and Reid and Stewart among 
the Scotch philosophers, have been represented as holding 
the opinion that consciousness is a separate faculty, having 
for its objects the operations of our other faculties. 
" Consciousness ^^^ says Dr. Reid (Jntell. Pow.^ essay i., chap. 
1 ; see also essay vL, chap. 5), "is a word used by phil- 
osophers to signify that immediate knowledge which we 
have of our present thoughts and purposes, and in general, 
of all the present operations of our minds. Whence we 
may observe that consciousness is only of things present. 
To apply consciousness to things past, which sometimes is 
done, in popular discourse, is to confound consciousness 
with memory; and all such confusion of words ought to be 
avoided in philosophical discourse. It is likewise to be 
observed that consciousness is only of things in the mind, 
and not of external things. It is improper to say, ' I am 
conscious of the table which is before me.' I perceive it, I 
see it, but do not say I am conscious of it. As that con- 



112 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONSCIOUSNESS— 

sciousness by which we have a knowledge of the operations 
of onr own minds, is a different power from that by which 
we perceive external objects, and as these different powers 
have different names in our language, and, I believe, in all 
languages, a philosopher ought carefully to preserve this 
distinction and never confound things so different in their 
nature." In this passage Dr. Eeid speaks of consciousness 
properly so called as that consciousness which is distinct 
from the consciousness by which we perceive external 
objects — as if perception was another kind or mode of 
consciousness. Whether all his language be quite consis- 
tent with the opinion that all our faculties are just so many 
different modes of our becoming conscious, may be doubted. 
But there is no doubt that by consciousness he meant 
especially attention to the operations of our own minds, 
or reflection; while by observation he meant attention to 
external things. This language has been interpreted as 
favourable to the opinion that consciousness is a separate 
faculty. Yet he has not distinctly separated it from reflec- 
tion except by sajdng that consciousness accompanies all 
the operations of mind. Now reflection does not. It is a 
voluntary act — an energetic attention to the facts of 
consciousness. But consciousness may be either spontaneous 
or reflective. 

'•'• This word denotes the immediate knowledge which the 
mind has of its sensations and thoughts, and, in general, of 
all its present operations." — Outlines of Mor. Pliilosoph.^ 
part 1, sect. 1. 

Mr. Stewart, in his Outlines,, has enumerated consciousness 
as one of our intellectual powers, co-ordinate with percep- 
tion, memory, judgment, &c. But consciousness is not 
confined to the operation of the intellectual powers. It 
accompanies the development of the feelings and the de- 
terminations of the will. And the opinion that conscious- 
ness is a separate faculty is not only founded on a false 
analysis, but an opinion, which if prosecuted to its results 
would overturn the doctrine of immediate knowledge in 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 113 

CONSCIOUSNESS— 

perception — a doctrine which Stewart and Eeid upheld as 
the true and only barrier against the scepticism of Hume. 
'^ Once admit that, after I have perceived an object, I need 
another power termed consciousness^ by which I become 
cognizant of the perception, and by the medium of which 
the knowledge involved in perception is made clear to the 
thinking self, and the plea of common sense against scep- 
ticism is cut off. .... I am conscious of self and of 
notself; my knowledge of both in the act of percep- 
tion is equally direct and immediate. On the other hand, 
to make consciousness a peculiar faculty, by which we 
are simply cognizant of our own mental operations, is 
virtually to deny the immediatecy of our knowledge of an 
external world." — Morell, Hist, of Spec. Pliilosoi^li.., vol. 
ii., p. 13. 

See Fearn, Essay on Consciousness, 
CONSENT. — *' Believing in the prophets and evangelists with 
a calm and settled faith, with that consent of the will, and 
heart, and understanding, which constitutes religious behef, 
I find in them the clear annunciation of the kingdom of 
God upon earth." — Southey, Progress of Society ., colloquy 2, 
— F. Assent. 

Assent is the consequence of a conviction of the under- 
standing. Consent arises from the state of the disposition 
and the will. The one accepts what is true; the other 
embraces it as true and good, and worthy of all accepta- 
tion. 
CONSENT (Argument from UniTersal). — F. AUTHORITY. 

Eeid applies this argument to establish first prmciples. 
— Intell. Powers., essay i., chap. 2. He uses it against the 
views of Berkeley and Hume. — Essay ii., chap. 19. 

Cicero {De Officiis., lib. i., cap. 41,) says. Major enim jxtrs 
eofere deferri solet quo a natura deducitur. It is used to prove 
the existence of the gods. Be quo autem omnium natura 
eonsentit.) id verum esse necesse est. Esse igitur deos^ con- 
Jitendum est. {De Nat. Deorum^ lib. i., cap. 17,) Cottn 
argues against it, cap. 23. The argument is also used (Tk 



114 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONSENT— 

Nat. Deor.., lib. ii., 2 ; and TuscuL Qucest., lib. i., 18), 
when we read, Omni autem in re, consensio omnium gentium 
lex naturce putanda est. 

Bacon is against this argument in preface to Instauratio 
Magna^ and also Aphorism 77, and in Cogitata et Visa. 

"These things are to be regarded as first truths., the 
credit of which is not derived from other truths, but is in- 
herent in themselves. As for jjrohable truths, they are 
such as are admitted by all men, or by the generality of 
men, or by wise men ; and among these last, either by all 
the wise, or by the generality of the wise, or by such of 
the wise as are of the highest authority."-— Aristotle, Topic. ^ 

1, 1. 

''What seems true to most wise men is very probable ; 
what most men, both wise and unwise, assent to, doth still 
more resemble truth ; but what men generally consent in 
hath the highest probability, and approaches demonstra- 
tion so near, that it may pass for ridiculous arrogance, or 
for intolerable obstinacy and perverseness to deny it. A 
man may assume what seems true to the wise, if it do not 
contradict the common opinion of mankind." — Aristotle, 
Topic. ^ i., 8, or 10. 

Multum dare solemus prsesumptioni omnium hominum, 
Apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri. 
—Seneca, Epist.^ evil, a cxvii. 
€ONSEC|UENT. — V. ANTECEDENT, NECESSITY. 
CONSllilENCE of INSJUCTIONS takes place when an in- 
duction obtained from one class of facts coincides with an 
induction obtained from a different class. This consilience 
is a test of the truth of the theory in which it occurs. — 
Whewell, Philosoph. Induct. Sciences^ aphorism 14. 

Paley's Horrn Paulince^ which consists of gathering to- 
gether undesigned coincidences, is an example of the 
consilience of inductions. 

The law of gravitation may be proved by a consilience of 
inductions. 
CONTEmPliATION.-— The next faculty of the mind (i. e., to 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 115 

CONTE:MPr.ATION— 

perception), whereby it makes a further progress towards 
knowledge, is that which I call retention^ or the keeping of 
these simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it hath 
received. This is done two ways ; first, by keeping the idea 
which is brought into it for some time actually in view, 
which is called contemplation. — Locke, Essay on Hum. 
Understand.., book ii., chap. 10. 

When an object of sense or thought has attracted our 
admiration or love we dwell upon it ; not so much to know 
it better, as to enjoy it more and longer. This is contem- 
plation., and differs from reflection. The latter seeks know- 
ledge, and our intellect is active. In the former, we think 
we have found the knowledge which reflection seeks, and 
luxmiate in the enjoyment of it. Mystics have exaggerated 
the benefits of contemplation., and have directed it exclu- 
sively to God, and to the cherishing of love to Him. 

CONTINENCE {continere., to restrain), is the virtue which con- 
sists in governing the appetite of sex. It is most usually 
applied to men, as chastity is to women. Chastity may be 
the result of natural disposition or temperament — continence 
carries with it the idea of struggle and victory. 

CONTINCJ-ENT (con-tingere., to touch two points). — '' Perhaps 

the beauty of the world requireth that some agents should 

^. work without deliberation (which his lordship calls neces- 

■ sary agentsj, and some agents with deliberation (and those 

■ both he and I call free agents), and that some agents 
^ should work, and we know not how (and their effects we 

call contingents^.''^ — Hobbes, Liberty and Necessity. 

'' When any event takes place which seems to us to have 

no cause, why it shovdd happen in one way, rather than 

another, it is called a contingent event ; as, for example, the 

falling of a leaf on a certain spot., or the turning up of any 

: particular number when the dice are thrown." — Ta}ior. 

Elements of Thought. 
k The contingent is that which does not exist necessarily, 

I and which we can think as non-existing without contradic- 
;' tion. Everything which had a beginning, or will have an 



116 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONTING-ENT— 

end, or which changes, is contingent. The necessary^ on the 
contrary, is that of which we cannot conceive as non-exist- 
ing — that which has always been, which will always be, and 
which does not change its manner of being. 

'•'- Contingent is that which does not happen constantly 
and regularly. Of this kind ancient philosophy has distin- 
guished three different opinions ; for either the event hap- 
pens more frequently one way than another, and then it is 
said to be 's-r/ ro 'koKv ; of this kind are the regular pro- 
ductions of nature, and the ordinary actions of men. Or it 
happens more rarely, such as the birth of monsters, or other 
extraordinary productions of nature, and many accidents 
that happen to man. Or, lastly, it is betwixt the two, and 
happens as often the one way as the other ; or, as they ex- 
press it in Greek, 'o9rgT£^ sry;^*?. Of this kind are some 
things in nature, such as the birth of a male or female child ; 
a good or bad day in some climates of the earth ; and many 
things among men, such as good or bad luck at play. All 
these last-mentioned events are in reality as necessary as 
the falling of heavy bodies, &c. But as they do not happen 
constantly and uniformly, and as we cannot account for 
their happening sometimes one way and sometimes another, 
we say they are contingent^'' — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ 
vol. i., p. 295. 

The contingent is known empirically — the necessary by the 
reason. There are but two modes of being, the necessary 
and the contingent. But the contingent has degrees : 
1. Simple facts which appear and disappear, or, in the lan- 
guage of the schools, accidents. 2. Qualities or properties 
inherent in a substance, which constitute its specific char- 
acter. 3. The substance itself considered as a particular 
and finite existence. 
A thing may be contingent in three ways : — 

1. (Equaliter^ when the thing or its opposite may equally 
be, from the determination of a free will. 

2. Utplurimum^ as when a man is born with five digits, 
thouo'h sometimes with more or less. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 117 

COXTIXGEXT— 

3. Baro, as Tvhen it happens seldom; physically^ as when 
a tile falls on a man's head : or voluntarily^ as when a man 
cleaving wood womids the bystander. — See Chauvin, Lexicon 
Philosoph.. 

An event, the opposite of which is possible^ is contingent. 

An event, the opposite of which is impossihle^ is necessary. 

An event is impossihle when the opposite of it is nece^.sar?/. 

An event is possible when the opposite of it is contingent. 
CONTIA'FITY (l^aw of). — "The supposition of bodies /^er- 
fectly hard, having been shown to be inconsistent with two of 
the leading doctrines of Leibnitz, tTtat of the constant main- 
tenance of the same quantity of force in the imiverse, and 
that of the proportionality of forces to the squares of 
the velocities — he found himself reduced to the necessity 
of maintaining that all changes are produced by insensible 
gradations, so as to render it impossible for a body to have 
its state changed from motion to rest, or from rest to 
motion, without passing through all the intermediate states 
of velocity. From this assumption he argued with much 
ingenuity, that the existence of atoms, or of perfectly hard 
bodies, is impossible : because, if two of them should meet 
-^-ith equal and opposite motions, they would necessarily 
stop at once, in violation of the law of continuity." — 
Stewart, Dissert.^ part 2, p. 275. 

"I speak." said John Bemouilli (D/.^coz^/'^^e on Motion^ 
1727). •• of that immovable and perpetual order established 
since the creation of the universe, which may be called the 
lav: of continuity ^ in virtue of which ever^-thing that is 
done, is done by degrees infinitely small. It seems to be 
the dictate of good sense that no change is made per sal- 
turn: natura non operatur per saltum ; and nothing can 
pass from one extreme to another, without passing through 
aU the mtermediate degrees." 

The law of continuity, though originally applied to con- 
tinuity of motion, was extended by Charles Bonnet to con- 
tinuity of being. He held that all the various beings which 
compose the universe, fonn a scale descending downwards 



118 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONTINUITY— 

without any cliasm or saltus^ from the Deity to the siniplest 
forms of unorganized matter. A similar view had been 
held by Locke and others {Spectator^ N'o. 519). The re- 
searches of Cuvier have shown that it can only be held 
with limitations and exceptions, even when confined to the 
comparative anatomy of animals. — F. Association. 
CONTRACT (con-traliere^ to draw together). — A contract is 
an agreement or pact in which one party comes under ob- 
ligation to do one thing, and the other party to do some other 
thing. Paley calls it a mutual promise. Contracts originate 
in the insufficiency of man to supply all his needs. One 
wants what another has abundance of and to spare ; while 
that other may want something which his neighbour has. 
They are drawn more closely together by their individual 
insufficiency, and they enter into an agreement each to give 
what the other needs or desires. 

Contracts being so necessary and important for the wel- 
fare of society, the framing and fulfilling of them have in 
all countries been made the object of positive law. Viewed 
ethically, the obligation to fulfil them is the same with that 
to fulfil a promise. The consideration of contracts^ and of 
the various kinds and conditions of them belongs to Juris- 
prudence. 

While all contracts are pacts^ all pacts are not contracts. 
In the Roman law, a distinction was taken between pacts 
or agTeements entered into without any cause or consider- 
ation antecedent, present or future, and pacts which were 
entered into for a cause or consideration, that is, containing 
a synallagraa or bargain, or as it may be popularly ex- 
pressed, a quid pro quo — in which one party came under 
obligation to give or do something, on account of some- 
thing being done or given by the other party. Agree- 
ments of the latter kind were properly contracts^ while 
those of the former were called hare jjacts, A pactum 
nudum^ or hare pact^ was so called because it was not 
clothed with the circumstances of mutual advantage, and 
was not a valid agreement in the eye of the Roman law. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 119 

CONTRACT— 

Nuda pactio ohligationem non facit. It is the same in the 
English law, in which a contract is defined : " An agree- 
ment of two or more persons, upon sufficient consideration^ 
to do or not to do a particular thing," — and the consider- 
ation is necessary to the validity of the contract, 
CONTKAl>lCTlON, l»rinciple of (contra dicere^ to speak 
against). — It is usually expressed thus : A thing cannot be 
and not be at the same time, or a thing must either be or 
not be, or the same attribute cannot at the same time 
be affirmed and denied of the same subject. — Pierron and 
Zevost, Introd. a la Metapliys. d Aristote^ 2 torn. Paris, 
1840. — V. Identity. 

Aristotle laid down this principle as the basis of all Logic 
and of all Metaphysic. 

Leibnitz thought it insufficient as the basis of all truth 
and reasoning, and added the prmciple of the sufficient 
reason^ q, v. 

Kant thought this principle good only for those judgments 
of which the attribute is the consequence of the subject, or, 
as he called them, analytic judgments ; as when we say, all 
body has extension. The idea of extension being enclosed 
in that of body, it is a sufficient warrant of the truth of 
such a judgment, that it implies no contradiction. But in 
synthetic judgments, we rest either on a belief of the reason 
or the testunony of experience, according as they are a 
priori or a posteriori. — Aristot., Metapliys.^ lib. iii., cap. 
3 ; lib. ix., cap. 7 ; lib. x., cap, 5. Kant, Critique de la 
Raison Pure. 

'' The principle of sufficient reason deals with facts, and 
the principle of contradiction with indemonstrable truths. 
Apparently these two principles are distmct when con- 
sidered in reference to two different species of thought, 
yet the one is derived from the other. The necessity of a 
sufficient reason for every thing which exists, is itself a 
necessary or fundamental truth in all reasonings, because 
the negative of it cannot be conceived. Ultimately, there- 
fore, the principle of contradiction is the sole and common 



120 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CONTRADICTION— 

root from wMch all scientific truth springs." — Blakey, Hist. 
of Logic, p. 249. 

'''• The dictum de omni et nullo is the same with the principle 
of contradiction. If the propositions A is B, and A is not 
B, could stand together, there could be no reasoning. 
Hence, all sceptics attacked it in various ways. Heraclitus 
said all things are in a perpetual flux, so that nothing is in 
the same state for two successive moments.* From this it 
would follow, that neither of two contradictories could be 
predicated with truth of any subject. Anaxagoras held 
that the ultimate elements could never be entirely separ- 
ated ; that nothing in nature was pure or simple, or ex- 
cluded opposite elements, but received its denomination 
according to the predominance of particular ingredients. 
It follows that neither of two contradictories can be predi- 
cated absolutely of any subject. He maintained also, that 
whatever seems is true, an assertion similar to that of Pro- 
tagoras, who taught that man is the measure of reality, 
which meant that opinion is the criterion of truth ; and, as 
the same objects produce different sensations and opinions 
in different men, it was inferred that truth may be self-con- 
tradictory.'''' — Poste, Trans, of Poster. AnalyU^ appendix A. 
CONTRARIES. — Aristotle {De Ariima^ lib. iii., cap. 3), says — 
" There seems to be one and the same error, and one and 
the same science, with respect to things contrary." This, 
by Themistius, in his Paraplirase^ is thus illustrated: — 
" Of things contrary there is one science and one ignorance. 
For thus, he who knows good to be something beneficial, 
knows evil at the same time to be something pernicious ; 
and he who is deceived with respect to one of these, is de- 
ceived also with respect to the other." 

'' There is an essential difference between opposite and 
contrary. Opposite powers are always of the same kind, 
and tend to union either by equipoise or by a common 
product. Thus the + and the — poles of the magnet, thus 

* To avoid the consequences of the doctrine of Heraclitus, Plato, who came from 
this school, maintained the existence of immutable Ideas. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 121 

CONTR AMIE S— 

positive and negative electricity, are opposites. Sweet and 
sour are opposites; sweet and litter are contraries. The 
feminine character is opposed to the masculine; but the 
effeminate is its contrary.'''' — Coleridge, Church and State., 
note, p. 18. 

We should say opposite sides of the street ; not contrary. 

''Among the ancient philosophers, some held the prin- 
ciples of things to be hot and cold ; others, to be moist and 
dry; others, to be dense and rare; others, in a more ab- 
stracted way, to be excess and defect ; even and odd ; 
friendship and strife. Among the moderns, we know the 
stress laid on action and re- action ; attraction and repul- 
sion ; expansion and condensation ; centripetal and centri- 
fugal ; to which may be added these two principles, held 
by many ancients as well as moderns, the principles of 
atoms and a void, which two stand opposed nearly as heing 
and non-being.^'' — Harris, Philosoph. Arrange.^ chap. iii. 

Aristotle generally enumerates four kinds of opposition, 
viz.: contradiction^' otuTiCpoiffig; cojitrariety^ rxvotunoc'^ rela- 
tion^ TO, 'TT^og Ti ; privation and habit^ arsQYiaig xoct s^ig, 

Aristotle defines contrary., " that which in the same 
genus differs most ;" as in colour, white and black ; in 
sensation, pleasure and pain ; in morals, good and evil. 
Contraries never co-exist, but they may succeed in the 
same subject. They are of two kinds, one admitting a 
middle term, participating at once in the nature of the things 
opposed. Thus, between being absolute and nonentity, there 
may be contingent being. In others no middle term is 
possible. There are contraries of which the one belongs 
necessarily to a subject, or is a simple privation, as health 
and sickness ; light and darkness ; sight and bhndness. 
Contraries which admit of no middle term are contradic- 
tories; and form, when united, a contradiction. On 
this rests all logic; and Aristotle wished to make wtue 
a middle term, between two extremes. — Diet, des Sciences 
Philosoph. 
COSMEOOONY («o«7,d^05-, world ; yiuog, birth). — ''It was a most 



122 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

COSMOOONY— 

ancient, and, in a manner, universally received tradition 
among the Pagans, that the cosmogonia^ or generation of the 
world, took its first beginning from a chaos (the divine cos- 
mogonists agreeing herein with the atheistic ones) : this tradi- 
tion having been delivered down from Orpheus and Linus 
(among the Greeks) by Hesiod and Homer, and others." — 
Cudworth, IntelL Syst.^ p. 248. 

The different theories as to the origin of the world may 
be comprehended under three classes : — 

1. Those which represent the world, in its present form, 
as having existed from eternity. — Aristotle. 

2. Those which represent the matter but not the form of 
the world to be from eternity. — Leucippus, Democritus, 
Epicurus. 

3. Those which assign both the matter and form of the 
world to the direct agency of a spiritual cause. 

€©§lTIOIiO€JY, Motional. — F. METAPHYSICS. 

CMANior^oc^Y.— V. Phrenology. 

CRANioscopY.— F. Phrenology, Organ, Organology. 

CKEATION — is the act by which God produced out of 
nothing all things that now exist. Unless we deny alto- 
gether the existence of God, we must either believe in 
creation or accept one or other of the two hypotheses, which 
may be called theological dualism or pantheism. According 
to the former, there are two necessary and eternal beings, 
God and matter. According to the latter, all beings are but 
modes or manifestations of one eternal and necessary being. 
A belief in creation admits only the existence of one neces- 
sary and eternal being, who is at once substance and cause, 
intelligence and power, absolutely free and infinitely good. 
— God and the universe are essentially distinct. — God has 
self- consciousness, the universe has not and cannot have. — 
Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. 

CREIJUIilTY, or a disposition to believe what others tell us, 
is set down by Dr. Eeid as an original principle implanted 
in us by the Supreme Being. And as the counterpart 
of this he reckons veracity or a propensity to speak truth 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 123 

and to use language so as to convey our real sentiments, 
to be also an original principle of human nature. — Keid, 
Inquiry^ chap. 6, sect. 24; and also Eeid, Active Poic, 
essay iii., pt. 1, chap. 2 ; Stewart, Active Pow.^ vol. ii., p. 
344 ; Priestley, Examin.^ p. 86 ; Brown, lect. Ixxxiv. 
CRITERION (K^irsQiou^ from the Greek verb kpivhv^ to 
judge), denotes in general, all means proper to judge. It 
has been distinguished into the criterion a quo^ per quod^ 
and secundum quad — or the being who judges, as man ; 
the organ or faculty by which he judges, and the rule 
according to which he judges. Unless utter scepticism 
be maintained, man must be admitted capable of knowing 
what is true. 

"With regard to the criterion (says Edw. Poste, M.A., 
Introd., p. 14, to Trans, of Poster. Analyt. of Aristotle)^ 
or organ of truth among the ancient philosophers, some ad- 
vocated a simple, and others a mixed criterion. The ad- 
vocates of the former were divided into Sensationalists or 
Rationalists, as they advocated sense or reason ; the 
advocates of the latter advocated both sense and reason. 
Democritus and Leucippus were Sensationalists ; Parmenides 
and the Pythagoreans were Rationalists ; Plato and Aris- 
totle belonged to the mixed school. Among those who 
advocated reason as a criterion^ there was an important 
difference : some advocating the common reason, as Hera- 
clitus and Anaxagoras ; others, the scientific reason, or 
the reason as cultivated and developed by education, as 
Parmenides, the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Aristotle. In 
the Republic (7, sect. 9), Plato prescribes a training calcu- 
lated to prepare the reason for the perception of the higher 
truths. Aristotle requires education for the moral reason. 
The older Greeks used the word measure, instead 
of criterion ; and Protagoras had said, that man was the 
measure of all truth. This Aristotle interprets to mean 
that sense and reason are the organs of truth (Aletaphys., 
x. 2 ; xi. 6), and he accepts the doctrine, if limited to 
these faculties in a healthy and perfect condition. Those 



124 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CRITERION— 

names, then, cannot properly be ranked among tlie common 
sense philosophers, where they are placed by Sir William 
Hamilton. 

'•'• When reason is said to be an organ of truth, we must 
include, besides the intuitive, the syllogistic faculty. This 
is the instrument of the mediate or indirect apprehension 
of truth, as the other of immediate. The examination of 
these instruments, in order to discover their capabilities 
and right use, is Logic. This appears to be the reason 
why Aristotle gave the title of Organon to his Logic. So 
Epicurus called his the canon or criterion. The contro- 
versy on the criterion is to be found at length in Sextus 
Empiricus, Hypotopos.^ lib. ii., cap. 5-7. 

Criterion is now used chiefly to denote the character 
which distinguishes truth from falsity. In this sense it 
corresponds with the ground of certitude. — V, Certi- 
tude. 

CUIWUIiATIVE (The Argument ). — '' The proof of a Divine 
agency is not a conclusion which lies at the end of a chain 
of reasoning, of which chain each instance of contrivance 
is only a link, and of which, if one link fail, the whole falls ; 
but it is an argument separately supplied by every separate 
example. An error in stating an example affects only that 
example. The argument is cumulative in the fullest sense 
of that term. The eye proves it without the ear, the ear 
without the eye. The proof in each example is complete ; 
for when the design of the part, and the conduciveness of 
its structure to that design is shown, the mind may set 
itself at rest ; no future consideration can detract anything 
from the force of the example" — Paley, Nat, Theol^ 
chap. 6. 

CUSTOM. — '' Let custom^^'' says Locke, " from the very child- 
hood, have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and 
what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the 
Deity." — Essay on Hum. Understand.., book ii., chap. 33, 
17 ; and book i., chap. 4, 16. 
Mundus regitur opinionihus. 



VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 125 

CUSTOM— 

Custom is the queen of the world. 

" Such precedents are numberless ; we draw 
Our right from custom ; custom is a law 
As high as heaven, as wide as seas or land." 

Lansdown, Beauty and Law. 

A custom is not necessarily a usage. A custom is merely 
that which is often repeated ; a usage must be often 
repeated and of long standing. Hence we may speak of a 
" new custom^^^ but not of a "' new usage.'''' Custom had 
probably the same origin as "accost," to come near, and 
thence to be habitual. The root is the Latin costa^ the 
side or rib. — See Kames, Elements of Criticism., chap. 14, 
Cornwall Lewis, On Politics., chap. 20, sect- 9. 

'^ An aggregate of habits, either successive or cotempor- 
aneous, in different individuals, is denoted by the words 
custom., usage., or practice.^ When many persons — either i% 
class of society, or the inhabitants of a district, or an entire 
nation — agree in a certain habit, they are said to have a 
custom or usage to that effect. 

'' Customs may be of two kinds : — First., There may be 
voluntary customs — customs which are adopted spontan- 
eously by the people, and originate from their independen 
choice, such as the modes of salutation, dress, eating, 
travelling, &c., prevalent in any country, and most of the 
items which constitute the manners of a people. — Secondly^ 
There are the customs which are the result of laws — customs 
which have grown up in consequence of the action of the 
government upon the people. Thus, when successive judges 
in a court of justice have laid down certain rules of proce- 
dure, and the advocates pleading before the court have 
observed these rules, such is called the established practice 
of the court. The sum of the habits of the successive 
judges and practitioners constitute the practice of the court. 
The same may be said of a deliberative assembly, or an} 
other body, renewed by a perpetual succession of its mem- 

* A similar distinction .between mos and consuetudo is made by Macrobius, Saturn 
iii., 8, commenting on Virgil, ^neid, G, 601. He quotes Varro as stating that 
mos is the unit, and consuetude the resulting aggregate. 



126 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

CUSTOM— 

bers. In cliurclies the equivalent name is rites and cere- 
monies,'''' 

CYNIC. — After the death of Socrates, some of his disciples, 
under Antisthenes, were accustomed to meet in the Cynos- 
argos, one of the gymnasia of Athens, — and hence they 
were called Cynics. According to others, the designation 
comes from kvov or Kvuog^ a dog, because like the dog they 
were destitute of al] modesty. Antisthenes, Diogenes, and 
Crates, were the first heads of the sect. Zeno, by checking 
and moderating their doctrines, gave birth to the sect of 
Stoics. 

Richterus, Dissertatio de Cynicis^ Leips., 1701 ; Diogenes 
Laertius, lib. vi., c. 103. 



JO^MONIST. — "To believe the governing mind, or minds, 
not absolutely and necessarily good, nor confined to what 
is best, but capable of acting according to mere will or 
fancy, is to be a DcBmonisty — Shaftesbury, Inquiry con- 
cerning Virtue^ book i., pt. 1, sect. 2. 

a>ATA (the plural of Datum — given or granted). — "Those 
facts from which an inference is drawn, are called data ; 
for example, it has always been found that the inhabitants 
of temperate climates have excelled those of very hot or 
very cold climates in stature, strength, and intelhgence : 
these facts are the data^ from which it is inferred that 
excellence of body and mind depend, in some measure, 
upon the temperature of the climate." — Taylor, Elements 
of Thought. 

©EDUCTION (from de ducere^ to draw from, to cause to 
come out of) — is the mental operation which consists in 
drawing a particular truth from a general principle antece- 
dently known. It is opposed to induction^ which consists 
in rising from particular truths to the determination of 
a general principle. Let it be proposed to prove that 
Peter is mortal ; I know that Peter is a man, and this 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 127 

DEDUCTION— 

enables me to say that all men are mortal ; from which 
affirmation I deduce that Peter is mortal. 

The syllogism is the form of deduction. Aristotle (Prior. 
Analyt., lib. i., cap. 1), has defined it to be '' an enunciation 
in which certain assertions bemg made, by their being true, 
it follows necessarily, that another assertion different from 
the first is true also." 

Before we can deduce a particular truth we must be in 
possession of the general truth. This may be acquired 
intuitively^ as every change implies a cause ; or inductively, 
as the volume of gas is in the inverse ratio of the pressure. 

Deduction, when it uses the former kind of truths, is 
demonstration or science. Truths drawn from the latter 
kind are contingent and relative, and admit of correction 
by increasing knowledge. 

The principle of deduction is, that things which agree with 
the same thing agree with one another. The principle of 
induction is, that in the same circumstances, and in the 
same substances, fr^om the same causes the same effects 
will follow. 

The mathematical and metaphysical sciences are founded 
on deduction, the physical sciences rest on induction. 

For the different ^iews of deduction and induction, see 
Whewell, Pliilosopli, of Induct. Sciences, book i., chap. 6; 
Mill, Logic, book ii., chap. 5 ; Quarterly Rev., vol. ^d>, art. 
on Whew ell. 
DEFINITION (de Jinire, to mark out limits). — Est definitio, 
earum rerum, quae sunt ejus rei propriae, quam definire 
volumus, brevis et circumscripta qui^dam explicatio. — 
Cicero, De Orat., lib. i., c. 42. 

"' The simplest and most correct notion of a definition is, 
a proposition declaratory of the meaning of a word." — Mill, 
Logic, 2d edit., vol. i., p. 182. 

Definition signifies ''laying down a boundary;" and is 
used m logic to signify '' an expression which explams any 
term so as to separate it from everything else, as a boundary 
separates fields. Logicians distinguish definitions into cssen- 



I 



128 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

DEFINITION— 

tial and accidental An essential definition states what are 
regarded as the constituent parts of the essence of that 
which is to be defined ; and an accidental definition (or 
description) lays down what are regarded as circumstances 
belonging to it, viz., properties or accidents, such as 
causes, effects, &c. 

'' Essential definition is divided into physical (natural), 
and logical (metaphysical) : the physical definition being 
made by an enumeration of such parts as are actually 
separable; such as are the hull, masts, &c., of a 'ship;' 
the root, trunk, branches, bark, &c., of a ' tree.' The 
logical definition consists of the genus and difference, which 
are called by some the metaphysical (ideal) parts ; as being 
not two real parts into which an individual object can (as 
in the former case), be actually divided, but only different 
views taken (notions formed) of a class of objects, by one 
mind. Thus a magnet would be defined logically^ ' an iron 
ore having attraction for iron.'" — Whately, Logic^ b. ii., 
ch. 5, sect. 6. 

The rules of a good definition are : — 
1. That it be clearer than the thing defined. 2. That it 
be brief— weg'we ahsit quidquam nee super sit. 3. That it 
agree toti definito et soli definito; that is, that it be proper 
and universal. 

That which is complex can be defined, not that which is 
simple. I can define man — ^not being. Individuals cannot 
be defined, as James and John, for they have the same 
essence, and are only distinguished by accidents. 

Accidental or descriptive definition, may be — 1. Causal ; 
as when man is defined as made after the image of God, and 
for his glory. 2. Accidental ; as when he is defined to be 
animal hipes implume, 3. Genetic; as when the means by 
which it is made are indicated — as, if a straight line fixed 
at one end be drawn round by the other end so as to return 
to itself, a circle will be described. Or, 4. Per oppositum ; 
as when virtue is said to be the flying from vice. 

'^Definitions are called nominal^ which explain merely 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 129 

DEFINITION— 

the meaning of the term; and real^ wMch explain the 
nature of tlie thing signified by that term. Logic is 
concerned with nominal definitions alone." — Whately, nt 
svpra, 

'' By a real^ in contrast to a verbal or nominal definition. 
the logicians do not intend ' the giving an adequate con- 
ception of the nature and essence of a thing ;' that is, of 
a thing considered in itself, and apart fi.'om the conceptions 
of it already possessed. By verbal definition is meant the 
more accurate determination of the signification of a word ; 
by real the more accurate determination of the contents of 
a notion. The one clears up the relation of icords to notions ; 
the other of notions to things. The substitution of notional 
for real would, perhaps, remove the ambiguity. But if we 
retain the term real., the aim of a verbal definition being tc 
specify the thought denoted by the word., such definition ought 
to be called notiono.1^ on the principle on which the defini- 
tion of a notion is called real ; for this definition is the ex- 
position of what things are comprehended in a thought." — 
Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ p. 691, note. 

" In the sense in which nominal and real definitions were 
distinguished by the scholastic logicians, logic is concerned 
with reaZ, i. e., notional definitions only; to explain the 
meaning of words belongs to dictionaries or gTammars." — 
Mansell, Prolegom. Log.^ p. 189. 

'' There is a real distinction between definitions of names 
and what are erroneously called definitions of things ; but 
it is that the latter, along with the meaning of a name, 
covertly asserts a matter of fact. This covert assertion is 
not a definition., but a postulate. The definition is a mere 
identical proposition, which gives information only about 
the use of language, and from which no conclusions re- 
specting matters of fact can possibly be drawn. The 
accompanying postulate, on the other hand, affirms a fact 
which may lead to consequences of every degree of impor- 
tance. It afHrms the real existence of things, possessing 
the combination of attributes set forth in the definition, and 

K 



130 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

DEFINITION— 

this, if true, may be foundation sufficient to build a whole 
fabric of scientific truth." — Mill, Logic^ p. 197. 

Aristotle, Poster. Analyt.^ lib. ii. ; Topic,., lib. vi. 

Logic of Port Royal., part 1, chap. 12, 13, 14; part 2, 
chap. 16. 

Locke, Essay on Hum, Understand.., book iii., c. 3 and 4. 

Leibnitz, Noveaux Essais., liv. iii., cap. 3 et 4. 

"Reid, Account of Aristotle's Logic, chap. 2, sect. 4. 
BE 1ST. — There are different kinds of deists noticed by Dr. 
Sam. Clarke, vol. ii., p. 12. 

1. Those who believe in an Eternal and Intelligent Being, 
but deny a Providence, either conserving or governing. 

2. Those who believe in God and in Providence, but 
deny moral distinctions and moral government. 

3. Those who believe in God and his moral perfections, 
but deny a future state. 

4. Those who believe in God and his moral government, 
here and hereafter, in so far as the light of nature goes ; 
but doubt or deny the doctrines of revelation. 

Kant has distinguished between a tJieist and a deist — the 
former acknowledging a God, free and intelligent, the 
creator and preserver of all things; the latter believing that 
the first principle of all things is an Infinite Force, which is 
inherent in matter, and the blind cause of all the phenomena 
of nature. Deism., in this sense, is mere materialism. But 
deism is generally employed to denote a belief in God, 
without implying a belief in revelation. 

'^ That modern species of infidelity, called deism., or natural 
religion., as contradistinguished from revealed.'''' — Van Mil- 
dert, Bampton Lect.., sermon 9. 

'' Tindal appears to have been the first who assumed for 
himself, and bestowed on his coadjutors, the denomination 
of Christian deists., though it implied no less than an absolute 
contradiction in terms." — Van Mildert, Bampton Lecture., 
sermon 10. 

See Leland, Answer to Deistical Writers. — F. Theist. 
l>EIIIIURCiE (In^iov^yog^ workman, architect). — Socrates and 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 131 

DExlIlUROE— 

Plato represented God as the architect of the universe. 
Plotinus confounded the demiurge with the soul of the world, 
and represented it as inferior to the supreme intelligence. 
The Gnostics represented it as an emanation from the 
supreme di\^nity, and having a separate existence. The 
difficulty of reconciling our idea of an infinite cause to the 
variable and contingent effects observable in the universe 
has given rise to the hypotheses of a demiurge^ and of a 
plastic nature ; but they do not alleviate the difficulty. This 
term is applied to God, Heb. xi. 10. 
JttEmONSTBATION (demoitstrare^ d-olu'ii;^ from oi7:ohix,uvui, 
to point out, to cause to see). — In old English writers this 
word was used to signify the pointing out^ the connection 
between a conclusion and its premises, or that of a pheno- 
menon with its asserted cause. It now denotes a necessary 
consequence, and is spionymous with proof from ffi'st prin- 
ciples. To draw out a particular truth from a general 
truth in which it is enclosed, is deduction ; from a necessary 
and universal truth to draw consequences which necessarily 
follow, is demonstration. To connect a truth with a first 
principle, to show that it is this principle applied or realized 
in a particular case, is to demonstrate. The result is 
science, knowledge, certainty. Those general truths arrived 
at by induction in the sciences of observation, are certain 
knowledo'e. But it is knowledo-e which is not definite or 
complete. It may admit of increase or modification, by new 
discoveries ; but the knowledge which demonstration gives 
is fixed and unalterable. 

A demonstration is a reasoniag consisting of one or more 
arguments, by which some proposition brought into ques- 
tion is evidently shown to be contained in some other pro- 
position assumed, whose truth and certainty being evident 
and acknowledged, the proposition in question must also be 
admitted as certain. 

Demonstration is dii^ect or indirect. Direct demonstration 
is descending — when starting from a general truth we come 
to a particular conclusion, which we must affirm or deny; 



132 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

or ascending —when starting from the subject and its attri- 
butes, we arrive by degrees at a general principle, with 
which we connect the proposition in question. Both these 
are deductive, because they connect a particular truth with 
a general principle. Indirect demonstratio is when we 
admit hypothetically a proposition contradictory of that 
which we wish to demonstrate and show that this admission 
leads to absurdity ; that is, an impossibility or a contradic- 
tion. This is demonstratio per impossibile^ or reductio ad 
absurdum. It should only be employed when direct de- 
monstration is unattainable. 

'' Demonstration was divided by ancient writers into two 
kinds : one kind they called demonstration on ; the other 
demonstration oion. 

''The demonstration B/or/, or argument from cause to effect, 
is most commonly employed in anticipating future events. 
When, e. g.^ we argue that at a certain time the tides will 
be unusually high, because of its being the day following 
the new or the full moon, it is because we know that that 
condition of the moon is in some way connected as a cause 
with an unusually high rising of the tides as its effect, and 
can argue, therefore, that it will produce what is called 
spring tide* 

'' On the other hand, the demonstration ori^ or argument 
from effect to cause, is more applicable, naturally, to past 
events, and to the explanation of the phenomena which they 
exhibit as effects. Thus the presence of poison in the 
bodies of those whose death has been unaccountably sudden, 
is frequently proved in this way by the phenomena which 
such bodies present, and which involve the presence of poison 
as their cause." — Karslake, Aids to Logic^ vol. ii., p. 46. 

The theory of demonstration is to be found in the Organon 
of Aristotle, " since whose time," said Kant, " Logic, as to 
its foundation, has gained nothing." 

DENOMINATION, External. — V. MOBE. 

I>EONTOIiOOY (^To 0201/^ what is due, or binding ; T^oyog^ dis- 
course). 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 133 

I>E©NTOI.©OY— 

" Deontology^ or that wMcli is proper, lias been chosen as 
a fitter term than any other y/hich could be found, to repre- 
sent in the field of morals, the principle of utilitarianism^ or 
that which is useful." — Bentham, Deontology^ or the Science 
of Morality^ vol. i., p. 34. 

*' The term deontology expresses moral science, and ex- 
presses it well, precisely because it signifies the science of 
duty, and contains no reference to utility." — Whewell, Pre- 
face to Mackintosh'' s Prelim, Dissert.,, p. 20. 

Deontology involves the being bound or being under ob- 
ligation ; the very idea which it was selected to avoid, and 
which utility does not give. 

''• The ancient Pythagoreans defined virtue to be "E|;? 
Tov ^eovTog (that is, the habit of duty, or of doing what 
is binding j, the oldest definition of virtue of which we have 
any account, and one of the most unexceptionable which is 
yet to be found in any system of philosophy." — Stewart, 
Active and Mor. Powers^ vol. ii., p. 446. 

And Sir W. Hamilton (Reid''s Works ^ p. 540, note), has 
observed that ethics are well denominated deontology. 
l>ESlCrN. — '' The atomic atheists further allege, that though 
there be many things in the world which serve well for uses, 
yet it does not at all follow that therefore they were made 
intentionally and designedly for those uses." — Cudworth, 
Intell Syst, p. 670. 

^' What is done, neither by accident, nor simply for its 
own sake, but with a view to some efiect that is to follow, 
is said to be the result of design. Xone but intelligent 
beings act with design ; because it requires knowledge of 
the connection of causes and effects, and the power of com- 
paring ideas, to conceive of some end or object to be pro- 
duced, and to devise the means proper to produce the 
effect. Therefore, whenever we see a thing which not only 
may be applied to some use, but which is evidently made 
for the sake of the effect which it produces, we feel sure 
that it is the work of a being capable of thought." — Taylor, 
Elements of Thought. 



134 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

DESIGN— 

'•'• When we find in nature the adaptation of means to an 
end, we infer design and a designer; because the only 
circumstances in which we can trace the origination of 
adaptation, are those in which human mind is implicated." 
— Theory of Hum. Progression^ p. 482. 

'' The words design and ivisdom are by no means synony- 
mous ; and it is possible that a philosopher may grant that 
there are marks of design in the universe, who thinks but 
meanly of the wisdom displayed in its formation. This 
was the case with King Alphonso when he ventured to 
censure the planetary system (according to the conceptions 
which astronomers then entertained of it), as a contrivance 
which admitted of important improvements. Distinct, 
however, as these two inquiries are, they have often been 
confounded by sceptical writers, who imagined that every 
little criticism they were able to make on the course of 
events, either in the physical or moral world, furnished an 
argument in favour of atheism." — Stewart, Active and 
Mor. Powers., vol. ii., p. 34. 

"I cannot help remarking, on the other hand, that the 
same distinction between design and wisdom has been over- 
looked by many of the excellent writers who have employed 
their genius in defending and illustrating the truths of 
natural religion. Of those who have speculated on the 
subject of final causes, the greater number seem plainly to 
have considered every new conjecture they were able to 
form concerning the ends and uses of the different objects 
comprising the universe, and of the general laws by which 
its phenomena are regulated, as an additional proof that it 
is not the work of chance or of necessity; and to have 
imagined that the greater the number of such ends and uses 
they were able to trace, the more irresistible they rendered 

the evidence of design and intelligence The proper 

use of such speculations is not to refute the atheist, but to 
illustrate the wisdom and unity of design displayed in the 
material and moral worlds, or rather, to enlighten and 
exalt our own understanding, by tracing with humility and 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 135 

DESIOIV— 

reverence the operations of a msdoui which is infinite and 
divine." — Ibid. — V. Cause (Final). 

On the argument for the being of God from the evidences 
of design^ or the adaptation of means to ends in the uni- 
verse, see 

Xenophon, Memorabilia of Socrates^ book i., chap. 4. 

Buffier, Treatise on First Truths^ part 2, chap. 16. 

Pteid, Active Powers^ essay vi., chap. 6. 

Stewart, Active and Mor. Powers^ book iii-, chap. 2. 

Paley, Xat. Theology. 

Bridgewater Treatises. 

Burnett Prize Essays, 
]>£SIR£. — According to Dr. Hutcheson {Essay on the Passions^ 
sect. 1), ''''desires arise in our mind from the frame of our 
nature, upon apprehension of good or evil in objects, 
actions, or events, to obtain for ourselves or others the 
agreeable sensation when the object or event is good ; or 
to prevent the uneasy sensation when it is evil.'' 

But, while desires imply intelligence, they are not the 
mere efflux, or product of that intelhgence ; and, while 
the objects of our desires are known, it is not, solely, in 
consequence of knowing them, that we desire them ; but, 
rather, because we have a capacity of desiring. There is a 
tendency, on om^ part, towards certain ends or objects, and 
there is a fitness in them to give us pleasure, when they are 
attained. Our desires of such ends or objects are natural 
a.nd primary. Natural^ hut not instinctive^ for they im-plj 
intelligence ; primary., and not factitious., for they result 
from the constitution of things, and the constitution of the 
human mind, antecedent to experience and education. 

It has been maintained, however, that there are no ori- 
ginal principles in our nature, carrying us towards particu- 
lar objects, but that, in the com^se of experience, we learn 
what gives us pleasure or pain — what does us good or ill : 
that we flee from the one class of objects, and follow after 
the other ; that, in this way, likings and dislikings — incli- 
nation and aversion spring up within us : and. that all tlu^ 



136 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

various passions and pursuits of human life are produced 
and prompted by sensibility to pleasure and pain, and a 
knowledge of wbat affects that sensibility; and, thus, all 
our desires may be resolved into one general desire of 
happiness or well-being. 

There is room for difference of opinion as to the number 
of those desires which are original ; but there is Httle room 
for doubting, that there are some which may be so desig- 
nated. Every being has a nature. Every thing is what it 
is, by having such a nature. Man has a nature, and his 
nature has an end. This end is indicated by certain ten- 
dencies. He feels inclination or desire towards certain 
objects, which are suited to his faculties and fitted to 
improve them. The attainment of these objects gives 
pleasure, the absence of them is a source of uneasiness. 
Man seeks them by a natural and spontaneous effort. In 
seeking them, he comes to knov/ them better and desire 
them more eagerly. But the intelligence which is grad- 
ually developed, and the development which it may give 
to the desires^ should not lead us to overlook the fact, that 
the desires primarily existed, as inherent tendencies of our 
nature, aiming at their correspondent objects ^ spontane- 
ously, it may be, in the first instance, but gradually gaining 
clearness and strength, by the aid and concurrence of our 
intellectual and rational powers. 
©ETEliMlNlSM. — This name is applied by Sir W. Hamilton 
(Reid^s Works^ p. 601, note) to the doctrine of Hobbes, 
as contradistinguished from the ancient doctrine of fatalism. 
The principle of the sufficient reason is likewise called by 
Leibnitz the principle of the determining reason. In the 
Diet, des Sciences Philosophy., nothing is given undei 
determinism., but a reference made to fatalism.'^ And 
fatalism is explained as the doctrine which denies liberty 
to man.— F. ISTecessity, Fatalism, Liberty. 

* But in the article Liherte, determinism is applied to tlie doctrine that motive^-' 
invincibly determine the will, and is opposed to liberty of indiiference, which is 
described as the doctrine that man can determine himself without motives. 



TCCASUXAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 137 

BESTlirr (destinatum^^ed) — ^isthe necessary and unalterable 
connection of events ; of wMcli the heathens made a divine 
power, superior to all their deities. The idea of an irre- 
sistible destiny, against which man strives in vain, pervades 
the whole of Greek tragedy. — V, Fatausm. 

l>t4l.ECTICS (otccX/ix^TiKr, tsx^ti). — -'The Greek verb oict- 
Azysat'xi, m its widest signification, — 1. Includes the use 
both of reason and speech as proper to man. Hence, 
dialectics may mean Logic, as includiag the right use of 
reason and language. 2. It is also used as synon\TQOus 
with the Latin word disserere^ to discuss or dispute ; hence, 
dialectics has been used to denote the Logic of proba- 
bilities, as opposed to the doctriQe of demonstration and 
scientific induction. 3. It is also used lq popular language 
to denote Logic properly so called. But dialectics, Hke 
science, is not Logic, but the subject matter of Logic. 
Dialectics is handled, anatomized, and its conditions deter- 
mined by Logic ; but. for all that, it is not Logic, any 
more than the animal kingdom is Zoology, or the vegetable 
kingdom is Botany." — Poste, Introd. to Aristotle's Poster 
Analyt.^ p. 16. 12mo, London, 1850. 

In the philosophy of Kant, dialectic means what is pro- 
bable. He opposes dialectic arguments to apodeictic or 
demonstrative arguments. 

••Xenophon teUs us (Mem. iv., 5. 11). that Socrates said, 
• That dialectic (to oiscAzyefj^c&i) was so called because it is 
an inquire' pursued by persons who take cotmsel together, 
separating the subjects considered accordiQg to their kinds 
{oix^.zyo'jTcc^). He held accordingly that men should try 
to be well prepared for such a process, and should pursue 
it with diligence. By this means he thought they would 
become good men, fitted for responsible offices of command, 
and tnily dialecticaV Qnc&'kzx.Tix.cdrcc'kGvg), And this is, I 
conceive, the answer to ^Ir. Grote's interrogator}- excla- 
mation (vol. viii., p. 577). ^Surely the et^TQolog}* here 
given by Xenophon or Socrates of the word (oix7.iyiadat), 
cannot be considered as satisfactory.' The two notions, of 
investigatory dialogue and distribution of notions according 



138 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

l>IAi:iECTICS— 

to their kinds, which are thus asserted to be connected in 
etymology, were, among the followers of Socrates, con- 
nected in fact ; the dialectic dialogue was supposed to 
involve of course the dialectic division of the subject." — 
Dr. Whewell, On Plato's Notion of Dialectic^ Trans, of 
Carab. PJiilosoph. Soc.^ vol. ix., part 4. 

i>ia]\oiojloc;y— F. Noology. - 

1>ICTUM I>E OMNI ET I>E NUIiliO— an axiom from 
Aristotle, which is the fundamental principle of reasoning. 
It maybe explained to mean ''whatever is predicated (i. e., 
affirmed, or denied) universally of any class of things, may 
be predicated in like manner (viz., affirmed, or denied) of 
any thing comprehended in that class." 

DIFFERENCE (liocOo^o&, differentia) . — When two objects 
are compared they may have qualities which are common 
to both, or the one may have qualities which the other has 
not. The first constitutes their resemblance^ the second 
their difference. If the qualities constituting their resem- 
blance be essential qualities, and the qualities constituting 
their difference be merely accidental^ the objects are only 
said to be distinct ; but if the qualities constituting their 
difference be essential qualities, then the objects are differ- 
ent.* One man is distinct from another man, or one piece 
of silver from another ; but a man is different from a horse, 
and gold is different from silver. Those accidental differ- 
ences which distinguish objects whose essence is common, 
belong only to individuals, and are called individual or 
numerical differences. Those differences^ which cause ob- 
jects to have a different nature, constitute species, and are 
called specific differences. The former are passing and 
variable ; but the latter are permanent and form the ob- 
jects of science, and furnish the grounds of all classification^ 
division^ and definition^ — q. v. 

'' Difference or differentia^ in Logic, means the formal 
or distinguishing part of the essence of a species." When 

* Derodon, De Universalihus, seems to use differentia and distinctio indiscrimi- 
nately. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 139 

DIFFERENCE— 

I say that the differentia of a magnet is '4ts attracting 
iron," and that its property is "polarity," these are called 
respectively, a specific difference and 'property; because 
magnet is (I have supposed) an infima species (i. e., only a 
species). When I say that the differentia of iron ore is 
''its containing iron," and its property ''being attracted 
by the magnet," these are called respectively, a generic 
difference and property^ because " iron ore" is a subaltern 
species or genus ; being both the genus of magnet, and the 
species of mineral." — Whately, Logic^ book ii., chap. 5, 
sect. 4. 

The English word divers expresses difference only, but 
diverse expresses difference icith opposition. The Evange- 
lists narrate the same events in " divers manners," but not 
in " diverse manners.^'' 

Porphyry, Introd. to Categor. 

Aristotle, Topic. ^ lib. vii., c. 1, 2. — F. Distinction. 
DIi:iEM]n;A (^tg T^Yif^^ci) — is an argument consisting of two or 
more contradictory propositions which lead to the same 
conclusion — as, 

The wicked either perish utterly at death, or their souls 
are immortal. 

If they perish utterly at death, there is no hope for them. 

If their souls are immortal, they will be punished for 
their wickedness 
i>iSCOVERY.— F. Invention. 

IJISCURSUS. — "If the mind do not perceive intuitively the 
connection betwixt the prsedicate and subject, as in the 
case of axioms, or self-evident propositions, it can do so no 
otherwise than by the intervention of other ideas, or by the 
use of middle terms, as they are called, in the language of 
Aristotle. And this application of the middle term, first to 
one of the terms of a proposition, and then to the other, is 
performed by that exercise of the intellect which is very 
properly called in Greek liotvota.^ because the intellect hi 
this operation goes betwixt the two terms, as it were, and 
passes from the one to the other. In Latin, as there is not 



140 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

I>ISCURSUS— 

the same facility of composition, it is expressed by two 
words, disciirsus mentis^ mens being the same thing in Latin 
as Nof J in Greek ; and the Latin expression is rendered 
into English by discourse of reasoning^ or as it is commonly 
called, reasoning." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ book v., 
ch. 4. 

" Reasoning (or discourse) is the act of proceeding from 
certain judgments to another founded on them (or the 
result of them.)" — Whately, Logic^ book ii., ch. 1, sect. 2. 

I>ISTINCTI®N (hidl^iuii) — is wider in signification than 
difference ; for all things that are different are also distinct ; 
but all things that are distinct are not also different. One 
drop of water does not specif cally differ from another ; but 
they are individually distinct. 

Distinction is a kind of alietas or otherness. Those 
things are said to be distinct of which one is not the other. 
Thus Peter., precisely because he is not Paul., is said to be 
distinct from Paul. Union is not opposed to distinction ; 
for things may be so united that the one shall not be con- 
founded with the other. Thus the soul is united to the 
body. Indeed union implies distinction; it is when two 
things which are mutually distinct., become, as it were, 
one. 

Distinction is real and mental., a parte rei and per in- 
tellectum. Real distinction is founded in the nature of the 
thing, and amounts to difference. It is threefold: — 1. 
Object from object — as God from man. 2. Mode from 
mode — as blue from black. 3. Mode from thing — as body 
from motion. Mental distinction is made by the mind — as 
when we distinguish between light and heat, which are 
naturally united, or between the length and breadth of a 
body. It amounts to abstraction. — Bossuet, Logique., liv. 
i., c. 25 ; Eeid, Account of AristotWs Logic^ ch. 2, sect. 3. 

DISTRIBUTION — "Is the placing particular things in the 
places or compartments which have already been prepared 
to receive them." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

"In Logic, a term is said to be distributed when it is 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 141 

l>ISTRIBUTION~ 

employed in its full extent, so as to comprehend all its 
significates— everything to which it is applicable.— Whately, 
Logic ^ b. ii., ch. 8, sect. 2. 

''A term is said to be ' distributed^'' when an assertion is 
made or implied respecting every memher of the class which 
the term denotes. Of every universal proposition, there- 
fore, the subject is distributed; e. g.^ all men are mortal ; 
ISTo rational being is irresponsible ; Whatsoever things were 
written aforetime were vmtten for our learning. When an 
assertion is made or implied respecting some member or 
members of a class, but not necessarily respecting all, the 
term is said to be ' undistributed ; ' as, for example, the 
subjects of the following propositions :— Some men are 
benevolent ; There are some standing here that shall not die ; 
Not every one that invokes the sacred name shall enter into 
the heavenly kingdom."— Kidd, Principles of Reasoning^ 
ch. 4, sect. 3, p. 179. 

MTHEISM. — " As for that fore- mentioned ditheism^ or opinion 
of two gods, a good and an evil one, it is evident that its 
original sprung from nothing else, but from a firm persuasion 
of the essential goodness of Deity, &c." — Cudworth, Inte.ll. 
Sijstem^ p. 213. — V. Dualism. 

l>IVl@lON — ''Is the separating things of the same kind into 
parcels ; analysis is the separating of things that are of 
different kinds ; we divide a stick by cutting it into two, or 
into twenty pieces ; we analyze it by separating the bark, 
the wood, and the pith — a division may be made at plea- 
sure, an analysis must be made according to the nature of 
the object." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

' ' Division (Logical) is the distinct enumeration of several 
things signified by one common name. It is so called from 
its being analogous to the real division of a whole into its 
parts." — Whately, Logic ^ book ii., ch. 5, sect. 5. 

Division is either division proper or partition. Partition 
is the distribution of some substance into its parts ; as of 
the globe into Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. Division 
proper is the distribution of genus and species into wliat is 



142 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

©IVISIOIV— 

under them ; as when substance is divided into spiritual and 
material. The members which arise from division retam 
the name of their whole ; but not those from partition, 

" Division is the separation of a whole into its parts. 

" But as there are two kinds of wholes^ there are also two 
kinds of division. There is a whole composed of parts 
really distinct, called in Latin, totum, and whose parts are 
called integral parts. The division of this whole is called 
properly partition; as when we divide a house into its 
apartments, a tovm into its wards, a kingdom or state into 
its provinces, man into body and soul^ the body into its 
members. The sole rule of their division is, to make the 
enumeration of particulars very exact, and that there be 
nothing wanting to them. 

''The other whole is called, in Latin, omne^ and its parts 
subjected or inferior parts^ inasmuch as the whole is a 
common term^ and its parts are the terms comprising its 
extension. The word animal is a whole of this nature, of 
which the inferiors, as man and beast, which are compre- 
hended under its extension, are subjected parts. This 
division obtains properly the name of division^ and there 
are four kinds of division which may be noticed. 

''The^r5^ is, when we divide the genus by its species; 
every substance is body or mind, every animal is man or 
beast. The second is, when we divide the genus by its 
differences; every animal is rational or irrational, every 
number is even or uneven. The third is, when we divide a 
common subject into the opposite accidents of which it is 
susceptible, these being according to its different inferiors, 
or in relation to different times ; as, every star is luminous 
by itself, or by reflection only ; every body is in motion or 
at rest, &c. The fourth is, that of an accident into its 
different subjects^ as division of goods into those of mind and 
body." — Port Roy, Logic, part 2, chap. 15. 

The rules of a good division are : — 

1st. That it be adequate, i. e., that the parts taken to- 
ojether contain the whole. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 143 

DIVISION— 

2d. That it be distinct, so that the members do not coin- 
cide, but exclude one another. 

3d. That there be nothing superfluous or redundant. 

Seneca {Epist. 89) said, Idem villi Jiahet nimia quod nulla 
divisio ; simile confuso est quicquid usque in j^ulverem 
sectum est. 

Aristotle, Poster. Analyt., lib. ii., c. 13. 

Reid, Account of AristotWs Logic, chap, ii., sect. 2. — 
V. Whole. 
DOOMATISM (Boy^flf, from Iokhv^ to see or seem).—" Philoso- 
phers," said Lord Bacon, '^ may be divided into two classes, 
the empirics and the dogmatists. The empiric, like the ant, 
is content to amass, and then consume his provisions. The 
dogmatist., like the spider, spins webs of which the materials 
are extracted from his own substance, admirable for the 
delicacy of their workmanship, but without sohdity or use. 
The bee keeps a middle course — she draws her matter from 
flowers and gardens ; then, by art peculiar to her, she 
labours and digests it. True philosophy does something 
like this." 

'^He who is certain or presumes to say he knows., is, 
whether he be mistaken or in the right, a dogmatist.''' — 
Shaftesbury, Miscell. Reflect.., Miscell. ii., c. 2. 

Kant defined dogmatism., ''the presumption that we are 
able to attain a pure knowledge based on ideas, according 
to principles w^hich the reason has long had in use, without 
any inquiry into the manner or into the right by which it 
has attained them." — Morell, Elements of PsycJiologij^ p. 
236, note. 

"By dogmatism we understand, in general, both aU pro- 
pounding and all receiving of tenets, merely from habit, 
without thought or examination, or, in other words, upon 
the authority of others ; in short, the very opposite of 
critical investigation. All assertion for which no proof is 
oflered is dogmatical.'^'' — Chalybaeus, Specid. Philosoph.. 
P-4. 

To maintain that man cannot attain to knowled^'e of the 



144 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

truth, is scepticism. To maintain that lie can do so only bv 
renouncing his reason, which is naturally defective, and 
surrendering himself to an internal inspiration or superior 
intuition, by which he is absorbed into God, and loses all 
personal existence, is mysticism. Dogmatism is to maintain 
that knowledge may be attained by the right use of our 
faculties, each within its proper sphere, and employed in a 
right method. This is the natur^il creed of the human 
race. Scepticism and mysticism are after thoughts. 

Dogmatism^ or faith in the results of the due exercise of 
our faculties, is to be commended. But dogmatism in the 
method of prosecuting our inquiries is to be condemned. 
Instead of laying dovfn dogmatically truths which are not 
proven, we should proceed rather by observation and doubt. 
- The scholastic philosophers did much harm by their dog- 
matic method. It is not to be mistaken for the synthetic 
method. There can be no synthesis without a preceding 
analysis. But they started from positions which had not 
been proved, and deduced consequences which were of no 
value. — Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. 
l>OUliT (duditare^ duitare^ i. e., in duo iiare^ to go two ways). — 
Man knows some things, and is ignorant of many things, while 
he is in douht as to other things. Doubt is that state of mind 
in which we hesitate as to two contradictory conclusions — 
havmg no preponderance of evidence in favour of either. 
Philosophical douht has been distinguished as provisional or 
definitive. Definitive douht is scepticism. Provisional^ or 
methodical douht is a voluntary suspending of our judgment 
for a time, in order to come to a more clear and sure con- 
clusion. This was first given as a rule in philosophical 
method by Descartes, who teUs us that he began by doubt- 
ing everything, discharging his mind of all preconceived 
ideas, and admitting none as clear and true tiU he had 
subjected them to a rigorous examination. 

^' Douht is some degree of belief, along with the conscious- 
ness of ignorance, in regard to a proposition. Absolute 
disbelief implies knowledge : it is the knowledge that such 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 145 

I>OUBT— 

or such a thing is not true. If the mind admits a proposi- 
tion without any desire for knowledge concerning it, this is 
credulity. If it is open to receive the proposition, but feels 
io-norance concerning it, this is doiibt. In proportion as 
knowledge increases, doubt diminishes, and behef or dis- 
belief strengthens." — Taylor, Elements of Thought, — V. 
Certainty, Scepticism. 
]>R.e: AMINO — The phenomena of sleep and dreaming^ are 
treated by almost all Avriters on psycholog}'. Dreams very 
often take their rise and character from something in the 
preceding state of body or mind. '' Through the multitude 
of business cometh a dream.^^^ said Solomon ; and Aristotle 
regarded dreams as the vibrations of our waking feelings. 
— Ethic, ^ lib. i., cap. 13. 

According to these views, dreams^ instead of being pros- 
pective or prophetic, are retrospective and resultant. The 
former opinion, however, has prevailed in all ages and 
among all nations ; and hence, oneiromancy or prophesying 
by dreams^ that is, interpreting them as presages of coming- 
events. 
DUAIilSl^I, DUAIilTY.-— ''P>i;hagoras talked, it is said, of 
an immaterial unity, and a material duality^ by which he 
pretended to signii}', perhaps, the first prmciples of all 
things, the efficient and material causes." — Bolingbroke. 
Hum. Reason^ essay ii. 

Dualism is the doctrine that the universe was created 
and is preserved by the concurrence of two principles, 
equally necessary, eternal, and independent. 

Mythological dualism was held by Zoroaster and the 
Magi, who maintained the existence of a good principle 
and an evil principle ; and thus explained the mixed state 
of things which prevails. It would appear, however, accord- 
ing to Zoroaster, that both Ormuzd and Ahrimanes were 
subordinate to Akerenes, or the Supreme Deity ; and that 
it was only a sect of the Magi who held the doctrine of 
dualism in its naked form. Their views were re^-ived in 
the second century by the Gnostics, and in the third cen- 

L 



146 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

tury were supported by Manes, whose followers were called 
Manicliaeans. 

Many of tlie ancient philosophers regarded the universe 
as constituted by two principles, the one active, the other 
passive, the one mind, the other matter, the one soul, the 
other body. But the supposition of two infinites, or of two 
first causes, is self- contradictory, and is now abandoned. 

The term dualism also finds a place in the theory of per- 
ception^ — q, V. 
DURATION. — ''After some thought has entirely disappeared 
from the mind it will often return, joined with the belief 
that it has been in the mind before ; this is called memory. 
Memory and the consciousness of succession give us the 
notion signified by the word duration,^'* — Locke, Essay on 
Hum. Understand.^ book ii., chap. 15. 

According to Kant, duration or time, and also space, are 
necessary forms of the human mind, which cannot think of 
bodies but as existing in space, nor of events but as 
occurring in time. — V. Time. 
1>UTY. — That which we ouglit to do — that which we are under 
obligation to do. In seeing a thing to be right we see at the 
same time that it is our duty to do it. There is a complete 
synthesis between rectitude and obligation. Price has used 
ougJitness as synonymous with rigJitness. — F. Obligation. 

Duty and right are relative terms. If it be the duty of 
one party to do some thing, it is the right of some other 
party to expect or exact the doing of it. — V. Right, 
Rectitude. 

See Wordsworth, Ode to Duty. 
l>YNAl»llsrW[ — the doctrine of Leibnitz, that all substance 
involves force, — V. Matter. 



ECIiECTICIsm (l;tXgyg/v, to select, to choose out). — The 
Alexandrian philosophers, or Neo-platonicians, who arose 
at Alexandria about the time of Pertinax and Severus, and 
continued to flourish to the end of the reign of Justinian, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 147 

ECIiECTICISm— 

professed to gather and unite into one body, what was true 
in all systems of philosophy. To their method of philo- 
sophizing, the name eclecticism was first applied. Clemens 
Alexandrinus (Stromm.^ lib. i., p. 288) said, '^By philo- 
sophy I mean neither the Stoic, nor the Platonic, nor the 
Epicurean, nor the Aristotelian ; but whatever things have 
been properly said by each of these sects, inculcating jus- 
tice and devout knowledge, — this whole selection I call philo- 
sophy.^'' Diogenes Laertius tells us (1, sect. 21), that 
Potamos of Alexandria introduced k^'hsKTiKYiu uipsaif. 
But the method had been adopted by Plato and Aristotle 
before, and has been followed by many in all ages of philo- 
sophy. Leibnitz said that truth was more widely diffused 
than was commonly thought; but it was often burdened 
and weakened, mutilated and corrupted by additions which 
spoiled it and made it less useful. In the philosophy of the 
ancients, or those who had gone before, he thought there 
was perennis quoedam philosophia — if it could only be dis- 
intricated from error and disinterred from the rubbish 
which overwhelmed it. In modern times the great advo- 
cate of eclecticism is Mons. Cousin. But its legitimacy as 
a mode of philosophizing has been challenged. 

'' I follow the liberty of the old Christians, who did not 
pin their faith to any sect of philosophers, not that they 
agreed with those who say that nothing can be known ; 
than which nothing is more foolish ; but that they thought 
that there was no sect which had seen the whole of the 
truth, and none which had not seen some part of the truth. 
They therefore aimed at collecting the truth which was 
diffused among individual philosophers, and among sects, 
into one body : and they thought that this result would be 
nothing else but the true Christian religion." — Grotius, De 
Jure Belli ^ &c.. Prolegomena, sec. 42. 

'*The sense in which this term is used by Clemens" (of 
Alexandria), says Mr. Maurice (Mor. and Metaphys. Phil.^ 
p. 53), '4s obvious enough. He did not care for Plato, 
Aristotle, Pythagoras, as such ; far less did he care for the 



148 VOCAEULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ECI.ECTICISM— 

opinions and conflicts of the schools which bore their names ; 
he found in each hints of precious truths of which he desired 
to avail himself; he would gather the flowers without 
asking in what garden they grew, the prickles he would 
leave for those who had a fancy for them. Eclecticism^ in 
this sense, seemed only like another name for cathohc wis- 
dom. A man, conscious that everything in nature and in 
art was given for his learning, had a right to suck honey 
wherever it was to be found ; he would find sweetness in it 
if it was hanging wild on trees and shrubs, he could admire 
the elaborate architecture of the cells in which it was 
stored. The Author of all good to man had scattered the 
gifts, had imparted the skill ; to receive them thankfully 
was an act of homage to Him. But once lose the feeling 
of devotion and gratitude^ which belonged so remarkably to 
Clemens — once let it be fancied that the philosopher was 
not a mere receiver of treasures which had been provided 
for him, but an ingenious chemist and compounder of various 
naturally unsociable ingredients, and the eclectical doctrine 
would lead to more self-conceit, would be more unreal and 
heartless than any one of the sectarian elements out of which 
it was fashioned. It would want the behef and conviction 
which dwell, with whatever unsuitable companions, even in 
the narrowest theory. Many of the most vital characteris- 
tics of the original dogmas would be effaced under pretence 
of taking off their rough edges and fitting them into each 
other. In general the superficialities and formahties of 
each creed would be preserved in the new system; its 
original and essential characteristics sacrificed." 

'' In philosophy Cicero was never more than an Eclectic^ 
that is, in point of fact, no philosopher at all. For the very 
essence of the philosophical mind hes in this, that it is con- 
strained by an irresistible impulse to ascend to primary, 
necessary principles, and cannot halt until it reaches the 
living, streaming sources of truth ; whereas the eclectic wiU 
stop short where he likes, at any maxim to which he chooses 
to ascribe the authority of a principle. The philosophical 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 149 

£CI.ECTI€IS:TI— 

mind must be systematic, ever seeking to behold all things 
in their connection, as parts or members of a great organic 
Tvhole. and impregnating them all with the electric spiiit of 
order : while the eclectic is content if he can string together 
a number of generalizations. A philosopher incorporates 
and animates : an eclectic heaps and ties up. The philo- 
sopher combines multiplicity into unity: the eclectic leaves 
unity stragghug about in multiplicity. The former opens 
the arteries of truth, the latter its veins. Cicero's legal 
habits peer out from under his philosophical cloak, in his 
constant appeal to precedent, his ready deference to autho- 
rity. For in law, as in other things, the practitioner does 
not go beyond maxims, that is, secondary or tertiarr- prin- 
ciples, taking his stand upon the mounds which his prede- 
cessors have erected." — Second Series of Guesses at Truth. 
edition 1848, p. 238. 

See Cousin, Fragmens PMlosophiques. 8vo. Paris, 1826. 

Jouffi-oy, Melanges PJiilosopJiiques. 8vo, Paris, 1833. 

Damiron, Essal sur THistoire de la Philosophie au dix- 
neuvieme siecle, 2 tom., 8vo, Paris. 1834. 
ECONOmcS (oiico; !/ou>og — the law of the house). — Treatises 
under this title were written by Xenophon, Aristotle, and 
Cicero. They seem to have treated of the best means of 
managing and increasing the comfort and resources of a 
household. Only fragments of them remain. But in 
modem times justice or social duty has been distinguished 
by Henry More into etJdcal^ economical, and political. And 
economics has been employed to denote those duties which 
spring from the relations which exist in a family or house- 
hold. These are the duties — 

1. Of husband and wife. 

2. Of parent and child. 

3. Of master and servant. 

ECSTASY {^zx,7roL>7i:. standing out)— a transport of the soul by 
which it seems as if out of the body. 

This word does not occur in philosophy before the time 
of Philo and the Alexandrians. Plotinus and Porphyry 



150 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ECSTASY— 

pretended to have ecstasies in which they were united to 
God. Among Christian writers, Bonaventura {Itinerarium 
Mentis in Deum)^ Gerson (Theologia Mystica)^Sind Francis 
de Sales, recommend those contemplations which may lead 
to ecstasy. But there is danger of their leading to delusion, 
and to confound the visions of a heated imagination mth 
higher and nearer views of spmtual things. 
Baader, Traite sur VExtase^ 1817. 
EDUCATION {educere^ to draw out) — means the development 
of the bodily and mental powers. The human being is 
born and lives amidst scenes and circumstances which have 
a tendency to call forth and strengthen his powers of body 
and mind. And this may be called the education of nature. 
But by education is generally meant the using those means 
of development which one man or one generation of men 
may employ in favour of another. These means are chiefly 
instruction^ or the communication of knowledge to enlighten 
and strengthen the mind, and discipline^ or the formation of 
manners and habits. Instruction and discipline may be 
physical or moral, that is, may refer to the body or to the 
mind. Both, when employed in all their extent, go to make 
up education^ which is the aid given to assist the develop- 
ment, and advance the progress of the human being, as an 
individual, and as a member of a family, of a community, 
and a race. 

''The business of education is to educe or bring out 
that which is within, not merely or mainly to instruct or 
impose a form from without. Only we are not framed to 
be self-sufficient, but to derive our nourishment, intellectual 
and spiritual, as well as bodily, from without, through the 
ministration of others ; and hence instruction must ever be 
a chief element of education. Hence too we obtain a 
criterion to determine what sort of instruction is right and 
beneficial — that which ministers to education.^ which tends 
to bring out, to nourish and cultivate the faculties of the 
mhid, not that which merely piles a mass of information 
upon them. Moreover, since nature, if left to herself, is 



VOCABUXAEY OF PHZLOSOPHT. 151 

E3>r€AT10X— 

ever prone to ran wild, and since there are hurtful and 
pernicious elements around us, as well as nourisiiing and 
salutary^ pruning and sheltering, correcting and protecting 
are also among the principal offices of education^ — Second 
SOTisir Gwisses at Truthj ISttS, p. 14:5. 
HEkon, 0-^ E''>r'/^'-'.^.'^':'n. Locke. On Education. 
Guizot, M: !>Y0, Paris, 1852. 

Conseils d'n'/t Fdn mr V Education. 
EFTECT. — ^That which is produced bv the operation of a 
iise. — F. Cause. 

EG-<:> I"* ^^ Supposing it proved that my thoughts and mv 

lioi yosness must have a subject, and consequently that I 
exLsi. how do I know that all that train and succession of 
thoughts which I remember belong to one subject, and 
' iix, the I of this moment is the very individual / of yester- 
--. ind of time past ? " — ^Reid, Inquiry, introd, sect. 3. 
" '^niiam Hamilton's note upon this passage is as 
— •• Ir. English, we cannot say the /and the not I. 
_ ._ -„7 Trench le moi and le non-moi^ or even the 
LT^-maii J jj i_'/i and das nicht Ic7i. The ambiguity arising 
from identity of sound between the / and the eye. would 
:':elf preclude the ordinary employment of the former. 
~ir '^;''' iii-i the non-ego are the best terms we can use: 
1 -T 7.: .Tiiions are scientific, it is perhaps no loss 

" " ---rir tecnnioal precision l5 guarded by their non- 
'arity,'^ 
1: „ -^t: - : -t {Reid/s Works^ note B. sect. 1, p. 806.) 
_ - . - -7 . — ' The ego as the subject of thought and 
•: 7 .7 15 now commonly styled by philosophers the 
:. :. :^,^■l subjective is a familiar expression for what 
Jtaios to the mind or thinking principle. In contrast 
jjid correlation to these, the terms object and objective are. 
in like manner, now in general use to denote the non-ego. 
its aflfections and properties, and in general, the really 
existent as opposed to the ideally known.'' ^ 
EGOISM. ECrOl^T.—^'' Those Cartesians who in the progress 
of their doubts ended in absolute egoism.'^ 



152 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EGOISIfl— 

" A few bold thinkers, distinguislied by the name of 
egoists^ had pushed their scepticism to such a length as to 
doubt of everything but their own existence. According 
to tliese^ the proposition Cogito^ ergo sum, is the only truth 
which can be regarded as absolutely certain." — Stewart, 
Dissert., part 2, p. 161, and p. 175. 

Dr. Keid says (IntelL Powers, essay ii., chap. 8), that 
some of Descartes' disciples who doubted of everything 
but their own existence, and the existence of the operations 
and ideas of their own mind, remained at this stage of his 
system and got the name of egoists. But Sir William 
Hamilton, in a note on the passage, says " He is doubtful 
about the existence of this supposed sect of egoists.''^ 

The first sense and aspect of egoism may seem to be 
selfishness. But this is contradicted by the following 
epitaph. 

In the churchyard of Homersfield (St. Mary, Southelm- 
ham), Suffolk, was the gravestone of Robert Crytoft, who 
died ISTov. 17th, 1810, aged ninety, bearing the following 
epitaph : — 

"MYSELF. 
" As I walk'd by myself, I talk'd to myself, 

And thus myself said to me, 
Look to thyself, and take care of thyself, 
For nobody cares for thee. 

" So I turned to myself and I answered myself, 
In the self-same reverie, 
Look to myself, or look not to myself, 
The self-same thing will it be. " 

EliECTION (eligere, to choose) — is an elicit act of wiU, by 
which, after deliberation of several means to an end pro- 
posed by the imderstanding, the will elects one rather than 
any other. Volition has reference to the end, election is of 
the means. According to others, no distinction should be 
taken between election and volition ; as to will an end is 
the same act as to choose the means. But an end may be 
accomplished by different means — of one or other of which 
there is election. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 153 

EL.ECTIOX— 

Aristotle {Ethics, book iii.. chap. 3. 4) says ••moral pre- 
ference. '^poxiDzai:. then, relates to those thmgs only which 
may be accomplished by oiu' own exenions: it is appetite 
or affection, combined with and modified by reason : and, 
conversant not about tuds. but about the best means by 
which they may be attained. VoUu^ju. on the contrary, is 
conversant onlv about t?ids : which consist, according to 
some, m real, and according to others in seeming good." 
EJLE:?1E>'T (^Tcr/jio'^). — The Stoic definition of an tlement is, 
"that out of wluch. as theii^ fii'st principle, things generated 
are made, and into which, as theii' last remains, they are 
resolved."" — Diog. Laert.. vli.. 176. 

'* The word eUmtnt designates the case in which one thing 
is the primitive matter which constitutes another thing." — 
Ai'ist., MetajjJu/s.. lib. x.. c. 1. 

•• We call that elementary which in a composition cannot 
be di^fided into heterogeneous parts — thus the dements of 
sound constitute soimd. and the last parts into which you 
divide it — pai*ts which you cannot di^dde into other sounds 
of a difi:erent kind. The last parts into which bodies can 
be divided — parts whicli cannot be divided into parts of a 
difierent kind, are the thyrrrin^s of bodies. The d-iiKnts oi 
every being are its constitutive principle." — Arist.. 2L:ta- 
pl<ys.. hb. v.. c. 3. 

"Elements are r^ h'j-xry/^r:.-7x d^nx — the inherent or 
in-existing causes, such as matter and form. There are 
other causes, such as the tribe of emcirnt causes, which 
cannot be called t •'://-; z^^:^. because they make no pai*t of the 
substances vrhich they generate or produce. Thus the 
statuary is no part ot his statue : the painter of his pictiu*e. 
Hence it appears that all elements are causes, btit not all 
causes elements." — Harris. PJnIosoph. Arraneje.. chap. 5, 
note. And in the chap, he says, ''In form and matter 
we place the elements of natiu-al substance." 

Materia prima, or matter without form, was an element 
ready to receive form. This seems to be the use of the 
word as retained in the communion service. Bread and 



154 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

wine are elements ready to receive the form of the body 
and blood of Christ. *' Like the elements of the material 
world, the bases of the sacred natures into which they were 
transformed." — Hampden, On Scholastic Philosophy^ lect. 
vii. — See Doublado's Letters. 

'' The elementes be those originall thynges unmyxt and 
uncompounde, of whose temperance and myxture all other 
thynges having corporal substance be compact ; of them be 
foure, that is to say, earth, water, ayre, and fyre." — Sir T. 
Elyot, Castel of Healthy b. i. 

Element is applied analogically to many things ; as to 
letters, the elements of words ; to words, the elements of 
speech ; and in general to the principles or first truths or 
rules of any science or art. 

ElilCIT (elicere^ to draw out) — is applied to acts of will which 
are produced directly by the will itself, and are contained 
within it ; as velle aut nolle. An elicit act of will is either 
election or volition — the latter having reference to ends, 
and the former to means. 

x:ii£l?llNATION9 in mathematics, is the process of causing a 
function to disappear from an equation, the solution of 
which would be embarrassed by its presence there. In other 
writings the correct signification is, '' the extrusion of that 
which is superfluous or irrelevant." Thus, in Edin. Rev.^ 
April, 1833, Sir W. Hamilton says: — ^'The preparatory 
step of the discussion was, therefore, an elimination of 
those less precise and appropriate significations, which, 
as they would at best only afford a remote genus and dif- 
ference, were wholly incompetent for the purpose of a 
definition." 

It is frequently used in the sense of eliciting, but incor- 
rectly. 

EMANATION (e-manare^ to flow from). — According to several 
systems of philosophy and religion which have prevailed in 
the East, all the beings of which the universe is composed, 
whether body or spirit, have proceeded from, and are parts 
of, the divine being oi' substance. This doctrine of emana- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 155 

EJMAJ^ATION— 

Hon is to be found in the systems of Zoroaster, the Gnostics, 
and Neo-platonicians. It differs little, if at all, from Pan- 
theism. 
EMINENTIiY.— 7. VIRTUAL, 

EMOTION (emovere^ to move out) — is often used as synony- 
mous with feeling. Strictly taken, it means '' a state of 
feeling which, while it does not spring directly from an 
•affection of body, manifests its existence and character by 
some sensible effect upon the body." 

An emotion differs from a sensation^ by its not origi- 
nating in a state of body ; and from a cognition^ by its being 
pleasurable or painful. 

Emotions^ like other states of feeling, imply knowledge. 
Something beautiful or deformed, sublime or ridiculous, is 
known and contemplated ; and, on the contemplation, 
springs up the appropriate feeling, followed by the charac- 
teristic expression of countenance, or attitude, or manner. 

In themselves considered, emotions * can scarcely be called 
springs of action. They tend, rather, while they last, to fix 
attention on the objects or occurrences which have excited 
them. In many instances, however, emotions are succeeded 
by desires to obtain possession of the objects which awaken 
them, or to remove ourselves from the presence of such 
objects. When an emotion is thus succeeded by some 
degTce of desire, it forms, according to Lord Kames, a 
passion^ and becomes, according to its nature, a powerful 
and permanent spring of action. 

Emotions^ then, are awakened through the medium of the 
intellect, and are varied and modified by the conception we 
form of the objects to which they refer. 

Emotions manifest their existence and character by sen- 
sible effects upon the body. 

Emotions^ in themselves, and by themselves, lead to 

* "The feelings of beauty, grandeur, and whatever else is comprehended under 
the name of taste, do not lead to action, but terminate in delightful contemplation, 
which constitutes the essential distinction between them and the moral sentiments, 
to which, in some points of view, they may doubtless be likened."— Mackintosh, 
Dissert., p. 238. 



156 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EMOTION— 

quiescence and contemplation, rather than activity. But 
they combine with springs of action, and give to them a 
character and a colouring. What is said to be done from 
surprise or shame, has its proper spring — the surprise or 
shame being concomitant.— See Dr. Chalmers, Sketches of 
Mental and Moral Phil., p. 88. 
EMPIRIC, EMPIRICISM.— Among the Greek physicians 
those who founded their practice on experience called them- 
selves empirics (kf^TreiniKoi) ; those who relied on theory, 
methodists (/iisdoliKoi) ; and those who held a middle course, 
dogmatists (loyf^ocTi^coi). The term empiricism became 
naturalized in England when the writings of Galen and 
other opponents of the empirics were in repute, and hence 
it was applied generally to any ignorant pretender to know- 
ledge. It is now used to denote that kind of knowledge 
which is the result of experience. Aristotle applies the 
terms historical and empirical in the same sense. Historical 
knowledge is the knowledge that a thing is. Philosophical 
knowledge is the knowledge of its cause, or why it is. The 
Germans laugh at our phrase philosophical transactions. 
and say, '^ Socrates brought down philosophy from the 
clouds — but the English have brought her down to the 
dunghill." 

Empiricism allows nothing to be true nor certain but 
what is given by experience, and rejects all knowledge a 
priori. 

In antiquity the Ionian school may be said to have been 
sensualist or empirical. The saying of Heraclitus that 
nothing is, but that all things are beginning to be,, or are in 
a continual flux, amounts to a denial of the persistence of 
substance. Democritus and the atomists, if they admitted 
the substance of atoms, denied the fundamental laws of the 
human mind. And the teaching of Protagoras, that sense 
is knowledge, and man the measure of all things, made all 
science individual and relative. The influence of Plato and 
Aristotle re-established the foundation of true philosophy, 
and empiricism was regarded as scepticism. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 157 

EMPIRIC— 

In the middle ages empiricism was found only among the 
physicians and alchemists, and was not the badge of any 
school of philosophy. 

Empiricism^ as applied to the philosophy of Locke, means 
that he traces all knowledge to experience, k^'miipicx,. 
Experience, according to him, included sensation and re- 
flection. The French philosophers, Condillac and others, 
rejected reflection as a distinct source of knowledge ; and 
their doctrine, to distinguish it from that of Locke, is called 
sensualism. Ideology gives nothing to the mind but sensations 
remembered or generalized, which it calls ideas. But Reid 
and the common sense philosophers, as well as Cousin 
and the rationalist philosophers, hold that the mind has 
primary beliefs, or universal and necessary ideas, which are 
the ground of all experience and knowledge. — V, Expe- 

KIENCE. 

Empirical or experimental ''is an epithet used by Madame 
de Stael and other writers on German philosophy, to dis- 
tinguish what they call the philosophy of sensation, fi'om 
that of Plato and of Leibnitz. It is, accordingly, generally, 
if not always, employed by them in an unfavourable sense. 
In this country, on the contrary, the experimental or induc- 
tive philosophy of the human mind denotes those speculations 
concerning mind, which, rejecting all hypothetical theories, 
rest solely on phenomena for which we have the evidence of 
consciousness. It is applied to the philosophy of Reid, and 
to all that is truly valuable in the metaphysical works of 
Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume." — Stewart, Dissert,^ 
pt. 2, p. 146, note. 
EMUlLiATlON (ciiu,i7i7ici^ contest, whence the 'Lsitmcemulus^ and 
thence emulation) — ^is the desire of superiority. It is one of 
those primitive desu'es which manifest themselves in very 
early years. It prompts, when properly directed and regu- 
lated, to the most strenuous and persevering exertion. Its 
influence in the carrying forward of education is most 
important. 
E1VI>. — Ends are of two kinds, according to Aristotle {Eth., 



158 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

lib. i., cap. 1), eus^ysioci, operations, k^yx, productions. 
An svsQysioc is the end^ when the object of a man's acting 
is the pleasure or advantage in being so employed, as in 
music, dancing, contemplation, &c., which produce nothing, 
generally speaking, beyond the pleasure which the act 
affords. An s^you is something which is produced beyond 
the operation or energy; thus, the shoe is the sQyou pro- 
duced by the hs^ysioi. of shoe-making. — Paul, Analysis of 
Arist.^ p. 2. 

This corresponds to Adam Smith's distinction of labour 
as productive or unproductive, according as it gives or does 
not give a material product. 

An end is that for the sake of which an action is done. 
Hence it has been said to be, principium in intentione et 
terminus in executione. 

When one end has been gained, it may be the means of 
gaining some other end. Hence it is that ends have been 
distinguished, as supreme and ultimate^ or subordinate and 
intermediate. That which is sought for its own sake, is 
the supreme and ultimate end of those actions which are 
done with a view to it. That which is sought for the sake 
of some other end, is a subordinate and intermediate end. 

Ends are ultimate, are distinguished into the end simpli- 
citer ultimus^ and ends which are ultimate secundum quid. 
An end which is the last that is successively aimed at, in a 
series of actions, is called ultimate secundum quid. But 
that which is aimed at, exclusively for its own sake, and is 
never regarded as a means to any other end^ is an ultimate 
end, simply and absolutely. 

See Edwards, Dissertation concerning the End for ivMch 
God created the World. 

Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. 
ENS is either ens reale or ens rationis. 

Ens Rationis. — That which has no existence but in the idea 

which the mind forms of it ; as a golden mountain. 
Eii8 Reale, m philosophical language, is taken late et stricte^ 
and means anything that exists or may exist ; and is distin- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 159 

ENS— 

guished as ens potentiale^ or that which may exist, and ens 

actuate^ or that which does exist. It is sometimes taken as 
the concrete of essentia^ and signifies what has essence and 
may exist — as a rose in winter.. Sometimes as the parti- 
ciple of esse^ and then it signifies what actually exists. Ens 
without intellect is re^, a thing. 
ENTEIiECBEl^ {ivn'kiX^Lu,^ from brsAg^, perfect, l%iLv^ to have, 
and Tihoq^ an end, in \j^\avl 'perfectilfiahid). — ''In one of the 
books of the Pythagoreans, viz.. Ocellus Lucanus, m^ni rov 
TToti^Tog^ the word avurs'Asioc is used in the same sense. 
Hence it has been thought that this was borrowed from 
the Pythagoreans." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ b. i., 
ch. 3, p. 16.— :N'ote. 

Cicero (Tuscul. Qucest.^ lib. i., quaest. 1) interprets it to 
mean quandam quasi continuatam motionem et perennem. 

Melancthon {Opera^ tom. xiii., pp. 12-14, edit. 1846) 
gives two interpretations of Endelechy, as he writes it. 
He says that hhTiSxiS signifies continuus, and iulsT^sxsioc 
continuitas. According to him, Aristotle used it as syno- 
nymous with hs^ysia,. Hence Cicero translated it by 
continuous movement or agitation. Argyropolus blames 
Cicero for this, and explains it as meaning ''interior per- 
fection," as if it were to surog tsT^siovu, But Melancthon 
thinks Cicero's explanation in accordance with the philo- 
sophy of Aristotle. 

According to Leibnitz, entelecheia is derived apparently 
from the Greek word which signifies perfect^ and therefore 
the celebrated Hermolaus Barbarus expressed it in Latin, 
word for word, by perfectiliabia^ for act is the accomplish- 
ment of power ; and he needed not to have consulted the 
devil, as he did, they say, to tell him this much. — Leibnitz, 
Theodicee, partie i., sect. 87. 

"You may give the name of entelecMes to all simple 
substances or created monads, for they have in them a 
certain perfection (iyc^vai to brsAg^), they have a suffi- 
ciency (UvTot^Kitot) which makes them the source of their 
internal actions, and so to say incorporeal automatons." 



160 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ENTEIiECHY— 

— Monadologie^ sect. 18. He calls a monad an autarchic 
automaton, or first entelecJiie — having life and force in itself 

'-'- Entelechy is the opposite to potentiality, yet would be ill 
translated by that which we often oppose to potentiality, 
actuality, 'E/^og- expresses the substance of each thing 
viewed in repose — its form or constitution ; svspysut sit 
substance, considered as active and generative ; evTs'^ex^toc 
seems to be the synthesis or harmony of these two ideas. 
The effectio of Cicero, therefore, represents the most im- 
portant side of it, but not the whole." — Maurice, Mor. 
and Metaphys. PM., note, p. 191, 

'l^vTi7^s-)ciioc ce qui a en soi sa fin, qui par consequent ne 
releve que de soi meme, et constitue une unite indivisible. 
— Cousin, note to Translat. of Aristotle's Metaphysics^ book 
xii., p. 212. 

''Z ^EntelecJiie est oppose a la simple puissance, comme la 
forme a la matiere, I'etre au possible. C'est elle qui, par la 
vertu de la Gn^ constitue I'essence meme des choses, et im- 
prime le mouvement a la matiere aveugle ; et c'est en ce 
sens qu' Aristote a pu donner de I'ame cette celebre de- 
finition, qu'elle est I'entelechie ou forme premiere de tout 
corps naturel qui possede la vie en puissance." — Diet, des 
Sciences Philosoph, 

Aristotle defines the soul of man to be an entelechy ; a 
definition of which Dr. Eeid said he could make no sense. — 
F. Soul. 
ENTHUSIASM (o 9iog iv vif^iv) — "is almost a synonym of 
genius ; the moral life in the intellectual light, the will in 
the reason ; and without it, says Seneca, nothing truly 
great was ever achieved." — Coleridge, Notes on Eng. Div.^ 
vol. i., p. 338. 

The word occurs both in Plato and Aristotle. According 
to its composition it should signify " divine inspiration." 
But it is applied in general to any extraordinary excitement 
or exaltation of mind. The raptures of the poet, the deep 
meditations of the philosopher, the heroism of the warrior. 
the devotedness of the martyr, and the ardour of the patriot, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 161 

ENTHUSIASM— 

are so many different phases of enthusiasm* "According 
to Plutarch, there be five kinds of enthusiasm : — Divinatory. 
Bacchic al (or corybantical), Poetical (under which he com- 
prehends musical also), Martial and Erotical^ or Amatoriey 
A Treatise concerning enthusiasm by Meric Casaubon, D.D., 
chap. 1. See also Natural Hist of Enthusiasm^ by Isaac 
Taylor ; Madame de Stael, Germany ; Locke, Essay on 
Hum. Understand.^ book iv., chap. 19. 

ENTHYMEME Q'J 6vuco^ in the mind) — is an irregular syllo- 
gism in which one of the premisses is not expressed, but 
kept in mind; as every animal is a substance, therefore 
every man is a substance, in which the premiss, '' man is an 
animal," is suppressed. The famous expression of Des- 
cartes, Cogito ergo sum^ is, as to form, an enthymeme. It 
was not put, however, as a proof of existence, but as 
meaning that the fact of existing is enclosed in the con- 
sciousness of thinking. 

ENTITY (entitas) — in the scholastic philosophy was s}Tion}-- 
mous with essence or form. 

To all individuals of a species there is something in 
common — a natm^e which transiently invests all, but belongs 
exclusively to none. This essence, taken by itself and 
viewed apart from any individual, was what the scholastics 
called an entity. Animals had their entity^ which was 
called animality. Men had their entity.^ which was called 
humanity. It denoted the common nature of the individuals 
of a species or genus. It was the idea or model according 
to which we conceived of them. The question whether 
there was a reality corresponding to this idea, divided 
philosophers into nominalists and realists., — q. v. 

It is used to denote any thing that exists, as an object of 
sense or of thought. — V, Ens. 

ENUNCIATION, in Logic, included the doctrme of proposi- 
tions. 

EQUANIMITY.— F. Magnanimity. 

EQUITY (i-TTietKiiet., or to laov^ as distinguished from tc 
voiLiiPcot/) — is described by Ai-istotle {Ethics^ book v., chap. 

M 



162 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EQUITY— 

10), as tliat kind of justice which corrects the irregularities 
or rigours of strict legal justice. All written laws must 
necessarily speak in general terms, and must leave parti- 
cular cases to the discretion of the parties. An equitable 
man will not press the letter of the law in his own favour, 
when, by doing so, he may do injustice to his neighbour. 
The ancients, in measuring rusticated building, in which 
the stones alternately projected and receded, used a leaden 
rule. Equity^ like this leaden rule, bends to the spe- 
ciahties of every case, when the iron rule of legal justice 
cannot do so. 

''''Equity contemplates the mass of rights growing 
out of the law of nature ; and justice contemplates the 
mass of rights growing out of the law of society. Equity 
treats of our dues as equals ; justice treats of our dues as 
fellow- subjects. The purpose of equity is respect for 
humanity ; the purpose of justice is respect for property. 
Equity withstands oppression ; justice withstands injury." 
— Taylor, Synonyms. — V. Justice. 
EQUlVOCAli words have different significations, as hull^ the 
animal, the Pope's letter, a blunder. Gallus, in Latin, a 
cock, or a Frenchman. Canis^ a dog, or the dog-star. 
They originate in the multiplicity of things and the poverty 
of language. 

Words signifying different things may be used, — 
First, By accident; or, second. With intention. 1st. 
It has happened, that sandwich is the name of a peer — of 
a town — of a cluster of islands, and of a slice of bread 
and meat. 2d. There are four ways in which a word 
may come to be used equivocally with knowledge or 
intention : — 

1. On account of the resemblance of the things signi- 
fied, as when a statue or picture is called a man. 

2. On account of proportion, as when a point is called 
a principle in respect to a line, and unity a principle in 
respect to number. 

3. On account of common derivation — thus, a ; 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 16.3 

EQUIVOCAIi— 

man, a medical book, a medical instrument, are all derived 
from medicine. 

4. On account of common reduction or reference — 
thus, a healthful medicine, healthful pulse, healthful herb, 
all referring to human health. 

Some of these are intermediate between equivocal and 
analogous terms, particularly No. 4. 

An Equivocal noun, in Logic, has more than one signifi- 
cation, each of its significations being equalhj applicable 
to several objects, as hull.^ the animal, the Pope's letter, a 
blunder. '' Strictly spealdng, there is hardly a word in any 
language which may not be regarded as in this sense equivo- 
cal : but the title is usually applied only in any case when 
a word is employed equivocally ; e. g.^ when the middle 
term is used in different senses in the two premises, or 
where a proposition is liable to be understood in differ- 
ent senses, according to the various meaning of one of its 
terms." — Whately, Logic^ b. iii., sect. 10. 
EQUIVOCATION (ceque vocare^ to use one word in different 
senses). — "How absolute the knave is! We must speak 
by the card, or equivocation will undo us." — Hamlet^ act v.. 
scene 1. 

In morals, to equivocate is to offend against the truth by 
using language of double meaning, in one sense, with the 
intention of its being understood in another — or in either 
sense according to circumstances. The ancient oracles 
gave responses of ambiguous meaning. Aio^ te^ JSacide^ 
Romanos posse vincere — may mean either; '*I say that 
thou, O descendant of ^acus, canst conquer the Romans ;" 
or, ''I say that the Eomans can conquer thee, O descen- 
dant of ^acus." Latronem Petrum occidisse^ may mean, 
" a robber slew Peter ;" or, " Peter slew a robber." 

There may be equivocation in sound as well as in sense. 
It is told that the queen of George III. asked one of the 
dignitaries of the church, if ladies might knot on Sunday? 
His reply was, ladies may not; which, in so far as sound 
goes, is equivocal. 



164 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EQUIVOCATION— 

'' Eyes saw Peter to-day," sounds the same as '' I saw 
Peter to-day." — V. Eeservation. 
ERROR. — Knowledge being to be had only of visible certain 
truth, error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake 
of our judgment, giving assent to that v^hich is not true. — 
Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ b. iv., c. 20. 

"The true," said Bossuet, after Augustine, "is that 
which is, the false is that which is not." To err is to fail 
of attaining to the true, which we do when we think that 
to be which is not — or think that not to be which is. Error 
is not in things themselves, but in the mind of him who errSj 
or judges not according to the truth. 

Our faculties, when employed within their proper sphere, 
are fitted to give us the knowledge of truth. We err by a 
wrong use of them. The causes of error are partly in the 
objects of knowledge, and partly in ourselves. As it is 
only the true and real which exists, it is only the true and 
real which can reveal itself But it may not reveal itself 
fully — and man, mistaking a part for the whole, or partial 
evidence for complete evidence, falls into error. Hence 
it is, that in all error there is some truth. To discover the 
relation which this partial truth bears to the whole truth, 
is to discover the origin of the error. 

The causes in ourselves which lead to error^ arise from 
wrong views of our faculties, and of the conditions under 
which they operate. Indolence, precipitation, passion, 
custom, authority, and education, may also contribute to 
lead us into error, — F. Falsity. 

Bacon, Novum Organum, lib. i. 

Malebranche, Recherche de la Verite. 

Descartes, On Method, 

Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ b. vi., c. 20. 
ESOTERIC and EXOTERIC (saahv^ within ; Ig^j, without). 
— "The philosophy of the Pythagoreans, like that of the 
other sects, was divided into the exoteric and the esoteric ; 
the open, taught to all ; and the secret, taught to a select 
number." — Warburton, Div. Leg.., book ii., note bb. 



V^OCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 165 

ESOTERIC— 

According to Origen, Aulus Gellius, Porphyry, and Jam- 
blichus, the distinction of esoteric and exoteric among the 
Pythagoreans was applied to the disciples — according to 
the degree of initiation to which they had attained, beinc' 
fully admitted into the society, or being merely postulants. 
— Eitter, Hist, de Philosophies torn, i., p. 298, of 'Franch 
translation. 

Plato is said to have had doctrines which he taught 
pubhcly to all — and other doctrines which he taught only 
to a few, in secret. There is no allusion to such a distinc- 
tion of doctrines in the writings of Plato, Aristotle (Phys,. 
lib. iv., c. 2), speaks of opinions of Plato which were not 
written. But it does not follow that these were secret — ^Ey 
Toig 'hiyo^.ivoig dypot^poi^ 6oy[/.otaiv, They may have been 
oral. 

Aristotle himself frequently speaks of some of his writings 
as exoteric; and others as acroamatic, or esoteric. The 
former treat of the same subjects as the latter, but in a 
popular and elementary way ; while the esoteric are more 
scientific in their form and matter. 

Eavaisson, Essai sur la Metaphysique d^Aristote^ tom i., c. 1 . 

Tucker, Light of Nature Pursued^ vol. ii., chap. 2. — 

V. ACEOAMATIC. 

ESSENCE (essentia^ from essens^ the old participle of esse^ to 
be — introduced into the Latin tongue by Cicero). 

'' Sicut ab eo quod est sapere^ vocatur sapientia; sic ab 
eo quod est 6556, vocatur essentia.'''' — August., De Civit., lib. 
xii., c. 11. 

"Totum illud per quod res est, et est id quod est." — 
Chauvin, Lexicon Philosoph. 

''Essence may be taken for the very being of any thing, 
whereby it is what it is." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Under - 
stand.., book iii., chap. 3, sect. 15. 

"The essence of things is made up of that common nature 
wherein it is founded, and of that distinctive nature by 
which it is formed. This latter is commonly understood when 
we speak of the formality or formalis ratio (the formal con- 



166 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ESSENCE— 

sideration) of things ; and it is looked upon as being more 
peculiarly the essence of things, though 'tis certain that a 
triangle is as truly made up in part of figure, its common 
nature, as of the three lines and angles, which are distinctive 
and peculiar to it. 

'' The essence of a thing most properly and strictly is, what 
does first and fundamentally constitute that thing, and that 
only Is strictly essential which is either the whole or some 
part of the constituent essence ; as in man to be a living 
creature, or to be capable of religion ; his being capable of 
celestial happiness, may be called essential in the way of 
consequence, or consecutively, not constituently." — Oldfield, 
Essay on Reason^ p. 184. 

'•'- Whatever makes a thing to be what it is, is properly 
called its essence. Self-consciousness, therefore, is the 
essence of the mind, because it is in virtue of self- conscious- 
ness that the mind is the mind — the man himself." — Ferrier, 
Instit of MetapJiys.^ p. 245. 

''AU those properties or qualities, without which a thing 
could not exist, or without which it would be entirely 
altered, make up what is called the essence of a thing. 
Three lines joining are the essence of a triangle ; if one is 
removed, what remains is no longer a triangle." — ^Taylor, 
Elements of Thought. 

The essential attributes, faciunt esse entia^ cause things to 
be what they are. 

The Greeks had but one word for essence and substance, 
viz., ovffioc. The word vTroaruaig was latterly introduced. 
By Aristotle ovaict was applied — 1. To the form^ or those 
qualities which constitute the specific nature of every being, 
2. To the matter., in which those qualities manifest them- 
selves to us — the substratum or subject {yiroytn^ivav). 
8. To the concrete or individual being (aui/o'Aou)^ constituted 
by the union of the two preceding. 

In the scholastic philosophy a distinction began to be 
established between essence and substance. Substance was 
applied to the abstract notion of matter — the undetermined 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 167 

ESSENCE— 

subject or substratum of all possible forms, to v7:okbii^suou. 
Essence to the qualities expressed in the definition of a 
thing, or those ideas which represent the genus and species. 
Descartes defined substance as ''that which exists so that 
it needs nothing but itself to exist" — {Princip. Philosoph.^ 4 
pars, sect. 1) — a definition applicable to deity only. Essence 
he stripped of its logical signification, and made it the foun- 
dation of all those qualities and modes which we perceive 
in matter. Among the attributes of every substance there is 
one only which deserves the name of essence^ and on which 
the others depend as modifications — as extension, in matter, 
and thought, in mind. He thus identified essence and 
substance. But extension supposes something extended, and 
thought something that thinks. With Leibnitz essence and 
substance were the same, \'iz., force or power. 

Essence is analogically applied to things having no real 
existence ; and then it retains its logical sense and expresses 
the quahties or ideas which should enter into the definition ; 
as when we speak of the essence of an equilateral triangle 
being three equal sides and three equal angles. This is the 
only sense in which Kant recognizes the word. In popular 
language essence is used to denote the nature of a thing. 

ETERNITY is a negative idea expressed by a positive term. 
It supposes a present existence, and denies a beginning or 
an end of that existence. Hence the schoolmen spoke of 
eternity^ a parte ante^ and a parte post. The Scotists main- 
tained that eternity is made up of successive parts, which 
drop, so to speak, one from another. The Tliomists held 
that it is simple duration, excluding the past and the future. 
Plato said, time is the moving shadow of eternity. The 
common symbol of eternity is a circle. It may be doubted 
how far it is competent to the human mind to compass in 
thought the idea of absolute beginning, or the idea of 
absolute ending. 

On man's conception of eternity^ see an Examination of 
Mr. Maurice's Theory of a Fixed State out of Time. By 
]SIr. IMansell. 



168 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ETERNITIT— 

" What is eternity ? can anglit 
Paint its duration to the thought ? 
Tell all the sand the ocean laves, 
Tell all its changes, all its waves. 
Or, tell with more lahorious pains, 
The drops its mighty mass contains ; 
Be this astonishing account 
Augmented with the full amount 
Of all the drops that clouds have shed, 
Where'er their wat'ry fleeces spread, 
Through all time's long protracted tour. 
From Adam to the present hour; — 
Still short the sum, nor can it vie 
With the more numerous years that lie 
Embosomed in eternity. 
Attend, man, with awe divine. 
For this eternity is thine."— Gibhons. 

ETERNITIT (®F €^Ol>). — The Eternal is that which is above 
all variation. The Eternal is not time infinite, duration 
without limits. The Eternal is above and without time and 
duration ; it is the condition of time itself. God is eternal 
by his infinite essence, absolute, always the same, identical, 
immovable ; He is eternal in the fundamental properties 
which constitute the ground of his essence. He is by his 
eternity^ the source of all those laws^ eternal, immutable, 
necessary, which govern all the domains of existence, the 
world physical and spiritual. Eternity is the reason even 
of necessity. For we call that necessary which cannot be 
but in one manner, which admits no alternative, and permits 
no choice, which is immovable. The Being eternal and 
immovable is also the Being necessary. God cannot not 
be, or be other than he is in his eternal nature. All his 
essence, all his attributes are necessarily given in his being 
and by his being. God is all which can be in his eternal 
nature, in the absolute organism of his existence, by one 
single power immovable and necessary; he is absolute 
power, he is the Being in regard to which there is neither 
present, nor past, nor future. — Tiberghien, Essai de Con- 
naiss. Hum,., p. 741. 

Deus non est duratio vel spatium., sed durat et adest. This 
scholium of Sir Isaac Newton contains the germ of Dr. 



VOCABULARY OF PHLLOSOPHY. 169 

JETERXITY (OF OOI>)— 

Clarke's Demonstration of the Being of God. Time and 
space are qualities, and imply a substance. Tlie ideas of 
time and space necessaiily force themselves upon our minds. 
T\'e cannot think of them as not existmg. And as we think 
of them as infinite, they are the infinite qualities of an in- 
finite substance, that is. of God. necessarily existing. 
ETHICS "extend to the investigation of those principles by 
which 77wral men are governed ; they explore the nature 
and excellence of virtue, the natm^e o^ moral obligation, on 
what it i5 foimded. and what are the proper motives of 
practice : morality in the more common acceptation, though 
not exclusively, relates to the practical and obligatoiy part 
of ethics. Ethics prmcipally regard the theory of morals/' 
— Cogan. Ethic. Treat, on Passions, introd. 

Aristotle (Eth.. lib. 2), says that '/;^c, which signifies 
moral wtue. is derived trom sVo^, custom: since it is by 
repeated acts that virtue, which is a moral habit, is 
acqiured. Cicero (De Eaio. cap. 1). says. Quia pertinet ad 
mores, quod r^^og illi vacant^ nos earn partem pJiilosopJiice, 
De morihus., appellare solemus: sed decet augentem lingxiam 
Latinam nominare Moralem. Ethics is thus made synony- 
mous with morals or moral philosophy, q. v. 

Ethics taken in its widest signification, as including the 
moral sciences or natural jm^isprudence. may be divided 
into : — 

1. Moral Philosophy, or the science of the relations. 
rights, and duties, by which men are tmder obligation to- 
wards God. themselves, and then- fellow-creattu:es. 

'2. The Law of Nations, or the science of those laws by 
which all nations, as constituting the imiversal society of 
the human race, are boimd in their mutual relations to one 
another. 

3. Public or Pohtical Law, or the science of the relations 
between the difierent ranks in society. 

4. Civil Law, or the science of those laws, rights, and 
duties, by which individuals in civil society are bound, — 
as commercial, cruninal, judicial, Koman or modern. 



170 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

5. History, Profane, Civil, and Political. — Peemans, 
Introd. ad PMlosopli,^ p. 96. 
ETHNOORAPIIY (ihog y^xCpy^^ and ETIIN01.0GY bear 
the same relation almost to one another as geology and 
geography. While ethnography contents herself with the 
mere description and classification of the races of man, 
ethnology^ or the science of races, "investigates the mental 
and physical differences of mankind, and the organic laws 
upon which they depend ; seeks to deduce from these in- 
vestigations principles of human guidance, in all the im- 
portant relations of social and national existence.'* 

Ethnological Journal^ June 1, 1848. 

Edin, Rev., Oct., 1844. 
ETKOIiOCM^ (y}6og, or I'^o^-, and T^oyog) — is a word coming to 
be used in philosophy. Sir William Hamilton has said 
that Aristotle's Rhetoric is the best ethology extant, mean- 
ing that it contains the best account of the passions and 
feelings of the human heart, and of the means of awaken- 
ing and interesting them so as to produce persuasion or 
action. 
CUDXIMONISM Qvldtftouid, happiness) — is a term applied by 
German philosophers to that system of morality which 
places the foundation of virtue in the production of happi- 
ness. — Whewell, Pref. to Mackintosh'' s Dissert., p. 20. 

This name, or rather Hedonism, may be applied to the 
system of Chrysippus and Epicurus. 
EVnOENCE (e-videre, to see, to make see). — " Evidence signi- 
fies that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the 
truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one 
side or the other." — Blackstone, Comment., b. iii., c. 23. 

Evidence is the ground or reason of knowledge. It is the 
light by which the mind apprehends things presented to it. 
Fulgor quidam mentis assensum rapiens. 

In an act of knowledge there is the object or thing known, 
and the subject or person knowing. Between the faculties 
of the person knowing and the qualities of the thing known, 
there is some proportion or relation. The qualities mani- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 171 

fest themselves to the faculties, and the result is knowledge ; 
or the thing is made evident — that is, it not only exists, but 
is revealed as existing. 

There are as many kinds or sources of evidence as there 
are powers or faculties by which we attain to truth and 
reaUty. Sense, consciousness, and memory are som^ces of 
evidence. Reason, as giving necessary and universal truth, 
and reasoning, by which we ascend from the particular to 
the general, or by which we descend fr'om the general to 
the particular, are so many sources of evidence. And the 
testimony of others as to things which have not come under 
the cognizance of our OAvn faculties, may also fornish evi- 
dence^ or a gi^ound of knowledge. 

''The demonstrations of algebra possess equal certainty 
with those of geometry, but cannot lay claim to the same 
evidence. Certainty is ipositixe; evidence^ ve\siti\e'^ the for- 
mer, strictly taken, insusceptible of more or less, the latter 
capable of existing in many different degTees.'' — Coleridge, 
Xoies on English Divines, vol. i., p. 33. 

Evidence is of different degrees. The evidence of sense 
and consciousness as to matters of fact, and the evidence of 
reason as to first truths or truths demonstrated by means of 
them, is of the highest degree, and begets certainty or 
knowledge properly so called. When things do not frilly 
manifest themselves to our faculties, or when our faculties 
do not clearly nor fully apprehend them, but when we, not- 
withstanduig, form some judgment concerning them, the 
evidence is probable. And when there is merely the possi- 
bility of the object of our apprehension existing as it is 
apprehended by us, we have not knowledge or opinion, 
even, but may rather be said to be in doubt. 

Evidence of sense and consciousness, and also of the 
truths of reason, is such as to give knowledge ^vithout any 
effort upon oiu- parts. But in reasoning, although the 
result may be equally clear and certain, we do not attain it 
without attention and intellectual effort. We are not, on 
this account, to think that we make or give the evidence 



172 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

to what is true. Truth and reality exist independent!}- 
of us. 

Many things are most certain which are not evident^ not 
only in matters of faith but of sense ; as the motion trans- 
mitted from one body to another. 

The rules as to the various kinds and degrees of evidence 
can only be found in writers on the several departments of 
inquiry to which that evidence belongs. On evidence in 
general, see Glassford, Essay on the Principles of Evidence^ 
part 1, 8vo, Edin., 1820. 

Smedley, Moral Evidence^ 8vo, Lond., 1850, 
EVlli is the negation or contrary of good. — ''That which hath 
in it a fitness to promote its own preservation or well-being, 
is called good. And, on the contrary, that which is apt to 
hinder it, is called eviV — ^Wilkins, Nat. Eelig,^ book i. 

"Every man calleth that which joleaseth^ and is delight- 
ful to himself, good ; and that evil which displeaseth him." 
— Hobbes, Hum. Nat.., chap 7. 

Pleasure is fit for, or agreeable to, the nature of a sen- 
sible being, or a natural good; pain is unfits or is a natural 
evil. 

"The voluntary application of this natural good and evil 
to any rational being, or the production of it by a rational 
being, is moral good and eviU^ — King, Essay on Origin of 
Evil., translated by Law, chap. 1, sect. 3, notes, p. 38, fifth 
edit. 

^''Metaphysical evil consists simply in imperfection, 79/^1/- 
sical evil in suffering, and moral evil in sin." — Leibnitz, On 
Goodness of God., part 1, sect. 21. 

'-'•Evil does not proceed from ^principle of evil. Cold does 
not proceed from a principle of coldness., nor darkness from 
a principle of darkness. Evil is mere privation." — part 2, 
sect. 153. 

" Evil does not exist in itself as a substance; there is not 
an element of evil ; nothing is evil considered in itself, but 
it may be vitiated in its relations with other things. Evil., 
then, expresses the false relations (^faux rapports)., in which 



VOC-lIiULAP.Y OF PHILO::OPHY. 173 

EVIL— 

several things good in themselves may he placed^ in the 
physical or moral world. "VMience it foUows, that evil is 
neither a principle^ in the sense of dualism, since all things 
are good in so far as they manifest the diyine essence in 
the world, nor a simple negation^ in the sense of pantheism, 
since evil exists effectively and really in the false relations, 
or in the false combinations established among things. 
These false relations from which evil results, denote evi- 
dently an individual being, a finite being, who, at the same 
time that he is capable of ascending to absolute unity and 
harmony, in which things find themselves in their true 
relations, can also, in so far as finite, embrace things in 
their isolation, in their particularity, and establish between 
them relations contrary to the general harmony of beings. 
Evil^ then, has its origin in the individuality, in xh^ finite- 
ness of beings who are not sufficient for themselves, 
and who can, in virtue of their spontaneity and liberty, 
break the absolute relations which exist among things. 
Spontaneity and liberty are not imperfect in themselves, but 
they may become so, by the bad use made of them, and may 
be the cause of imperfections and evils without niunber. 
And, as individuality is an eternal principle, it is also an 
eternal cause of evil; the evil is given with the finite nature 
of beings and endiu-es with it — ^if not in reality at least in 
possibility, in all states and conditions in which individual 
beings can be found. Evil is an eternal element of the 
life of finite beings, and as such, it is also necessary and 
independent of the Divine will." — Tiber ghien, Essai des 
Connais. Hum., p. 736. 

^'The Being infinite and absolute, who is selt- sufficient. 
independent, in possession of all the conditions to accom- 
plish good and to embrace all things in their just relations, 
is not capable of evil or error. But as individual beings 
have the reason of their existence in God, evil also has its 

last reason in the being of all reality The divine 

nature gave the possibility of evil^ in giving individual and 
finite beings who transfer it into reality. That which is 



174 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EVIIi— 

possible in finite beings, by reason of their eternal and 
divine origin, they render real, effective in time, by the use 
of their spontaneity. Evil may be said to exist in God, 
not in act, but in power. He does not will it as such, but 
admits it as the possible result of the nature of finite beings 
who have their eternal cause in himself ; in other words, 
he pennits evil. 

''''Evil has also its origin in human nature in so far as it is 
finite, but it may be avoided and combated by that part of 
his nature which is the expression of the infinite and abso- 
lute. Evil is the occasion for man to show what is divine 
in him, by rising above the finite and contingent events of 
this life, and striving to be perfect as his Father in heaven 
is perfect." — Ihid., p. 758. 

A power to do good, is ex necessitate rei^ a power to do 
evil. 

'' Almighty power itself cannot create an intelligent 
moral agent, and place it beyond all liability to sin. If it 
could not sin, there would be no merit, no virtue in its 
obedience. That is to say, it would not be a moral agent 
at all, but a machine merely. The power to do wrong, as 
well as to do right, is included in the very idea of a moral 
and accountable agent, and no such agent can possibly 
exist without being invested with such a power." — Bledsoe, 
Theodicy., p. 195, and p. 353. 

Dr. Young (Mystery.^ p. 203) says, — "The abuse of 
moral power, in other words, the rebellion of the created 
will, must have been impreventible, else it had been pre- 
vented. All that was possible to be done must have been 
done ; but to prevent the abuse of moral power, that is, 
to necessitate the created will, was an impossibility." 
And in a note he says, this is the view of Julius Miiller, 

"Moral evil is an evil that has its origin in a will. An 
evil common to all, must have a ground common to all. 
But the actual existence of moral evil^ we are bound in 
conscience to admit ; and that there is an evil common to 
all is a fact ; and this evil must therefore have a common 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 17^ 

EVIIi— 

ground. Now, this evil ground cannot originate in the 
Divine will; it must therefore be referred to the will of 
man." — Coleridge, Aids to Reflection^ pp. 158, 174. 

The question concerning the origin of evil has been 
answered by — 1. The doctrine of pre -existence, or that the 
evils we are here suffering are^the punishments or expi- 
ations of moral delinquencies in a former state of existence. 
2. The doctrine of the Manicheans which supposes two co- 
eternal and independent agencies, the one the author of 
good, and the other of evil. 8. The doctrine of optimism, 
or, that evil is part of a system conducted by Almighty 
power, under the direction of infinite wisdom and good- 
ness. — Stewart, Active and Mor, Poivers^ b. iii., c. 3, sect. 1, 

On the origin of evil^ its nature, extent, uses, &c., see 
Plato, Cicero, and Seneca, Malebranche and Fenelon, 
Clarke and Leibnitz, Bledsoe, Theodicy; Young, Mystery. 
EXISTENCE (ex sister e^ to stand out). — ^'The metaphysicians 
look upon existence as the formal and actual part of a being." 
— H. More, Antid. agt. Atheism^ app., c. 44. 

It has been called the actus entitativus^ or that by which 
anything has its essence actually constituted in the nature 
of things. 

Essence pertains to the question Quid est .^ 

Existence pertains to the question An est f 

Essence formal^ combined with essence substantial^ gives 
existence ; for existence is essence clothed with form. — Tiber- 
ghien, Essai des Connaiss. Hum..^ p. 739, note. 

Existence is the actuality of essence. It is the act by 
which the essences of things are actually in rerum natura — 
beyond their causes. Before things are produced by their 
causes, they are said to be in the objective power of their 
causes ; but when produced they are beyond their causes, 
and are actually in rerum natura — as maggots before they 
are warmed into life by heat of the sun. 

'' Existentia est unio realis, sive actualis conjunctio 

partium sive attributorum quibus ens constat 

Existentia dicitur quasi rei extra causas etnihilum sistentia.^^ 



176 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EXISTENCE— 

— Peemans, Introd, ad Pliilosoph.^ 12mo, Lovan., 1840, 
p. 45. 
Existence and Essence. — Incaute sibi finxerunt quidam, 

'•'- Essentias quasdam easque eternas, fuisse sine existentia;''^ 
siquando autem subnascatur E,es istiusmodi ideae similis, tunc 
censent existentiam essentia supervenientem, veram rem 
efficere, sive ens reale. Atque Line, essentiam et existen- 
tiam dixerunt essendi principia, sive entis constitutiva. 
Quicquid vero essentiam babet yeram, eodem tempore habet 
existentiam^ eodem sensu quo habet essentiam^ aut quo est 
ens, aut aliquid." — Hutcbeson, Metaphys.^ p. 4. 

'^ Essence^ in relation to God, must involve a necessary 
existence ; for we cannot in any measure duly conceive what 
he is^ without conceiving that he is^ and, indeed, cannot but 
be. The name he takes to himself is I am (or I will be). 
This is the contraction of that larger name, I am what I am 
(or I will be what I will be), which may seem closely to 
conjoin God's unquestionable necessary existence with his 
unsearchable, boundless essence.^"" — Oldfield, Essay on Rea- 
son^ p. 48. 

See art. Existence^ in French Encyclopoedia^ by Mons. 
Turgot. 

EXOTERIC— F. Esoteric. 

EXPEDIENCE (©octffine of). — Paley has said, "Whatever is 
expedient is right."— F. Utility (Doctrine of). 

EXPERIENCE Q^TTSi^icc^ experientia). — Aristotle hmited ex- 
perience to the results of sensation and perception. "Ex /^tu 

ocvTov yii/of/^eu'/ig if^Tiru^ioi. — Analyt. Poster.^ ii., 19. 

Wolf used experience as co-extensive with the contents of 
consciousness, to include all of which the mind is conscious, 
as agent or patient, all that it does from within, as well as 
all that it suffers from without. " Experiri dicimur, quic- 
quid ad perceptiones nostras attenti cognoscimus. Sokm 
lucere^ cognoscimus ad ea attenti, quse visu percipimus. 
Similiter ad nosmet ipsos attenti cognoscimus, nos non posse 
assensum proebere contradictoriis, v. g. non posse sumere 



VC)CABirLAP.Y OF PHIL060PHT. 177 

ZXPERIII^CE— 

tin jiini veran^ qaod sbmil plnat et non plnat."^ — PMLo- 
:<cph. Eatj sect. 664:, 

" Ejeperience. in its strict sense, i|ipfies to wh^t has 
occurred within a person s own knondedge. Erperiencej in 
this sense, of coarse, relates to the paai alone. Thus it is 
that a man knows bj expariemee niiat aaiflmngs he has 
nndergiHie in some disease; or what ha^bt tiie tideresfC^ied 
at a certain time and place. Moie frequenl]^ llie word is 
nsed to denote that judgment idiich is desired fitm erpe- 
rience im the primary aoue, hj reascming from that in com- 
Imiation with odier data. Thus a man mar assert, : n :lr 
ground of experieace^ diat he was ODxed of 
snch a me^cine — that tiiat medkine is gene: 
in that dBsordor ; that the tide may ahvap be exj -^ tt^ 
mider soch circumstances, to rise tosncli a height. Strictlj 
speaking, none of these can be known £f experiemXj but 
are conchi^ons from erpmemce. It is in this sense osAy 
that experience can be appified to die fktwrej <Nr, whidli 
comes to the same tihing, to anjjpe»€9til&ct; as, e.^., when 
it L5 said th^t we know % erperiemce diaft water exposed to 
a certain temperatnre will ficeeze." — What^, Xo^ic, a|ip.L 

Mr. Locke (Essay cm Hmm, Understand.j hook n., du^ 
1), has assigned experiemee as Ae only and nmrersal source 
of human knowledge. ^^ Whence hath the mind aQ the 
materials of reascm and knowledge? To this I answer, in 
one wordy £rom erperieMce ; in that, all oar knowledge is 
founded, and fixmi that nldmat^ dmres itsd£ Our ob- 
servation, employed either about extemad senable otjects, 
or about the internal operations of omr nunds, percexred 
and reflected on by ourselves, is that whidi siq^plies our 
understanding with all the materials of thinking. These 
are the ibontaios of knowledge frmn whence all the ideas 
we have, or can naturalLy have, do spring — that is, sensation 
and reflection." 

In opposition to tiiis view, according to whidi all human 
knowledge is a po-<teriori, or the result of experience^ it is 
contended that man has knowledge a priori — knowledge 



178 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EXPERIENCE— 

whicli experience iieitlier does nor can gire, and knowledge 
witliout whicli there could be no experience — inasmuch 
as all the generalizations of experience proceed and rest 
upon it. 

''''No accumulation of experiments whatever can hring a 
general laiv liome to the mind of man ; because if we rest 
upon experiments, our conclusion can never logically pass 
beyond the bounds of our premises; we can never infer 
more than we have proved j and all the past, which we 
have not seen, and the future, which we cannot see, is still 
left open, in which new experiences may arise to overturn the 
present theory. And yet the child will believe at once 
upon a single^ experiment. "Why? Because a hand divine 
has implanted in him the tendency to generalize thus 
rapidly. Because he does it by an instmct, of which he 
can give no account, except that he is so formed by his 
maker." — Sewell, Christ. Mor., chap. 24. 

'' We may have seen one circle, and investigated its pro- 
perties, but why, when our individual experience is so 
circumscribed, do we assume the same relations of all? 
Simply because the understanding has the conviction intui- 
tively that similar objects will have similar properties ; it 
does not acquire this idea by sensation or custom ; the mind 
develops it by its own intrinsic force — it is a law of om^ 
faculties, ultimate and universal, from which all reasoning 
proceeds."— Dr. Mill, Essays, p. 337. 

Experience, more especially in physical philosophy, is 
either active or passive, that is, it is constituted by obser- 
vation and experiment. 

'•'• Ohservationes fiunt spectando id quod natura per 
seipsam sponte exhibet. Experimenta fiunt ponendo natu- 
ram in eas circumstantias, in quibus debeat agere, et nobis 
ostendere id quod qu^erimus." — Boscovich, Note to Stay's 
Poem, De Sytemate. 

These are more fully explained and characterized in the 

* As havii]g l)cen once burnt by fire. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 179 

EXPERIENCE— 

following passage from Sir John Herschel, On the Study of 
Nat. Pkil.^ Lardner's Cyclop.^ IsTo. xiv., p. 67 : — 

''The great, and indeed the only ultimate somxe of our 
knowledge of nature and its laws is experience ; by which 
we mean not the experience of one man only, or of one 
generation, but the accumulated experience of all mankind 
in all ages, registered in books, or recorded by tradition. 
But experience may be acquired in two ways : either, first, 
by noticing facts as they occur, without any attempt to 
influence the frequency of their occurrence, or to vary the 
circumstances under which they occur ; this is observation : 
or secondly, by putting in action causes and agents over 
which we have control, and purposely varying their com- 
binations, and noticing what effects take place ; this is 
experiment. To these two sources we must look as the 
fountains of all natural science. It is not intended, how- 
ever, by thus distinguishing observation from experiment^ 
to place them in any kind of contrast. Essentially they are 
much alike, and differ rather in degree than in kind ; so 
that, perhaps, the terms passive and active observation 
might better express their distinction ; but it is, neverthe- 
less, highly important to mark the different states of mind 
in inquuies carried on by their respective aids, as well as 
their different effects in promoting the progress of science. 
In the former, we sit still and hsten to a tale, told us, 
perhaps obscurely, piecemeal, and at long intervals of time, 
with our attention more or less awake. It is only by after 
rumination that we gather its full import ; and often, when 
the opportunity is gone by, we have to regret that our 
attention was not more particularly directed to some point 
which, at the time, appeared of little moment, but of which 
we at length appreciate the importance. In the latter, on 
the other hand, we cross-examine our witness, and by 
comparing one part of his evidence with the other, while he 
is yet before us, and reasoning upon it in his presence, are 
enabled to put pointed and searching questions, the answer 
to which may at once enable us to make up our minds. 



180 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EXPERIENCE— 

Accordingly it has been found invariably, that in those 
departments of physics, where the phenomena are beyond 
our control, or into which experimental inquiry, from 
other causes, has not been carried, the progress of know- 
ledge has been slow, uncertain, and irregular; while in 
such as admit of experiment, and in which mankind have 
agreed to its adoption, it has been rapid, sure, and steady." 
— F. Analogy. 
Experimentum Crucis. — A crucial or decisive experiment in 
attempting to interpret the laws of nature : so called, by 
Bacon, from the crosses or way-posts used to point out roads, 
because they determine at once between two or more pos- 
sible conclusions. 

Bacon {Nov. Organ, ^ book ii., sect. 36) says, '' Crucial 
instances are of this kind ; when in inquiry into any nature 
the intellect is put into a sort of equilibrium, so that it is 
uncertain to which of two, or sometimes more natures, the 
cause of the nature inquired into ought to be attributed or 
assigned, on account of the frequent and ordinary con- 
currence of more natures than one ; the instances of the 
cross show that the union of the one nature with the nature 
sought for is faithful and indissoluble ; while that of the 
other is varied and separable ; whence the question is 
limited, and that first nature received as the cause, and the 
other sent off and rejected." 

Sir G. Blane {Med. Logic^ p. 30), notices that in che- 
mistry a single experiment is conclusive, and the epithet 
experimentum crucis applied ; because the crucible derives 
its name from the figure of the cross being stamped upon it. 
A and B, two different causes, may produce a certain 
number of similar effects ; find some effect which the one 
produces and the other does not, and this will point out, as 
the direction-post (crux)., at a point where two highways 
meet, which of these causes may have been in operation in 
any particular instance. Thus, many of the symptoms of 
the Oriental plague are common to other diseases ; but when 
the observer discovers the peculiar bubo or boil of the 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 181 

EXPERIENCE— 

complaint, lie has an instantia crucis which directs him 
immediately to its discovery. 

Playfair, WorJcs^ vol. ii., p. 108. 

Edin, Review^ vol. xxxvi. 

''If, in a variety of cases presenting a general resem- 
blance, whenever a certain circmnstance is present, a 
certain effect follows, there is a strong probability that one 
is dependent on the other ; but if you can also find a case 
where the circumstance is absent from the combination, 
and the effect also disappears, your conclusion has all the 
evidence in its favour of which it is susceptible. TMien a 
decisive trial can be made by leading out, in this manner, 
the cause of which we wish to trace the effect, or by 
insulating any substances so- as to exclude all agents but 
those we wish to operate, or in any other way, such a 
decisive trial receives the title of experimentum crucis. 
One of the most interesting on record is that of Dr. 
Franklin, by which he established the identity of lightning 
and the electricity of our common machines." — S. Bailey, 
Discourses^ Lond., 1852, p. 169. 
EXTENSION (ex-tendere^ to stretch from). — ''The notions 
acquired by the sense of touch, and by the movement of the 
body, compared with what is learnt by the eye, make up 
the idea expressed by the word extension.''^ — Taylor, Ele- 
ments of Thought 

Extension is that property of matter by which it occupies 
space ; it relates to the qualities of length, breadth, and 
thickness, mthout which no substance can exist ; but has no 
respect to the size or shape of a body. Solidity is an essen- 
tial quality of matter as well as extension. And it is from 
the resistance of a solid body, as the occasion, that we get 
the idea of externality^ — q. v. 

According to the Cartesians, extension was the essence of 
matter. " Sola igitur extensio corporis naturam constituit, 
quum ilia omni solum semperque conveniat, adeo ut nihil in 
corpore prius percipere possumus." — Le Grand, Institut. 
Philosoph.^ pars, iv., p. 152. 



182 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

EXTENSION— 

Hobbes' views are given, PhilosopJi. Prima, pars, ii., cap. 
8, sect. 1. 

Locke's views are given, Essay on Hum, Understand.^ 
b. ii., chap. 13, see also chap. 15. 

Eeid, Inquiry, chap. 5, sect. 5 and 6, IntelL Powers, 
essay ii., chap. 19. 
Extension (riOgical), when predicated as belonging to a 
general term, means the number of objects included under 
it, and comprehension means the common characters belong- 
ing to such objects, 

"I call the comprehension of an idea, those attributes which 
it involves in itself, and which cannot be taken away from 
it without destroying it : as the comprehension of the idea 
triangle includes extension^ figure, three lines, three angles, 
and the equality of these three angles to two right angles, &c. 

" I call the extension of an idea those subjects to which 
that idea applies, which are also called the inferiors of a 
general term, which, in relation to them, is called superior. 
as the idea of triangle in general extends to all the differ- 
ent sorts of triangles." — Port Roy. Logic, part 1, chap. 6. 

We cannot detach any properties from a notion without 
extending the list of objects to which it is applied. Thus, 
if we abstract from a rose its essential qualities, attending 
only to those which it connotes as a plant, we extend its 
application, before limited to flowers with red petals, to the 
oak, fir, &c. But as we narrow the sphere of a notion, 
the qualities which it comprehends proportionally increase. 
If we restrict the term body to animal, we include life and 
sensation — if to man, it comprehends reason. 
EXTEKNAIilTY or OUTNESS. — "Pressure or resistance 
necessarily supposes externality in the thing which presses 
or resists." — Adam Smith, On the Senses. 

'' Distance or outness is neither immediately of itself per- 
ceived by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines 
and angles, but is only suggested to our thoughts," &c. — 
Berkeley, Principles of Knowledge, part 1, sect. 43. — V. 
Perception. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 183 

FABi^x:. — V. Apologue. 

FACT. — '^ Whatever really exists, whether necessarily or re- 
latively, may be called a fact. A statement concerning a 
number of facts^ is called a doctrine (when it is considered 
ahsolutehj as a truth), and a law (when it is considered 
relatively to an intelligence ordaining or recei\ing it.") — 
Irons, On Final Causes., p. 48. 

'' By a matter oi fact., I understand any thing of which 
we obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, or 
any individual event or phenomenon which is the object of 
sensation."" — Lewis, Essay on Influence of Authority, pp. 
1-4. 

It is thus opposed to matter of inference. Thus, the 
destructivenes-s of cholera is matter of fact., the mode of its 
propagation is matter of inference. Matter of fact also 
denotes what is certain, as opposed to matter of douht. 
The existence of God is matter of fact., though ascertained 
hj reasoning. 

*'The distinction oi fact and theory., is only relative. 
Events and phenomena considered as particulars which 
may be colligated by induction, are facts; considered as 
generalities already obtained by colligation of other facts., 
they are theories. The same event or phenomenon is a 
fact or a theory., according as it is considered as standing 
on one side or the other of the inductive bracket." — TMie- 
well, Philosoph. Induct. Sciences., aphorism 23. 

"Theories which are true, are facts.'''' — "WTiewell, On 
Induction., p. 23. — V. Opinion. 

FACTITIOUS (factitare., to practise) — is applied to what is the 
result of use or art, in distinction to what is the product of 
nature. JVIineral waters made in imitation of the natural 
springs are csiJled factitious, 

Cupiditas alionim existimationis non est faciitia sed 
nobis congenita ; deprehenditur enim et in infantibus qui, 
etiam ante reflectionis usum, molestia afficiimtur, quuni 
parvi a ceteris penduntur. — jN". Lacoudre, Institut. Philosoph.., 
torn, iii., p. 21. 

'^It is enough that we have moral ideas, however ob- 



184 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FACTITIOUS— 

tained ; whether by original constitution of our nature, or 
factitiously^ makes no difference." — Hampden, Introd. to 
Mor. PhilosopJi,^ p. 13. 

'^ To Mr. Locke, the writings of Hobbes suggested saiu h 
of the sophistry displayed in the first book of his essay oi^ 
the factitious nature of our moral principles." — Ste^Viirt 
Prelimin. Dissert., p. 64. 
FACUI.TY. — Facultates sunt aut quibus facilius fit, aiii :iTi>, 
quibus omnino confici non potest. — Cicero, De Invent.^ 
Hb. ii., 40. 

Facultas est quselibet vis activa, sen virtus, seu potcvi ;'J\ 
Solet etiam vocari potentia, verum tunc intelligenda e>- 
potentia activa, seu habilitas ad agendum, — Chainin, 
Lexicon Philosoph. 

'' The word faculty is most properly applied to t host- 
powers of the mind which are original and natura-; and 
which make part of the constitution of the mind."— -Epld, 
Intell. Powers, essay i., chap. 1. 

A faculty is the natural power by which phen^Mne^^i 
are produced by a person that is an agent, who can direct 
and concentrate the power which he possesses. — ^Jo^iTroy^ 
Melanges, Bruxell, 1834, p. 249. 

Bodies have the property of being put in motion, or being 
melted. The magnet has an attractive poiver. Plants 
have a medical virtue. But instead of blind and fatal 
activity, let the being who has power be conscious of It^ 
and be able to exercise and regulate it ; this is what is rneunt 
by faculty. It implies intelligence and fi:-eedom. It is 
personality which gives the character of faculties to thor 
natural powers which belong to us. — Did. des Sci-'i^Ci- 
Philosoph. 

''The faculties of the mind and its powers,^'' say<; Dw 
Beid, '' are often used as synonymous expressions. But/' 
continues he, " as most synonyms have some minut*^ dis- 
tinction that deserves notice, I apprehend that the word 
faculty is most properly applied to those powers of the 
mind which are original and natural, and which make part 



TOa^JBULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 185 

FACrJLTY— 

of the constitution of the mind. There are other powers 
which are acquii-ed by use, exercise, or study, which are 
not called faculties^ but habits. There must be something 
in the constitution of the mind necessary to our being able 
to acquire liabits^ and this is commonly called capacity.^" 

Such are the distinct meanings which Dr. Keid would 
assign to these words ; and these meanings are in accord- 
ance both with their philosophical and more familiar use. 
The distinction between J90i6'er and faculty is, that faculty 
is more properly applied to what is natm^al and original, 
in opposition or contrast to what is acquired. We say the 
faculty of judging, but th^ power of habit. But, as all our 
faculties are powers, we can apply the latter term equally 
to what is original and to what is acquired. And we can 
say, with equal propriety, the poicer of judging and the 
power of habit. The acquiring of habits is pecuhar to man : 
at least the ulterior animals do so to a ver^' limited extent. 
There must, therefore, be somethiog in the constitution of 
the human mind upon which the acquhiag of habits de- 
pends. This, says Dr. Reid, is called a capacity. The 
capacity is natural, the habit is acquired. Dr. Reid did 
not recognize the distinction between active and passive 
power. But a capacity is a passive power. The term is 
appHed to those manifestations of mind m which it is 
generally regarded as passive, or as affected or acted on by 
somethiag external to itself Thus, we say a man is capable 
of gratitude, or love, or grief, or joy. We speak also of 
the capacity of acquiring knowledge. Xow, in these forms 
of expression, the miad is considered as the passive recipient 
of certain affections or impressions coming upon it. Taking 
into accoimt the distiaction of powers as active and passive, 
^^ these terms,'' says Sir Will. Hamilton {BeifTs Works^ 
p. 221), '' stand in the following relations. Powers are 
active and passive, natural and acquired. Powers natiu^l 
and active are called faculties. Powers natural and passive, 
capacities or receptivities. Powers acquired are habits, and 
habit is used both in an active and passive sense. The 



186 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FACUXTY— 

power, again, of acquiring a habit is called a disposition." 
This is quite in accordance with the explanations of Dr. 
Eeid, only that instead of disposition he employs the term 
capacity, to denote that on which the acquiring of habits is 
founded. Disposition is employed by Dr. Reid to denote 
one of the active principles of our nature. 

One great end and aim of philosophy is to reduce facts 
and phenomena to general heads and laws. The philosophy 
of mind, therefore, endeavours to arrange and classify the 
operations of mind according to the general circumstances 
under which they are observed. Thus we find that the 
mind frequently exerts itself in acquiring a knowledge of 
the objects around it by means of the bodily senses. These 
operations vary according to the sense employed, and 
according to the object presented. But in smelling, tasting, 
and touching, and in all its operations by means of the 
senses, the mind comes to the knowledge of some object 
different from itself. This general fact is denoted by the 
term perception ; and we say that the mind, as manifested 
in these operations, has the power or faculty of perception. 
The knowledge which the mind thus acquires can be 
recalled or reproduced, and this is an operation which the 
mind delights to perform, both from the pleasure which it 
feels in reviving objects of former knowledge, and the^ 
benefit which results from reflectmg upon them. But the 
recalling or reproducing objects of former knowledge is an 
act altogether different from the act of originally obtaining 
it. It implies the possession of a peculiar power to per- 
form it. And hence we ascribe to the mind a power of 
recollection or dt, faculty of memory. A perception is quite 
distinct from a recollection. In the one we acquire know- 
ledge which is new to us — in the other we reproduce 
knowledge which we already possess. 

In the operations of recollection or memory it is often 
necessary that the mind exert itself to exclude some ob- 
jects which present themselves, and to introduce others 
which do not at first appear. In such case- the mind doe-^ 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 187 

FACUIiTY— 

SO by an act of resolving or determining, by a volition, 
ISTow, a volition is altogether different from a cognition. 
To know is one thing, to will is quite another thing. 
Hence it is that we assign these different acts to different 
powers, and say that the mind has a power of understanding, 
and also a power of willing. The power of understanding 
may exert itself in different ways, and although the end 
and result of all its operations be knowledge, the different 
ways in which knowledge is acquired or improved may be 
assigned, as we have seen they are, to different powers or 
faculties — but these are all considered as powers of under- 
standing. In like manner the power of willing or deter- 
mining may be exerted under different conditions, and, for 
the sake of distinctness, these may be denoted by different 
terms ; but still they are all included in one class, and called 
powers of the will. 

Before the will is exerted we are in a state of pleasure 
or pain, and the act of will has for its end to continue that 
state or to terminate it. The pleasures and the pains of 
which we are susceptible are numerous and varied, but the 
power or capacity of being affected by them is denoted by 
the term sensibility or feeling. And we are said not only 
to have powers of understanding and will, but powers of 
sensibility. 

When we speak, therefore, of a power or faculty of the 
mind, we mean that certain operations of mind have been 
observed, and classified according to the conditions and 
circumstances under which they manifest themselves, and 
that distinct names have been given to these classes of 
phenomena, to mark what is pecuhar in the act or operation, 
and consequently in the power or faculty to which they are 
referred. But when we thus classify the operations of the 
mind, and assign them to different powers, we are not to ^ 
suppose that we divide the mind into different compart- 
ments, of which each has a different energy. The euerg}- 
is the same in one and all of the operations. It is the 
same mind actin«f accordino- to different conditions and laws. 



188 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FACUIiTY— 

The energy is one and indivisible. It is only the manifesta- 
tions of it that we arrange and classify. 

This is well put by the famous Alcuin, who was the 
friend and adviser of Charlemagne, in the following passage, 
which is translated from his work De Ratione Animce : — 
''The soul bears divers names according to the nature of 
its operations ; inasmuch as it lives and makes live, it is 
the soul {animd) ; inasmuch as it contemplates, it is the 
spirit (spiritus) ; inasmuch as it feels, it is sentiment 
(sensus) ; since it reflects, it is thought (animus) ; as it 
comprehends, intelligence (mens) ; inasmuch as it discerns, 
reason (ratio) ; as it consents, will (voluntas) ; as it recol- 
lects, memory (memoria). But these things are not divided 
in substance as in name, for all this is the soul, and one 
soul only." 
^Faculties of the iwiind.— The faculties of the human mind were 
formerly distinguished as gnostic or cognitive, and orectic 
or appetent. They have also been regarded as belonging 
to the understanding or to the will, and have been desig- 
nated as intellectual or active. A threefold classification 
of them is now generally adopted, and they are reduced to 
the heads of intellect or cognition, of sensitivity or feeling, 
and of activity or will. Under each of these heads, again, 
it is common to speak of several subordinate faculties, 

" This way of speaking of faculties has misled many into 
a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which 
had their several provinces and authorities, and did com- 
mand, obey, and perform several actions, as so many dis- 
tinct beings : which has been no small occasion of wrangling, 
obscurity, and uncertainty, in questions relating to them." 
— Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book ii., chap. 21, 
sect. 17, 20. 

Dr. Brown, instead of ascribing so many distinct faculties 
to the mind, which is one, would speak of it as in different 
states^ or under different affections. — Lecture xvi. 

"Les divers facultes que I'on considere dans I'ame, ne 
sont point des choses distinctes reellement, mais le meme 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 189 

FACinLTY— 

etre clifferemment consldere." — Amaud, Des Vrais et 
des Fausses Idees^ ch. 27. 

•• Quoique nous donnions a ces facultes des noms differents, 
par rapport a leiir diverses operations, cela ne nous oblige 
pas a les regarder comme des choses differentes, car I'en- 
tendement n'est autre chose que Tame, en tant qu'elle 
retient et se ressouvient ; la volonte n'est autre chose que 

Tame, en tant qu'elle veut et que'lle choisit 

De sorte qu'on pent entendre que toutes ces facidtes ne 
sent, au fond, que le meme ame. qui recoit divers noms, a 
cause de ses difterentes operations." — Bossuet, Connaissance 
de Dieu. ch. 1, art. 20. 

•• Man is sometimes in a predominant state of intelligence^ 
sometimes in a predominant state of feeling ^ and sometimes in 
a predominant state of action and determination. To call 
these, however, separate faculties, is altogether beside the 
mark. Xo act of intelligence can be performed without 
the will, no act of determination without the intellect, and 
no act either of the one or the other without some amount 
of feeling being mingled in the process. Thus, whilst thev 
each have then' own distinctive characteristics, yet there is 
a perfect unity at the root." — Morell, Psychology^ p. 61. 

"I feel that there is no more reason for believing my 
mind to be made up of distinct entities, or attributes, or 
faculties^ than that my foot is made up of walking and 
rtmning. My mind, I firmly believe, thinks, and wills, 
and remembers, just as simply as my body walks, and rims. 
and rests." — Irons, Final Causes^ p. 93. 

•• It woidd be well if, instead of speaking of ' the powers 
(ov faculties) of the mind ' (which causes misunderstanding), 
we adhered to the designation of the several ' operations of 
one muid;' which most psychologists recommend, but in 
the sequel forget." — Feuchtersleben, Medical Psychol^ 8vo, 
18^7, p. 120. 

^•The judgn^ent is often spoken of as if it were a dis- 
tinct power or faculty of the soul, differing from the 
imagmation, the memory, &c., as the heart differs from the 



190 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FACUIiTY— 

lungs, or the brain from the stomach. All that ought to 
be understood by these modes of expression is, that the 
mind sometimes compares objects or notions ; sometimes 
joins together images ; sometimes has the feeling of past 
time with an idea now present, &c." — Taylor, Elements of 
Thought. 

'' ^N'otwithstanding we divide the soul into several powers 
and faculties^ there is no such division in the soul itself, 
since it is the whole soul that remembers, understands, 
wills, or imagines. Our manner of considering the memory, 
understanding, will, imagination, and the like faculties^ is 
for the better enabling us to express ourselves in such 
abstracted subjects of speculation, not that there is any such 
division in the soul itself" — Spectator^ No. 600. 

"The expression, ' man perceives, and remembers, and 
imagines, and reasons,' denotes all that is conveyed by the 
longer phrase, ' the mind of man has the faculties of per- 
ception, and memory, and imagination, and reasoning.' " — 
S. Bailey, Letters on Philosoph. of Hum. Mind^ p. 13. 

'' Herbart rejects the whole theory of mental inherent 
faculties as chimerical, and has, in consequence, aimed some 
severe blows at the psychology of Kant. But, in fact, it is 
only the rational psychology which Kant exploded, which 
is open to this attack. It may be that in mental, as in 
physical mechanics, we know force only from its effects ; 
but the consciousness of distinct effects will thus form the 
real basis of psychology. The faculties may then be retained 
as a convenient method of classification, provided the lan- 
guage is properly explained, and no more is attributed to 
them than is warranted by consciousness. The same con- 
sciousness which tells me that seeing is distinct from hearing, 
tells me also that volition is distinct from both ; and to 
speak of the faculty of will does not necessarily imply more 
than the consciousness of a distinct class of mental pheno- 
mena." — ^Mansell, Prolegem. Log.^ p. 34, note. 

FAIiSE, FAIiSITY — ^The false^ in one sense, applies to 
things ; and there is falsity either when things really are 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 191 

FAL.SE-— 

not, or when it is impossible they can be ; as when it Ls 
said that the proportion of the diagonal to the side of a 
square is commensurable, or that you sit — the one is abso- 
lutely false ^ the other accidentally — for in the one case and 
the other the fact affirmed is not. 

The false is also predicated of things which really exist, 
but which appear other than they are, or what they are not : 
a portrait, or a dream. They have a kind of reality, but 
they really are not what they represent. Thus, we say 
that things Sirefalse^ either because they do not absolutely 
exist, or because they are but appearances and not reali- 
ties. — Arist., Metaphys.^ lib. v., cap. 30. 
Falsity is opposed to verity or trut?i. — q, v. 
To transcendental truth, or truth of being ^ the opposite Ls 
nonentity^ rather than falsity. A thing that really is, is 
what it is. A thing that is not is a nonentity. Falsity^ 
then, is twofold — objective and formal. Objective falsity is 
when a thing resembles a thing which it really is not, or 
when a sign or proposition seems to represent or enunciate 
what it does not. Formal falsity belongs to the intellect 
when it fails to discover objective falsify ^ and judges 
according to appearances rather than the reahty and truth 
of things. Formal falsity is error ; which is opposed to 
logical truth. To moral truth, the opposite is falsehood or 
lying. 
FANCY ((pciyrctGicc). — ''Imagination or phantasy^ in its most 
extensive meaning, is the faculty representative of the 
phenomena both of the internal and external worlds." — 
Sir W. Hamilton, Eeid's Works^ note B, sect. 1. 

" In the soul 
Are many lesser faculties, that serve 
Reason as chief; among them fancy next 
Her oflBce Ltolds : of all external things 
Which the five watchful senses represent 
She forms Imaginations, air>' shapes." 

:>Iilton. Paradise Lost, book v. 

* Aristotle says {Metaphys.. lib. ix., cap. 10), -'Being is above all true— nonentity 
false.'' 



192 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FANCY— 

" Where fantasi/, near handmaid to the mind, 
Sits and beholds, and doth discern them all ; 
Compounds in one things different in their kind. 

Compares the black and white, the great and small." 

Sir John Davies, Immortality. 

" When nature rests, 
Oft in her absence mimic fancy wakes 
To imitate her, but, misjoining shapes, 
Wild work produces oft, but most in dreams." 

" Tell me where is fancy bred, 
Or in the heart, or in the head? 
How begot, how nourished ? 

Merch. of Venice, act iii., scene 2. 

*' Break, Phantsie, from thy cave of cloud. 

And wave thy purple wings, 
Now all thy figures are allowed, 

And various shapes of things. 
Create of airy forms a stream ; 

It must have blood and naught of phlegm ; 
And though it be a waking dream. 

Yet let it like an odour rise 
To all the senses here. 

And fall like sleep upon their eyes, 
Or music on their ear."— Ben Jonson. 

" How various soever the pictures of fancy ^ the mate- 
rials, according to some, are all derived from sense ; so that 
the maxim — Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu 
— though not true of the intellect, holds with regard to the 
phantasy.'''' — ^Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ b. ii., ch. 7. 

Addison said {Spectator, No. 411), that he used the 
words imagination and fancy indiscriminately. 

Mr. Stewart ssld (Philosoph, Hum. Mind^ chap, v.), '^It 
is obvious that a creative imagination, when a person 
possesses it so habitually that it may be regarded as form- 
ing one characteristic of his genius, implies a power of 
summoning up at pleasure a particular class of ideas ; and 
of ideas related to each other in a particular manner ; 
which power can be the result only of certain habits of 
association, which the individual has acquired. It is to 
this power of the mind which is evidently a particular turn 
of thought, and not one of the common priuciples of our 
nature," that Mr. Stewart would appropriate the name 



VOCABULAHY OF PHILOSOPHY. 193 

FAIVCY— 

fancy. '' The office of this power is to collect materials 
for the imagination ; and therefore, the latter power pre- 
supposes the former, while the former does not necessarily 
suppose the latter. A man v/hose habits of association 
present to him, for illustrating or embellishing a subject, 
a number of resembling or analogous ideas, we call a man 
o^ fancy; but for an effort of imagination, various other 
powers are necessary, particularly the powers of taste and 
judgment ; without which, we can hope to produce nothing 
that will be a source of pleasure to others. It is the power 
of fancy which supplies the poet with metaphorical lan- 
guage, and with all the analogies which are the founda- 
tion of his allusions ; but it is the power of imagination 
that creates the complex scenes he describes, and the 
fictitious characters he delineates. To fancy we apply the 
epithets of rich or luxuriant ; to imagination, those of 
beautiful or sublime." 

Fancy was called by Coleridge ''the aggregative and 
associative power." But Wordsworth says, "To aggre- 
gate and to associate, to evoke and to combine, belong as 
well to imagination as to fancy. But fancy does not re- 
quire that the materials which she makes use of should be 
susceptible of change in their constitution from her touch ; 
and, where they admit of modification, it is enough for her 
purpose if it be slight, limited, and evanescent. Du^ecth' 
the reverse of these are the desires and demands of the 
imagination. She recoils from every thmg but the plastic, 
the pliant, and the indefinite." — Wordsworth, Preface to 
Works, vol. i., 12mo. Lond., 1836. — K Imagination. 

FATAIiISM, FATE. — '''• Fatum is derived from /a?'z ; that is, 
to pronounce, to decree ; and in its right sense, it signifies 
the decree of Providence." — Leibnitz, Fifth Paper to Dr. 
Clarke. '•^ Fate derived from the Latin fari., to speak, 
must denote the word spoken by some intelligent being who 
has power to make his words good." — Tucker, Light of 
Nature, vol. ii., part 2, chap. 26. 

Among all nations it has been common to speak of fate 
o 



194 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

or destiny as a power superior to gods and men — swaying 
all tilings irresistibly. This may be called the fate of poets 
and mytJiologists. Philosophical fate is the sum of the laws 
of the universe, the product of eternal intelligence, and the 
blind properties of matter. Theological fate represents 
Deity as above the laws of natuie, and ordaining all things 
according to his will — the expression of that will being the 
law. 

Leibnitz (Fifth Paper to Dr. Samuel Clarke) says :— 
^^ There is a Fatum Mahomet anum^ a Fatum Sioicum, and 
a Fatum Christianum, The Turkish fate will have an 
effect to happen, even though its cause should be avoided ; 
as if there was an absolute necessity. The Stoical /a ^c will 
have a man to be quiet, because he must have patience 
whether he will or not, since 'tis impossible to resist the 
course of things. But 'tis agreed that there is Fatum 
Christianum^ a certain destiny of every thing, regulated by 
the fore-knowledge and providence of God." 

'' Fatalists that hold the necessity of all human actions and 
events, may be reduced to these three heads — First, such 
as, asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree 
and determine all things, and thereby make all actions 
necessary to us ; which kind of fate^ though philosophers 
and other ancient writers have not been altogether silent 
of it, yet it has been principally maintained by some 
neoteric Christians, contrary to the sense of the ancient 
church. Secondly, such as suppose a Deity that, acting 
wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of 
things in the world ; from whence, by a series of causes, 
doth unavoidably result whatsoever is so done in it : which 
fate is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves neces- 
sary, and is that which was asserted by the ancient Stoics, 
Zeno, and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Essenes seemed 
to follow. And lastly, such as hold the material necessity 
of all thingc without a Deity; which /a^6 Epicurus calls rviv 
TOiv (PvaiKcou it[/.u^y.ivYiv^ the fate of the naturahsts, that is, 
indeed, the atheists, the assertors whereof may be called 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 195 

FATAIiISM— 

also the democritical fatalists,'''' — Cudworth, Intell. Syst-. 
book i., chap. 1. 

Cicero, De Fato, 

Pkitarchus, De Fato. 

Grotius, Philosophorum Sententice De Fato. 
F£AR is one of the passions. It arises on the conception or 

contemplation of something evil coming upon us. 
FEElilNO. — "This word has two meanings. -FzV^^, it signi- 
fies the perceptions we have of eternal objects, by the sense 
of touch. When we sjDcak of feeling a body to be hard or 
soft, or rough or smooth, hot or cold, to feel these things 
is to perceive them by touch. They are external things, 
and that act of the mind by which we feel them is easil}' 
distinguished from the objects felt. Secondly^ the word 
feeling is used to signify the same thing as sensation ; and 
in this sense, it has no object ; the feeling and the thing 
felt are one and the same. 

''Perhaps betwixt /ee/zr?^, taken in this last sense, and 
sensation^ there may be this small difference, that sensation 
is most commonly used to signify those feelings which we 
have by our external senses and bodily appetites, and all 
our bodily pains and pleasures. But t\i&cQ 2ccq feelings oi 
a nobler nature accompanying our affections, our moral 
judgments, and our determinations in matters of taste, to 
which the word sensation is less properly applied."* — Reid, 
IntelL Powers^ essay i., chap. 1. 

'^ Feeling^ beside denoting one of the external senses, is a 
general term, signifying that internal act by which we are 
made conscious of our pleasures and our pains ; for it is 
not limited, as sensation is, to any one sort. Thus, feeling 
being the genus of which sensation is a species, their mean- 
ing is the same when applied to pleasure and pain felt at 
the organ of sense ; and accordingly we say indifferently, 
' I feel pleasure from heat, and pain from cold ; ' or, ^ I 

* The French use of sensation — as when we say such an occurrence excited a 
^a'eat sensation, that is, feeling of surprise, or indignation, or satisfaction, is be- 
coming more common. 



196 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

have a sensation of pleasure from heat and of pain from 
cold.' But the meaning of feeling^ as is said, is much 
more extensive. It is proper to say, I feel pleasure in a 
sumptuous building, in love, in friendship ; and pain in 
losing a child, in revenge, in envy; sensation is not pro- 
perly applied to any of these. 

" The term, feeling is frequently used in a less proper sense, 
to signify what we feel or are conscious of; and in that sense 
it is a general term for all our passions and emotions, 
and for all our other pleasures and pains." — Kames, 
Elements of Criticism^ appendix. 

'' Pressing my hand with force against the table, I feel 
pain and I feel the table to be hard. The pain is a sensa- 
tion of the mind, and there is nothing that resembles it in 
the table. The hardness is in the table, nor is there any- 
thing resembling it in the mind. Feeling is applied to 
both, but in a different sense ; being a word common to the 
act of sensation, and to that of perceiving by the sense of 
touch." — Eeid, IntelL Powers^ essay ii., chap. 16. 

All sensations are feelings; but all feelings are not sensa- 
tions. Sensations are those feelings which arise immediately 
and solely from a state or affection of the bodily organism. 
But we have feelings which are connected not with our 
animal, but with our intellectual, and rational, and moral 
nature; such as feelings of the sublime and beautiful, of 
esteem and gratitude, of approbation and disapproba- 
tion. Those higher feelings it has been proposed to call 
sentiments. 

From its most restricted sense of the perceiving by the 
sense of touch, feeling has been extended to signify imme- 
diate perceiving or knowing in general. It is applied in 
this sense to the immediate knowledge which we have of 
first truths or the principles of common sense. "By 
external or internal perception, I apprehend a phenomenon 
of mind or matter as existing ; I therefore affirm it to be. 
Now, if asked how I know, or am assured, that what I 
apprehend as a mode of mind, may not, in reality, be a 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 197 

FEElilNO— 

mode of mind; I can only say, using the simplest language, 
' I know it to be true, because I feel^ and cannot but feel^ 
or '- because I 'believe, and cannot but helieve^^ it so to be. 
And if further interrogated how I know, or am assured that 
I thus feel or thus believe^ I can make no better answer than, 
in the one case, 'because I believe that I/eeZ;' in the other, 
' because I feel that I believe.^ It thus appears, that when 
pushed to our last resort, we must retire either n-p on feeling 
or belief or upon both indifferently. And, accordingly, 
among philosophers, we find that a great many employ one 
or other of these terms by which to indicate the nature of 
the ultimate ground to which our cognitions are reducible ; 
while some employ both, even though they may award a 

preference to one In this application of it we 

must discharge that signification of the word by which we 
denote the phenomena of pain and pleasure." — Sir Will. 
Hamilton, Reicfs Works^ note A, sect. 5. — V. Belief. 

FETICHISM is supposed to have been the first form of the 
theological philosophy; and is described as consisting in 
the ascription of life and intelligence essentially analogous 
to our own, to every existing object, of whatever kind, 
whether organic or morganic, natural or artificial. — (Comte, 
Pkilosoph. Positive^ i., 3.) The Portuguese call the objects 
worshipped by the negroes of Africa fetisso — bewitched or 
possessed by fairies. Such are the grisgris of Africa, the 
manitous and the ockis of America, and the burklians of 
Siberia — good and evil genii inhabiting the objects of nature 
which they worship. The priests of this worship are called 
griots in Africa, jongleurs or jugglers in America, and 
chamanes in Central Asia. 

FITNESS and UNFITNESS— '' most frequently denote the 
congruity or incongruity, aptitude or maptitude, of an}' 
means to accomplish an end. But when applied to actions, 
they generally signify the same with i^ight and icrong ; nor 
is it often hard to determine in which of these senses these 
words are to be understood. It is worth observing that 
fitness in the former sense is equally undefinable with fitness 



198 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FITNESS— 

in the latter ; or, that it is as impossible to express in any 
other than synonymous words, what we mean when we say 
of certain objects, ' that they have Sijitness to one another ; 
or are Jit to answer certain purposes,' as when we say, 
' reverencing the Deity is Jit^ or beneficence is Jit to be 
practised.' In the first of these instances, none can avoid 
owning the absurdity of making an arbitrary sense the 
source of the idea of Jitness^ and of concluding that it 
signifies nothing real in objects, and that no one thing can 
be properly the means of another. In both cases the term 
Jit signifies a simple perception of the understanding." — 
Price, Review^ chap. 6. 

According to Dr. Samuel Clarke, virtue consists in 
acting in conformity to the nature and Jitness of things. 
In this theory the term Jitness does not mean the adapta- 
tion of an action, as a means towards some en-d designed 
by the agent ; but a congruity, proportion, or suitableness 
between an action and the relations, in which, as a moral 
being, the agent* stands. Dr. Clarke has been misunder- 
stood on this point by Dr. Brown (lect. Ixxvi.) and 
others. See Wardlaw, Christ, Ethics^ note E. 

FORCE is any energy or power which has a tendency to move 
a body at rest, or to afiect or stop the progress of a body 
already in motion. This is sometimes termed active force^ 
in contradistinction to that which merely resists or retards 
the motion of a body, but is itself apparently inactive. 
But according to Leibnitz, by whom the term force was 
introduced into modern philosophy, no substance is alto- 
gether passive. Force^ or a continual tendency to activity, 
was originally communicated hf the Creator to all sub- 
stances,, whether material or Spiritual. Every force is a 
substance^ and every substance is a force. The two notions 
are inseparable ; for you cannot think of action without a 
being, nor of a being without activity. A substance 
entirely passive is a contradictory idea. See Leibnitz, De 
primes PhilosophicE emendatione^ et de notione s^ihstanlice, — 
F. Monad. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 199 

FORCE— 

In like manner Bosco^ich maintained that the ultimate 
particles of matter are indivisible and miextended points, 
endowed Tsrith the forces of attraction and repidsion. — 
Dissertationes diice cle viribus vivis^ 4to, 1745. See aLso 
Stewart, Pliilosopliical Essays, essay ii., chap. 1. 

According to the d^Tiamic theory of Kant, and the 
atomic theory of Leiicippus, the phenomena of matter were 
explained by attraction and repulsion. 

'' La force^ proprement elite ^ c'est ce qui regit les actes^ 
sans regler les voIont£s.''' If this definition of force^ which 
is given by Mons. Comte, be adopted, it would make a 
distinction between force and power. Power extends to 
volitions as well as to operations^ to mind as well as 
matter. 

•^We talk of mechanical forces. ^Miere are they? 
Apart fi'om will, what have we but weights ? All motion 
and power in mechanism result from the power of man. 
Lever, pulley, wedge, and wheel, are all helpless as dust 
till the human spirit gives them power. The huge things 
that spin, and hammer, and run for us, are but artificial 
limbs, — outhing physical instruments, whereby the spirit 
within us does heav}' work, never meant for the gentle 
frame which everywhere attends it.-' — Crystal Palace, an 
essay, p. xx., reprinted from Quarterly Review. 1855. 
FORITX — '' is that of which matter is the receptacle," says Lord 
Monboddo (Ancient Metaphys.^ book ii., chap. 2). A 
trumpet may be said to consist of two parts ; the matter or 
brass of which it is made, and the form which the maker 
gives to it. The latter is essential, but not the former : 
since although the matter were silver, it would still be a 
trumpet; but without the form, it would not. Now, 
although there can be no form without matter, yet as it is 
the form which makes the thing what it is, the word form 
came to signi^^ essence or natiu^e. '•'•Form is the essence 
of the thing, from which result not only its figure and 
shape, but all its other quahties." — ]Monboddo, ut supra. 

Matter void of form, but ready to receive it, was called, 



200 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FORM— 

in metaphysics, materia prima^ or elementary; in allusion 

to wliich Butler has made Hudibras say, that he 

Professed 
He had first matter seen undressed, 
And found it naked and alone, 
Before one rag oi form was on. 

Form was defined by Aristotle 7.oyog Tvig ovniecg^ and as 
ovGice. signifies, equally, substance and essence, hence came 
the question whether form should be called substantial 
or essential ; the Peripatetics espousing the former epithet, 
and the Cartesians the latter. 

According to the Peripatetics, in any natural com- 
posite body, there were — 1. The matter. 2. Quantity, 
which followed the matter. 3. The substantial form. 
4. The qualities which followed the form. According to 
others, there were only, — 1. Matter. 2. Essential /orm ; 
as quantity is identified with matter., and qualities with 
matter or form., or the compound of them. 

According to the Peripatetics, form was a subtle sub- 
stance, penetrating matter., and the cause of all acts of the 
compound ; in conformity with the saying, formoB est agere^ 
materice vero pati. According to others, form is the union 
of material parts, as atoms, or elements, &c., to which some 
added a certain motion and position of the parts. — Derodon, 
Pliys.., pars prima, pp. 11, 12. 

He who gives form to matter, must, before he do so, 
have in his mind some idea of the particular /or/T? which he 
is about to give. And hence the word form is used to 
signify an idea. 

Idea and Law are the same thing, seen from opposite 
points. '' That which contemplated ohjectively (that is, as 
existing externally to the mind), we call a law ; the same 
contemplated subjectively (that is, as existing in a subject 
or mind), is an idea. Hence Plato often names ideas laws ; 
and Lord Bacon, the British Plato (?), describes the laws of 
the material universe as ideas in nature. Quod in natura 
naturata lex^ in natura naturante idea dicitur." — Coleridge, 



\ OCABULAP.Y OF PHILOSOPHY. 201 

FORM— 

Church and State, p. 12. And in Xoi\ Organ. ^ iL, 17, 
Bacon says: "" "Wlien we speiik of forms, we imderstimd 
nothing more than the /«?/-•:? and modes of action which 
regelate and constitnte any simple nature, stich as heat, 
light, weight, in all kinds of matter susceptible of them ; so 
that the farm of heat, or the form of light, and the law of 
heat, and the laifj of light, are the same thing.'' Again he 
sajs : " Since the form of a thing is the Terr thing itself, 
and the thing no otherwise diiiers from the form, than as 
the apparent diflfers firom the existent, the outward from 
the inward, or that which is considered in relation to man 
from that which is considered in relation to the universe, it 
foUows clearly that no nature can be taken for the true 
f&rm^ unless it CTer decreases when the nature itself de- 
creases, and in like manner is always increased when the 
nature is increased.' ' — Nov. Organ. ^ 2, 13. 

As the word form denotes the law, so it may also 
denote the class of cases brouo^ht toother and united by 
the law. " Thus to speak of the forvi of animals might 
mean, first, the law or definition of animal in general : 
second, the part of any given animal by which it comes 
under the law, and is what it is ; and last, the class of 
animals in general formed by the law." — ^Thomson, Outline 
of Laws of Thought^ p. 33, 2d edit. 

*'The sense attached at the present day to the words 
form and matter, is son ■ rent from, though closely 

related to, theie. Tlir hat the mind impresses 

upon its percc ^ ^ re the matter; form 

therefore means / :.: / c . / ^ uojee is that are presented 
to the mind. AVhen the attention is directed to any object, 
we do not ser :t itself, but contemplate it in the 

light of om- r conceptions. A rich man. for 

example, is regarded by the poor and ignorant imder the 
form of a very fortunate person, able to purchase luxuries 
which are above their own reach; by the religious mind 
under the form of a person with more than ordiaary tempta- 
tions to contend with; by the poKtical economist, imderthat 



202 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FORM— 

of an example of the unequal distribution of wealth; by the 
tradesman, under that of one whose patronage is valuable. 
ISTow, the object is really the same to all these observers ; 
the same rich man has been represented under all these 
different forms. And the reason that the observers a^e 
able to find many in one,, is that they connect him 
severally with their own prior conceptions. The form^ thfiJn, 
in this view, is mode of knowing; and the matter is the 
perception^ or ohject we have to know." — Ihid^ p. 34, 

Sir W. Hamilton calls the theory of substantial forms^ 
"the theory of qualities viewed as entities conjoinjed with, 
and not as mere dispositions or modifications of matter." — 
Reid's Works, p. 827, note. 

Aristotle, Metaphys., lib. 7 et 8. 

Miclielet, Examen Critique de la MetapJiysiqne d''Aristote, 
8vo, Paris, 1836, p. 164 et p. 287. 

E^vaisson, JEssai sur la MetapJiysiqne d'Aristote^ 8vo, 
Pafis, 1837, tom. i., p. 149.— F. Law. 

FORMAiiiiY.— 7. Really, Virtually. 

FORTITUDE is one of the virtues called cardinal. It may 
display itself actively by resolution or constancy, which 
consists in adhering to duty in the face of danger and 
difficulty which cannot be avoided, or by intrepidity or 
courage, which consists in maintaining firmness and presence 
of mind in the midst of perils from which there may be 
escape. The displays oi fortitude passively considered may 
be comprehended under the term patience, including 
huiaiility, meekness, submission, resignation, &c. 

FREE i¥iiiii.— F. Liberty, I^ecessity, Will. 

FRIE]V1>SIIIP is the mutual affection cherished by two 
petsons of congenial minds. It springs from the social 
nature of man, and rests on the esteem which each enter- 
tains for the good qualities of the other. The resemblance 
in disposition and character between friends may some- 
times be the occasion of their contracting friendship ; but 
it may also be the effect of imitation and frequent and 
familiar intercourse. And the interchange of kind offices 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 20 O 

FRIENDSHIP— 

which takes place between friends is not the cause of their 
friendship, but its natural result. FamiHarities founded on 
views of interest or pleasure are not to be dignified by the 
name of friendship. 

Dr. Brown (lect. Ixxxix.) has classified the duties of 
friendship as they regard the commencement of it, the con- 
tinuance of it, and its close. 

In the choice of a friend there is room for discretion and 
prudence: The cultivation of friendship calls for confi- 
dence, kindness, and encouragement. Shoul(J it become 
necessary, fr'om a change of circumstances, or fr^om a 
neglect or violation of its duties, to break o^ friendship^ it 
should be done not abruptly, but gTadually, and more in 
sorrow than in anger. Should friendship last till it be dis- 
solved by the death of one of the parties, then it becomes 
the duty of the sur\'ivor to eherish the memory of his de- 
parted friend, to defend his character, and to continue to 
imitate his excellences. 

See the various questions connected mth friendship 
treated by Aristotle, in Ethics^ books vui. and ix., and by 
Cicero, in his treatise De Amicitia. 



OENERAlilZATlON.— '^The mind makes its utmost endea- 
vours to generalize its ideas, begins early with such as are 
most famihar, comes in time to those that are less so, and 
is never at rest till it has found means of concei^ang, as well 
as it can, its ideas collectively, and of signifying them in 
that manner to others." — Bolingbroke, Essay on Hum. 
Knowl.^ s. 5. 

'' Generalization is the act of comprehending, under a 
common name, several objects agreeing in some point which 
we abstract fi-om each of them, and wliich that common 
name serves to indicate." 

'' When we are contemplating several individuals which 
resemble each other in some part of theii' natm-e, we can 
(by attending to that part alone^ and not to those points 



204 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

OENERAIilZATION— 

wherein they differ) assign them one common name^ which 
will express or stand for them merely as far as they all 
agree; and which, of course, will be applicable to all or 
any of them (which process is called genei^alization) ; and 
each of these names is called a common term, from its be- 
longing to them all alike ; or a predicaMe^ because it may 
be predicated affirmatively of them or any of them." — 
Whately, Logic^ b. ii., ch. 5, sect. 3. 

'' On sensation," says Aristotle (Poster. Analyt.^ chap. 
16), "ensues memory ; and on many memories of the same 
fact experience ; for many similar memories are one ex- 
perience : on experience, or the whole unchanging univer- 
sal that has settled in the mind, the all penetrating one 
beside the many, ensues the beginning of art and science ; 
of art, if the end is production, of science, if the end is 
truth." Experience can only give truths which are parti- 
cular, but science aims at truths which are general. Now 
these general truths are involved in particular cases or 
instances ; and the mental process by which we disengage 
the general from the particular and look on it separately 
from any individual case, is the process of generalization^ 
while the general truths derived from particular observa- 
tions constitute science. 

Generalization is of two kinds — classification and gene- 
ralization properly so called. 

When we observe facts accompanied by diverse circum- 
stances, and reduce these circumstances to such as are 
essential and common, we obtain a law. 

"V\nien we observe individual objects and arrange them 
according to their common characters, we obtain a class. 
When the characters selected are such as belong essentially 
to the nature of the objects, the class corresponds with the 
law. When the character selected is not natural the 
classification is artificial. If we were to class animals into 
white and red, we would have a classification which had no 
reference to the laws of their nature. But if we classify 
them as vertebrate or invertebrate, we have a classification 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 205 

OENERAI.IZATIOIV— 

founded on their organization. Artificial classification is 
of no value in science, it is a mere aid to the memory. 
jSTatural classification is the foundation of all science. This 
is sometimes called generalization. It is more properly 
classification, — F. Classification. 

The law of gravitation is exemplified in the fall of a 
single stone to the ground. But many stones and other 
heavy bodies must have been observed to fall before the 
fact was generalized, and the law stated. And in this 
process of generalizing there is involved a priuciple which 
experience does not furnish. Experience, how extensive so- 
ever it may be, can only give the particular, yet from the 
particular we rise to the general, and affirm not only that 
all hea^y bodies which have been observed, but that all 
heavy bodies whether they have been observed or not, 
gravitate. In this is implied a belief that there is order 
in natm^e, that under the same circumstances the same 
substances will present the same phenomena. This is 
a principle fiu-nished by reason, the process founded 
on it embodies elements furnished by experience. — V, 
Induction. 

The results of generalization are general notions expres- 
sed by general terms. Objects are classed according to 
certain properties which they have in common, into genera 
and species. Hence arose the question which caused cen- 
turies of acrimonious discussion. Have genera and species 
a real, independent existence, or are they only to be found 
in the mind? — V. Realism, Nominalism, Conceptu- 
ALiSM. — Reid, /??^eZ?. Powers^ essay v., chap. 6; Stewart, 
Philosopli. Hum. Mind, chap. 4. 

'^ General ideas or general notions are of two kinds, 
i^ssentially different from each other ; those which are 
general merely from the vagueness and imperfection of our 
information ; and those which have been methodically 
generalized, in consequence of an abstraction founded on 
the careful study of particulars." — Stewart, PMosopli. of 
Hum, Mind, part ii., ch. 2, sect. 4. 



206 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOI'HY. 

OENERAIilZATION— 

The principle of geneixdization is, that beings howsoever 
different agree or are homogeneous in some respect. 
GENXIRAIi TERMS.— F. TermS. 

CrENIUS (from geno^ the old form of the verb gigno^ to pro- 
duce) . 

This word was in ancient times applied to the tutelary 
God or spirit appointed to watch over every individual 
from his birth to his death. As the character and capaci- 
ties of men were supposed to vary according to the higher 
or lower nature of their genius^ the word came to signify 
the natural powers and abilities of men, and more particu- 
larly their natural inclination or disposition. But the 
peculiar and restricted use of the term is to denote that 
high degree of mental power which produces or invents. 
'•'- Genius^'''' says Dr. Blair {Lectures on Rhetoric^ lect. iii.), 
''always imports something inventive or creative." ''It 
produces," says another, "what has never been accomplished, 
and which all in all ages are constrained to admire. Its 
chief elements are the reason and the imagination, which 
are alone inventive and productive. According as one or 
other predominates, genius becomes scientific or artistic. 
In the former case, it seizes at once those hidden affinities 
which otherwise do not reveal themselves, except to the 
most patient and vigorous application ; and as it were 
intuitively recognizing in phenomena the unalterable and 
eternal, it produces truth. In the latter, seeking to 
exhibit its own ideas in due and appropriate forms, it 
realizes the infinite under finite types, and so creates the 
beautiful." 

To possess the powers of common sense in a more 
eminent degree, so as to be able to perceive identity in 
things widely different, and diversity in things nearly the 
same ; this it is that constitutes what we call genius^ that 
power divine, which through every sort of discipline renders 
the difference so conspicuous between one learner and 
another." — Harris, Philosophy Arrange.^ chap. 9. 

"IsTature gives men a bias to their respective pursuits, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 207 

GENIUS— 

and that strong propensity, I suppose, is what we mean by 

geniusy — Coiiper. 

Dryden has said, — 

" What the child admired, 
The youth endeavoured, and the man acquired/' 

He read Polybius, with a notion of his historic exact- 
ness, before he was ten years old. Pope, at twelve, feasted 
his eyes in the picture galleries of Spenser. Murillo filled 
the margin of his schoolbooks with drawings. Le Brun, 
in the beginning of childhood, di^ew with a piece of char- 
coal on the walls of the house. — Pleasures^ ^-c, of Litera- 
ture^ 12mo, Lond., 1851, pp. 27, 28. 

Sharp, Dissertation on Genius. Lond., 1755. 

Duff, Essays on Original Genius. Lond., 1767. 

Gerard, Essay on Genius. Lond., 1774. 

Lcelius and Hortensia^ or Thoughts on the Nature and 
Objects of Taste and Genius. Edin., 1782. 

Beattie, Dissertations. Of Imagination^ chap. 3, -Ito, 
Lond., 1783. 
OENUINJE.— F. Authentic. 

OENUS is "a predicable which is considered as the material 
part of the species of which it is affirmed." — Whately, Logic ^ 
b. ii., ch. 5, sect 3. It is either summum or subalternum, 
that is, having no genus above it, as heing^ or having an- 
other genus above it, as quadruped ; proximum or remotum^ 
when nothing intervenes between it and the species, as 
animal in respect of man, or when something intervenes, 
as animal in respect of a crow, for between it and crow, 
hrute and bird mtervene. A genus physicum is part of the 
species, as animal in respect of man, who has an animal 
body and a rational soul. A genus metaphysicum is iden- 
tified adequately with the species and distinguished from it 
extrinsically, as animalm respect of brute, colour in respect 
of blackness in ink. Logically the genus contains the 
species ; whereas metaphysically the species contains the 
genus; e. ^., we di\4de logically the geyius man into Euro- 
pean, Asiatic, &c., but each of the species, European, &c., 



208 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

OENUS— 

contains tlie idea of man, together with the characteristic 
difference. 

In modern classification, genus signifies '' a distinct but 
subordinate group, which gives its name as a prefix to that 
of all the species of which it is composed." 
00]>9 in Anglo-Saxon, means good. 

One of the names of the Supreme Being. The corre- 
sponding terms in Latin (Deus) and in Greek (Jdsog) were 
applied to natures superior to the human nature. With us, 
God always refers to the Supreme Being. 

That department of knowledge which treats of the being, 
perfections, and government of God^ is theology, q, v. 

" The true and genuine idea of God in general, is this — 
a perfect conscious understanding being (or mind) existing 
of itself from eternity, and the cause of all other things." — 
Cudworth, Intell. Syst.^ b. i., ch. 4, sect. 4. 

" The true and proper idea of God^ in its most contracted 
form, is this — a being absolutely perfect ; for this is that 
alone to which necessary existence is essential, and of 
which it is demonstrable." — Ihid, sect. 8. 

''I define God thus — mi essence or heing^ fully and 
absolutely perfect, I say fully and absolutely perfect, in 
contradistinction to such perfection as is not full and abso- 
lute, but the perfection of this or that species or kind of 
finite beings, suppose a lion, horse, or tree. But to be 
fully and absolutely perfect, is to be, at least, as perfect as 
the apprehension of a man can conceive without a contra- 
diction." — H. More, Antidote against Atheism^ ch. 2. 
CrOO]> (The Chief). — An inquiry into the chief good, or the 
summum honum, is an inquiry into what constitutes the 
perfection of human nature and the happiness of the human 
condition. This has been the aim of all religion and philo- 
sophy. The answers given to the question have been 
many. Yarro enumerated 288 ; August., De Civit.,]ih. 19, 
cap. 1. But they may easily be reduced to a few. The 
ends aimed at by human action, how various soever they 
may seem, may all be reduced to three, viz., pleasure, in- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 209 

oooo— 

terest, and duty. Wliat conduces to these ends we call 
good, and seek after ; what is contrary to these ends we call 
evil, and shun. But the highest of these ends is duty, and 
the chief good of man lies in the discharge of duty. By 
doing so he perfects his nature, and may at the same 
time enjoy the highest happiness. 

"Semitacerte 
Tranquilly per virtutem patet unica vitse." 

Juvenal, lib. iv., sat. 10. 

Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, 

L'Abbe Anselme, Sur le Souverain Men des anciens, 
Mem. d, VAcad. des Inscript.^ et Belles Lettres^ 1 ser., 
torn. 5. — Jouffroy, MiscelL — V, Bonum (Summum). 
C^RAHIRIAB (Universal). — This word grammar comes to us 
from the Greeks, who included under rs-)c^Yi ynufA.(A.a,Tia- 
Tty.Yi the art of writing and reading letters. But '•'-grammar,^' 
says B. Johnson (the English Grammar., c. 1), "is the art 
of true and well speaking a language ; the writing is but 
an accident." Language is the expression of thought — 
thought is the operation of mind, and hence language may 
be studied as a help to psychology. — Beid, Intell. Powers, 
essay i., chap. 5. 

Thought assumes the form of ideas or of judgments, that 
is, the object of thought is either simply apprehended or 
conceived of, or something is affirmed concerning it. 
Ideas are expressed in words, judgments by propositions ; 
so that as ideas are the elements of judgments, words are 
the elements of propositions. 

Every judgment involves the idea of a substance., of which 
some quality is affirmed or denied — so that language must 
have the substantive or noun, the adjective or quality., and 
the verb connecting or disconnecting. 

If the objects of our thoughts existed or were contem- 
plated singly, these parts of speech would be sufficient. 
But the relations between objects and the connection be- 
tween propositions, render other parts of speech necessary. 

It is because we have ideas that are general, and ideas 
p 



210 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPPIY. 

ORAMMAR— 

tliat are individual, tliat we have also nouns common and 
proper ; and it is because we have ideas of unity and plu- 
rality, that we have numbers^ singular^ dual^ and plural. 
Tenses and moods arise from dividing duration, and viewing 
things as conditional or positive. Even the order or con- 
struction of language is to be traced to the calm or im- 
passioned state of mind from which it proceeds. 

In confirmation of the connection thus indicated between 
grammar and psychology, it may be noticed that those who 
have done much for the one have also improved the other. 
Plato has given his views of language in the Cratylus^ and 
Aristotle, in his Interpretation and Analytics^ has laid the 
foundations of general grammar. And so in later times 
the most successful cultivators of mental philosophy have 
also been attentive to the theory of language. 

In Greek, the same word (T^oyog) means reason and 
language. And in Latin, reasoning is called discursus—SL 
meaning which is made English by our great poet when he 
speaks of '' large discourse of reason." In all this the 
connection between the powers of the mind and language 
is recognized. 

Montemont, Grammaire General ou Philosophie des 
Langues^ 12 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1845. 

Beattie, Dissertations^ Theory of Language^ part 2. 4to, 
Lond., 1783. 

Monboddo, On the Origin and Progress of Language^ 3 Yoh. 
ORA]V]>x:UR. — " The emotion raised by grand objects is 
awful, solemn, and serious." 

" Of all objects of contemplation, the Supreme Being is 

the most grand The emotion which this grandest 

of all objects raises in the mind is what we call devotion — 
a serious recollected temper, which inspires magnanimity, 
and disposes to the most heroic acts of virtue. 

*' The emotion produced by other objects which may be 
called grand^ though, in an inferior degree, is, in its nature 
and in its effects, similar to that of devotion. It disposes to 
seriousness, elevates the mind above its usual state to a 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 211 

GRANDEUR— 

kind of enthusiasm, and inspires magnanimity, and a con- 
tempt of what is mean 

''To me grandeur in objects seems nothing else but such 
a degree of excellence, in one kind or another, as merits 
our admiration." — Keid, Intell. Poicers^ essay viii., chap. 3. 
— F. Sublimity, Beauty", .Esthetics. 
GRATITUDE is one of the affections which have been desig- 
nated benevolent. It implies a sense of kindness done or 
intended, and a desire to return it. It is sometimes also 
characterized as a moral affection, because the party 
cherishing it has the idea that he who did or intended 
kindness to him has done right and deserves a return ; 
just as the party who has received an injury has not merely 
a sense or feeling of the wrong done, but a sense of in- 
justice in the doing of it, and the feeling or conviction that 
he who did it deserves punishment. 

See Chalmers, Sketches of Mental and Moral Philosophy^ 
chap. viii. 

Shaftesbury, Moralists^ pt. 3, lect. ii. 
OYIWENOSOPHIST (yv^uvo^^ naked; ao(l)og^ wise). — "Among 
the Indians, be certain philosophers, whom they call gymiw- 
sophists^ who from sun rising to the setting thereof are able 
to endure aU the day long, looking full against the sun, 
without winking or once moving their eyes." — Holland, 
Pliny f b. vii., c. 2. 

The Brahmins, although their religion and philosophy 
were but little known to the ancients, are alluded to by 
Cicero. Tuscul.^ lib. v., cap. 27 ; Arrian, Exped. Alexand., 
lib. vii., cap. 1. 

Colebrooke and others in modern times have explained 
the Indian philosophy. 



HAJBIT {}^ig^ habitus). — Hahit^ or state, is a constitution, 
frame, or disposition of parts, by which everything is fitted 
to act or suffer in a certain way. — ]Monboddo, Ancient 
Metaphys.^ chap. 4. By Aristotle e^ig is defined (Metaphys.^ 



212 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MAJKIT— 

lib. 5, cap. 20) to be, in one sense, the same with hiochatg^ 
or disposition. His commentators make a distinction, and 
say s^ig is more permanent. There is the same distinction 
in English between liaUt and disposition. 

Habits have been distinguished into natural and super- 
natural, or acquired and infused. Natural lialnts are those 
acquired by custom or repetition. Supernatural habits are 
such as are infused at once. They correspond to gifts or 
graces, and the consideration of them belongs to theology. 

Acquired habits are distinguished into intellectual and 
moral. From habit results power or virtue, and the 
intellectual habits or virtues are intellect, wisdom, prudence, 
science, and art. '^ These may be subservient to quite 
contrary purposes, and those who have them may exercise 
them spontaneously and agreeably in producing directly 
contrary effects. But the moral virtues, like the different 
habits of the body, are determined by their nature to one 
specific operation. Thus, a man in health acts and moves 
in a manner conformable to his healthy state of body, and 
never otherwise, when his motions are natural and volun- 
tary ; and in the same manner the habits of justice or 
temperance uniformly determine those adorned by them to 
act justly and temperately." — Aristotle, Ethic. ^ lib. v., cap. 1. 

Habits have been distinguished as active or passive. 
The determinations of the will, efforts of attention, and the 
use of our bodily organs, give birth to active habits ; the 
acts of the memory and the affections of the sensibility, to 
passive habits, 

Aristotle (Ethic. ^ lib. iii.) proves that our habits are 
voluntary, as being created by a series of voluntary actions. 
'' But, it may be asked, does it depend merely on our own 
will to correct and reform our bad habits? It certainly 
does not ; neither does it depend on the will of a patient, 
who has despised the advice of a physician, to recover that 
health which has been lost by profligacy. When we have 
thrown a stone we cannot restrain its flight ; but it depended 
entirely on ourselves whether we should throw it or not." 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 213 

HABIT— 

Actions, according to Aristotle, are voluntary throughout : 
habits only as to their beginnings. 

Thurot {De VEntendement^ torn, i., p. 138) calls ^'-Jialit 
the memory of the organs, or that which gives memorv^ to 
the organs." 

Maine de Biran, U Influence de Hahitude. 

Dutrochet, Theorie de r Hahitude. 

M. F. Eavaisson, De VHahitude, 

Butler, Analogy^ part 1, ch. 5. 

Reid, Active Poivers^ essay iii., pt. 1, ch. 3. 

Reid, Intellectual Poivers., essay iv., ch. 4. — V. Custom. 
Habit and Custom* 

"That opinion of Aristotle* seems to me to savour of 
narrowness and carelessness of view, when he asserts that 
hahit has no power over such actions as are natural ; taking 
as an illustration that, if a stone be thrown a thousand 
times into the aii', it acquires not the slightest tendency to 
ascend of its own accord ; moreover, that we see and hear 
no better by often seeing and hearing. For though this 
may hold in some cases, where nature is absolute, yet it is 
far otherwise in those cases where nature, with a certain 
degree of latitude, admits of intension and remission. He 
might surely have observed that a glove a little too tight is 
rendered looser by often putting it on the hand ; that a 
staff, by use and time, is bent quite in the opposite of its 
natural shape, and continues for a while in that state ; that 
the voice, by exercise, is rendered stronger and more dis- 
tinct ; that custom enables us to endure cold and heat : 
and several other things of the same kind. And these two 
latter instances are more analogous to the subject than 
those adduced by him. Nevertheless, the more truth there 
is in the remark that virtues and vices consist in Imhit., the 
more he should have endeavoured to lay down rules whereby 

* "None of these things, Avhich are what they are by nature, can he altered by 
being accustomed. Tlius a stone, which by nature is carried dowmvard, can never 
be accustomed to mount upward, no, not though anyone should ten thousand times 
attempt it, by throwing the stone upward. The same may be said of accustominc 
lire to move downward.' —^^^tc, lib. ii., c. 1. 



214 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

HABIT— 

hahits of this kind migiit be acquired or got rid of; for 
several precepts can be given for the wise regulation of 
the exercises of the mind as well as of the body. We shall 
enumerate a few of them. 

''The first is, that we should, from the very commence- 
ment, be on our guard against tasks of too difficult or too 
easy a nature ; for, if too great a burden be imposed, in the 
diffident temper you will check the buoyancy of hope, in 
the self-confident temper you will excite an opinion whereby 
it will promise itself more than it can accomplish, the con- 
sequence of which will be sloth. But in both dispositions 
it will happen that the trial will not answer the expectation, 
a circumstance which always depresses and confounds the 
mind. But if the tasks be of too trivial a kind there will 
be a serious loss on the total progress. 

''The second is, that in order to the exercise of any faculty 
for the acquirement of Tiahit^ two particular times should be 
carefully observed : the one when the mind is best disposed, 
the other, when worst disposed to the matter ; so that, by 
the former, we may make most progress on our way ; by 
the latter we may, by laborious effi^rt, wear out the knots 
and obstructions of the mind, by which means the inter- 
mediate times shaU pass on easily and smoothly. 

" The third precept is that of which Aristotle makes inci- 
dental mention : — ' That we should, ivith all our strength 
(yet not running into a faulty excess), struggle to the 
opposite of that to which we are by nature most inclined ;' 
as when we row against the current, or bend into an oppo- 
site direction a crooked stafi*, in order to straighten it. 

" The fourth precept depends on a general law, of un- 
doubted truth, namely, that the mind is led on to anything 
more successfully and agreeably, if that at which we aim be 
not the chief object in the agent's design, but is accom- 
plished, as it were, by doing something else ; since the bias 
of our nature is such, that it usually dislikes constraint and 
rigorous authority. There are several other rules which 
may be given with advantage on the government of liaMt ; 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 215 

IS ABIT— 

for liabit^ if wisely and skilfully formed, becomes truly a 
second nature (as the common saying is) ; but unskilfully 
and unmethodically directed, it will be, as it were, tlie ape 
of nature, which imitates nothing to the life, but only 
clumsily and awkwardly." 

Bacon, On[Advancement of Learning.^ book vli., translated 
in MofFet's Selections^ Dubl, 1847. 
MAPPINESS — '4s not, I think, the most appropriate term for 
a state, the perfection of which consists in the exclusion of 
all hap, that is, chance. 

"Felicity in its proper sense, is but another word for for- 
tunateness, or happiness ; and I can see no advantage in 
the improper use of words, when proper terms are to be 
found, but on the contrary, much mischief." — Coleridge, 
Aids to Reflection^ vol. i., pp. 31-2. 

The Greeks called the sum total of the pleasure which is 
allotted or happens to a man evrvxioc^ that is, good hap; or, 
more religiously, svloti/^covioc^ that is, favourable providence. 
—Ibid. 

To live well and to act well is s}Tionynious with being 
happy. — Aristotle-, Ethic, ^ lib. i., c. 4. 

Happiness is never d ^sired but for its own sake only. 
Honour, pleasure, intelligence, and every virtue are desir- 
able on their own account, but they are also desirable as 
means towards happiness. But happiness is never desired 
as a means, because it is complete and all-sufficient in itself. 

'' Happiness is the object of human action in its most 
general form, as including all other objects, and approved 
by reason. As pleasure is the aim of mere desire, and 
interest the aim of prudence, so happiness is the aim of 
wisdom. Happiness is conceived as necessarily an ultimate 
object of action. To be happy, includes or supersedes all 
other gratifications. If we are happy, we do not miss that 
which we have not ; if we are not happy, we want some- 
thing more, whatever we have. The desire of happiness 
is the supreme desire. All other desires of pleasure, 
wealth, power, fame, are included in this, and are subor- 



2^6 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

HAPPINESS— 

dinate to it. We may make other objects our ultimate 
objects ; but we can do so only by identifying them with 
this. Happiness is our being's end and aim. 

'^ Since happiness is necessarily the supreme object of our 
desires, and duty the supreme rule of our actions, there can 
be no harmony in our being, except our happiness coincide 
with our duty. That which we contemplate as the ultimate 
and universal object of desire, must be identical with that 
which we contemplate as the ultimate and supreme guide 
of our intentions. As moral beings, our happiness must 
be found in our moral progTCss, and in the consequences of 
our moral progress we must be happy by being virtuous." 
— Whewell, Morality^ ISTos. 544, 545. 

See Aristotle, Ethic. ^ lib. i. 

Harris, Dialogue on Happiness, — V. Good (Chief). 
HARinONY (Pre-established)— When an impression is made 
on a bodily organ by an external object, the mind becomes 
percipient. When a volition is framed by the will, the 
bodily organs are ready to execute it. How is this brought 
about? The doctrine of a pre- established harmony has 
reference to this question, and may be thus stated. 

Before creating the mind and the body of man, God 
had a perfect knowledge of all possible minds and of all 
possible bodies. Among this infinite variety of minds and 
bodies, it was impossible but that there should come 
together a mind the sequence of whose ideas and volitions 
should correspond with the movements of some body : for, 
in an infinite number of possible minds and possible bodies, 
every combination or union was possible. Let us, then, 
suppose a mind, the order and succession of whose modifi- 
cations corresponded with the series of movements to take 
place In some body, God would unite the two and make of 
them a living soul, a man. Here, then, Is the most perfect 
harmony between the two parts of which man is composed. 
There is no commerce nor communication, no action and 
reaction. The mind is an independent force, which passes 
from one volition or perception to another, In conformity 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 217 

HARITIOIVY— 

with its own nature ; and would have done so although the 
body had not existed. The body, in hke manner, by yirtue 
of its own inherent force, and by the single unpression of 
external objects, goes through a series of moyements ; and 
would have done so although it had not been united to a 
rational soul. But the moTements of the body and the 
modifications of the mind correspond to each other. In 
short, the mind is a spiritual automaton, and the body is 
a material automaton. Like two pieces of clock-work, 
they are so regulated as to mark the same time ; but the 
spring which moves the one is not the spring which moves 
the other : yet they go exactly together. The harmony be- 
tween them existed before the mind was imited to the body. 
Hence this is called the doctrine oi pre-established fiarmony. 

It may be called correspondence or parallelism^ but not 
harmony between mind and body — for there is no unity 
superior to both, and containing both, which is the cause 
of theh^ mutual penetration. In decomposing human per- 
sonahty into two substances,* from eternity abandoned 
each to its proper impulse, which acknowledges no superior 
law in man to direct and control them, liberty is destroyed. 
— Tiberghien, Essai des Connais. Hum.^ p. 394. 

The doctrine of pre-estahlished harmony differs from that 
of occasional causes "only in this respect, that by the 
former the accordance of the mental and the bodily pheno- 
mena was supposed to be pre-arranged, once for aU, by the 
Divine Power, while by the latter their harmony was sup- 
posed to be brought about by His constant interposition.'' — 
V. Causes (Occasional). 

This doctrine was first advocated by Leibnitz in his 
Theodicee and Monadologie. 

Wolfius, Psycologia Rationalis^ sect. 614-15-17, &c. 
HAR:?I0NY (of the Spheres). — The ancient philosophers sup- 
posed that the regular movements of the heavenly bodie> 
throughout space formed a kind of harmony^ which they 
called the harmony of the spheres. 

* Soul and body, however, constitute one suppoiiiam or person. 



218 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOrHY. 

HATREO.— F. Love. 

lIx:i>ONlSlfI (ilouY}^ pleasure) — is the doctrine that the chief 
good of man lies in the pursuit of pleasure. This was the 
doctrine of Aristippus and the Cyrenaic school. 

MERPriETIC PHIIiOSOPHY.— A system of mystical philo- 
sophy ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus or Mercury, and 
contained in a book or books ascribed to him. — Plato, 
PMllhus. 

Hor., ode 10, lib. i. Hesiod, TJieog.^ v. q. 37. 
Lenglet du Fresnoy, HisL de la Philosoph. Hermetique^ 
3 torn., 12mo, Paris, 1742. 

HYI.0Z01SM (" i> A >7, matter; and ^6^/), life). — The doctrine that 
life and matter are inseparable. This doctrine has been 
held under different forms. Straton of Lampsacus held that 
the ultimate particles of matter were each and all of them 
possessed of life. The Stoics, on the other hand, while 
they did not accord activity or life to every distinct 
particle of matter, held that the universe, as a whole, was 
a being animated by a principle which gave to it motion, 
form, and life. This doctrine appeared among the followers 
of Plotinus, who held that the soul of the universe animated 
the least particle of matter. Spinoza asserted that all 
things were alive in different degrees. Omnia quamvis 
diversis gradihus animata tamen sunt. 

Under all these forms of the doctrine there is a confound- 
ing of life with force. Matter, according to Leibnitz and 
Boscovich, and others, is always endowed with force. Even 
the vis inertice ascribed to it is a force. Attraction and 
repulsion, and chemical affinity, all indicate activity in 
matter ; but life is a force always connected with organiza- 
tion, which much of matter wants. Spontaneous motion, 
growth, nutrition, separation of parts, generation, are 
phenomena which indicate the presence of life ; which is 
obviously not co- extensive with matter. 

HYPOSTASIS.— F. SUBSISTENTIA. 

MYPOTMESIS (^'vTro^sffig^ suppositio, supposition). — In Logic 
Aristotle gave the name dsatg to every proposition 
which, without being an axiom, served as the basis of 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 219 

HYPOTHESIS— 

demonstration, and did not require to be demonstrated 
itself. He distinguished two kinds of thesis, the one which 
expressed the essence of a thing, and the other which ex- 
pressed its existence or non-existence. The first is the 
opiai^og or definition — the second, the v'lro&eutg. ''What is 
capable of proof, but assumed without proof, il believed by 
the learner, is, relatively to the learner, though not abso- 
lutely, an hypothesis ; if the learner has no behef or a dis- 
belief, it is a petition or postulate." — Poster. Analyt.^ lib. 
ii., cap. 10. 

^Vhen a phenomenon that is new to us cannot be 
explained by any known cause, we are uneasy and try 
to reconcile it to unity by assigning it ad interim to some 
cause which may appear to explain it. Before framing 
an hypothesis^ we must see first that the phenomenon reaUy 
exists. Prove ghosts before explaining them. Put the 
question an sit ? before cur sit ? Second^ that the pheno- 
menon cannot be explained by any known cause. When 
the necessity of an hypothesis has been admitted, a good 
hypothesis — First.^ should contain nothing contradictory be- 
tween its own constituent parts or other established truths. 
The Wernerians suppose water once to have held in solu- 
tion bodies which it cannot now dissolve. The Huttonians 
ascribe no effect to fire but what it can now produce. 
Second^ it should fully explain the phenomenon. The Coper- 
nican system is more satisfactory than that of Tycho Brahe. 
Third., it should simply explain the phenomenon, that is, 
should not depend upon any other hypothesis to help it out. 
The Copernican system is more simple. It needs only 
gravitation to carry it out — that of Tycho Brahe depends 
on several things. 

This word is not used by Aristotle in the sense which 
is now assigned to it. With him, vTroQsaig is a proposition, 
the truth of which is affirmed, and which serves as the 
basis of science ; a basis not arbitrary, but legitimate, not 
imaginary, but real. Hypothesis and definition are the two 
phases under which the diaig presents itself. The thesis is 



220 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

HYPOTHESIS— 

the principle proper to each particular science. — Aristotle's 
Metaphysics^ by Pierron and Zevost, torn, i., p. 200, note. 

By hypothesis is now understood the supposing of some- 
thing, the existence of which is not proved, as a cause to 
explain phenomena which have been observed. It thus 
differs in signification from theory, which explains pheno- 
mena by causes which are known to exist and to operate. 
'* Hypothesis^'''' says Dr. Gregory (Lectures on Duties and 
Qualifications of a Physician)^ '4s commonly confounded with 
theory ; but a hypothesis properly means the supposition of 
a principle, of whose existence there is no proof from experi- 
ence, but which may be rendered more or less probable by 
facts which are neither numerous enough nor adequate to 
infer its existence." 

'' In some instances," says Boscovich {De Solis ac Lunce 
Defectibus, Lond., 1776, pp. 211, 212), '' observations and 
experiments at once reveal to us all we know. In other 
cases, we avail ourselves of the aid of hypothesis ; by which 
word^ however^ is to he understood^ not fictions altogether 
arbitrary^ hut suppositions conformahle to experience or 
analogy. '''' ''This," says Dr. Brown, "is the right use of 
hypothesis — not to supersede, but to direct investigation — 
not as telling us what we are to believe, but as pointing 
out to us what we are to ascertain." And it has been said 
{Pursuit of Knowledge., vol. ii., p. 255, weekly vol., No. 
31), that "the history of all discoveries that have been 
arrived at, by what can with any propriety be called philo- 
sophical investigation and induction, attests the necessity 
of the experimenter proceeding in the institution and man- 
agement of his experiments upon a previous idea of the 
truth to be evolved. This previous idea is what is properly 
called an hypothesis., which means something placed under 
as a foundation or platform on which to institute and carry 
on the process of investigation." 

DilFerent opinions have been held as to the use of hypo- 
theses in philosophy. The sum of the matter seems to be, 
that hypotheses are admissible and may be useful as a means 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 221 

H YPOTHE SIS— 

of stimulating, extending, and directing inquiry. But they 
ought not to be hastily framed, nor fondly upheld in the 
absence of support from facts. They are not to be set up 
as barriers or stopping places in the path of knowledge, 
but as way-posts to guide us in the road of observation, 
and to cheer us with the prospect of speedily arriving at a 
resting place — at another stage in our journey towards 
truth. They are to be given only as provisional explana- 
tions of the phenomena, and are to be cheerfully abandoned 
the moment that a more full and satisfactory explanation 
presents itself. — Eeid, Intell. Powers^ essay i., chap. 3. 



I.— F. Ego, Subject. 

I[I>]EA (Jlio.^ hlog^ forma^ species^ image). — "Plato agreed 

with the rest of the ancient philosophers in this — that all 

things consist of matter and form ; and that the matter of 

which all things were made, existed from eternity, without 

form ; but he likewise believed that there are eternal forms 

of all possible things which exist, without matter ; and to 

those eternal and immaterial forms he gave the name of ideas. 

" In the Platonic sense, then, ideas were the patterns 

according to which the Deity fashioned the phenomenal or 

ectypal world." — Sir William Hamilton. 

The word is used in this sense by Milton when he says, — 

" God saw his works were good, 
Answering his fair idea.'" 

And by Spenser in the following passage : — 

' What time this world's great workmaister did cast, 
To make all things such as we now behold, 
It seems that He before his eyes had plast 
A goodly patterne, to whose perfect mould 
He fashioned them as comely as he could. 
That now so fair and seemly they appear, 
As naught may be amended anywhere. 

That wondrous pattcrae, wheresoe'er it be, 
Whether in earth, laid up in secret store, 
Or else in heaven, that no man may it see 
With sinful eyes, for fear it to deflore, 
Is perfect beauty." 



222 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IDEA— 

We are accustomed to say tliat an artificer contemplat- 
ing the idea of anything, as of a chair or bed, makes a 
chair or bed. But he does not make the idea of them. 
^' These forms of things," said Cicero {Orat.^ c. 3), ''Plato 
called ideas^ and denied that they were born, but were 
always contained in reason and intelligence." — Heusde, Init. 
Philosoph. Platon.^ torn, ii., pars, 3. 

'' Idea is a bodiless substance, which of itself hath no 
subsistence, but giveth form and figure to shapeless matter, 
and becometh the cause that bringeth them into show and 
evidence. Socrates and Plato supposed that these be sub- 
stances separate and distinct fi:'om matter, howbeit subsist- 
ing in the thoughts and imagination of God, that is to say, 
of mind and understanding. Aristotle admitteth verily 
these forms and ideas ^ howbeit not separate from matter, 
as being patterns of all that God hath made. The Stoics, 
such at least as were of the school of Zeno, have delivered 
that our thoughts and conceits are the ideas ^ — Plutarch, 
Opinions of PhilosopJiers^ ch. 10, fol. 666 of the translation 
by Holland. 

^^ Idece sunt principales form^ qu^dam, vel rationes 
rerum stabiles, atque incommutabiles, quge ips« formatse 
non sunt, ac per hoc geternae ac semper eodem modo sese 
habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur : et cum 
ipsae neque oriantur, neque intereant ; secundum eas tamen 
formari dicitur, quicquid oriri et interire potest, et omne 
quod oritur et interit." — Augustine, lib. Ixxxiii., 99, 46. 

"Tu cnncta superno 
Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulclierimus ipse 
Mundum mente gerens, similique imagine formans." — 

Boeth., De Con sol., 9. 
Tiberghien (Essai des Connaiss. Hum.., p, 207), has 
said, — " Seneca considered ideas., according to Plato, as 
the eternal exemplars of things, Cicero as their form., 
Diogenes Laertius as their cause and principle., Aris- 
totle as substances; and in the middle ages and in our 
day they are general notions^ in opposition to particular 
or individual notions. The ideas of Plato embrace all 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 'I'lV) 

these meanings. The terms which he employs are /'oga 
and li}iog to designate the Divine image, the ideal model 
or type {rvTroq) of all things and beings. He also calls 
them nra^ot^iLy^a.roL^ oitTioti, u^x^h ^0 denote that these 
eternal exemplars are the principle and cause of the existence 
and development of all that is in nature. They are also 
the thoughts of God (^voYif/.ocTot)^ who has produced all things 
according to the type of these ideas. And the terms iuocoig, 
fcovulsg^ indicate the affinity between the theory of Plato 
and the numbers of Pythagoras." 

In another passage {Essai des Connais. Hum.^ pp. 33, 
34) ^the same author has said, that, '' according to the 
Platonic sense, adopted by Kant and Cousin, ideas 
are as it were the essence and matter of our intelligence. 
They are not as such, a product or result of intelligence, 
they are its primitive elements, and at the same time 
the immediate object of its activity. . . . They are 
the primary anticipations which the mind brings to all 
its cognitions, the principles and laws by reason of which it 
conceives of beings and things. The mind does not create 
ideas^ it creates by means of ideas. . . . There are two 
great classes of ideas — 1. Those which are related in some 
sense to experience ; as the principles of mathematics, 
notions of figure, magTiitude, extension, number, time, and 
space. 2. Those which are completely independent of all 
sensible representation, as the ideas of good and evil, just 
and unjust, true or false, fair or deformed." — p. 208. — F. 

l^OTION. 

According to Plato, ideas were the only objects of 
science or true knowledge. Things created being in a 
state of continual flux, there can be no real knowledge 
with respect to them. But the divine ideas bemg eternal 
and unchangeable, are objects of science properly so called. 
According to Aristotle and the Peripatetics, knowledge, 
instead of originating or consisting in the contemplation of 
the eternal ideas^ types, or forms, according to which all 
things were created, originated, and consisted in the con- 



/ 



224 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

I1>EA— 

templation of the things created, and in the thoughts and 

the operations of mind to which that contemplation gives rise. 

But as external things cannot themselves be in the mind, 

they are made known to it by means of species^ images^ or 

phantasms (q. v.) ; so that, in perception, we are not directly 

cognizant of the object, but only of a representation of it. 

In like manner, in imagination, memory, and the operations 

of intellect, what is directly present to the mind is not the 

^^^real object of thought, but a representation of it. 

/'' Instead of employing the various terms image^ species, 

phantasm^ &c., of the Peripatetic philosophy, Descartes 

adopted the term idea^ which till his time had been all but 

exclusively employed in its Platonic sense. 

^ By Descartes and subsequent philosophers the term idea 

was employed to signify all our mental representations, all 

the notions which the mind frames of things. And this, in 

contradistinction to the Platonic, may be called the modem 

use of the word. ]\Ir, Locke, for example, who uses the 

word idea so frequently, as to think it necessary to make 

i an apology for doing so, says — '' It is the term which, I 

I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of 

I the understanding, when a man thinks : I have used it to 

I express whatever is meant by phantasm^ notion^ species^ or 

5^r... \ whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in 

% thinking." 

Against this modern use of the word idea^ more espe- 
cially in reference to the doctrine of perception (q. v.), Dr. 
Eeid most vehemently protested. — ' '- Modern philosophers, '' 
' said he (IntelL Powers^ essay i., ch. 1), '' as weU as the Peri- 
I patetics and Epicureans of old, have conceived that external 
I objects cannot be the immediate objects of our thoughts : 
I that there must be some image of them in the mind itself; 
1 in which, as in a mirror, they are seen. And the name 
I idea^ in the philosophical sense of it, is given to those 
internal and immediate objects of our thoughts. The 
external thing is the remote or mediate object; but the 
Idea^ or image of that object in the mind, is the immediate 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. >^.) 

I]>EA— 

object, without wHch we would have no perception, no 
remembrance, no conception of the mediate object. 

'• When, therefore, in common language, we speak of 
having an idea of anything, we mean no more by that ex- 
pression than thinking of it. The vulgar allow that this 
expression implies a mind that thinks, an act of that mind 
which we call thinking, and an object about which we 
think. But besides these three, the philosopher conceives 
that there is a fourth; to wit, the idea which is the imme- 
diate object. The idea is in the mind itself, and can have 
no existence but in a mind that thinks ; but the remote or 
mediate object may be something external, as the sun or 
moon ; it may be somethiug past or future ; it may be 
something which never existed. This is the philosophical 
meaniug of the word idea : and we may observe that this 
meaniag of the word is btiilt upon a philosophical opioion : 
for if philosophers had not believed that there are such 
inmiediate objects of all our thoughts in the mind, they 
would never have used the word idea to express them. 

'•' I shall only add that, although I may have occasion to 
use the word idea in this philosophical sense in explaiuing 
the opiuions of others, I shall have no occasion to use it m 
expressing my own, because I believe ideas^ taken iu this 
sense, to be a mere fiction of philosophers. And in the 
popular meaning of the word, there is the less occasion to 
use it, because the English words thought^ notion^ appre- 
hension, answer the purpose as well as the Greek word idea : 
with this advantage, that they are less ambiguous." 

Xow it may be doubted whether ui this passage Dr. 
Eeid has correctly understood and explained the meaning 
of the word idea as employed by all modem philosophers, 
from the time of Descartes. 

Dr. Reid takes idea to mean something iaterposed be- 
tween the mind and the object of its thought — a tertium 
quid, or a quartum qtiid^ an independent entity different 
irom the mind and from the object thought of. Xow this 
has been the opinion both of ancient and modem philosc- 
Q 



226 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

II>EA— 

phers ; but it is not the opinion of all. There are many, 
especially among modern philosophers, who, by the idea of 
a tiling^ mean the thing itself in the mind as an object of 
thought. Even when the object thought of is represented 
to the mind, the representation is a modification of the 
mind itself, and the act of representing and the act of 
knowing the object thought of, are one and the same ; the 
representation and cognition are indivisible. But Dr. 
Reid does not admit that any of our knowledge is repre- 
sentative. He had such a horror of the doctrine of ideas^ 
as meaning something interposed between the mind and 
the objects of its knowledge, that he calls all our know- 
ledge immediate. Thus he speaks of an immediate know- 
ledge of things past, and of an immediate knowledge of 
things future. Now all knowledge is present knowledge, 
that is, it is only knowledge when we have it. But all 
knowledge is not immediate knowledge. Things that are 
past are not actually present to the mind when we remem- 
ber them. Things that are future are not actually present 
when we anticipate them, for they have as yet no actual 
existence. But the mind frames to itself a representation 
of these things as they have been, or as they will be, and 
in thus representing them has knowledge of them. This 
knowledge, however, cannot be called immediate. In 
memory there is the faculty, and there is the object of the 
faculty or the thing remembered. But the object or the 
thing remembered is not actually present to the faculty. 
It is reproduced or represented, and in representing the 
object to the faculty we have knowledge of it as a past 
reality. Memory, therefore, may be called a representa- 
tive faculty. ISTow, in perception, where the object of the 
faculty is also present, it may not be necessary for the 
mind to frame to itself any representation or image of the 
external reality. The faculty and its object are in direct 
contact, and the knowledge or perception is the immediate 
result. This is the doctrine of Dr. Reid, and if he had 
acknowledged the distinction, he might have called per- 



I 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 227 

IDEA— 

ception a presentative faculty, as memory is a representative 
faculty.* According to other philosophers, however, there 
is a representation even in perception. The external 
reality is not in the mind. The mind merely frames to 
itself a representation or image of what the external reality 
is, and in this way has knowledge of it. But this represen- 
tation or image is not something interposed or different 
from the mind and the external object. It is a modification 
of the mind itself. It is the external object in the mind 
as an object of thought. It is the idea of the external 
reality. This is a theory of perception which Dr. Reid did 
not clearly distinguish ; but it is at variance with his own, 
and, if he had distinctly apprehended it, he would have 
condemned it. In like manner he would have condemned 
the use of the word idea to denote a representative image, 
even although that representation was held to be merely a 
modification of mmd. But this is the sense in which the 
term idea is used by Descartes, and other philosophers, in 
reference to the doctrine of perception. In a general sense 
it means an}i:liing present to the mind, whether reaUy or 
representatively, as an object of thought, f 

Ideas^ regarded according to the nature and diversity of 
their objects, are sensible^ intellectual^ or moral; according 
to the essential characters of these objects, they are neces- 
sary and absolute^ or contingent and relative ; according to 
the aspect in which they represent things, they are simple 
or compound^ abstract or concrete^ individual or general, 
partitive or collective ; according to their origin or forma- 
tion, they are adventitious^ factitious^ or innate ; according 
to their quality or fidehty, they are true or false^ real or 

* See ReicTs Works, edited by Sir WiU. Hamilton; Note B, Of Presentative and 
Representative Knowledge; and Note C, Of the Various Theories of External Per- 
ception. 

t Dr. Currie once, upon being bored by a foolish blue, to tell her the precise 
meaning of the word idea (which she said she had been reading about in some 
metaphysical work, but could not understand), answered, at last, angrily, ''Idea, 
madam, is the feminine of idioty and means a female fool."— Moore, Diary, vol. iv., 
p. 38. 



228 VOCABULAHY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IDEA— 

imaginary^ clear or obscure, distinct or confused, complete 
or incomplete, adequate or inadequate. 

As to the origin of our ideas, the opinions of metaphy- 
sicians may be divided into three classes. 1. Those who 
deny the senses to be anything more than instruments con- 
veying objects to the mind, perception being active, (Plato 
and others). 2. Those who attribute all our ideas to 
sense, (Hobbes, Gassendi, Condillac, the ancient Sophists). 
3. Those who admit that the earliest notions proceed from 
the senses, yet maintain that they are not adequate to pro- 
duce the whole knowledge possessed by the human under- 
standing, (Aristotle, Locke). — Dr. Mill, Essays, 314, 321. — 
V, Innate. 

See Trendlenburg, De Ideis Platonis. 

Richter, De Ideis Platonis. 

Sir William Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy. 

Eeid^s Works, edited by Sir William Hamilton. 

Dugald Stewart, Philosoph, Essays, appendix ii. 

Adam Smith, Essays on Philosoph. Subjects, p. 119, note. 
II>x:AIi. — ''Though ideas are widely separated from sensible 
reality, there is something, if possible, still more widely 
separated, and that is the ideal. A few examples will 
enable you to comprehend the difference between ideas 
and the ideal : Perfection is an idea ; humanity in all its 
perfection is an ideal; human virtue and wisdom in all 
their purity are ideas ; the wisdom of the Stoics is an ideal. 
The ideal, then, is the intellectual existence of a thing 
which has no other characters than those determined by 
the idea itself. The idea, thus individualized, so to speak, 
serves as the rule of our actions ; it is a model, which we 
may approach in a greater or lesser degree, but from which 
we are nevertheless infinitely distant. We compare, for 
example, our conduct with the dictates of the monitor, 
that exists within us. We all judge and correct ourselves 
with reference to this ideal, without the power of ever 
attaining to its perfection. These ideas, though destitute 
of any objective reality, cannot be regarded as purely 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 229 

cMmencal. They furnish a unit of measure to the reason, 
which requires a conception of what is perfect in each kind, 
in order to appreciate and measure the various degrees of 
imperfection. But would you realize the ideal in experi- 
ence as the hero of a romance ? It is impossible, and is, 
besides, a senseless and useless enterprise ; for the imper- 
fection of our nature, which ever belies the perfection of 
the idea, renders all illusion impossible, and makes the 
good itself, as contemplated in the idea, resemble a fiction." 
— Henderson, The Philosopliy of Kant^ p. 119. 

'' We call attention" says Cousin (Ow the Beautiful)^ ''to 
two words which continually recur in this discussion — they 
are, on the one hand, nature or experience ; on the other, 
ideal. Experience is individual or collective ; but the col- 
lective is resolved into the individual ; the ideal is opposed 
to the individual and to collectiveness : it appears as an origi- 
nal conception of the mind. Nature or experience gives 
me the occasion for conceiving the ideal^ but the ideal is 
something entirely different from experience or nature ; so 
that, if we apply it to natural, or even to artificial figures, 
they cannot fiU up the condition of the ideal conception, 
and we are obliged to imagine them exact. The word 
ideal corresponds to an absolute and independent idea, and 
not to a collective one." 

" By ideal I understand the idea, not in concreto but in 
individuo^ as an individual thing, determinable or determined 
hj the idea alone. What I have termed an ideal, was in 
Plato's philosophy an idea of the divine mind — an individual 
object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of 
every kind of possible beings, and the archet}^e of aU 
phenomenal existences." — Meiklejohn, Translation of 
Kanfs Criticism of Pure Reason^ p. 351. 

''I should dread to disfigure the beautiful ideal of the 
memories of illustrious persons with incongruous featiu-es, 
and to sully the imaginative purity of classical works Tvdth 
gross and trivial recollections." — Wordsworth, Letter on 
Burns, 



230 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

When the word ideal is used as a noun and qualified by 
the adjective heau^ its sense is critical or aesthetic, and has 
reference to the fine arts, especially to statuary and paint- 
ing. '^ The common notion of the ideal as exemplified 
more especially in the painting of the last century, de- 
grades it into a mere abstraction. It was assumed that 
to raise an object into an ideal^ you must get rid of every- 
thing individual about it. Whereas the true ideal is the 
individual freed from everything that is not individual in 
it, with all its parts pervaded, and animated, and harmon- 
ized by the spirit of life which flows from the centre." — 
Guesses at Truth^ second series, p. 218. 

The ideal is to be attained by selecting and assembling 
in one whole the beauties and perfections which are usually 
seen in different individuals, excluding everything defec- 
tive or unseemly, so as to form a type or model of the 
species. Thus, the Apollo Belvedere is the ideal of the 
beauty and proportion of the human frame ; the Farnese 
Hercules is the type of manly strength. The ideal can 
only be attained by following nature. There must be no 
elements nor combinations but such as nature exhibits ; 
but the elements of beauty and perfection must be disen- 
gaged from individuals, and embodied in one faultless 
whole. This is the empirical account of the ideal. 

According to Cicero (Orator.^ c. 2, 3), there is nothing 
of any kind so fair that there may not be a fairer conceived 
by the mind. "We can conceive of statues more perfect 
than those of Phidias. Nor did that artist, when he made 
the statue of Jupiter or Minerva, contemplate any one in- 
dividual from which to take a likeness ; but there was in 
his mind a form of beauty, gazing on which he guided his 
hand and skill in imitation of it." In the philosophy of 
Plato this form was called 'Trxpochiy/u.cc. Seneca (Eplst.^ 
Iviii., sect. 15-18) takes the distinction between ilix and 
'^ |/^Qf? thus : — when a painter paints a likeness, the original 

is his /^£ot— the likeness is the iihog or image. The iiho$ is 
in the work — the Hi ex. is out of the work and before the 



VOCABXn.ARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 231 

I1>EAI.— 

work. This distinction is commended by Hensde (^Init. PJiilo- 
soph. Platon.^ vol. 2, pars 3, p. 105). And he refers to Cicero 
{De Invent.^ ii., 1), who states that Zeuxis had five of the 
most beautiful women of Crotona, as models, from which to 
make up his picture of a perfect beauty, as illustrating the 
Platonic sense of nzoLo^^nyu.oL or the ideal. According to 
this view, the tean ideal is a t^-pe of h^-pothetical perfection 
contemplated by the mind, but which may never have been 
realized, how nearly soever it may have been approached 
in the shape of an actual specimen. 
iDEAliiSJl is the doctrine that in external perceptions the 
objects immediately known are ideas. It has been held 
under various forms. — See Sir W. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ 
note C ; Berkeley, Works; Sir W. Drummond, Academic 
Questions; Reid, Inquiry. 

Some of the phases of modern idealism among the Ger- 
mans, may be seen in the following passage from Lewes, 
Biograpli. Hist, of Pfdlosopli.. vol. iv., p. 209 : — '* I see a 
tree. The common psychologists tell me that there are 
three things implied in this one fact of vision, viz. : a tree, 
an image of that tree, and a mind which apprehends that 
image. Fichte tells me that it is I alone who exist. The 
tree and the image of it are one thing, and that is a modi- 
fication of my mind. This is sithjective idealism. Schelling 
tells me that both the tree andmy ego (or self), are exis- 
tences equally real or ideal ; but they are nothing less than 
manifestations of the absolute, the infinite, or unconditioned. 
This is objective idealism. But Hegel tells me that all these 
explanations are false. The only thiiig really existing (in 
this one fact of vision) is the idea, the relation. The ego 
and the tree are but two terms of the relation, and owe 
their reality to it. This is absolute idealism. According to 
this there is neither mind nor matter, heaven nor earth. 
God nor man. — V, Xihilism. The only real existences 
are certain ideas or relations. Ever%-thing else that has 
name or being derives its name and being from its consti- 
tuting one or other of the two related terms, subject and 



232 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

object; but tbe only tbing tbat is true or real is tbe identity 
of tbeir contradiction, tbat is, tbe relation itself." 

Tbe doctrine opposed to idealism is realism^ q. v. See 
also Perception. 

II>x:AlilST. — " In England, tbe word idealist is most commonly 
restricted to sucb as (witb Berkeley) reject tbe existence of a 
material world. Of late its meaning bas been sometimes ex- 
tended (particularly since tbe publication of Reid) to all tbose 
wbo retain tbe tbeory of Descartes and Locke, concerning 
tbe immediate objects of our perceptions and tbougbts, 
wbetber tbey admit or reject tbe consequences deduced 
from tbis tbeory by tbe Berkeleian. In tbe present state 
of tbe science, it would contribute mucb to tbe distinctness 
of our reasonings were it to be used in tbis last sense exclu- 
siyely." — Stewart, Dissert.^ part ii., 166, note. 

rDENTlCAli PROPOSITION.— ''It is Locke, I believe, wbo 
introduced, or at least gave currency to tbe expression 
identical proposition^ in pbilosopbic language. It signifies 
a judgment, a proposition, in wbicb an idea is affirmed by 
itself, or in wbicb we affirm of a tbing wbat we already 
know of it." — Cousin, Hist, of Mod. Philosoph.., lect. xxiv, 
Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book iv., cbap. 8, 
sect. 3. 

A proposition is called identical wbenever tbe attribute 
is contained in tbe subject, so tbat tbe subject cannot be 
conceived as not containing tbe attribute. Tbus, wben you 
say body is solid, I say tbat you make an identical proposi- 
tion.^ because it is impossible to bave tbe idea of body 
witbout tbat of solidity. 

II>ENTlSTri or IDENTITY (idem^ tbe same) — or tbe doctrine 
of absolute identity, teacbes tbat tbe two elements of 
tbougbt, objective and subjective, are absolutely one ; tbat 
matter and mind are opposite poles of tbe same infinite 
substance ; and tbat creation and tbe Creator are one. 
Tbis is tbe pbilosopby of Scbelling. It coincides ultimately 
witb Pantheism.^ q. v. 

" If tbe doctrine of identity means anytbing, it means 



I 



TOCAEULAEY OF PHIJLOSOPHY. 233 

ihiii rh.uiiht and being are essentiaQy one : tliat the process 
of thinking is Yirtuallj the same as the process of creating: 
that in constructing the universe by logical deduction, we 
do Tirtoallj the same thing as Deitj accomplished in de- 
^ eloping himself in all the forms and regions of creation : 
:iiat everY man's reason, therefore, is really God ; in line, 
that Deity is the whole siun of consciousness immanent in 
theworkU' — Morell. Hi.st. of Philosoph.^ yoI. ii., p. 127. 
iDEXTlTY lie - - :: vness. Unity is opposed to division, 
■ ■ - ' - 1 r:::: ::: vii. A thing is one when it is not divided 
i:;: : tl- A :hing is the .:?am^ when it is not distingiiish- 
: ; : : r - l::aer it be divided from them or not. 

- : r ii^ibleness of a thing in itself. Identitg 
/ -- . — : a thing from itself, or from that 
./._ _..._ i: 1^ s„:a :: be the same. It is unity with per- 
sistence and continuity ; unity perceived even in plurality: 
in multiplicity and succession, ui diversity and change. It 
is the essential characteristic of all substance or being, that 
it is one and endmres. 

Unorganized matter may be said to have identity in the 
persistence of the parts or molecides of which it consists. 
Organized bodies have identity so long as organization and 
lite remain. An oak, which from a small plant becomes a 
great tree, is still the same tree. — Locke, Essay on Hum. 
Cndtrstand., book ii., ch. 27, sect. 3. 
IDE-VTITF (Per§oiial). — '* WTiat is called J3er50« a? identity^ is 
oiir beiug the same persons from the commencement to the 
end ot life : while the matter of the body, the dispositions, 
habits, and thoughts of the mind, are continually changing. 
We feel and know that we are the same. This notion or 
persuasion of personal identity results from memory. It' a 
man loses all recollection of his early lite, he continues, 
-evertheless, actually the same person." — ^Taylor, Elements 
(./' Thought. 

Dr. Brown (lecture xi.) changes the phrase personal 
identity into mental identity. Locke says {Essay on Hum. 
Understand., book ii., ch. 27) — "To hnd wherein personal 



234 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IDENTITY— 

identity consists we must consider wliat person stands for ; 
which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has 
reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the 
same thinking thing, in different times and places." 

This looks Hke confining personal identity to the mind. 
But Leibnitz (in his Theodicee^ p. 172) called it a " meta- 
physical communication by which soul and body make up 
one suppositum, which we call a person." In a Review of 
the Doctrine of Personal Identity^ p. 73, 8vo, London, 1827, 
it has been proposed to define it as ^'the continuation of 
the same organization of animal life in a human creature 
possessing an intelligent mind, that is, one endowed with 
the ordinary faculties of reason and memory, without refer- 
ence to the original formation or constitution of that mind, 
whether it be material or immaterial, or whether it survives 
or perishes with the body. Or, more shortly, it may be 
said personal identity consists in the same thinking intelli- 
gent substance united to the same human body. By the 
same human body, however, is not meant of the same 
particles of matter, but of the same human structure and 
form." — F. Personality. 

Locke makes personal identity consist in consciousness. 
'' Consciousness is inseparable from thinking; and since it 
is so, and is that which makes every one to be what he calls 
self and thereby distinguishes himself from all other think- 
ing beings, in this alone consists personal identity^ i, 6., the 
sameness of a rational being. And as far as this conscious- 
ness can be extended backwards to any past action or 
thought, so far reaches the identity of that person." — Essay 
on Hum, Understand.^ book ii., ch. 27. 

But it has been remarked that " Consciousness, without 
any regard to a sameness of the thinking intelligent sub- 
stance, cannot constitute personal identity. For, then, a 
disordered imagination might make one man become two^ 
or even twenty persons^ whose actions he should imagine 
himself to have performed. And if a man forgets and loses 
all consciousness of having done certain actions, he will then 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 235 

IDENTITY— 

not be the same person who did them." — Whitehead, On 
Materialism^ p. 79. 

Consciousness merely ascertains or indicates personal 
identity^ but does not constitute it. Consciousness pre- 
supposes personal identity as knowledge presupposes truth. 

See Butler, Dissertation on Personal Identity. 

Eeid, Intellect. Powers., essay iii., ch. 6, with note. 

Stewart, PJiilosopJi. of Hum. Mind., part ii., ch. 1, sect. 2. 
IDENTITY (Principle of). — It is usually expressed thus— a 
thing is what it is, and not another. So that it amounts to 
the same as the principle of contradiction., q. v. In Logic it 
is expressed thus — conceptions which agree can be iQ thought 
united, or af&rmed of the same subject at the same time. 
IDEOIiOOY or IDEAXOOY.— The analysis of the human 
mind by Destutt de Tracy, published about the end of last 
century, was entitled '' Elemens d^Idealogie,^'' and the 
word has come to be applied to the philosophy of the 
sensational school, or the followers of CondiUac — as Cabanis, 
Garat, and Yolney. Of this school, De Tracy is the meta- 
physician ; Cabanis (Rapports du Physique et de Moral de 
r Homme) is the physiologist ; and Yolney (Catechism du 
Citoyen Francais) is the moralist. The followers of this 
school were leading members of the Academic des Sciences 
Morales et Politiques., and also took an active share in 
political assemblies. Their doctrines and movements were 
contrary to the views of Napoleon, who showed his dislike 
by suppressing the Academic des Sciences Morales et Poli- 
tiques. But the members of the school kept up their 
doctrines and their meetings, and it was on the motion of 
De Tracy that the Senate decreed the abdication of the 
emperor in 1814. — Damiron, Hist, de Philosoph. en France 
aw 19 siecle. 

" For Locke and his whole school, the study of the under- 
standing is the study of ideas ; hence the recent and cele- 
brated expression ideology., to designate the science of the 
human understanding. The source of this expression is in 
the Essay on the Hum. Understanding., and the ideological 



236 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IDEOIiOOY— 

school is the natural offspring of Locke." — Cousin, Hist, of 
Mod. Philosopli.^ lect. 16. 

'' By a double blunder in philosophy and Greek, ideologic 
(for idealogie)^ a word which could only properly suggest 
an a priori scheme, deducing our knowledge from the in- 
tellect, has in France become the name peculiarly distinc- 
tive of that philosophy of mind which exclusively derives 
our knowledge from sensation." — Sir W. Hamilton, Edin. 
Rev., Octr., 1830, p. 182. 

'' Destutt de Tracy has distinguished Condillac by the title 
of the father of ideology.''^ — Stewsirt^Philosoph.Essays^esssijin. 
IDIOSYNCRASY (f O/o?, proprius^ and avu kocaui;, com-mixtio) — 
means a peculiar temperament of mind or of body. '' The 
soul in its first and pure nature hath no idiosyncrasies,, that 
is, hath no proper natural inclinations^ which are not com- 
petent to others of the same kind and condition." Glanville, 
Pre-existence of Souls, c. 10. It is seen, however, that 
different persons of the same kind and condition may soon 
manifest different inclinations — which if not natural are 
partly so, and are traced to some peculiarity in their tem- 
perament, as well as to the effect of circumstances. 

Sir Thomas Brown (Vulgar Errors, book iii., chap. 28), 
asks, " Whether quails from any idiosyncrasy or peculiarity 
of constitution do invariably feed upon hellebore, or rather 
sometimes but medically use the same ?" In like manner 
some men are violently affected by honey and coffee, which 
have no such effects on others. This is bodily idiosyncrasy. 
Sympathy, and antipathy, q. v., when peculiar, may be 
traced to idiosyncrasy, 

Mr. Stewart in the conclusion of part second of his 
Philosoph. of Hum. Mind, says he uses temperament as 
synonymous with idiosyncrasy. — V. Temperament. 
II>OIi (iioo)'kov, from 'iihog, an image). — Something set up in 
place of the true and the real. Hence Lord Bacon (De 
Augment. Scient., lib. iv., cap. 5) calls those false appear- 
ances by which men are led into error, idols. "I do find, 
therefore, in this enchanted glass four idols, or false appear- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 237 

ances, of several distinct sorts, eveiy sort compreliending 
many subdivisions : tlie first sort I call idols of the nation 
or tribe ; tlie second, idols of the den or cave ; the third, 
idols of the forum : and the fourth, idols of the theatre.'' — 
De Interpretatione Xaturce^ sect. 39. 
Reid, IntelL Powers^ essay vi., chap. 8. — F. Prejudice. 

iCrNORAlVCE, in morals and jurisprudence, may respect the 
law or the action, and is distinguished into ignorantia juris ^ 
and ignorantia factl. 

In respect of the action, ignorance is called efficacious or 
concomitant^ according as the removal* of it would, or 
TTOidd not, prevent the action from being done. In re- 
spect of the agent, ignorance is said to be vincible or invin- 
cible^ according as it can, or cannot, be removed, by the 
use of accessible means of knowledge. 

Vincible ignorance is distinguished into affected or wilful ; 
by which the means of knowuig are perversely rejected ; 
and supine or crass ; by which the means of knowing are 
indolently or stupidly neglected. 

Ignorance is said to be invincible in two ways — in itself^ 
and also in its cause; as when a man knows not what he 
does, through disease of body or of mind. In itself^ but 
not in its cause ; as when a man knows not what he does, 
through hitoxication or passion. 

lL.IiATlOIV Qllatum^ from inferre, to bring ui) — or '^inference 
consists m nothuig but the perception of the connection 
there is between the ideas in each step of the deduction, 
whereby the muid comes to see either the certaia agree- 
ment or disagreement of any two ideas^ as ia demonstration, 
in which it arrives at knowledge ; or their probable con- 
nection on which it withholds its assent, as m opinion." — 
Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ b. iv., c. 17. — F. In- 
ference, Induction. 

* Aristotle {Ethic, lib. iii., cap. 1) takes a difference between an action done 
through ignorance (J/« Scy^^oKnv), and an action done ignorantly {a.yvou)v). In the 
former ca:<e the ignorance is the direct cause of the action, in the latter case it is 
an accident or concomitant 



238 VOC ABU LAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IMAOINATION. — '^ Nihil aliud est imaginari quam rei cor- 
porese figuram seu imagiQem contemplari." — Descartes, 
Medit. Secunda. 

Mr. Addison says (Spectator^ No. 411), "• The pleasures of 
imagination are such as arise from visible objects, since it 
is the sense of sight that furnishes the imagination with its 
ideas." Dr. Reid says : — '' Imagination, in its proper 
sense, signifies a lively conception of objects of sight. It 
is distinguished from conception as a part, from a whole." 
But a much wider signification has been given to the word 
by others. 

^' Imagination or phantasy^ in its most extensive meaning, 
is the faculty representative of the phenomena, both of the 
external and internal worlds." — Sir William Hamilton, 
Reid's Works ^ note B, sect. 1. 

'' By imagination we mean, in a comprehensive sense, 
that operation of the mind by which it (1) receives^ (2) 
retains^ (3) recals^ and (4) combines, according to higher 
laws the ideal images furnished to it by the csenesthesis 
and by the senses ; for all these acts are manifestly links of 
one chain. At the first step, we usually call this opera- 
tion,* the faculty of conception; at the second, memory; 
at the third, reproductive fancy, and at the fourth, pro- 
ductive fancy." — Feuchtersleben, Med, Psychol,^ p. 120. 
8vo, 1847. 

'' In the language of modem philosophy, the word im- 
agination seems to denote — first, the power of appre- 
hending or conceiving ideas, simply as they are in them- 
selves, without any view to their reality; secondly, the 
power of combining into new forms or assemblages, those 
thoughts, ideas, or notions, which we have derived from 
experience or from information. These two powers, 
though distingioishable, are not essentially dififerent." — 
Beattie, Dissert., Of Imagination, chap. 1. 

" Imagination^ as reproductive^ stores the mind with ideal 

* " It would be well, if; instead of speaking of the powers of the mind (which causes 
a misunderstanding), we adhered to the designation of the several operations of one 
mind; which most psychologists recommend, but in the sequel forget" 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 239 

miAGINATION— 

images, constructed through the medium of attention and 
memory, out of our immediate perceptions. These images 
when laid up in the mind, form types with which we can 
compare any new phenomena we meet with, and which 
help us to begin the important work of reducing our ex- 
perience to some appreciable degree of unity. 

''To understand the nature of productive or creative 
imagination^ we must suppose the reproductive process to 
be already in full operation, that is, we must suppose a 
number of ideas to be already formed and stored up within 
the mind. . - . They may now be combined together so 
as to form new images, which, though composed of the 
elements given in the original representations, yet are now 
purely mental creations of our own. Thus I may have an 
image of a rock in my mind, and another image of a dia- 
mond. I combine these two together and create the 
purely ideal representation of a diamond rock." — Morell, 
Psychol, pp. 175, 176. 8vo, Lond., 1853. 
IRIAOINATION and FANCY.— ''A man has imagination in 
proportion as he can distinctly copy in idea the impressions 
of sense ; it is the faculty which images within the mind the 
phenomena of sensation. A man has fancy in proportion 
as he can call up, connect, or associate at pleasure, these 
internal images {<l)ccuroi,^uv, is to cause to appear) so as to 
complete ideal representations of absent objects. Imagi- 
nation is the power of depicting, sjid fancy, of evoking or 
combining. The imagination is formed by patient obser- 
vation ; the fancy, by a voluntary activity in shifting the 
scenery of the mind. The more accurate the imagination, 
the more safely may a painter, or a poet, undertake a 
dehneation or description, without the presence of the 
objects to be characterized. The more versatile the fancy, 
the more original and striking will be the decorations pro- 
duced." — Taylor, Synonyms. 

Wordsworth (Preface to his Works,\ol. i., 12mo, Lond., 
1836) finds fault with the foregoing discrimination, and 
says, ''It is not easy to find how imagination thus ex- 



240 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IMAGINATION— 

plained, differs from distinct remembrance of images ; or 
fancy ^ from quick and vivid recollection of them : each is 
nothing more than a mode of memory." According to 
Wordsworth, '' imagination^ in the sense of the poet, has 
no reference to images that are merely a faithful copy, 
existing in the mind, of absent external objects ; but is 
a word of higher import, denoting operations of the mind 
upon these objects, and processes of creation or compo- 
sition governed by fixed laws." 

''It is the divine attribute of the imagination^ that it is 
irrepressible, unconfinable ; that when the real world is 
shut out, it can create a world for itself, and with a necro- 
mantic power, can conjure up glorious shapes and forms, 
and brilliant visions to make solitude populous, and irradi- 
ate the gloom of the dungeon." — ^W. Irving, Sketch Book. 

" And as imagination bodies forth 
The form of things unknown, the poet's pen 
Turns them to shapes, and gives to nothing 
A local habitation and a name. 

To imagine in this high and true sense of the word, is to 
realize the ideal, to make intelligible truths descend into 
the forms of sensible nature, to represent the invisible by 
the visible, the infinite by the finite. In this view of it, 
imagination may be regarded as the differentia of man — the 
distinctive mark which separates him a grege mutorum. 
That the inferior animals have memory, and what has been 
called passive imagination^ is proved by the fact that they 
dream — and that in this state the sensuous impressions 
made on them during their waking hours, are reproduced. 
But they show no trace of that higher faculty or function 
which transcends the sphere of sense, and which out of 
elements supplied by things seen and temporal, can create 
new objects, the contemplation of which lifts us to the in> 
finite and the unseen, and gives us thoughts which wander 
through eternity. High art is highly metaphysical, and 
whether it be in poetry or music, in painting or in sculp- 
ture, the triumph of the artist lies not in presenting us 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 241 

IJTIAOINATION— 

with an exact transcript of things that may be seen, or 
heard, or handled in the world around us, but in carrying 
us across the gulf which separates the phenomenal from 
the real, and placing us in the presence of the truly 
beautiful, and surrounding us with an atmosphere more 
pure than that which the sun enhghtens. 
IITIAGINATION and CONCJEPTIOI^. — ''The business of con- 
ception,^^ says IVIr. Stewart (PTiilosoph. of Hum. Mind, chap. 
3), '4s to present us with an exact transcriptof what we have 
felt or perceived. But we have, moreover, a power of modi- 
fying our conceptions, by combining the parts of different 
ones together, so as to form new wholes of our own crea- 
tion. I shall employ the word imagination to express this 
power, and I apprehend that this is the proper sense of 
the word ; if imagination be the power which gives birth to 
the productions of the poet and the painter. This is not a 
simple faculty of the mind. It presupposes abstraction to 
separate from each other qualities and circumstances which 
have been perceived in conjunction ; and also judgment 
and taste to direct us in forming the combinations." And 
he adds (chap. 6), " The operations of imagination are by 
no means confined to the materials which conception fiir- 
nishes, but may be equally employed about all the subjects 
of our knowledge." — F. Conception, Fancy. 

See Hunt, Imagination and Fancy, 

Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads. 

Edin. Review for April, 1842, article on Moore's Poems, 

Akenside, Pleasures of Imagination, 
IIWEITATIOIV (Latin, imitor, quasi mimitor, from the Greek 
^if/^ov^ut, the initial [^ omitted, Vossius.) — "is afacultie to 
expresse livelie and perfitelie that example, which ye go 
about to folow." — Ascham, The Scliulemaster, b. ii. 

As a social and improveable being, man has been endowed 
with a propensity to do as he sees others do. This pro- 
pensity manifests itself in the fii'st instance spontaneously 
or instinctively. Children try to follow the gestures and 
movements of others, before their muscles are ready to 

R 



242 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IMITATION— 

obey, and imitate sounds whieli they hear, before their 
voice is able to do so. Mr. Stewart has made a distinc- 
tion {PMlosopJi. of Hum. Mind^ vol. iii., chap. 2) between 
the propensity and the power of imitation. Both are pecu- 
liarly strong and lively in children, and answer the most 
important purposes. But the propensity to imitate what 
others do and the manner of doing it continues throughout 
life, and requires to be carefully watched and properly 
directed. 

And man not only imitates his fellow-creatures, but tries 
to copy nature in all her departments. In the fine arts he 
imitates the forms which strike and please him. And the 
germ of some of the highest discoveries in science has 
been found in attempts to copy the movements and pro- 
cesses of nature. — Beid, Act. Powers., essay iii., part 1, 
chap. 2. 
IMMANENT (from in manere^ to remain in) — means that 
which does not pass out of a certain subject or certain 
limits. '-'' Logicians distinguish two kinds of operations of 
the mind; the first kind produces no efifect without the 
mind, the last does. The first they call immanent acts ; 
the second transitive. All intellectual operations belong 
to the first class ; they produce no effect upon any external 
object."— Beid, Intell. Powers^ essay ii., chap. 14. 

'' Even some voluntary acts, as attention, deliberation, 
purpose, are also immanent.'''' — Correspondence of Dr. 
Reid^ p. 81. 

'' Conceiving, as well as projecting or resolving, are 
what the schoolmen called immanent acts of the mind, 
which produce nothing beyond themselves. But painting 
is a transitive act, which produces an effect distinct from 
the operation, and this effect is the picture*" — Beid, Intell. 
Powers^ essay iv., chap. 1. 

The logical sense assigned to this word by Kant, is 
somewhat different. According to him we make an im- 
manent and valid use of the forms of the understanding, 
and conceive of the matter, furnished by the senses, accord- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 243 

IMMANENT— 

ing to our notions, of time and space. But wlien we try to 
lift ourselves above experience and phenomena, and to 
conceive of things as they are in themselves, we are making 
a transcendent and illegitimate use of our faculties. 

With moralists an immanent act is one which has no 
effect on anything out of the agent. Sensation is an im- 
manent act of the senses — cognition of the intellect. A 
transient act produces an effect or result out of, and beyond 
the agent ; as the act of writing, or of building. 

Theologians say, God the Father generated the Son by 
an immanent act, but he created the world by a transient act. 

The doctrine of Spinoza {Ethic. ^ pars, 1, pref. 18) is, Deus 
est omnium rerum causa immanens^ non vero transiens^ — 
that is, all that exists, exists in God ; and there is no 
difference in substance between the universe and God. 

Acts of the will are distinguished as elicit and imper- 
ate., — q. v, 

'' We are deceived, when, judging the infinite essence by 
our narrow selves, we ascribe intellections^ volitions^ decrees^ 
purposes^! and such like immanent actions to that nature 
which hath nothing in common with us, as being infinitely 
above us." — Glanville, Vanity of Dogmatising., edit. 1661, 
p. 101. 
lltlMATERIAlilSlVI is the doctrine of Bishop Berkeley, that 
there is no material substance, and that all being may be 
reduced to mind, and ideas in a mind. 

Swift, in a letter to Lord Carteret, of date 3d September, 
1724, speaking of Berkeley, says, '-'- Going to England very 
young, about thirteen years ago, he became founder of a 
sect there, called the immaterialists^ by the force of a very 
curious book upon that subject." 

*' In the early part of his own life, he (Dr. Reid) informs 
us that he was actually a convert to the scheme of imma - 
terialism ; a scheme which he probably considered as of a 
perfectly inoffensive tendency, so long as he conceived the 
existence of the material world to be the only point in 
dispute." This passage is quoted by llichardson in his 



244 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

imiflATERIAXISM— 

Diet, as ocurring in Stewart's PhilosopJi, of Hum, Mind^ 
c. 1, s. 3. Dr. Reid's acknowledging that he once believed 
the doctrine of ideas is in Intell. Powers^ essay ii., chap. 10. 
A work published a few years ago in defence of Ber- 
keley's doctrine, was entitled Immaterialism ; and a prize 
offered to any one who would refute the reasoning of it. 

liniMLATSRiAlilTir is predicated of mind, to denote that as 
a substance it is different from matter. Spirituality is the 
positive expression of the same idea. Simplicity is also 
used in the same sense. Matter is made up of parts into 
which it can be resolved. Mind is simple and has no parts, 
and so cannot be dissolved. The materiality of the soul was 
maintained by Tertullian, Arnobius, and others, during the 
three first centuries. At the end of the fourth, the imma- 
teriality of the soul was professed by Augustin, Nemesius, 
and Mamertius Claudienus. — Guizot, Hist, of Civilizat.^ 
vol. i., p. 394. 

IIWMORT AX.it Y (OF THE SOUIL.)— is one of the doctrines 
of natural religion. At death the body dies, and is dissolved 
into its elements. The soul being distinct from the body, 
is not afiected by the dissolution of the body. How long, 
or in what state it may survive after the death of the 
body, is not intimated by the term immortality. But 
the arguments to prove that the soul survives the body, 
all go to favour the belief that it will live for ever. 

See Plato, Phcedon; Porteous, Sermons; Sherlock, On the 
Immortality of the Soid ; Watson, Intimations of a Future 
State ; Bakewell, Evidence of a Future State ; Autenrieth, 
On Man., and his Hope of Immortality^ Tubingen, 1815. 

IirmiUTABMilTY is the absence or impossibility of change. 
It is applied to the Supreme Being to denote that there 
can be no inconstancy in his character or government. It 
was argued for by the heathens. See Bishop Wilkins, 
Natural Religion. 

lOTPENETRABIIilTY is one of the primary qualities of 
matter, in virtue of which the same portion of space cannot 
at the same time be occupied by more than one portion of 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 245 

IMlPENETRABIIilTY— 

matter. It is extension, or the quality of occupying space. 
A nail driven into a board does not penetrate the wood ; it 
merely separates and displaces the particles. Things are 
penetrable^ when two or more can exist in the same space 
— as two angels ; impenetralle^ when not — as two stones. 

1I7IPEBATE.— F. Elicit. 

IMPERATIVE (CATEOORICAIi, THE) — is the phrase em- 
ployed by Kant, to denote that the moral law is absolute and 
obhgatory. The practical reason speaks to us in the catego- 
rical imperative^ — that is, in seeing an action to be right, we 
see, at the same time, that we ought to do it. And this sense 
of obligation springs from no \dew of the consequences of 
the action, as likely to be beneficial, but is a primitive and 
absolute idea of the reason ; involving, according to Kant, 
the power to obey, or not to obey. We are under obliga- 
tion, therefore we are free. Moral obligation implies freedom . 

IMPOSSlBIiE (the) — or that which cannot be, has been 
distinguished as the metapliysically or absolutely impossible^ 
or that which implies a contradiction, as to make a square 
circle, or two straight lines to enclose a space ; tJie physi- 
cally impossible — the miraculous, or that which cannot be 
brought about by merely physical causes, or in accordance 
with the laws of nature, as the death of the soul ; and the 
ethically impossible^ or that which cannot be done without 
going against the dictates of right reason, or the enactments 
of law, or the feelings of propriety. That which is morally 
impossible^ is that against the occiuTence of which there is 
the highest probable evidence — as that the dice should turn 
up the same number a hundred successive times. — ^Vhately, 
Logic^ append, i. 

"It maybe as really impossible for a person in his senses, 
and without any motive urging him to it, to drink poison, 
as it is for him to prevent the effects of it after drinking it ; 
but who sees not these impossibilities to be totally differ- 
ent in their foundation and meaning ? or what good reason 
can there be ''against calling the one a moral and the other 
a natural impossibility?" — Price, Review^ chap. 10, p. 431. 



246 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IMPRESSION (in premere^ to press in, or on) — is the term 
employed to denote the change on the nervous system 
arising from a communication between an external object 
and a bodily organ. It is obviously borrowed from the 
effect which one piece of matter which is hard has, if pressed 
upon another piece of matter which is softer ; as the seal 
leaving its impression or configuration upon the wax. It 
is not intended, however, to convey any affirmation as to 
the nature of the change which is effected in the nervous 
system, or as to the nature of sensation ; and still less to 
confound this preliminary change with the sensation itself. 
The term impression^ is also apphed to the effects produced 
upon the higher sensibility, or our sentiments. Thus, we 
speak of moral impressions^ religious impressions^ impres- 
sions of sublimity and beauty. 

Hume divided all modifications of mind into impressions 
and ideas. Ideas were impressions when first received ; and 
became ideas when remembered and reflected on. See Reid, 
Intell. Powers^ essay i., chap. 1. 

"Mr. StewsLvt (Philosoph. of Hum, iW/zc?, vol. iii., addenda 
to vol. i., p. 43), seems to think that the word impression 
was first introduced as a technical term, into the philosophy 
of mind, by Hume. This is not altogether correct ; for, 
besides the instances which Mr. Stewart himself adduces, 
of the illustration attempted, of the phenomena of memory 
from the analogy of an impress and a trace,, words corre- 
sponding to impression were among the ancients f^piiliarly 
applied to the processes of external perception, imagina- 
tion, &c., in the Atomistic, the Platonic, the Aristotelian, 
and the Stoical philosophies ; while, among modem psycho- 
logists (as Descartes and Gassendi), the term was likewise 
in common use." — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ p. 
294, note. 

Dr. Reid (Intell. Powers^ essay ii.), distinguishes the im- 
pressions made on the organs of sense into mediate and 
immediate. The impressions made on the sense of touch 
are immediate^ the external body and the organ being in 
contact. The impressions made on the ear by sounding 



I 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 247 

litlPRESSION— 

bodies are mediate^ requiring the air and the vibrations of the 
air to give the sensation of hearing, It may be questioned 
whether this distinction is well or deeply founded. See 
Dr. Young, Intell. Philosoph.^ p. 71. Sir Will. Hamilton, 
Reid's Works, p. 104. 

iMPUliSE: and iMPUliSlVE (in-pellere, to drive on)— are 
used in contradistinction to reason and rational, to denote 
the influence of appetite and passion as differing from the 
authority of reason and conscience. " It may happen, that 
when appetite draws one way, it may be opposed, not by 
any appetite or passion, but by some cool principle of 
action, which has authority without any impulsive force. — 
Reid, Act. Powers^ essay iii., pt. 2, chap. 1. 

^' Passion often gives a violent impulse to the will, and 
makes a man do what he knows he shall repent as long as 
he lives." — Ibid, chap. 6. 

INCIilNATION (in-clinare, to lean towards) — is a form or 
degree of natural desire. It is synonymous with propen- 
sity or with the penchant of the French. It is more allied 
to affection than to appetite. *'It does not appear that 
in things so intimately connected with the happiness of 
life, as marriage and the choice of an employment, parents 
have any right to force the inclinations of their children. " 
— Beattie, Mar. Science^ vol. ii., part 2. — V. Disposition, 
Tendency. 

IWDKFIIVITE (in or non-definitum^ that which is not limited) 
— means that, the limits of which are not determined, or at 
least not so determined as to be apprehended by us. 
The definite is that of which the form and limits are deter- 
mined and apprehended by us. That of which we know 
not the limits comes to be regarded as having none : and 
hence indefinite has been confounded with the infinite. 
But they ought to be carefully distinguished. The infinite 
is absolute ; it is that of which we not only know not the 
limits, but which has and can have no limit. The indefinite is 
that of which there is no limit fixed. You can suppose it 
enlarged or diminished, but still it is finite. — T". Infinite. 



248 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IIVIJEFINITE— 

Leibnitz, Discours de la Conformite de la Foi et de la 
Raison^ sect. 70. 

Descartes, Princip. PhilosojyJi, 1 pars, c. 26 et 27. 

IIVDIFFERENCE (liiberty of)— is that state of mind in which 
the will is not influenced or moved to choose or to refuse 
an object, but is equally ready to do either. It is also 
called liberty of contrariety. It should rather be called 
liberty of indetermination, or that state in which the mind 
is when it has not determined to do one of two or more 
things. — F. Liberty, Will. 

INDIFFERENT. — An action in morals is said to be indiffer- 
ent^ that is, neither right nor wrong, when, considered in 
itself or in specie^ it is neither contrary nor conformable to 
any moral law or rule ; as, to bow the head. Such an 
action becomes right or wrong, when the end for which it 
is done, or the circumstances in which it is done are con- 
sidered. It is then regarded in individuo; as, to bow the 
head, in token of respect, or in a temple^ in token of adora- 
tion. 

IN1>IFFERENTIS]« or IDENTISM, q. v., is sometimes em- 
ployed to denote the philosophy of Schelling, according to 
which there is no difference between the real and the 
ideal, or the idea and the reality, or rather that the idea 
is the reality. 

INI>IVII>UAIi, INI>IVI»UAr.ISI?I, INDIVIDUAI.ITY, 
INI>IVI1>UATI0N (from in or non and dividere^ to divide). 
Individual was defined by Porphyry — Id cujus proprietates 
alteri simul convenire non possunt. 

'-'- An object which is, in the strict and primary sense, 
one, and cannot be logically divided, is called individual.'''' 
— Whately, Logic^ b. ii., ch. 5, sect. 5. 

An individual is not absolutely indivisible, but that which 
cannot be divided without losing its name and distinctive 
qualities, that which cannot be parted into several other 
things of the same nature as the individual whole. A 
stone or a piece of metal may be separated into parts, each 
of which shall continue to have the same qualities as the 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 249 

INDITrDUAIi— 

whole. But a plant or an animal when separated into 
parts loses its individuality; which is not retained by any 
of the parts. We do not ascribe individuality to brute 
matter. But what is that which distinguishes one organ- 
ized being, or one living being, or one thinking being from 
all others ? This is the question so much agitated by the 
schoolmen, concerning the principle of individuation. In 
their barbarous Latin it was called Hcecceietas, that is, that 
in virtue of which we say this and not that ; or Ecceietas^ that 
of which we say, lo ! here, and not anywhere else. Peter, 
as an individual^ possesses many properties which are quid- 
dative^ or common to him with others, such as sulstan- 
iialitas^ corporeietas^ animalitas^ humanitas. But he has 
also a reahty, which may be called Petreietas or Peterness^ 
which marks all the others with a difference, and consti- 
tutes him Peter. It is the Hcecceietas which constitutes 
the principle of individuation. It was divided into the 
extrinsic and intrinsic. 

The number of properties which constituted an indi- 
viduum extrinsecum^ are enumerated in the following 
versicle : — 

Forma^ figura^ locus, tempus, cum nomine, sanguis, 
Patria, sunt septem, quce non Jidbet unum et alter. 

You may call Socrates a philosopher, bald, big-bellied, 
the son of Sophroniscus, an Athenian, the husband of Xan- 
tippe, &c., any one of which properties might belong to 
another man ; but the congeries of all these is not to be 
found but in Socrates. 

The intrinsic principle of individuation, was the ultimate 
reality of the being — ipsa rei entitas. In physical sub- 
stances, the intrinsic principle of individuation is ipsa 
materia et forma cum unione. 

Hutcheson has said (Metaphys., pars 1, chap, iii.), ^' Si 
quasratur de causa cur res sit una, aut de Individuationis 
principio in re ipsa ; non aliud assignandum, quam ipsa 
rei natura existens. Quoecunque enim causa rem quam- 



250 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

INI>IVI1>UAJL.— 

libet fecerat aut creaverat, earn unam etiam fecerat, aut 
individuam, quo sensu volunt Metaphysici." 

Leibnitz has a dissertation, De principio Indivlduationis^ 
which has been thought to favour nominalism. Yet he 
maintained that individual substances have a real positive 
existence, independent of any thinking subject. 
IndiTiduality, like personal identity, belongs properly to in- 
telligent and responsible beings. Consciousness reveals it 
to us that no being can be put in our place, nor confounded 
with us, nor we with others. We are one and indivisible. 

'' Individuality is scarcely to be found among the inferior 
animals. When it is, it has been acquired or taught. 
Individuality is not individualism. The latter refers every- 
thing to self, and sees nothing but self in all things. 
Individuality consists only in willing to be self, in order to 
be something." — Yinet, Essais de Philosoph.^ Mor, Par., 
1847, p. 142. 

But in the Elements of Individualism^ by William Mac- 
call, 8vo, Lond., 1847, the word individualism is used in 
the sense assigned above to individuality, 
INDUCTION (iTIethod or Process of) (iTTocyayYi^ inductio). — 
" It has been said that Aristotle attributed the discovery of 
induction to Socrates, deriving the word ii^oiyuyn from the 
Socratic accumulation of instances serving as antecedents 
to establish the requisite conclusion." — Devey, Logic, p. 
151, note. 

''Inductio est argumentum quo ex plurium singularium 
recensione aliquid universale concluditur." — Le Grand, 
Instil, PMlosoph.,^ p. 57, edit. 1675. 

Inductio est argumentum quo probatur quid verum esse 
de quopiam generali, ex eo quod verum sit de particu- 
laribus omnibus, saltem de tot ut sit credibile. — Wallis, 
Instit, Log.^ p. 198, 4th edit. 

Induction is a kind of argument which infers, respecting 
a whole class, what has been ascertained respecting one or 
more individuals of that class. — Whately, Logic ^ book ii., 
chap. 5, sect. 5. 



VOCAB FLAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 251 

IXDrCTIOX— 

" Wlien from the obsf^rvation of a number of individual in- 
stances, we ascend to a general proposition, or when, by com- 
bining a number of general propositions, we conclude from 
them another proposition still more general, the process 
which is substantiaUv the same in both instances, is called 
induction, . . . When the conclusion is more general 
than the largest of the premisses, the argument is called 
induction ; when less general or equally general, it is ratio- 
cination.' ' — ^lill, Logic, 2d edit., vol. i., pp. 223, 224i. 

"■ Induction is that operation of mind bv which we infer 
that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, 
will be true iu all cases which resemble the former in cer- 
tain assignable respects. In other words, induction is the 
process bj which we conclude that what is true of certain 
indiyiduals of a class, is true of the whole chiss, or that 
what is true at certaia times will be true under similar 
circumstances at all times."' — ]Mill, Logic, ui., ii., i. 

'^ Induction is usuaHv defined to be the process of drawing 
a general rule from a sufficient number of particular cases ; 
deduction is the converse process of proving that some pro- 
perty belongs to the particular case from the consideration 
that it belongs to the whole class in which the case is 
found. Xhat aU bodies tend to fall towards the earth is a 
truth which we have obtained from examining a number 
of bodies coming under our notice, by induction : if from 
this general principle we argue that the stone we throw 
from our hand will show the same tendency, we adopt the 
deductive method. . . . More exactly, we may define the 
inductive method as the process of discovering laws and 
rules from facts, and causes from efiects ; and the deductive^ 
as the method of deriving facts from laws and effects from 
their causes." — ^Thomson, Outline of the Laws of Thought, 
2d edit., pp. 321, 323. 

In the process of induction, Bacon recommends the con- 
struction of — 1. Tahulce prasenticE, that is, we should 
extend observation and enumerate the circumstances in 
which a phenomenon has taken place, so as to separate the 



252 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IIVOUCTION— 

accidental from the essential. 2. Tabulce ahsentice^ that is, 
cases in which the phenomenon has not taken place, and 
thus ascend from the particular to the general conditions 
under which it occurs. 3. Tahulce comparationis^ that is, 
comparative tables in which the determining causes are 
ascertained and compared, and perhaps reduced to a higher 
cause or law. 

According to Sir William Hamilton (^Discussions on 
Philosopliy^ &c., p. 156), ^''Induction has been employed to 
designate three very different operations — 1. The objective 
process of investigating particular facts, as preparatory to 
induction^ which is not a process of reasoning of any kind. 
2. A material illation of a universal from a singular, as 
warranted either by the general analogy of nature, or the 
special presumptions afforded by the object matter of any 
real science. 3. A formal illation of a universal from the 
individual, as legitimated solely by the laws of thought, 
and abstracted from the conditions of any 'particular 
matter.' The second of these is the inductive method of 
Bacon, which proceeds by way of rejections and conclu- 
sions, so as to arrive at those axioms or general laws from 
which we infer by way of synthesis other particulars un- 
known to us, and perhaps placed beyond reach of direct 
examination. Aristotle's definition coincides with the 
third, and ' induction is an inference drawn from all the 
particulars' (Prior Analyt.^ ii., c. 23). The second and 
third have been confounded. But the second is not a 
logical process at all, since the conclusion is not necessarily 
inferrible from the premiss, for the some of the antecedent 
does not necessarily legitimate the all of the conclusion, 
notwithstanding that the procedure may be warranted by 
the material problem of the science or the fundamental 
principles of the human understanding. The third alone 
is properly an induction of Logic ; for Logic does not con- 
sider things, but the general forms of thought under which 
the mind conceives them ; and the logical inference is not 
determined by any relation of causality between the pre- 



VOCABULABY OF PHILOSOPHY. 253 

INDUCTION— 

miss and the conclusion, but by the subjective relation of 
reason and consequence as involved in the thought." 

On the diiFerence between induction as known and prac- 
tised by Aristotle and as recommended by Lord Bacon, 
see Stewart, PhilosopJi. of Hum, Mind, part 2, chap, iv., 
sect. 2. 

INDUCTION (Principle of) By the principle of induction 

is meant the ground or warrant on which we conclude that 
what has happened in certain cases, which have been 
observed, will also happen in other cases, which have not 
been observed. This principle is involved in the words of 
the wise man, Eccles. i. 9. ''The thing that hath been, 
it is that which shall be : and that which is done is that 
which shall be done." In nature there is nothing insulated. 
All things exist in consequence of a sufficient reason, all 
events occur according to the efficacy of proper causes. 
In the language of Xewton, Effectuum naturalium ejusdem 
generis ecedem sunt causce. The same causes produce the 
same effects. The principle of induction is an application 
of the principle of causality. Phenomena have their proper 
causes and these causes operate according to a fixed law. 
This law has been expressed by saving, substance is 
persistent. Our belief in the estabhshed order of nature 
is a primitive judgment, according to Dr. Reid and others, 
and the ground of all the knowledge we derive from ex- 
perience. According to others this belief is a result or 
inference derived from experience. On the different views 
as to this point compare Mill's Logic, vol. ii., chap. 5, mth 
WheweU's Philosophy of Inductive Sciences, book i., ch. 6. 
Also, the Quarterly Review, vol. 68. 

On the subject of induction in general, see 

Reid, Intell. Powers, essay vi., ch. 5. 

Keid, Inquiry, chap, vi., sect. 24. 

Stewart, Philosoph. of Hum. Mind,Yo\, i., ch. iv., sect. 5. 

Stewart, Philosoph. Essays, p. 74. 

Eoyer Collard, CEuvres de Reid. Par Mons. Jouffi:oy, 
tom. iv., p. 277. 



254 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

INERTIA. — That property of matter by wHcli it would always 
continue in the same state of rest or motion in which it 
was put, unless changed by some external force. Resist- 
ance to change of state. The quantity of matter in a body 
is determined by its quantity of inertia ; and this is esti- 
mated by the quantity of force required to put it in motion 
at a given rate. Kepler conceiving the disposition of a 
body to maintain its state of motion as indicating an exer- 
tion of power, prefixed the word vis to inertia. Leibnitz 
maintained that matter manifests force in maintaining its 
state of rest. 

"The vis insita^ or innate force of matter, is a power of 
resistiQg by which every body, as much as in it lies, endea- 
vours to persevere in its present state, whether it be of 
rest or of moving uniformly forward in a straight line. 
This force is ever proportional to the body whose force it 
is ; and differs nothing from the inactivity of the mass but 
in our manner of conceiving it. A body, from the in- 
activity of matter, is not without difficulty put out of its 
state of rest or motion Upon which account this vis insita 
may, by a most significant name, be called vis inertice, or 
force of inactivity." — Newton, Princip,^ defin. 3. 

IN ESSE ; IN POSSE. — Things that are not, but which may 
be, are said to be in posse; things actually existing are 
said to be in esse. 

INFERENCE (in ferre^ to bear, or bring in) — is of the same 
derivation as illation and induction^ q. v, 

''To infer is nothing but by virtue of one proposition 
laid down as true, to draw in another as true ; i. 6., to see 
or suppose such a connection of the two ideas of the in- 
ferred proposition." — Locke, Essay on Hum, Understand.^ 
b. iv., c. 17. 

" An inference is a proposition which is perceived to be 
true, because of its connection with some known fact. 
There are many things and events which are always found 
together ; or which constantly follow each other : there- 
fore, when we observe one of these things or events, we 
infer that the other also exists, or has existed, or will soon 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 255 

INFEKENCE— 

take place. If we see the prints of human feet on the 
sands of an unknown coast, we infer that the country is 
inhabited ; if these prints appear to be fresh, and also 
below the level of high water, we infer that the inhabitants 
are at no great distance ; if the prints are those of naked 
feet, we infer that these inhabitants are savages ; or if they 
are the prints of shoes, we infer that they are, in some 
degree, civilized." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. 
INFERENCE and PROOF. — ^' Reasoning comprehends in- 
ferring and proving ; which are not two different things, 
but the same thing regarded in two different points ofvievj; 
like the road from London to York, and the road from 
jjg York to London. He who infers^ proves ; and he who 

1 proves.^ infers ; but the word infer fixes the mind first on 

the premiss and then on the conclusion ; the word prove^ 
on the contrary, leads the mind fiom the conclusion to the 
premiss. Hence, the substantives derived from these 
words respectively, are often used to express that which, 
on each occasion, is last in the mind ; inference being often 
used to signify the conclusion (^. 6., proposition inferred^) 
and proof the premiss. To infer^ is the business of the 
philosopher ; to prove^ of the advocate.''^ — Whately, Logic, 
b. iv., ch. 3, sect. 1. 

Proving is the assigning a reason (or argument) for the 
support of a given proposition ; inferring is the deduction of 
a conclusion from given premisses." — Whately, ibid. 

'' When the grounds for believing anj^thing are slight, 
we term the mental act or state induced a conjecture ; when 
they are strong, we term it an inference or conclusion. 
Increase the evidence for a conjecture, it becomes a con- 
clusion ; diminish the evidence for a conclusion, it passes 
into a conjecture." — S. Bailey, Theory of Reasoning., pp. 31, 
32, 8vo, Lond., 1851.— F. Fact. 
Infinite {in or non finitum., unlimited or rather limitless). 
— In geometry, infinite is applied to quantity which is 
greater than any assignable magnitude. But strictly speak- 
ing it means that which is not only without determinate 



256 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

INFINITE— 

bounds, but wMcli cannot possibly admit of bound or 
limit. 

''The infinite expresses the entire absence of all limita- 
tion, and is applicable to the one infinite being in all his 
attributes. The absolute expresses perfect independence, 
both in being and in action. The unconditioned indicates 
entire freedom from every necessary relation. The whole 
three unite in expressing the entire absence of all restric- 
tion. But let this be particularly observed, they do not 
imply that the one infinite being cannot exist in a necessary 
relation^ that is, if He exist in relation, that relation cannot 
be a necessary condition of his existence." — Calderwood, 
Fhilosoph. of the Infinite^ p. 37. — F. Absolute, Uncon- 
ditioned. 

As to our idea of the infinite there are two opposite 
opinions. 

According to some, the idea is purely negative, and 
springs up when we contemplate the ocean or the sky, or 
some object of vast extent to which we can assign no limits. 
Or, if the idea has anything positive in it, that is furnished 
by the imagiaation, which goes on enlarging the finite 
without limit. 

On the other hand it is said that the enlarging of the 
finite can never furnish the idea of the infinite^ but only of 
the indefinite. The indefinite is merely the confused 
apprehension of what may or may not exist. But the idea 
of the infinite is the idea of an objective reality, and is im- 
plied as a necessary condition of every other idea. We 
cannot think of body but as existing in space, nor of an 
event but as occurring in time ; and space and duration are 
necessarily thought of as infinite. 

But have we or can we have knowledge of the infinite .^ 
Boethius {In Proed.., p. 113, edit. Bas.) is quoted as saying, 
" Infinitorum nulla cognitio est; infinita namque animo com- 
prehendi nequeunt ; quod autem ratione mentis circumdari 
non potest, nullius scientiae fine concluditur: quare in- 
finitorum scientia nulla est." 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 257 

IIVFIIVITE— 

On the other hand, Cudworth has said (Intell, System^ p. 
449), — "Since infinitely the same with a&^oZw^e/z/ perfect. 
we having a notion or idea of the latter must needs have \ 
of the former." 

Bi^t while we cannot comprehend the infinite we mav 
apprehend it in contrast or relation with the finite. And 
this is what the common sense of men leads them to rest 
satisfied with, and without attempting the metaphysical ) '^ 
difficulty of reconciling the existence of the irifinite with I v^ 
that of the finite to admit the existence of both. I f 

" Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the I y^ 
same with it, but have a lower participation only of the m- \ f 
tellectual nature, and are rather apprelienders t han co mpre- \ 
Renders thereof This is indeed one badge of our creaturely /"""^ 
state, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive know- / 
ledge, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the • 
essence of things." — Cudworth. 

xincillon, Essai sur VIdee et le Sentiment de VInfini, 
Cousin, Cours de Philosoph.^ et Hist, de la Philosoph. 
Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy^ &c. 
There is a Dissertatio de Finito et Infinito^ appended to 
the Dissertatio de principiis Justi et Decori^ 12mo, Amst.. 
1651. See also Descartes, Meditations. 
INFJLUX (Physical) (in fiuere^ to flow in) — is one of the 
theories as to our perception of external objects. — '' The 
advocates of this scheme maintained that real things are the 
efficient causes of our perceptions, the word efficient being 
employed to signify that the things by means of some posi- 
tive power or inherent virtue which they possess, were com- 
petent to transmit to the mind a knowledge of themselves. 
.... External objects were supposed to operate on the 
nervous system by the transmission of some kind of influ- 
ence, the nervous system was supposed to carry on the 
process by the transmission of certain images or re- 
presentations, and thus our knowledge of external things 
was supposed to be brought about. The representa- 
tions alone came before the mind ; the things by which 



258 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

INFliUX— 

they were caused remained occult and unknown." — ^Ferrier, 
Instit. of Metaphys.^^. 472. — V. Causes, (Occasional.) 

INJURY (in-juria^ from in and jus^ neglect or violation of 
right)— in morals and jurisprudence is the intentional doing 
of wrong. We may bring harm or evil upon others with- 
out intending it. But injury implies intention and awakens 
a sense of injustice and indignation, when it is done. It is 
on this difference in the meaning of harm and injury that 
Bishop Butler founds the distinction of resentment into 
sudden and deliberate, — Butler, Sermons yiii. and 9. 

INNATE (II>EAS). — Ideas, as to their origin, have been 
distinguished into adventitious^ or such as we receive from 
the objects of external nature, as the idea or notion of a 
mountain, or a tree ; factitious^ or such as we frame out of 
ideas already acquired, as of a golden mountain, or of a 
tree with golden fruit ; and innate^ or such as are inborn 
and belong to the mind from its birth, as the idea of God 
or of immortality. Cicero, in various passages of his treatise 
De Natura Deorum, speaks of the idea of God and of 
immortality as being inserted^ or engraven^ or inborn in the 
mind. "■ Intelligi necesse est^ esse deos^ quoniam insitas 
eorum, velpotius innatas cognitiones habemus^ — Lib. i., sect. 
17. In like manner, Origen {Adv, Celsum^Yih. i., cap. 4) 
has said, " That men would not be guilty if they did not 
carry in their mind common notions of morality, innate 
and written in divine letters. '' It was in this form that 
Locke (Essay on Hum. Understand,, book i.,) attacked and 
refuted the doctrine of innate ideas. It hasbeen questioned, 
however, whether the doctrine, as represented by Locke, 
was really held by the ancient philosophers. And Dr. 
Hutcheson (Oratio Inaugiiralis^ De Naturali hominum 
Societate) has the following passage : — '"'' Omnes autem ideas, 
apprehensiones, et judicia, quge de rebus, duce nature 
formamus, quocunque demum tempore hoc fiat, sive quae 
naturse nostrse viribus quibuscunque,* necessario fere, atque 

^ We have here, in 1730, the two marks oi necessity ar.d universality which subse- 
quently were so much insisted on hy Kant and others as characterizing all our a 
■priori cognitions. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 259 

INNATE— 

universaliter recipiuntur, innata, quantum memini, dixe- 
runt antiqui." Among modern philosophers it would be 
difficult to name any who held the doctrine in the form 
in which it has been attacked by Locke. In calling some 
of our ideas innate they seem merely to have used this 
word as synonymous with natural^ and applied it, as 
Hutcheson thinks the ancients did, to certam ideas which 
men, as human or rational beings, necessarily and uni- 
versally entertain.— See Natural as distinguished from 
Innate. 

*' There are three senses in which an idea may be sup- 
posed to be innate ; one, if it be something originally super- 
added to our mental constitution, either as an idea in the 
first instance fully developed ; or as one undeveloped, but 
having the power of self- development : another, if the idea 
is a subjective condition of any other ideas, which we 
receive independently of the previous acquisition of this 
idea, and is thus proved to be in some way embodied in or 
interwoven with the powers by which the mind receives 
those ideas : a third, if, without being a subjective condition 
of other ideas, there be any faculty or faculties of mind, 
the exercise of which would suffice, independently of any 
knowledge acquired from without, spontaneously to pro- 
duce the idea. In the first case, the idea is given us at 
our first creation, without its bearing any special relation 
to our other faculties ; in the second case, it is given us as 
a form, either of thought generally or of some particular 
species of thought, and is therefore embodied in mental 
powers by which we are enabled to receive the thought : 
in the third case, it is, as in the second, interwoven in the 
original constitution of some mental power or powers : 
not, however, as in the preceding case, simply as a pre- 
requisite to their exercise, but by their being so formed 
as by exercise spontaneously to produce the idea." — 
Dr. Alliot, PsycJwlogy and Theology^ p. 93, 12mo, Lond. 
1855. 

The first of these three is the form in vrhlch the doctrine 



260 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

INNATE— 

of inFiate ideas is commonly understood. This doctrine 
was at one time thought essential to support the principles 
of natural religion and morality. But Locke saw that 
these principles were safe from the attacks of the sceptic, 
although a belief in God and immortality and a sense of the 
difference between right and wrong were not implanted or 
inserted in the mind ; if it could be shown that men neces- 
sarily and universally came to them by the ordinary use of 
their faculties. He took a distinction between an innate lav7 
and a laio of nature {Essay on Hum. Understand,^ book i., 
ch. 3) ; and while he did not admit that there was a law 
'' imprinted on our minds in their very original," contended 
'' that there is a law knowable by the light of nature." In 
like manner, Bishop Law said (King's Essay on Origin of 
Evil., P' 79, note), ''It will really come to the same thing 
with regard to the usual attributes of God, and the nature 
of virtue and vice, whether the Deity has implanted these 
instincts and affections in us, or has framed and disposed us 
in such a manner — has given us such powers and placed us 
in such circumstances, that we must necessarily acquu^e 
them." — V. Nature (Law of.) 

'' Though it appears not that we have any innate ideas 
or formed notions or principles laid in by nature, ante- 
cedently to the exercise of our senses and understandings ; 
yet it must be granted, that we were born with the natural 
faculty, whereby we actually discern the agreement or dis- 
agreement of some notions, so soon as we have the notions 
themselves ; as, that we can or do think, that therefore we 
ourselves are ; that one and two make three, that gold is 
not silver, nor ice formally water ; that the whole is greater 
than its part, &c., and if we should set ourselves to do it, we 
cannot deliberately and seriously doubt of its being so. 
This we may call intuitive knowledge, or natural certainty 
wrought into our very make and constitution." — Oldfield, 
Essay on Reason^ p. 5, 8vo, Lond., 1707. 

" Some writers have imagined, that no conclusions can 
be drawn from the state of the passions for or against the 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 261 

IIVNATK— 

Divine Benevolence, because they are not innate but 
acquii-ed. This is frivolous. If we are so framed and 
placed in such circumstances, that all these various passions 
must be acquired ; it is just the same thing as if they had 
been planted in us originally.'' — Balguy, Divine Benevolence^ 
p. 100, note. 

'• Xi nos idees, ni nos sentiments, ne sent innes, mais ils 
sont naturels, fondes sur la constitution de notre esprit et 
de notre ame, et sm* nos rapports avec tout ce qui nous 
environne." G^uvres de Turgot, torn. iv.. p. 308 ; quoted 
by Cousin, (Eavres^ 1 serie, tom. iv., p. 202. 

The doctrine of innate ideas is handled by Locke in his 
Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book i., and by most authors 
who treat of intellectual philosophy. — See also Ellis, 
Knowledge of Divine Things, pp. 59-86. Sherlock. On the 
Immortality of the Soul., chap. 2. 
INSTINCT Qv or iuTo; and dri^ni'^ intus pungere) — signifies 
an internal stimulus. 

In its Avidest signification, it has been applied to plants 
as well as to animals; and may be defined to be "the 
power or energy by which all organized forms ai'e pre- 
served in the individual, or continued in the species.'' It 
is more common, however, to consider instinct as belonging 
to animals. And in this view of it Dr. Eeid (^Active 
Powers^ essay iii., part 1, chap. 2) has said: — "By instinct 
I mean a natural blind impulse to certam actions without 
having any end in ^iew. without deliberation, and very 
often without any conception of what we do." An instinct 
says Paley (Nat. Theoh, chap. 18), '• is a propensity prior 
to experience and independent of instruction." 

''An instinct," says Dr. Whately {Tract on Instinct^ 
p. 21), "is a blind tendency to some mode of action inde- 
pendt'nt of any consideration on the part of the agent, of 
the end to which the action leads." 

There are two classes of actions, which, in the inferior 
animals, have been refeiTcd to instinct as their sprmg. 1. 
Tliose which have reference to the preservation of mdivi- 



262 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

INSTINCT— 

duals — as the seeking and discerning the food which is 
convenient for them, and the using their natural organs of 
locomotion, and their natural means of defence and attack. 
2. Those which have reference to the continuation of the 
species — as the bringing forth and bringing up of their 
young. 

The theories which have been proposed to explain the 
instinctive operations of the inferior animals may be 
arranged in three classes. 

I. According to the pliysical theories, the operations of 
imtinct are all provided for in the structure and organiza- 
tion of the inferior animals, and do not imply any mind or 
soul. The principle of life may be developed — 

1. By the mechanical play of bodily organs. See Des- 
cartes, Epistles ; Polignac, Anti- Lucretius^ book vi. ; Norris, 
Essay towards the Theory of an Ideal World^ part 2, ch. 2. 

2. By Irritability : Badham, Insect Life ; Mason Good, 
Booh of Nature^ vol. ii., p. 132; Yirey, De la Physiologic 
dans ses rapports avec la Philosophies p. 394. 

3. By Sensation : Bushnan, Philosophy of Instinct and 
Reason^ p. 178 ; Barlow, Connection between Physiology 
and Intellectual Philosophy ; Kirby, Bridgewater Treatise^ 
vol. ii., p. 255. 

II. According to the psychical theories, the instinctive 
actions of the inferior animals are the results of mental 
powers or faculties possessed by them, analogous to those 
of understanding in man. 

1. Mr. Coleridge calls instinct " the power of selecting 
and adapting means to a proximate end." But he thinks 
'' that when instinct adapts itself, as it sometimes does, to 
varying circumstances, there is manifested by the inferior 
animals, an instinctive intelligence, which is not different 
in kind from understanding, or the faculty which judges 
according to sense in man." — Aids to Reflection^ vol. i., p. 
193, 6th edit. ; Green, Vital Dynamics^ app. F., p. 88, or 
Coleridge's Works^ vol. ii., app, B., p. 5. 

2. Dr. Darwin contends {Zoonomia^Yol. i., 4to, pp. 256-7), 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 263 

INSTINCT— 

that what have been called the instinctive actions of the 
inferior animals are to be referred to experience and 
reasoning, as well as those of our own species; ''though 
their reasoning is from fewer ideas, is busied about fewer 
objects, and is exerted with less energy." 

3. Mr. Smellie {Philosopliy of Nat. Hist.., vol. i., 4to, 
p. 155), instead of regarding the instinctive actions of the 
inferior animals as the results of reasoning, regards the 
power of reasoning as itself an zns^mct He holds that "all 
animals are, in some measure, rational beings ; and that 
the dignity and superiority of the human intellect are 
necessary results of the great variety of instincts which 
nature has been pleased to confer on the species." — p. 
159. 

III. According to the theories which may be called 
liyperpsycMcal.^ th^ phenomena of instinct are the results of 
an intelligence, different from the human, which emanates 
upon the inferior animals from the supreme spiiit or some 
subordinate spirit. 

This doctrine is wrapped up in the ancient fable, that 
the gods, when pursued by the Titans, fled into Eg^'pt, and 
took refuge under the form of animals of different kinds. 

Father Bougeant, in a work entitled, A PMlosopliical 
Amusement on the Language of Beasts, contends that the 
bodies of the inferior animals are inhabited by fallen and 
reprobate spirits. 

Mr. French {Zoological Journal., ISTo. 1) holds that the 
actions of the inferior animals are produced by good and 
evil spirits ; the former being the cause of the henevolent^ 
and the latter oi tho, ferocious instincts. 

Others have referred the operations of instinct to the 
direct agency of the Creator on the inferior animals. — See 
ISTewton, Optics^ book iii., xx., query subjoined ; Spectator.^ 
1^0. 120 ; Hancock, Essay on Instinct. 

Dr. Reid has maintained {Active Powers., essay iii., pt. 1, 
chap. 2) that in the human being many actions, such as 
sucking and swallowing, are done by instinct; while Dr. 



264 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IIVSTINCT— 

Priestley {Examinat. of Reid^ &c , p. 70) regards them as 
automatic or acquired. And tlie interpretation of natural 
signs and other acts which Dr. Reid considers to be instinc- 
tive, Dr. Priestley refers to association and experience. 

INTEliIiECT (inter -leg ere^ to choose between, to perceive 
a difference). — Intellect^ sensitivity^ and will^ are the 
three heads under which the powers and capacities of the 
human mind are now generally arranged. In this use of it, 
the term intellect includes all those powers by which we 
acquire, retain, and extend our knowledge, as perception, 
memory, imagination, judgment, &c. *'It is by those 
powers and faculties which compose that part of his nature 
commonly called his intellect or understanding that man 
acquires his knowledge of external objects ; that he investi- 
gates truth in the sciences ; that he combines means in 
order to attain the ends he has in view ; and that he 
imparts to his fellow -creatures the acquisitions he has 
made." — Stewart, Active and Moral Powers^ introd. 

The intellectual powers are commonly distinguished from 
the moral powers ; inasmuch as it is admitted that the 
moral powers partake partly of the intellect and partly of 
the sensitivity^ and imply not only knowledge but feeling. 

And when the moral powers are designated active, it is 
not meant to assert that in exercising the intellectual 
powers the mind is altogether passive, but only to intimate 
that while the function of the intellectual powers is to give 
knowledge, the function of the active and moral powers is 
to prompt and regulate actions. 

Lord Monboddo {Ancient Metaphysics^ book ii., chap. 7) 
reduces the gnostic powers to two, viz. — sense and intellect. 
Under sense he includes the phantasy and also the compar- 
ing faculty, and that by which we apprehend ideas, either 
single or in combination. This he considers to be partly 
rational, and shared by us with the brutes. But intellect or 
uovg^ he considers peculiar to man — it is the faculty by which 
we generalize and have ideas altogether independent of 
sense. He quotes Hierocles on the golden verses of Pytha- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



265 



INTEI.I.ECT— 

goras (p. 160, edit. Xeedham), as representing the Tioyogor 
'4yvx-ri y^oyiK-/}, as holding a middle place betwixt the irra- 
tional or lowest part of our nature and intellect, which is 
the highest. 

'' The term intellect is derived from a verb (intelligere), 
which signifies to understand: but the term itself is usually 
so applied as to imply a faculty which recognizes principles 
explicitly as well as implicitly ; and abstract as well as 
applied ; and therefore agrees with the reason rather than 
the understanding ; and the same extent of signification 
belongs to the adjective intellectual."— ^Yhewell, Elements 
of Morality^ introd. 12. 
Intellect and InteUection. — '' The mind of man is, by its 
native faculty, able to discern universal propositions, in 
the same manner as the sense does particular ones — 
that is, as the truth of these propositions — Socrates exists, 
An eagle flies, Bucephalus runs, is immediately perceived and 
judged of by the sense ; so these contradictory propositions 
cannot be both true ; TMiat begins to exist has its rise from 
another ; Action argues that a thing exists (or as it is vulgarly 
expressed, a thing that is not. acts not), and such-like pro- 
positions, which the mind directly contemplates and finds 
to be true by its native force, without any previous notion 
or applied reasoning ; which method of attaining truth is 
by a peculiar name styled intellection^ and the faculty of 
attaining it the intellect.'' — Barrow, Mathemat. Lectures, 
1734:, p. 72. 
InteUect and Intelligence. — *' By Aristotle, uovg is used to 
denote — 

'' 1. Our higher faculties of thought and knowledge. 

'• 2. The faculty, habit, or place of principles, that is of 
self-e^-ident and self- evidencing notions and judgments. 

'^ The schoolmen, following Boethius, translated it by 
intellectus and intelligentia ; and some of them appropriated 
the former of these terms to its first or general signification, 
the latter to its second or special.'' — Sir Will. Hamilton, 
ReicVs Work's^ note A, sect. 5. 



2Q6 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Intellect and intelligence are commonly used as synony- 
mous. But Trusler has said, "It seems to me that intel- 
lectus ought to describe art or power ^ and intelligentia ought 
to describe use or liahit of the understanding ; such being 
the tendency of the inflections in which the words terminate. 
In this case intellect or understanding power is a gift of 
nature ; and intelligence^ or understanding habit, an accu- 
mulation of time. So discrimmated, intellect is inspired, 
intelligence is acquired. The Supreme Intellect^ when we 
are speaking of the Wisdom, the Supreme Intelligence when 
we are speaking of the Knowledge of God. Every man is 
endowed with understanding ; but it requires reading to 
become a man of intelligence^ — V. Keason, Under- 
standing. 
Sntellectus Patieiis and Intellectus Agens. — Aristotle dis- 
tinguished between the intellectus p aliens and the intellectus 
agens. The former, perishing with the body (De Anima^ 
cap. 5), by means of the senses, imagination and memory, 
furnished the matter of knowledge ; the latter, separable 
from the body and eternal, gave that knowledge form. 
Under the impressions of the senses the mind is passive ; 
but while external things rapidly pass, imagination does 
not allow them altogether to escape, but the knowledge of 
them is retained by the memory. But this knowledge, 
being the knowledge of singulars, cannot give universal 
notions, but merely generalized ones. The intellectus agens, 
however, proceeding upon the information furnished by the 
senses, actually evolves the idea which the intellectus patiens 
potentially possessed. His illustration is, — as light makes 
colours existing potentially, actually to be, so the intellectus 
agens converts into actuality, and brings, as it were, to a 
new life, whatever was discovered or collected by the 
intellectus patiens. As the senses receive the forms of 
things expressed in matter, the intellect comprehends the 
universal form, which, free from the changes of matter, is 
really prior to it and underlies the production of it as cause. 
The common illustration of Aristotle is that the senses per- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 267 

IIVTEIiliECT— 

ceive the form of tilings as it is to ai^uou or a height, the 
intellect has knowledge of it as resembling to xoA<y, a 
hollow, out of which the height was produced. 

Aristotle has often been said to reduce all knowledge to 
experience. But although he maintained that we could 
not shut our eves and frame laws and causes for all things, 
yet he maintained, while he appealed to experience, that 
the intellect was the ultimate judge of what is true. 

See Herman Rassow, Aristotelis de Notionis Definitione 
Doctrina. Berol., 1843. 

According to Thomas Aquinas {Aclv, Gentes^ lib. iii., 
cap. 41.) '''- Intellectus noster niJiil intelligit sine pliantasmateJ''' 
But he distinguished between the intellect passive and the 
intellect active; the one receiying impressions from the 
senses, and the other reasoning on them. Sense knows 
the individual, intellect the universal. You see a triangle, 
but you rise to the idea of triangularity. It is this power 
of generalizing which specializes man and makes him what 
he is, intelligent. 
INTENT or INTENTION (in-tendere^ to tend to) — in 
morals and in law, means that act of the mind by which 
we contemplate and design the accomplishment of some 
end. It is followed by the adoption and use of suitable 
means. But this is more directly indicated by the word 
purpose. '''- He had long harboured the intention of taking 
away the life of his enemy, and for this purpose he provided 
himself with weapons." Purpose is a step nearer action 
than intention. But both in law and in morals, intention., 
according as it is right or wrong, good or bad, affects the 
nature or character of the action following. According to 
the doctrine of the Church of Rome, intention may alto- 
gether change the nature of an action. Killing may be no 
murder, if done with the intention of freeing the church from 
a persecutor, and society from a t}Tant. And if a priest 
admmisters any of the sacraments without the intention of 
exercismg his priestly functions, these sacraments may be 
rendered void. — V. Election. 



268 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

INTENTION (liOgical). 

Quoth he, whatever others deem ye, 

I understand your metonymy,* 

Your words of second-hand intention, 

"When things by wrongful names you mention. 

Butler, Hudihras, part ii., canto 3, 1. 587. 

Intention^ with logicians, has the same meaning as notion ; 

as it is by notions the mind tends towards or attends to 

objects. — V. Notion. 

Intention (First and Second). 

" Nouns of the^rs^ intention are those which are imposed 
upon things as such, that conception alone intervening, by 
which the mind is carried immediately to the thing itself. 
Such are man and stone. But nouns of the second intention 
are those which are imposed upon things not in virtue of 
what they are in themselves, but in virtue of their being 
subject to the intention which the mind makes concerning 
them ; as when we say that man is a species^ and animal 
a genusy — Aquinas, Opuscula, xlii., art. 12, ad init. 

'•'• Intentio nihil aliud est quam qugedam ratio intelligendi 
rem ut est in pluribus, seu quasdam cogitatio rei ; sicut uni- 
versale nihil aliud est quam quae dam ratio intelligendi rem 
ut est in pluribus, et genus nihil aliud est quam quagdam 
ratio intelligendi rem ut est in pluribus difFerentibus 
specie ; et sic de aliis. Logica igitur est de secundis inten- 
tionibus, non in abstracto, sed in concreto, ut concernunt 
rem primo intellectam." 

Raoul le Breton, Super Lihh. Poster. Analyt. He was a 
Thomist. 

See Tractatio de Secundis Intentionihus secundum doctri- 
nam Scoti. By Sarnanus, 4to, Ursellis, 1622. 

A first intention maybe defined '' a conception of a thing 
or things formed by the mind from materials existing 
without itself." 

A second intention is " a conception of another concep- 

* " The transference of words from the primary to a secondary meaning, is what 
grammarians call metonymy. Thus a door signifies both an opening in the wall 
(more strictly called the door-way) and a board which closes it ; which are things 
neither similar nor analogous."— Whately, Logic, h. iii., sect. 10. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 260 

INTENTION— 

tion or conceptions formed by the mind from materials 
existing in itself.'' Thus the conceptions ''ma/z, animal^ 
wJiiteness^^^ &c., are framed from marks presented by natural 
objects. "The conceptions, ^e^zw^', species^ accident^ &c., are 
formed from the first intentions themselves viewed in certain 
relations to each other." — Mansell, Note to Aldrich, 1849, 
pp. 16-17. 

See Review of Whately^s Logic^ No. cxv., Edin. Revietv. 

^'•Thejirst intention of a term is a certain vague and gene- 
ral signification of it, as opposed to one more precise and 
limited, which it bears in some particular art, science, or 
system, and which is called its second intention. Thus 
among farmers, in some parts of the world, beast is applied 
particularly and especially to the ox kind ; and bird, in the 
language of many sportsmen, is in like manner appropriated 
to the partridge : the common and general acceptation of 
each of these words, is the Jirst intention, the other is its 
second intention. 

'' The doctrine that logic is concerned only with the 
forms of thought was expressed by the old logicians when 
they said that it treated of ' second intentions applied to first, '^ 
A first intention being an image or idea, or copy in the 
mind of something objective, or conceived of as objective : 
of something really existing or supposed to be reaUy exist- 
ing : while a second intention is an idea or image or copy in 
the mind of a mode or form of thought. In other words it 
has to do not with things, but with our w^ay of thinking of 
things." — Karslake, Aids to Study of Logic, book i., 8vo, 
Oxf , 1851, p. 11. 
INTUITION (from intueri, to behold). — " Sometimes the mind 
perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas im- 
mediately by themselves, without the intervention of any 
other ; and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge. 
For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, 
but perceives the truth as the eye doth the light, only by 
being directed towards it. Thus, the mind perceives that 
white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three 



270 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

INTUITION— 

are more tlian two, and equal to one and two." — Locke, 
Essay on Hum, Understand.^ b. iv., cli. 2. 

" What we know or comprehend as soon as we perceive 
or attend to it, we are said to know by intuition : things 
which we know by intuition^ cannot be made more certain 
by arguments, than they are at first. We know by intuition 
that all the parts of a thing together are equal to the whole 
of it. Axioms are propositions known by intuition,^'' — 
Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

In the philosophy of Kant, intuition is almost synonymous 
with external perception ; — with this exception, that it 
applies both to the objects perceived and the absolute con- 
ditions under which they are perceived. Hence there are 
pure intuitions^ answering to notions of time and space, and 
empirical intuitions^ answering to the representations of 
sensible objects. Kant denied the existence of purely intel- 
lectual intuitions. On the other hand, he held an intellectual 
intuition by which reality revealed itself to the reason. 
Schelling also maintains an intellectual intuition by which 
the mind seizes the absolute in its identity. This approaches 
the sense of intuition in theology; from which it passed into 
philosophy, viz., a supernatural beholding of God awarded 
by grace to some chosen spirits in this life, and to the souls 
of believers after death. 

On the difference between knowledge as intuitive^ im- 
mediate, or presentative^ and as mediate, or representative, — 
See Sir W. Hamilton, Reid''s Works, note B. 

Intuition. — "Besides its original and proper meaning 
(as a visual perception), it has been employed to denote a 
Mnd of apprehension and a kind of judgment. Under the 
former head it has been used to denote, 1. A perception 
of the actual and present, in opposition to the abstractive 
knowledge which we have of the possible in imagination, 
and of the past in memory. 2. An immediate apprehension 
of a thing in itself, in contrast to a representative, vicarious 
or mediate, apprehension of it, in or through something 
else. (Hence by Fichte, Schelling, and others, intuition is 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 271 

INTUITION— 

employed to designate the cognition as opposed to tlie con- 
ception of the absolute.) 3. The knowledge, which we 
can adequately represent in imagination, in contradistinction 
to the ' symbolical ' knowledge which we cannot image, 
but only think or conceive, through and under a sign or word. 
(Hence, probably, Kant's application of the term to the 
forms of the sensibility, the imag-inations of Time and Space, 
in contrast to the forms or categories of the Understanding). 

4. Perception proper (the objective), in contrast to sensa- 
tion proper (the subjective), in our sensitive consciousness. 

5. The simple apprehension of a notion, in contradistinc- 
tion to the complex apprehension of the terms of a pro- 
position. 

'' Under the latter head it has only a single signification, 
viz. : — ^To denote the immediate affirmation by the intellect, 
that the predicate does or does not pertain to the subject, 
in what are called self-evident propositions." — Sir W. 
Hamilton, ReicTs Works ^ note A, sect. 5, p. 759. 

'•'- Intuition has been applied by Dr. Beattie and others, 
not only to the power by which we perceive the truth of 
the axioms of geometry, but to that by which we recognize 
the authority of the fundamental lavfs of belief, when we 
hear them enunciated in language. My only objection to 
this use of the word is, that it is a departure from common 
practice ; according to which, if I be not mistaken, the 
proper objects of intuition are propositions analogous to the 
axioms prefixed to Euclid's Elements. In some other 
respects, this innovation might perhaps be regarded as an 
improvement on the very limited and imperfect vocabulary 
of which we are able to avail ourselves in our present dis- 
cussions." — Stewart, Philosopli. of Hum. Mind^ part 2, 
chap. 1, sect. 2, 

'-'- Intuition is used in the extent of the German Anscliaung^ 
to include all the products of the perceptive (external or 
internal) and imaginative faculties ; every act of conscious- 
ness, in short, of which the immediate object is an individual, 
thing, state, or act of mind, presented under the condition 



272 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

INTUITION— 

of distinct existence in space or time." — Mansell, Prolegom. 
Log,, p. 9. 

'' Intuition is properly attributed and should be carefully 
restricted, to those instinctive faculties and impulses, ex- 
ternal and internal, which act instantaneously and irresis- 
tibly, which were given by nature as the first inlets of all 
knowledge, and which we have called the Primary Principles, 
whilst self-evidence may be justly and properly attributed 
to axioms, or the Secondary Principles of truth." — Tatham, 
Chart and Scale of Truth, ch. vii., lect. 1. 
INVENTION (in-venire, to come in) — is the creation or con- 
struction of something which has not before existed. Dis- 
covery is the making manifest something which hitherto has 
been unknown. We discover what is hidden. We come at 
new objects. Galileo invented the telescope. Harvey dis- 
covered the circulation of the blood. 

''We speak of the invention of printing, the discovery of 
America. Shift these words, and speak, for instance, of 
the invention of America, you feel at once how unsuitable 
the language is. And why? Because Columbus did not 
make that to be which before him had not been. America 
was there before he revealed it to European eyes ; but that 
which before was, he showed to be ; he withdrew the veil 
which hitherto had concealed it, he discovered it." — Trench, 
On Words. 

IN'ewton discovered the law of gravitation, but Watt 
invented the steam engine. We speak with a true distinc- 
tion, of the inventions of Art, the discoveries of Science. 

In Locke and his contemporaries, to say nothing of the 
older writers, to invent is currently used for to discover. 
Thus Bacon says, " Logic does not pretend to invent science, 
or the axioms of sciences, but passes it over with a cuique 
in sua arte credendum.^^ — Adv. of Learning. 

The object of invention is to produce something which 
had no existence before ; that of discovery to bring to light 
something which did exist, but which was concealed from 
common observation. Thus we say, Otto Guericke invented 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 27 O 

IIWENTION— 

the air pump ; Sanitorlus invented the thermometer ; Newton 
and Gregory invented the reflecting telescope ; Galileo dis- 
covered the solar spots, and Harvey discovered the circula- 
tion of the blood. It appears, therefore, that improvements 
in the arts are properly called Inventions ; and that facts 
brought to light by means of observation, are properly called 
Discoveries. — Stewart, Philosoph. of Hum. Mind., ch. 5. 



jrUDOMENT. — " A judgment is a combination of two concepts, 
related to one or more common objects of possible intuition." 
— Mansell, Prolegom. Log.^ p. 60. 

Our judgments, according to Aristotle, are either prohle- 
matical^ assertive^ or demonstrable; or in other words, the 
results of opinion^ of belief or of science. 

''The problematical judgment is neither subjectively nor 
objectively true, that is, it is neither held with entire 
certainty by the thinking subject, nor can we show that it 
truly represents the object about which we judge. It is a 
mere opinion. It may, however, be the expression of our 
presentiment of certainty ; and what was held as mere 
opinion before proof, may afterwards be proved to demon- 
stration. Great discoveries are problems at first, and the 
examination of them leads to a conviction of their truth, 
as it has done to the abandonment of many false opinions. 
In other subjects, we cannot, from the nature of the case, 
advance beyond mere opinion. Whenever we judge about 
variable things, as the future actions of men, the best course 
of conduct for ourselves under doubtful circumstances, his- 
torical facts about which there is conflicting testimony, we 
can but form a problematical y?^c?^7?ze7?^, and must admit the 
possibility of error at the moment of making our decision. 

''The assertive judgment is one of which we are fully 
persuaded ourselves, but cannot give grounds for our belief 
that shall compel men in general to coincide with us. It is 
therefore subjectively^ but not objectively^ certain. It 
commends itself to our moral nature, and in so fav as 



T 



274 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

JTUIJOMENT— 

otter men are of the same disposition, they will accept it 
likewise. 

''The demonstrative judgment is both subjectively and 
objectively true. It may either be certain in itself, as a 
mathematical axiom is, or capable of proof by means of 
other judgments, as the theories of mathematics and the 
laws of physical science." — Thomson, Outline of Laws of 
TJiought, pp. 304-6. 

Port Royal definition: — '-'• Judgment h that operation of 
the mind through which, joining different ideas together, it 
affirms or denies the one or the other ; as when, for instance, 
having the ideas of the earth and roundness, it affirms or 
denies that the earth is round." 

The old definition oi judgment was, ''It is an act of the 
mind, whereby one thing is affirmed or denied of another." 

When expressed in words a judgment is called a proposi- 
tion. According to Mr. Locke, judgment implies the com- 
parison of two or more ideas. But Dr. Reid says he applies 
the word judgment to every determination of the mind con- 
cerning what is true or false, and shows that many of these 
determinations are simple and primitive beliefs (not the 
result of comparing two or more ideas), accompanying the 
exercise of all our faculties, judgments of nature, the spon- 
taneous product of intelligence. — Intell. Powers^ essay vi., 
eh. 1. 

Chap. 4. — " One of the most important distinctions of our 
judgments is, that some of them are intuitive, others 
grounded on argument." 

In his Inquiry^ ch. ii., sect. 4, he shows ths^t judgment and 
belief, so far from arising from the comparison of ideas, in 
some cases precede even simple apprehension. 
Judgments, Analytic, Synthethic, and Tautologous. — 
" Some judgments are merely explanatory of their subject, 
having for their predicate a conception which it fairly 
implies, to all who know and can define its nature. They 
are called analytic judgments because they unfold the 
meaning of the subject, without determining anything new 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 275 

concerning it. If we say that 'all triangles have three 
sides,' the judgment is analytic ; because having three sides 
is always implied in a right notion of a triangle. Such 
judgments^ as declaring the nature or essence of the subject, 
have been called ' essential propositions.' 

'-'- Judgments of another class attribute to the subject 
something not directly implied in it and thus increase our 
knowledge. They are called synthetic^ from placing together 
two notions not hitherto associated. ' All bodies possess 
power of attraction ' is a synthetic judgment^ because we 
can think of bodies without thinking of attraction as one of 
their immediate primary attributes. 

" We must distinguish between analytic and tautologous 
judgments. Whilst the analytic display the meaning of 
the subject and put the same matter in a new form., the 
tautologous only repeat the subject, and give us the same 
matter in the same form, as 'Whatever is, is.' 'A spirit 
is a spirit.' 

" It is a misnomer to call analytic judgments identical pro- 
positions. — Mill, Logic, b. i., chap. 6. 'Every man is a 
living creature ' would not be an identical proposition 
unless ' hving creature ' denoted the same as ' man ; ' 
whereas it is far more extensive. Locke understands by 
identical propositions only such as are tautologous (b. iv., 
ch. 8, 3)." — Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought., pp. 194-5. 
jruRiSPRUIJENCE (Juris -prudentia., the science of rights). — 
Some refer the Latin word jus to jussum., the supine of the 
verb juheo.^ to order or enact. Others refer it to justum^ 
that which is just and right. But as right is, or ought to 
be, the foundation of positive law, a thing is jussum^ quia 
justum est — made law because it was antecedently just and 
right. 

Jurisprudence is the science of rights in accordance with 
positive law. It is distinguished into universal and par- 
ticular. "The former relates to the science of law in 
general, and investigates the principles which are common 
to all positive systems of law, apart from the local, partial, 



276 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

jrURISPRIJI>ElVCE— 

and accidental circumstances and peculiarities by wliich 
these systems respectively are distinguished from one 
another. Particular jurisprudence treats of the laws of 
particular states ; which laws are, or at least profess to be, 
the rules and principles of universal jurisprudence itself, 
specifically developed and applied." 

There is a close connection between ji^risprudence and 
morality^ so close that it is difficult to determine precisely 
the respective limits of each. Both rest upon the great law 
of right and wrong as made known by the light of nature. 
But while morality enjoins obedience to that law in all its 
extent, jurisprudence exacts obedience to it only in so far 
as the law of nature has been recognized in the law of 
nations or the positive institutions of society. Morality is, 
therefore, more extensive than jurisprudence. Morality has 
equal reference to the whole of human duty. Jurisprudence 
has special reference to social duty. All social duty as 
enjoined by the light of nature —whether included under 
justice or benevolence — belongs to morality. Jurispru- 
dence treats chiefly or almost exclusively of duties of justice, 
which have been made the subject of positive law ; which 
duties of benevolence cannot well be. The rules of morality 
as such, are enforced merely by the law within ; but in so 
far as they have been adopted by jurisprudence^ they can 
be enforced by external law. The moralist appeals to our 
sense of duty, the jurist to a sense of authority or law. 
^^ As the sense of duty is the sense of moral necessity 
simply, and excluding the sense of physical (or external) 
compulsion, so the sense of law is the sense of the same 
necessity, in combination with the notion of physical (or 
external) compulsion in aid of its requirements." — ^Foster, 
Elements of Jurisprudence^ p. 39. 

The difference between morality dixidi jurisprudence as to 
extent of range, may be illustrated by the difference of 
signification between the word right^ when used as an 
adjective, and when used as a substantive. Morality con- 
templates all that is right in action and in disposition. 



I 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 277 

3 «JKISPRtJI>EN€E— 

Jwrisprudence contemplates only that which one man has a 
right to from another. '' The adjective right^^^ says Dr. 
Whewell (Elements of Morality, No. 84), ''has a much 
wider signification than the substantive right. Everything 
is right which is conformable to the supreme rule of human 
action; but that only is a right which ^ being conformable 
to the supreme rule, is realized in society, and vested in a 
particular person. Hence the two words may often be 
properly opposed. We may say, that, a poor man has no 
right to relief; but it is right he should have it. A rich 
man has a ricjht to destroy the harvest of his fields ; but to 
do so would not he ricjUy So that the sphere o^ morality 
is wider than that oi jurisprudence,— th^ former embracing 
all that is right, the latter only particular rights realized 
or vested in particular persons. 

Morality and jurisprudence differ also in the immediate 
ground of obligation. Morality enjoins us to do what is 
right, because it is right. Jurisprudence enjoins us to give 
to others their right, with ultimate reference, no doubt, to 
the truth made known to us by the light of nature, that we 
are morally bound to do so ; but, appealing more directly 
to the fact, that our doing so can be demanded by our 
neighbour, and that his demand will be enforced by the 
authority of positive law. And this difference between the 
immediate ground of obligation in matters of morality and 
matters of jurisj^rudence, gives rise to a difference of mean- 
ing in the use of some words which are generally employed 
as synonymous. For example, if regard be had to the 
difference between morality and jurisprudence, duty is a 
word of wider signification than ohligation ; just as right, 
the adjective, is of wider signification than right, the sub- 
stantive. It is my duty to do what is right. I am under 
ohligation to give another man his 7'ight. A similar shade 
of difference in meaning may be noticed in reference to the 
words ought and obliged. I ought to do my duty ; I am 
obliged to give a man his right. I am not obliged to relieve 
a distressed person, but I ought to do so. 



278 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

These distinctions are sometimes explained by saying, that 
what is enjoined by jurisprudence is of perfect ohligation^ 
and what is enjoined only by morality is of imperfect obli- 
gation^ — that is, that we may or may not do what our 
conscience dictates, but that we can be compelled to do 
what positive law demands. But these phrases of perfect 
and imperfect obligation are objectionable in so far as they 
tend to represent the obligations of morality as inferior to 
those of jurisprudence — the dictates of conscience as of less 
authority than the enactments of law — whereas the latter 
rest upon the former, and the law of nations derives its 
binding force from the law of natm^e. 

Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pais. 

Puffendorff, De Officio Hominis et Civis, 

Leibnitz, Jurisprudentia. 

Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws. 

Burlamaqui, Principles of Natural Law. 

Eutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, 

Mackintosh, Discourse of the Law of Nature and of 
Nations. 

Lerminier, Sur le Droit. 
JUSTICE QiKUiOdvuv}^ justitia) — ^is one of the four cardinal vir- 
tues. It consists, according to Cicero (De Finihus^ lib. v., 
cap. 23), in suo cuique tribuendo^ in according to every 
one his right. By the Pythagoreans, and also by Plato, it 
was regarded as including all human virtue or duty. And 
Cicero has also used it in this sense when he said, Pietas 
est justitia ergo Deos. The word righteousness is used in 
our translation of the Scripture in a like extensive signi- 
fication. As opposed to equity, justice (to uo^uikov) means 
doing merely what positive law requires, while equity (ro 
hou) means doing what is fair and right in the circum- 
stances of every particular case. Justice is not founded 
in law, as Hobbes and others hold, but in our idea of 
what is right. And laws are just or unjust in so far as 
they do or do not conform to that idea. 

'' To say that there is nothing just nor unjust but what is 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 279 

JUSTICE— 

commanded or prohibited by positive laws," remarks Mon- 
tesquieu {Spirit of Laws ^ book L, chap. 1), "is like saying 
that the radii of a circle were not equal till you had drawn 
the circumference." 

Justice may be distinguished as ethical, economical, and 
political. The first consists in doing justice between man 
and man as men ; the second, in doing justice between the 
members of a family or household ; and the third, in domg 
justice between the members of a community or common- 
wealth. These distinctions are taken by More in his En- 
chiridion Etliicum^ and are adopted by Grove m his Moral 
Philosopliy . 

Plato's Republic contains a delineation oi justice. — Arist., 
Ethic.., lib. V. ; Cicero, Be Finibus, 

Horace gives the idea of a just or good man. — Epist.^ lib. 
i., 16, 40. — V, Right, Duty, Equity. 



KNOWIiEDOS: (yucoaig^ cognitio), 

.... "Learning dwells 
In heads replete with thoughts of other men, 
Knowledge in minds attentive to their own." 

''• Knowledges (or cognitions) — ^in common use with Bacon 
and our English philosophers, till after the time of Locke, 
ought not to be discarded. It is, however, unnoticed by 
any Enghsh lexicographer." — Sir William Hamilton, Reid's 
Works ^ note A, sect. 5, p. 763. 

'•''Knowledge is the perception of the connection and 
agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our 
ideas. Where this perception is, there is knoivledge ; and 
where it is not, then, though we may fancy, guess, or 
beheve, yet we always come short of hiowledge.^^ — Locke. 
Essay on Hum. Understand.., book iv., chap. 1. And in 
chap. 14, he says, ''The mind has two faculties conversant 
about truth and falsehood. First., knowledge, Avhereby it 
certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the 
agreement or disagreement of any ideas. Secondly, judg- 



280 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

menty which, is the putting ideas together, or separating 
them from one another in the mind^ when their certain 
agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but pre- 
sumed to be so." Knowledge is here opposed to opinion. 
But judgment is the faculty by which we attain to cer- 
tainty, as well as opinion. '-'- And," says Dr. Keid (IntelL 
Powers^ essay iv., chap. 3), ''I know no authority, besides 
that of Mr. Locke, for calling knowledge a faculty, any 
more than for calling opinion a faculty." 

^''Knowledge implies three things ; — 1st, Firm Belief ; 2d, 
Of what is true ; 3d, On sufficient grounds. If any one, e. g. , 
is in doiibt respecting one of Euclid's demonstrations, he 
cannot be said to know the proposition proved by it ; if, 
again, he is fully convinced of anything that is not true^ 
he is mistaken in supposing himself to know it; lastly, 
if two persons are Qd^oh fully confident ; one, that the moon 
is inhabited ; and the other, that it is not (though one of 
these opinions must be true), neither of them could pro- 
perly be said to know the truth, since he cannot have 
sufficient proof of it." — Whately, Logic^ book iv., chap. 2, 
sect. 2, note. 

Knowledge supposes three terms : a heing who knows, an 
ohject known, and a relation determined between the know- 
ing being and the known object. This relation properly 
constitutes knowledge. 

But this relation may not be exact, in conformity with 
the nature of things ; knowledge is not truth. Knowledge 
is a subjective conception — a relative state of the human 
mind ; it resides in the relation, essentially ideal, of our 
thought and its object. Truth., on the contrary, is the 
reality itself, the reality ontological and absolute, con- 
sidered in. their absolute relations with intelligence, and 
independent of our personal conceptions. Truth has its 
source in God ; knowledge proceeds from man. Knowledge 
is true and perfect from the moment that our conception 
is really conformable to that which is — from the moment 
that our thought has seized the reality. And, in this view, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 281 

truth may be defined to be the conformity of our thouglit 
with the nature of its object. 

But truth is not yet certitude. It may exist in itself 
without being acquired by the human mind, without exist- 
ing actually for us. It does not become certain to us till 
we have acquired it by the employment of method. Certi- 
tude is thus truth brought methodically to the human 
intelligence, — that is, conducted from principle to principle, 
to a point which is evident of itself. If such a point exist, 
it is plain that we can attain to all the truths which attach 
themselves to it directly or indirectly; and that we may 
have of these truths, howsoever remote, a certainty as com- 
plete as that of the point of departure. 

Certitude^ then, in its last analysis, is the relation of truth 
to Tcnoivledge^ the relation of man to God, of ontology to 
psychology. When the human intelligence, making its 
spring, has seized divine truth, in identifying itself with the 
reality, it ought then, in order to finish its work, to return 
upon itself, to individualize the truth in us ; and from this 
individualization resutlts the certitude which becomes, in 
some sort, personal, as knowledge ; all the while preser^dng 
the impersonal nature of truth. 

Certitude then reposes upon two points of support, the 
one subjective^ man or the human consciousness, the other 
objective and absolute, the Supreme Being. God and 
consciousness are the two arbiters of certitude. — Tiberghien, 
Essai des Connaiss, Hum., p. 34. 

''The schoolmen divided all human knowledge into two 
species, cognitio intuitiva^ and cognitio ahstractiva. By 
intuitive knowledge they signified that which we gain by 
an immediate presentation of the real individual object ; by 
abstractive, that which we gain and hold through the me- 
dium of a general term ; the one being, in modern language, 
a/)ercep^io?i, the other a concept." — Morell, Psychology,^, 158. 
KuoTFledge as Immediate and Preseutati^e or IntnitiTe — 
and as lUediate and Kepresentatirc or Remote. 

" A thing is known immediately or proximately, when 



282 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

we cognize it in itself ; mediately or remotely^ when we 
cognize it in or through something numerically different from 
itself Immediate cognition, tlius tlie knowledge of a thing 
in itself, involves the fact of its existence ; mediate cogni- 
tion, thus the knowledge of a thing in or through some- 
thing not itself, involves only the possibility of its existence. 

'' An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing- 
known is itself presented to observation, may be called a 
presentative ; and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as 
it were, viewed by the mind face to face^ may be called an 
intuitive cognition. A mediate cognition, inasmuch as the 
thing known is held up or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious 
representation, may be called a representative cognition. 

'''• A thing known is called an object of knowledge. 

''In a presentative or immediate cognition there is one 
sole object; the thing (immediately) known and the thing 
existing being one and the same. In a representative or 
mediate cognition there may be discriminated two objects ; 
the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing 
being numerically different. 

''A thing known in itself is the (sole) presentative or 
irduitive object of knowledge, or the (sole) object of a pre- 
sentative or intuitive knowledge, A thing known in arid 
through something else is the primary, mediate, remote, real, 
existent, or represented object of (mediate) knowledge — objec- 
turn quod; and a thing through ivhich something else is knoivn 
is the secondary, immediate, proximate, ideal, vicarious, or 
representative object of (mediate) knowledge — objectum quo or 
per quod. The former may likewise be styled — objectum enti- 
tativumy — Sir W. Hamilton, Reid^s Works, note B, sect. 1. 

Knowledge in respect of the mode in which it is obtained 
is intuitive or discursive. Intuitive when things are seen in 
themselves by the mind, or when objects are so clearly 
exhibited that there is no need of reasoning to perceive 
them — as, a whole is greater than any of its parts. Dis- 
cursive when objects are perceived by means of reasoning, 
as, the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 283 

KNOWI.EDOE— 

angles. In respect of its strength knowledge is certain or 
probable. If we attend to the degrees or ends of know- 
ledge, it is either science^ or art^ or experience^ or opinion^ 
or beliefs — q. v. 

^' Knowledge is not a couch whereon to rest a searching 
and reckless spirit, or a terrace for a wandering and 
variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect, 
or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon, or 
a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention, or 
a shop for profit or sale; but a rich store-house for the 
glory of the Creator, and the relief of man's estate." — Bacon. 

F. Certainty, Truth, Wisdom. 



liANGUAG-E is natural or artificial- Natural language ex- 
presses itself by features of the countenance, tones of the 
voice, and gestures and attitudes of the body. — See Reid, 
Inquiry., ch. 4, sect. 2. Artificial language expresses 
itself by words or signs which are conventionally under- 
stood. — F. Signs. 

liAUOHTER is the act of expressing our sense of the ridicu- 
lous. This act, or rather the sense of the ridiculous which 
prompts it, has been thought peculiar to man, as that 
which distinguishes him from the inferior animals.* — Dr. 
Hutcheson, Essay on Laughter; Dr. Beattie, Essay on 
Laugliter and Ludicrous Composition; Akenside, Pleasures 
of Lnaginat.^ book iii.. Spectator, Nos. 47 and 249. 

liAW comes from the Anglo-Saxon verb signifying ^' to lay 
down." 

'' All things that are have some operation not violent or 
casual. That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, 
that which doth moderate the force and power, that wliich 
doth appoint the form and measure of worldng, the same 
we term a law.'''' — Hooker, Eccles. Pol.., book i., sect. 2. 

* The ludicrous pranks of the puppy and the kitten make this doubtful ; and 
Montaigne said he was not sure whether his favourite cat might not sometimes be 
laughing as much at him as with him. 



284 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ILAW— 

" Laws in their most extended signification aretlie neces- 
sary relations arising from the nature of things ; and, in 
this sense, all beings have their laws, the Deity has his 
laws, the material world has its laws, superior intelligences 
have their laws, the beasts have their laws, and man has 
his laws." — Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws ^ book i., ch. 1. 

Thus understood, the word comprehends the laws of the 
physical, metaphysical, and moral universe. Its primary 
signification was that of a command or a prohibition, 
addressed by one having authority to those who had power 
to do or not to do. There are in this sense laivs of society, 
laws of morality, and laws of religion — each resting upon 
their proper authority. But the word has been transferred 
into the whole philosophy of being and knowing. And 
when a fact frequently observed recurs invariably under the 
same circumstances, we compare it to an act which has 
been prescribed, to an order which has been estabhshed — 
and say it recurs according to a law. On the analogy 
between political laws or laws proper, and those which are 
called metaphorically laws of nature, see Lindley, Intro- 
duction to Jurisprudence^ app., p. 1. 

Austin, Province of Jurisprudence Determined^ p. 186. 
SjSlw and Cause. 

The word law expresses the constant and regular order 
according to which an energy or agent operates. It 
may thus be distinguished from cause — the latter denoting 
efficiency^ the former denoting the mode according to which 
efficiency is developed. '^ It is a perversion of language," 
says Paley (Nat. Theol.^ ch. 1), '^to assign any law, as the 
efficient, operative cause of anything. A law pre-supposes 
an agent ; this is only the mode, according to which an 
agent proceeds ; it implies a power ; for it is the order 
according to which that power acts. Without this agent, 
without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the 
law does nothing, is nothing." To the same purpose Dr. 
Reid has said, ''The laws of nature are the rules accord- 
ing to which effects are produced; but there must be a 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 285 

cause which operates according to these rules. The rules 
of navigation never steered a ship, nor the law of gravity 
never moved a planet." 

'* Those who go about to attribute the origination of 
mankind (or any other effect) to a bare order or law of 
nature, as the primitive effecter thereof, speak that which 
is perfectly irrational and unintelligible ; for although a law 
or rule is the method and order by which an intelligent 
being may act, yet a laio^ or rule, or order, is a dead, 
unactive, uneffective, thing of itself, without an agent that 
useth it, and exerciseth it as his rule and method of action. 
What would a law signify in a kingdom or state, unless 
there were some person or society of men that did exercise 
and execute, and judge, and determine, and act by it, or 
according to it?" — Hales, Prim. Origin.^ chap. 7, sect. 4. 

To maintain that the world is governed by laws^ with- 
out ascending to the superior reason of these laws — not to 
recognize that every law implies a legislator and executor, 
an agent to put it in force, is to stop half-way ; it is to 
hypostatise these laws^ to make beings of them, and to 
imagine fabulous divinities in ignoring the only God who is 
the source of all laws^ and who governs by them all that 
lives in the universe. — See Tiberghien, Essai des Connaiss. 
Hum.^ p. 743 

*' A law supposes an agent and a power ; for it is the 
mode, according to which the agent proceeds, the order 
according to which the power acts. Without the presence 
of such an agent, of such a power, conscious of the rela- 
tions on which the law depends, producing the effects which 
the law prescribes, the lata can have no efficacy, no 
existence. Hence we infer, that the intelligence by which 
the law is ordained, the power by which it is put into 
action, must be present at all times and in all places, where 
the effects of the law occur ; that thus the knowledge and 
the agency of the Divine Being pervade every portion of 
the universe, producing all action and passion, all per- 
manence and change. The laws of matter are the laws 



286 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

wliicli lie, in his wisdom, prescribes to liis own acts ; his 
universal presence is the necessary condition of any course 
of events ; his universal agency, the only organ of any 
efficient force." — Whewell, Astronomy^ p. 361. 
liaTF, Physical, l^ental, Moral, Political. 

Laws may acquire different names from the difference in 
the agents or energies which operate according to them. 
A stone when thrown up into the air rises to a height pro- 
portional to tiie force with which it is thrown, and then 
falls to the ground by its own gravity. This takes place 
according to physical laws^ or what are commonly called 
laws of nature. 

'•'• Those principles and faculties are the general laws of 
our constitution, and hold the same place in the philosophy 
of mind that the general laws we investigate in physics 
hold in that branch of science." — Stewart, Philosoph. of 
Hum. Mind.^ part 1, introd. When an impression has been 
made upon a bodily organ a state of sensation follows in 
the mind. And when a state of sensation has been long 
continued or often repeated it comes to be less sensibly felt. 
These are mental laws. We have a faculty of memory by 
which the objects of former consciousness are recalled ; and 
this faculty operates according to the laws of association. 

Moral laws are derived from the nature and will of God, 
and the character and condition of man, and may be under- 
stood and adopted by man, as a being endowed with 
intelligence and will, to be the rules by which to regulate 
his actions. It is right to speak the truth. Gratitude 
should be cherished. These things are in accordance witli 
the nature and condition of man, and with the will of God 
— that is, they are in accordance with the moral law of 
conscience and of revelation. 

Political laws are prohibitions or injunctions promulgated 
by those having authority to do so, and may be obeyed or 
disobeyed ; but the disobedience of them implies punish- 
ment. 

'^ The i7itent or purpose of a law is wholly different from 



TOCABCLAIiY OF PHLLOSOPHY. 287 

LAW— 

the motives or grounds of the law. The former is its 
practical end or effect ; the hitter, the pre-existing circum- 
stances which suggested and caused its enactment.* For 
example, the existence of a famine in a coimtr}', mav tend 
to the enactment of a poor law. In this case the famine is 
the motive or groimd of the law ; and the relief of the poor 
its intent or purpose. The one is its positive cause, the 
latter its desired effect.'' — Lewis. Method of Ohservat. in 
Politics J eh. 12, sect. 6. 

In reference to the moral lawj Hobbes and his followers 
have overlooked the difference between a law and the 
principle of the law. An action is not right merely in 
consequence of a law declaring it to be so. But the 
dechiration of the law proceeds upon the antecedent 
lightness of the action. 
Law and Form, — "though correlative terms, must not, in 
strict accuracy, be used as SATiomTnous. The former is 
used properly with reference to an operation: the latter 
with reference to its product. Conceiving^ judging^ reason- 
ingy are subject to certain laws: concepts^ judgments^ 
syllogisms, exhibit certain forms,'' — ManseU, Prole gom. 
Log., p. 240. 

I.EJ13IJL (from >.cc^u,Sccvsi'j, sumere, to take for granted, to 
assume). — This term is used to denote a preliminary pro- 
position, which, while it has no direct relation to the point 
to be proved, yet serves to pave the way for the proof. In 
Logic, a premiss taken for granted is sometimes called a 
lemma. To prove some proposition in mechanics, some of 
the propositions ia geometry may be taken as lemmata. 

LIBERT ARI.a:¥.— "I believe he (Dr. Crombie, that is) may 
claim the merit of adding the word Libertarian to the 

* Suarez {De Legibu&, iiL, 20, sect. 2) says, " Sine dubio in aninio legislatoris 
IxSC duo distincta sunt, scilicet voluntas sen intentio ejus, secundum quam vult 
pr^ecipere. et ratio, ob quam movetur." 

Hie ratio Ic'jis and the mens J^ig-is ar« distinguished by Grotius (J. B. et P., ii.. 16, 
sect. S^ with BarbejTac's notes; and by Puifendorff (v., 12, sect. 10). The purpose 
of a law and its motive have often been confounded under the general term fxitio 
k'jis.—See Savigny. System des RechtSy voL L, pp. 216-224. 



288 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IjIBERTARIAN— 

English language, as Priestley added that of Necessarian^ 
— Correspondence of Dr. Reid^ p. 88. 

Both words have reference to the questions concerning 
liberty and necessity, in moral agency. 
IjIBEBTIT of the TI^IJLIi or lilBSlRTY of a MORAIi 
AOENT. 

'-'' The idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent 
to do or forbear any particular action, according to the 
determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of 
them is preferred to the other." — Locke, Essay on Hum. 
Understand..^ b. ii., ch. 21, sect. 8. 

" By the liberty of a moral agent, I understand a power 
over the determinations of his own will. If, in any action, 
he had power to will what he did, or not to will it, in that 
action he is free. But if, in every voluntary action, the 
determination of his will be the necessary consequence of 
something involuntary in the state of his mind, or of some- 
thing in his external circumstances, he is not free ; he has 
not what I call the liberty of a moral agent, but is subject 
to necessity." — Eeid, Active Powers, essay iv., ch. 1. 

It has been common to distinguish liberty into freedom 
from co-action.^ smd freedom from necessity. 

Freedom from co-action imphes, on the one hand, the 
absence of all impediment or restraint, and, on the other 
hand, the absence of all compulsion or violence. If we are 
prevented from doing what is in our power, when we desire 
and will to do it, or, if we are compelled to do it, when we 
desire and will not to do it, we are not free from co-action. 
This general explanation of freedom agrees equally with 
bodily freedom, mental freedom, and moral freedom. Indeed, 
although it is common to make a distinction between these, 
there is no difference, except what is denoted by the 
different epithets introduced. We have bodily freedom, 
when our body is not subjected to restraint or compulsion — 
mental freedom, when no impediment or violence prevents 
us from duly exercising our powers of mind — and moral 
freedom, when our moral principles and feelings are allowed 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 289 

I^IBERTY— 

to operate within the sphere which has been assigned to 
them. Xow it is with freedom regarded as moral that wt- 
have here to do — it is with freedom as the attribute of a 
being who possesses a moral nature, and who exerts the 
active power which belongs to him, in the Hght of reason, 
and under a sense of responsibility. Liberty of this kind L- 
called freedom from necessity. 

Freedom from necessity is also called liberty of election, 
or power to choose, and implies freedom from anything 
inyincibly determining a moral agent. It has been distin- 
guished into liberty of contrariety^ or the power of deter- 
mining to do either of two actions which are contraiy, a.-^ 
right or wrong, good or evil; and liberty of contradiction, 
or the power of determining to do either of two actions 
which are contradictory, as to walk or to sit still, to walk 
in one direction or in another. 

Freedom from necessity is sometimes also called liberty of 
indifference^ because, before he makes his election, the agent 
has not determined in favour of one action more than 
another. Liberty of indifference^ however, does not mean, 
as some would have it, liberty of equihbrium, or that the 
agent has no more inclination towards one action or one 
mode of action than towards another ; for although he may 
have motives prompting more urgently to one action or 
course of action, he still has liberty of election^ if he has the 
power of determining in favour of another action or another 
course of action. Still less can the phrase liberty of indif- 
ference be understood as denoting a power to determine in 
opposition to all motives, or in absence of any motive. A 
being with liberty of indiftrence in the former of these sense.- 
would not be a reasonable being ; and an action done with- 
out a motive is an action done without an end in view, that 
is, without intention or design, and, in that respect, could 
not be called a moral action, though done by a moral agent. 

Liberty of will may be viewed, 1st, in respect of the 
object^ and 2d, in respect of the action. In both respects it 
maybe liberty of. 1st. contrariety^ or 2d, of contradiction. 
u 



290 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

lilBERTY— 

Liberty of contrariety in respect of the object is when the 
will is indifferent to any object and to its opposite or 
contrary — as when a man is free, for the sake of health, to 
take hot water or cold water. Liberty of contradiction is 
when the will is indifferent to any object, and to its opposite 
or contradictory — as walking and not walking. 

In respect of the act of loill^ there is liberty of contrariety 
when the will is indifferent as to contrary actions concerning 
the same particular object, — as to choose or reject some 
particular good. There is liberty of contradiction when the 
will is free not to contrary action, but to act or not to 
act, that is, to will or not to will, to exercise or suspend 
volition. 

Liberty has also been distinguished into, 1st, liberty of 
specification^ and 2d, liberty of exercise. The former may 
be said to coincide with liberty of contrariety, and the latter 
with liberty of contradiction. — Baronius, Metaphys,^ p. 96. 
IjIFE belongs to organized bodies, that is, animals and vege- 
tables. Birth and development, decay and death, are 
peculiar to living bodies. Is there a vital principle, distinct 
on the one hand from matter and its forces, and on the 
other, from mind and its energies ? According to Descartes, 
Borelli, Boerhaave, and others, the phenomena of living 
bodies may be explained by the mechanical and chemical 
forces belonging to matter. According to Bichat, there is 
nothing in common — but rather an antagonism — ^between 
the forces of dead matter and the phenomena of life, which 
he defines to be ''the sum of functions which resist death." 
Bichat and his followers are called Organicists. Barthez 
and others hold that there is a vital principle distinct from 
the organization of living bodies, which directs all their acts 
and functions which are only vital, that is, without feehng 
or thought. Their doctrine is Vitalism. The older doctrine 
of Stahl was called Animism^ according to which the soul, 
or anima mundi^ presides not only over the functions of the 
sensibility and thought, but over all the functions and 
actions of the hving economy. 



TOC-UBrLAP.y OF PHILOSuPHY. 291 

Ai'e life and sensihiUty two things essentially distinct, or 
two things t^ssentiallv united ■.-' 

IrritabiUt;! and Excitability are terms applied to the 
sensibility which vegetables manifest to external influences. 
such as light, heat, &c. Biehat ascribed the functions of 
absorption, secretion, cii'culation, &c., which are not accom- 
panied with feeling, to what he called organic sensibility. 

The characteristics of the several kingdoms of natiu'e 
.ivrii ": ■ Lini:}.;^ are the following: — Lapides crescunt : 
vegetabiiia c;-..-.: ;;' et vivunt : aiiinialia crescunt vicunt et 
sentiunt. 

The the : lies oi life and its connection with the pheno- 
mena of mind are thus chissiiied by Morell, Psychology. 
p. 77. note : — 

1 . T:: : " ' ; ' theory. This was represented by Sylvius 

in the s oentmy. who reduced all the phenomena 

-1 organization to chemical processes. 2. 

?ry . This tails to the time when Harvey 

01 the blood, and Boerhaave 

: .. ^ :. i^c as one great hydraulic machine. 

J I ; theory. Here we have the phenomena 

:f mi.: f ; f :: id- dawn closely together. The writings 

: ^- d" V ;^^^d;wthis point of view. He regarded 

ing the product of certain organic 

_ - 1 the various manifestations of human 

Ide. dv'm the L^ttc^: vdv^i;:.! processes to the highest intel- 

Ic t ad -X. Tde if. :i i [;■ ■'Action. This we find more 

-: -;i :d; m :: _r: :dr Tirnod r nysiologists, such as Biehat. 

fl d::;de. and others, who regard lite as being the product 

. f a mere organism, acted on by physical stimuli ti'om the 

world without. 5. The theory of evolution, Schultz and 

others oi ^' '.;.,,. ^ •- .,^ ^^ ^j^^ same school, regard 

lite as a reated by opposing powers in 

the universe oi existence, ii'om the lowest forms of the vital 

functions to the highest spiheres of thought and activity. 

To these speculators natm*e is not a fixed reality, but a 

relation. It is perpetual movement, an unceasing becoming. 



292 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

lilFE— 

a passing from death to life, and from life to death. And 
just as physical life consists in the tension of the lower 
powers of nature, so does mental life consist in that of its 
higher powers. 6. The theory of the Divine ideal Here, 
Carus, prompted by Schelling's philosophy, has seized the 
ideal side of nature, as well as the real^ and united them 
together in his theory of the genesis of the soul, and thus 
connected the whole dynamics of nature with their Divine 
original. 

Plato, TimcBUS. 

Aristotle, De Anima^ lib. ii., cap. 10. 

Descartes, CEuvres^ par Cousin, torn. iv. 

Barthez, Bichat, Cabanis, and Berard. 

Coleridge, Posthumous Essay: Hints towards the Forma- 
tion of a more Comprehensive Theory of Life — a plagiarism 
from a ivork of Schellingh^ in which Life is defined to be '''•the 
Principle of Individuation.''^ 
liOOIC (TioyiKV}^ Tioyogf reason, reasoning, language). — The 
word logica was early used in Latin ; while ^ T^oyim and to 
7<oyix,ov were late in coming into use in Greek. Aristotle 
did not use either of them. His writings which treat of 
the syllogism and of demonstration were entitled Analytics 
(q. V.) The name org anon was not given to the collected 
series of his writings upon logic till after the invention of 
printing. The reason of the name is that logic was 
regarded as not so much a science in itself as the instrument 
of all science. The Epicureans called it Kuuovtx.vj.^ the rule 
by which true and false are to be tried. Plato, in the 
Phaedrus, has called it depart (jtcg^oj), and in the Parmenides 
the organ (o(iyccuov) of philosophy. — See Trendlenburg, 
Elementa Log. Aristot.^ 8vo, Basil. 1842, pp. 48-49. An 
old division of philosophy was into logic^ ethics^ and physics. 
But excluding physics, philosophy may be regarded as 
consisting of four parts — viz., psychology^ logic^ ethics., and 
metaphysics properly so called. 

" When we attend to the procedure of the human intellect 
we soon perceive that it is subject to certain supreme laws 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 293 

which are independent of the variable matter of our ideas^ 
and which, posited in their abstract generality, express the 
absolute and fixed rules not only of the human intellect, 
but of all thought, whatever be the subject which frames 
it or the object which it concerns. To determine those 
universal laws of thought in general, in order that the 
human mind in particular may find in all its researches a 
means of control and an infallible criterion of the legiti- 
macy of its procedure, is the object of loijic. At the 
beoinninof of the first analvtics, Aristotle has laid it down 
that ' the object of logic is demonstration.' 

'' Logic is the science of the laws of thought as thought 
— that is, of the necessary conditions to which thought, 
considered in itself, is subject." — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid^s 
Works ^ p« 698, note. 

'^ ' Logic is the science of the laws of thought.' It is a 
science rather than an art. As the science of the necessary 
laws of thought it is pure. It only gives those principles 
which constitute thought ; and pre-supposes the operation 
of those principles by which we gain the materials for 
thinking. And it is the science of the form or formal laws 
of thinking, and not of the matter.-^ — Thomson, Outline of 
the Laics of Tliought. — F. Intention, [N'otion. 

Others define logic to be the science of the laws of reason- 
ing. Dr. Whately has said, " Logic in its most extensive 
application, is the science as well as the art of reasoning. 
So far as it institutes an analysis of the process of the 
mind in reasoning, it is strictly a science : while so far 
as it investigates the principles on which argumentation is 
conducted, and furnishes rules to secure the mind from error 
in its deductions, it may be called the art of reasoning." 

Kirwan had said {Logic^ vol. i., p. 1), '•'Logic is both a 
science and an art ; it is a science inasmuch as, by analyzing 
the elements, principles, and structure of arguments, it 
teaches us how to discover their truth or detect their 
fallacies, and point out the sources of such errors. It is an 
art^ inasmuch as it teaches us how to arrange arguments in 



294 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

sucli manner that their trutli maybe most readily perceived 
or their falsehood detected." Sir William Hamilton thinks 
that Dr. Whately had this passage in view when he con- 
structed his own definition; but he adds, "IN'ot a single 
reason has been alleged to induce us to waver in our belief, 
that the laivs of tlionglit^ and not the lavjs of reasoning^ 
constitute the adequate object of the science." — Discussions, 
pp. 131-4. 

According to the significations attached to the terms 
art and science, and according to the point of -vdew in 
which it is legarded, logic may be called a science or an 
art, or both, that is, a scientific art. 

Thought may manifest itself in framing concepts, or 
judgments, or reasonings ; and logic treats of these under 
three corresponding heads. Method, which is the scientific 
arrangement of thoughts, is frequently added as a fourth 
head. But to some it appears that method belongs more 
properly to psychology than to logic. Barthelemy St. 
Hilaire, who takes this view, has said {Diet, des Sciences 
Philosoph., art. Logique), " In logic considered as a science 
there are necessarily four essential parts, which proceed 
frojn the simple to the compound, and in the following 
order, which cannot be changed : 1, A theory of the ele- 
ments of a proposition ; 2, A theory of propositions ; 3, 
A general theorv' of reasoning formed of propositions con- 
nected with one another according to certain laws; and, 
lastly, A theory of that special and supreme kind of reason- 
ing which is called demonstration, and gives assurance to 
the mind of man of the forms of truth, if it be not truth 
itself." 
JuOVE and MATR£:i> are the two generic or mother passions 
or affections of mind, from which all the others take their 
rise. The former is awakened by the contemplation of 
something which is regarded as good ; and the latter by 
the contemplation of something which is regarded as evil. 
Hence springs a desire to seek the one, and a desire to 
shun the other ; and desire under its various forms and 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 295 

JLOVE— 

modifications may be found as an element in all the mani- 
festations of the sensitivity. 



:TIACR0C0SM and MICROCOSRI (^cex^oV, large, (^ix-oo;, 
small, and aoaf^og^ world). 

'^As for Paracelsus, certainly he is injurious to man, if 
(as some eminent chemists expound him) he calls a man 
a microcosm^ because his body is really made up of all the 
several kinds of creatures the macrocosm or greater world 
consists of, and so is but a model or epitome of the uni- 
verse." — Boyle, Works^ vol. ii., p. 54. 

Many ancient philosophers regarded the world as an 
animal, consisting like man of a soul and a body. This 
opinion, exaggerated by the mystics, became the theory of 
the macrocosm and the microcosm^ according to which man 
was an epitome of creation, and the universe was man on 
a grand scale. The same principles and powers which 
were perceived in the one were attributed to the other, 
and while man was believed to have a supernatural power 
over the laws of the universe, the phenomena of the universe 
had an influence on the actions and destiny of man. Hence 
arose Alchemy and Astrology, which were united in the 
Hermetic medicine. Such views are fundamentally pan- 
theistic, leading to the belief that there is only one substance, 
manifesting itself in the universe by an infinite variety, and 
concentred in man as in an epitome. Van Helmont, 
Paracelsus, Robert Fludd, and others held some of these 
views. 

Dr. Reid has said (^Active Powers^ essay iii., part 1, chap. 
1), ''Man has, not without reason, been called an epitome 
of the universe. His body, by which his mind is greatly 
aflTected, being a part of the material system, is subject to 
all the laws of inanimate matter. During some part of his 
existence, his state is very like that of a vegetable. He 
rises, by imperceptible degrees, to the animal, and, at last, 
to the rational life, and has the principles that belong to all. " 



296 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ITIACROCOSM— 

"Man is not only a microcosm^ in the structure of his 
body, but in the system, too, of his impulses, including all 
of them within him, from the basest to the most subHme." 
— Harris, PJiilosoph. Arrange.^ cap. 17. 

'' Man is a living synthesis of the universe." — Tiberghien. 

Mons. Cousin (Introd. aux CEuvres Inedites d^Ahelard^ p. 
127,) has given an analysis of a MS. work by Bernard de 
Chartres, entitled Megacosmns et Microcosmus, 
MAGNANIMITY and EQUANIMITY (greatness of mind 
and evenness of mind) — are two words which were much 
used by Cicero and other ancient ethical writers. 

Magnanimity was described as lifting us above the good 
and evil of this Hfe — so that while the former was not 
necessary to our happiness, the latter could not make us 
miserable. The favourite example of magnanimity among the 
Komans was Fabius Maximus, who, amidst the provocation 
of the enemy and the impatience of his countrymen, delayed 
to give battle till he saw how he could do so successfully. 

Equanimity supposes change of state or fortune, and 
means the preservation of an even mind in the midst of 
vicissitude — neither elated unduly by prosperity nor 
depressed unduly by adversity. Equanimity springs from 
Magnanimity. Indeed both these words denote frames or 
states of mind from which special acts of virtue spring — 
rather than any particular virtue. They correspond to the 
active and ])SiSsiYe fortitude of modern moralists. 
MANICMEISM (so called from Manes, a Persian philosopher, 
who flourished about the beginning of the third century) 
— ^is the doctrine that there are two eternal principles or 
powers, the one good and the other evil, to which the 
happiness and misery of all beings may be traced. It has 
been questioned whether this doctrine was ever maintained to 
the extent of denying the Divine unity, or that the system 
of things had not an ultimate tendency to good. It is 
said that the Persians, before Manes, maintained dualism so 
as to give the supremacy to the good principle. And that 
Manes maintained both to be equally eternal and absolute. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 297 

MANICHEISITI— 

The doctrine of manic'heism was ingrafted upon Chris- 
tianity about the middle of the third century. The Cathari 
or Albigenses who appeared in the twelfth century are 
said also to have held the doctrine of dualism or dithe- 
ism. — q. V. 

To refute it we have only to say that if the two opposing 
principles were equal, they would neutralize each other — 
if they were unequal, the stronger would preyail, so that 
there would be nothing but eyil or nothing but good in the 
world : which is contrary to fact. 

Matter, Hist. Critiq. dii Gnosticisme^ 3 torn., Paris, 1843. 

Beausobre, Hist, du Maniclieisme. 
I?IATERlAlils:tl. — '-The materialists maintain that man con- 
sists of one uniform substance, the object of the senses ; 
and that perception, with its modes, is the result, necessary 
or otherwise, of the organization of the brain." — Belsham, 
Moral Philosophy^ chap, xi., sect. 1. The doctrine opposed 
to this is spiritualism^ or the doctrine that there is a spirit 
in man, and that he has a soul as well as a body. In like 
manner, he who maintains that there is but one substance 
(;unisuhstancisme)^ and that that substance is matter, is a 
materialist. And he who holds that above and beyond the 
material frame of the universe there is a spirit sustaining 
and directing it is a spiritualist. The philosopher who 
admits that there is a spirit in man, and a spirit in the 
universe, is a perfect spiritualist. He who denies spirit in 
man or in the universe is a perfect materialist. But some 
have been inconsistent enough to admit a spirit in man 
and deny the existence of God, while others have admitted 
the existence of God and denied the soul of man to be 
spiritual. — V, Immateriality. 

Baxter and Drew have both written on the immateri- 
aUty of the soul. Belsham and Priestley have defended 
materialism without denying the existence of God. 

Priestley, Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit. 

Priestley, T?iree Dissertations on the Doctrine of Materi- 
alism and Philosophical Necessity. 



298 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MATERttAIilSlWE— 

Price, Letters on Materialism and Philosophical Necessity. 
MATTER, as opposed to mind or spirit (q. v.), is that which 
occupies space, and with which we become acquainted by 
means of our bodily senses or organs. Everything of 
which we have any knowledge is either matter or mind., i. e., 
spirit. Mind is that which knows and thinks. Matter is 
that which makes itself known by means of the bodily 
senses. 

" The first form which matter assumes is extension, or 
length, breadth, and thickness — it then becomes body. If 
body were infinite there could be no figure., which is body 
bounded. But body is not physical body, unless it par- 
take of or is constituted of one or more of the elements, 
fire, air, earth, or water." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ 
b. ii., c. 2. 

According to Descartes the essence of mind is thought^ 
and the essence of matter is extension. He said. Give me 
extension and motion, and I shall make the world. Leib- 
nitz said the essence of all being, whether mind or matter., 
is force. Matter is an assemblage of simple forces or 
monads. His system of physics may be called dynamical^ 
in opposition to that of I^^ewton, which may be called 
mechanical; because Leibnitz held that the monads pos- 
sessed a vital or living energy. We may explain the 
phenomena of matter by the movements of ether, by gravity 
and electricity ; but the ultimate reason of all movement is 
a force primitively communicated at creation, a force which 
is everywhere, but which while it is present in all bodies is 
differently limited ; and this force, this virtue or power of 
action is inherent in all substances material and spiritual. 
Created substances received from the creative substance 
not only the faculty to act, but also to exercise their activ- 
ity each after its own manner. See Leibnitz, De Primw 
Philosophice Emendatione et de Notione Suhstantice, or Nou- 
veau Systeme de la Nature et de la Communication des Sub- 
stances^ in the Journal des Savans^ 1695. On the various 
hypotheses to explain the activity of matter, see Stewart, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 299 

MATTER— 

Outlines^ part 2, ch. 2, sect. 1, and Active and Mor, Powers^ 
last edit., vol. ii., note A. 

The properties which have been predicated as essential 
to matter are impenetrability, extension, divisibility, inertia, 
weight. To the senses it manifests colour, sound, smell, 
taste, heat, and motion ; and by observation it is discovered 
to possess elasticity, electricity, magnetism, &c. 

Metaphysicians have distinguished the qualities of matter 
into primary and secondary, and have said that our know- 
ledge of the former, as of impenetrability and extension, 
is clear and absolute — while our knowledge of the latter, 
as of sound and smell, is obscure and relative. This dis- 
tinction taken by Descartes, adopted by Locke and also by 
Eeid and Stewart, was rejected by Kant, according to 
whom, indeed, all our knowledge is relative. And others 
who do not doubt the objective reality of matter^ hold 
that our knowledge of all its qualities is the same in kind. 
See the distinctions precisely stated and strenuously up- 
held by Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ note D ; and 
ingeniously controverted by Mons. Emile Saisset, in Diet. 
des Sciences PMlosopJi., art. Matiere. 
Matter and Form. 

Matter as opposed to form (q. v.) is that elementary 
constituent in composite substances, which appertains in 
common to them all without distinguishing them from one 
another. Everything generated or made, whether by 
nature or art, is generated or made out of something else ; 
and this something else is called its subject or matter. Such 
is iron to the boat, such is timber to the boat. Matter 
void of form was called "yAyj 7r()cjTyi^ or, prima materia — 
Q'vT^Yi^ means wood. — V. Hylozoism). Form when united 
to matter makes it determinate and constitutes body (q. v.) 

'' The term matter is usually applied to whatever is given 
to the artist, and consequently, as given, does not come 
within the province of the art itself to supply. The form 
is that which is given in and through the proper operation 
of the art. In sculpture, the matter is the marble in its 



300 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MATTER— 

rough state as given to tlie sculptor ; the form is that 
which the sculptor in the exercise of his art communicates 
to it. The distinction between mailer and form in any 
mental operation is analogous to this. The former in- 
cludes all that is given io^ the latter all that is given hy, 
the operation. In the division of notions, for example, 
the generic notion is that given to be divided ; the addi- 
tion of the difference in the art of division constitutes the 
species. And accordingly, Genus is frequently designated 
by Logicians the material^ Difference, the formal part of 
the species." — Mansell, Prolegom. Log.^ p. 226. 

Harris, Philosoph, Arrange.^ chap. iv. 

Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ book ii., chap. 1. 

Reid, Intell. Powers^ essay ii., ch. 19. 
MAXIM, (maxima ijroposilio^ a proposition of the greatest 
weight) — is used by Boethius as synonymous with axiom^ or 
a self-evident truth. — Sir W. Hamilton, Reidfs Works^ 
note A, sect. 5. It is used in the same way by Locke, 
Essay on Hum, Understand.^ book iv., chap. 7. ''There 
are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of maxims 
and axioms., have passed for principles of science." '' By 
Kant, maxim was employed to designate a subjective prin- 
ciple, theoretical or practical, i. e., one not of objective 
validity, being exclusively relative to some interest of the 
subject. Maxim and regulative principle are, in the criti- 
cal philosophy, opposed to law and constitutive principle." 

In Morals, we have Rochefoucauld's Maxims. 

In Theology, Fenelon wrote Maxims of the Saints^ and 
EoUin made a collection of Maxims drawn from holy writ. 
MEMOKir (from memini^ preterite of the obsolete form meneo 
or meno^ from the Greek f/Jusiv^ manere.^ to stay or 
remain. From the contracted form f^vc&cd comes f^vnf^Yi^ 
the memory, in which things remain). — " The great Keeper 
or Master of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make 
amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind 
him those things which else he would so carry away as if 
they had not been." — Bishop Hall, Righteous Mammon. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 301 

MLEMORY— 

Consciousness testifies that when a thought has once been 
present to the mind, it may again become present to it, 
with the additional consciousness that it has formerly been 
present to it. When this takes place we are said to re- 
member^ and the faculty of which remembrance ib the act is 
memory. 

Memory implies, — 1. A mode of consciousness experi- 
enced. 2. The retaining or remaining of that mode of 
consciousness so that it may subsequently be revived 
without the presence of its object. 3. The actual revival 
of that mode of consciousness; and 4. The recognizing that 
mode of consciousness as having formerly been expe- 
rienced. 

''The word memory is not employed uniformly in the 
same precise sense ; but it always expresses some modifica- 
tion of that faculty, which enables us to treasure up, and 
preserve for future use, the knowledge we acquire ; a faculty 
which is obviously the great foundation of all intellectual 
improvement, and without which no advantage could be 
derived from the most enlarged experience. This faculty 
implies tw^o things ; a capacity of retaining knowledge, and a 
power of recalling it to our thoughts when we have occasion 
to apply it to use. The word memory is sometimes em- 
ployed to express the capacity, and sometimes the power. 
When we speak of a retentive memory^ we use it in the 
former sense ; when of a ready memory^ in the latter." — 
Stewart, Philosoph. of Hum. Mind, ch. 6. 

Memory has, and must have, an object ; for he that 
remembers must remember something, and that which he 
remembers is the object of memory. It is neither a decay- 
ing sense, as Hobbes would make it, nor a transformed 
sensation, as Condillac would have it to be ; but a distinct 
and original faculty, the phenomena of which cannot be 
included under those of any other power. The objects of 
memory may be things external to us, or internal states and 
modes of consciousness ; and we may remember what we 
have seen, touched, or tasted ; or we may remember a 



302 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ITI EMORY— 

feeling of joy or sorrow whicli we formerly experienced, or 
a resolution or purpose which we previously formed. 

Hobbes would confine memory to objects of sense. He 
says (Human Nature^ ch. 3, sect. 6), ''By the senses, 
which are numbered according to the organs to be five, we 
" — -tako notice of the objects vdthout us, and that notice is our 
conception thereof: but we take notice also, some way or 
other, of our conception, for when the conception of the 
same thing cometh again, we take notice that it is again, 
that is to say, that we have had the same conception before, 
which is as much as to imagine a thing past, which is 
impossible to the sense which is only of things present ; this, 
therefore, may be accounted a sixth sense, but internal ; not 
external as the rest, and is commonly called remembrance.''^ 
Mr. Stewart holds that memory involves ''a power of 
recognizing, as former objects of attention, the thoughts 
that from time to time occur to us : a power which is not 
implied in that law of our nature which is called the associa- 
tion of ideas." But the distinction thus taken between 
memory and association is not very consistent with a further 
distinction which he takes between the memory of things and 
the memory of events. (JPhilosopJi. of Hum. Mind^ chap. 6). 
" In the former case, thoughts which have been previously 
in the mind, may recur to us without suggesting the idea 
of the past, or of any modification of time whatever ; as 
when I repeat over a poem which I have got by heart, or 
when I think of the features of an absent friend. In this 
last instance, indeed, philosophers distinguish the act of the 
mind by the name of conception ; but in ordinary discourse, 
and frequently even in philosophical writing, it is considered 
as an exertion of memory. In these and similar cases, it is 
obvious that the operations of this faculty do not necessarily 
involve the idea of the past. The case is difierent with 
respect to the memory of events. When I think of these, I 
not only recall to the mind the former objects of its thoughts, 
but I refer the event to a particular point of time ; so that, 
of every such act of memory., the idea of the past is a neces- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 303 

sary concomitant." Mr. Stewart therefore supposes "that 
the remembrance of a past event ^*s not a simple act of the 
mind ; but that the mind first forms a conception of the 
event, and then judges from circumstances, of the period of 
time to which it is to be referred." But the remembrance 
of a thing is not a simple act of the mind, any more than 
the remembrance of an event. The truth seems to be that 
things and events recur to the mind equally unclothed or 
unconnected with the notion of pastness. (See Young, 
Intellect. Philosoph.^ lect. xvi.) And it is not till they are 
recognized as objects of former consciousness that they can 
be said to be remembered. But the recognition is the act 
of the judging faculty. Thoughts which have formerly been 
present to the mind may again become present to it with- 
out being recognized, l^ay, they may be entertained for a 
time as new thoughts, but it is not till they have been 
recognized as objects of former consciousness that they can 
be regarded as remembered thoughts,* so that an act of 
memory., whether of thmgs or events, is by no means a simple 
act of the mind. Indeed, it may be doubted whether in 
any mental operation we can detect any smgle faculty 
acting independently of others. What we mean by calling 
them distinct faculties is, that each has a separate or peculiar 
function ; not that that function is exercised independently 
of other faculties. — See Faculty. 

Mr. Locke (book ii., chap. 10,) treats of retention, " The 
next faculty of the mind (after perception), whereby it 
makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which 
I call retention., or the keeping of those simple ideas, which 
from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done 
two ways : 'first, by keeping the idea which is brought into 
it for some time actually in view; which is called contem- 
plation. The other way o^ retention., is the power to revive 
again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting, 

* Aristotle {De Memoria et Reminisceniia, cap. 1,) has said that memory is always 
accompanied with the notion of time, and that only those animals that have the 
notion of time have memory. 



304 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of 
sight ; and thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, 
yellow or sweet, — the object being removed. This is memory^ 
v^hich is as it were the store-house of our ideas." — V. 
Retention. 

The circumstances which have a tendency to facilitate or 
insure the retention or the recurrence of anything by the 
memory^ are chiefly — Vividness^ Repetition^ and Attention. 
When an object affects us in a pleasant or in a disagreeable 
manner — when it is frequently or familiarly observed — or 
when it is examined with attention and interest, it is more 
easily and surely remembered. 

"The things which are best preserved by the memory.,'' 
said Lord Herbert {De Veritate^ p. 156), " are the things 
which please or terrify — which are great or neiv — ^to which 
much attention has been paid — or which have been oft re- 
peated., — which are apt to the circumstances — or which have 
many things related to them.^'' 

The qualities of a good memory are, susceptibility, reten- 
tiveness, and readiness. 

The common saying that memory and judgment are not 
often found in the same individual, in a high degree, must 
be received with qualification. 

Memory in all its manifestations is very much influenced 
and guided by what have been called the laws of associa- 
tion, — q. V, 

In its first manifestations, memory operates spontaneously, 
and thoughts are allowed to come and go through the mind 
without direction or control. But it comes subsequently 
to be exercised with intention and will ; some thoughts 
being sought and invited, and others being shunned and 
as far as possible excluded. Spontaneous memory is remem- 
brance. Litentional memory is recollection or reminiscence. 

The former in Greek is Mf/jyy/i and the latter Avu^f^vnuig. 
In both forms, but especially in the latter, we are sensible 
of the influence which association has in regulating the 
exercise of this faculty. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 805 

By memory J we not only retain and recall former know- 
ledge, but we also acquire new knowledge. It is by means 
of memory that we haye tlie notion of continued existence 
or duration : and also the persuasion of our personal identity, 
amidst all the changes of our bodily frame, and all the 
alterations of our temper and habits. 

Memory^ ia its spontaneous or passive manifestation, is 
common to man with the inferior animals. But Aristotle 
denied that they are capable of recollection or reminiscence. 
which is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a 
present consciousness to a former, and from that to a more 
remote, till the whole facts of some case are brought again 
back to us. And Dr< Reid has remarked that the inferior 
animals do not measure time nor possess any distinct 
knowledge of intervals of time. In man memory is the 
condition of all experience, and consecpientlv of all progress. 
Memory in its exercise is yer\' dependent upon bodily 
organs, particularly the brain. In persons under lever, or 
in danger of drowning, the brain is pretematurallv excited : 
and in such cases it has been observed that memory be- 
comes more remote and far-reaching in its exercise than 
under ordinary and healthy circumstances. Several au- 
thentic cases of this kind are on record. (See Coleridge, 
BiograpMa Liter aria; Confessions of an English Opium 
Eater; and the AutohiograpJiy of Sir John Barroit\ p. 398). 
And hence the question has been suggested, whether 
thought be not absolutely imperishable— or whether every 
object of former consciousness may not, imder peculiar cir- 
cumstances, be liable to be recalled ? 

On Memory^ see Aristotle, De Memoria et Eeminiscentla. 
Beattie, Dissertations. 
Reid, Intell. Powers, essay iii. 
Stewart, Philosoph, of Hum, Mind, ch. 6. 
.^lE-^IORIA TECHNICA, or MNEITIOXICS.— These terms 
are applied to artificial methods which have been devised 
to assist the memory-. They all rest on the association of 
ideas. The relations by which ideas are most ensilv and 

X 



306 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MEMORIA— 

firmly associated are those of contiguity in place and re- 
semblance. On these two relations the principal methods 
of assisting the memory have been founded. The methods 
of localization or local memory associate the object which 
it is wished to remember with some place or building, all 
the parts of which are well known. The methods of re- 
semhlance or symholization^ establish some resemblance 
either between the things or the words which it is wished 
to remember, and some object more familiar to the mind. 
Rhythm and rhyme giving aid to the memory, technical 
verses have been framed for that purpose in various de- 
partments of study. 

The topical or local memory has been traced back to 
Simonides, who lived in the sixth century, B.C. Cicero 
(JDe Orator e^ ii., 86) describes a local memory or gives a 
Topology. Quintilian (xi., 2) and Pliny the naturalist 
(vii., 24) also describe this art. 

In modern times, may be mentioned Grey, Memoria 
Technica^ 1730 ; and Feinagle, New Art of Memory^ 1812. 
MENTAI. l»llli:.OSOPlIY — The adjective mental comes to 
us from the Latin mens^ or from the Greek f^ivog^ or these 
may be referred to the German meinen, to mean, to mark. 
If the adjective mental be regarded as coming from the 
Latin mens^ then mental philosophy will be the philosophy 
of the human mind, and will correspond with psychology. 
If the adjective mental be regarded as coming from the 
German meinen^ to mean or to mark, then the phrase men- 
tal pliilosophy may be restricted to the philosophy of the 
mind in its intellectual energies, or those faculties by which 
it marks or knows^ as distinguished from those faculties by 
which it feels and vnlls. It would appear that it is often 
used in this restricted signification to denote the philo- 
sophy of the intellect, or of the intellectual powers as 
contradistinguished from the active powers, exclusive of the 
phenomena of the sensitivity and the will. 

See Chalmers, Sketches of Moral and Mental Philosophy^ 
chap. 1. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. oU7 

MERIT (jmritum^ from f^ioog^ a part or portion, of labour or 
reward) — means good desert ; having done something worthy 
of praise or reward. 

Fear not the auger of the wise to raise 
Those best can bear reproof, who merit praise. 

Pope, Essay on Criticism. 

In seeing a thing to be right, Ave see at the same time 
that we ought to do it ; and when we have done it we ex- 
perience a feeling of conscious satisfaction or self- appro- 
bation. We thus come by the idea of merit or good 
desert. The approbation of our own mind is an indication 
that God approves of our conduct ; and the religious 
sentiment strengthens the moral one. We have the same 
sentiments towards others. When we see another do 
what is right we applaud him. When we see him do what 
is right in the midst of temptation and difficulty, we say he 
has much merit. Such conduct appears to be deserAing of 
reward. Virtue and happiness ought to go together. Vie 
are satisfied that under the government of God they will 
do so. 

The idea of merit then is a primary and natural idea to 
the mind of man. It is not an after thought to praise the 
doing of what is right from seeing that it is beneficial, but 
a spontaneous sentiment indissolubly connected with our 
idea of what is right, a sentiment guaranteed as to its 
truthfulness by the structure of the human mmd and the 
character of God. 

See Price, Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, 

Theological Avriters make a distinction between merit of 
congruity and merit of condignity. Only Popish winters 
admit merit in the latter sense. — V. Virtue. 
METAPHOR.— ''A metaphor is the transferring of a word 
from its usual meaning to an analogous meaning, and then 
the employing it agreeably to such transfer." Arist., 
Poet.., cap. 21. For example: the usual meaning of even- 
ing is the conclusion of the day. But age too is a conclu- 
sion, the conclusion of human life. Now there being an 
analogy in all conclusions, we aiTange in order the 



308 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

METAPHOR— 

two we have alleged, and say, that '^ as evening is to tlie 
day, SO is age to human life." Hence by an easy per- 
mutation (which furnishes at once two metapliors) we say 
alternately, that '' evening is the age of the day," and that 
*' age is the evening of life." — Harris, PJiilosopli, Arrange.^ 
p. 441. 

'-'- Sweet is primarily and properly applied to tastes ; 
secondarily and improperly (^. e., by analogy) to sounds. 

When the secondary meaning of a y\ ord is founded on 
some fanciful analogy, and especially when it is introduced 
for ornament's sake, we call this a metaphor, as when we 
speak of a ship's ploughing the deep ; the turning up of the 
surface being essential indeed to the plough, but accidental 
only to the ship." — Whately, Logic^ b. iii., sect. 10. — F. 
Analogy. 
METAPHYSICS. — This word is commonly said to have 
originated in the fact that Tyrannion or Andronicus, the 
collectors and conservers of the works of Aristotle, 
inscribed upon a portion of them the words Toe f^sroc tu, 
(pvGi>cu, But a late French critic, Mons. Ravaisson 
{Essai sur la Metaphysique, torn, i., p. 40), says he has 
found earlier traces of this phrase, and thinks it pro- 
bable that, although not employed by Aristotle him- 
self, it was applied to this portion of his writings by some 
of his immediate disciples. Whether the phrase was 
intended merely to indicate that this portion should standi 
or that it should be studied after the physics, in the collected 
works of Aristotle, are the two views which have been 
taken. In point of fact, this portion does usually stand 
after the physics. But, in the order of science or study, 
Aristotle said, that after physics should come mathematics. 
And Derodon (Proem. Metaphys.) has given reasons why 
metaphysics should be studied after logic and before physics 
and other parts of philosophy. But the truth is that the 
preposition ^gTct means along with as well as after^ and 
might even be translated alove. In Latin metaphysica is 
synonymous with sup ernatur alia. And in English Shake- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 309 

JTIETAPHYSICS— 

speare has used metapliysical as synonymous with super- 
natural, 

, . . Fate and metaphysical aid doth seem 
To have thee crowned, 

Macbeth, Act i., scene 3. 

In common usage liyperphysical^ or that which is above 
and beyond nature, is the meaning attached to metaphysical. 
And Aristotle has said (Metapliys.^ lib. iii., cap. 3) that 
there is a science above physics. "Ean yotp stti rov (pvuDcov 
ri olucoTs^ov. But if ^sToft bc interpreted, as it may, to mean 
along witli^ then metaphysics or metaphysical philosophy will 
be that philosophy which we should take along icith us uito 
physics, and into every other philosophy — that knowledge 
of causes and principles which we should carry with us into 
every department of inquiry. Aristotle called it the 
governing philosophy, which gives laws to all, but receives 
laws from none {Metaphys,^ Hb. i., cap. 2). Lord Bacon 
has hmited its sphere, when he says, "The one part (of 
philosophy) which is physics enquh^eth and handleth the 
material and efficient causes ; and the other which is meta- 
physic handleth the formal Sind Ji?ial cause." — {Advancement 
of Learning^ book ii.)* But all causes are considered by 
Aristotle in his writings which have heenentitledmetaphysics. 
The inquiry into causes was called by him the first philo- 
sophy — science of truth, science of being. It has for its 
object — not those things which are seen and temporal — 
phenomenal and passing, but things not seen and eternal, 
things supersensuous and stable. It investigates the first 

* In another passage, however, Bacon admits the advantage if not the validity of 
a higher metaphysic than this. " Because the distributions and partitions of know- 
ledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so touch hut in a point, 
but are like branches of a tree that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and 
quantity of entireness and continuance, before it come to discontinue and break 
itself into arms and boughs ; therefore, it is good to erect and constitute one 
universal science by the name of ^philosophia prima,' primitive or summary 
philosophy, as the main and common way, before ^ve come where the ways part and 
divide themselves ; which science, whether I should report delicient or no, I stand 
doubtful." Except in so far as it proceeded by observation rather than by specula- 
tion aprw?% even this science would have been but lightly esteemed by Bacon. 



310 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

METAPHYSICS— 

principles of nature and of thought, the ultimate Causes of 
existence and of knowledge. It considers things in their 
essence, independently of the particular properties or de- 
termined modes which make a difference between one 
thing and another. In short, it is ontology or the science 
of being as being — "ETnarYi^uy} rov ovrog v} ourog {Metaphys.^ 
lib. iv.), that is, not the science of any particular being or 
beings, such as animals or vegetables, lines or numbers, but 
the science of being in its general and common attributes. 
There is a science of matter and there is a science of mind. 
But Metaphysics is the science of being as common to both. 
Aristotle spoke of it as (pi'hoao(pioc 'Tr^um^ first or univer- 
sal philosophy, and called it hiorot,T'/i y.oti n/^icdTccrri^ the 
most honourable and divine science (Metaphys.^ lib. i.^ 
cap. 1, and lib. vi., cap. 1). 

'' The subject of Metaphysics is the whole of things. 
This cannot be other ways known than in its principles and 
causes. Now these must necessarily be what is most gene- 
ral in nature ; for it is from generals that particulars are 
derived, which cannot exist without the generals ; whereas 
the generals may exist without the particulars. Thus, 
the species, man^ cannot exist without the genus, animal; 
but animal may be without man. And this holds univer- 
sally of all genuses and specieses. The subject therefore 
of metaphysics^ is what is principal in nature, and first, if 
not in priority of time, in dignity and excellence, and in 
order likewise, as being the causes of everything in the 
universe. Leaving, therefore, particular subjects, and 
their several properties, to particular sciences, this universal 
science compares these subjects together ; considers where- 
in they differ and wherein they agree : and that which they 
have in common, but belongs not, in particular to any one 
science, is the proper object of metaphysics." — Monboddo, 
Ancient Metaphys.^ book iii., chap. 4. 

Metaphysics is the knowledge of the one and the real in 
opposition to the many and the apparent (Arist., Meta- 
phys., lib. iii., c. 2). Matter^ as perceived by the senses, 



VOCABULARY OF PPIILOSOPHY. 311 

JWIETAPHYSICS— 

is a combination of distinct and heterogeneous qualities, 
discernible, some by sight, some by smell, &c. What is 
the tiling itself^ the subject and owner of these several 
qualities, and yet not identical with any one of them? 
What is it by vu^tue of which those several attributes con- 
stitute or belong to one and the same thing? Mind^ pre- 
sents to consciousness so many distinct states and opera- 
tions and feelings. What is the nature of that one mind, 
of which all these are so many modifications ? The in- 
quiry may be carried higher still. Can we attain to any 
single conception of being in general, to which both mind 
and matter are subordinate, and from which the essence of 
both may be deduced? — Wolf, PMlosopli, Ration, Disc, 
Prelim.,, sect. 73. 

Mansell, Prolegom. Log.,, p. 277. 

Metaphysics was formerly distinguished into general and 
sjyeciaL The former was called ontology — {q. f.), or the 
science of being in general, whether infinite or finite, 
spiritual or material ; and explained therefore the most uni- 
versal notions and attributes common to all beings — such 
as entity, nonentity, essence, existence, unity, identity, 
diversity, &c. This is metaphysics properly so called. 
Special metaphysics was sometimes called Pneumatology — 
(g. i;.), and included — 1. Natural Theology or Theodicy, ">, 
Rational Cosmology,, or the science of the origin and order 
of the world ; and 3. Rational Psychology,, which treated 
of the nature, faculties, and destiny of the human mind. 

The three objects of special metaphysics^ \dz., God, the 
world, and the human mind, correspond to Kant's three 
ideas of the pure reason. According to him, a systematic 
exposition of those notions and truths, the knowledge of 
which is altogether independent of experience, constitutes 
the science of metaphysics. 

''Time was," says Kant (preface to the first edition of 
the Criticism of Pare Reason)^ "when metaphysics was the 
queen of all the sciences ; and if we take the will for the 
deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high im- 



312 VOCABUU^RY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

METAPHYSICS— 

portance of her object matter, tMs title of honour. Now, 
it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn 
upon her ; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken ^ 
like Hecuba — 

ModOy maxima remm. 
Tot generis, natisque potens, 
Nunc trahor exuT, inops. 

According to D'Alembert {Melanges^ torn, iv., p. 143). 
the aim of metaphysics is to examine the generation of our 
ideas and to show that they all come from sensations. 
This is the ideology of Condillae and De Tracy. 

Mr. Stewart (Dissert., part 2, p. 475) has said that 
^^Metaphysics was a word formerly appropriated to the 
ontology and pneumatology of the schools, but now under- 
stood as equally applicable to all those inquiries which have 
for their object, to trace the various branches of human 
knowledge to their first principles in the constitution of the 
human mind." And in the preface to the Dissert., he has 
said that by metaphysics he understands "the inductive 
philosophy of the human mind." In this sense the word is 
now popularly employed to denote, not the rational psycho- 
logy of the schools, but psychology^ or the philosophy of the 
human mind prosecuted according to the inductive method. 
In consequence of the subtle and insoluble questions prose- 
cuted by the schoolmen, under the head of metaphysics, the 
word and the inquiries which it includes have been exposed 
to ridicule.* 



* The word metaphysics was handled hy Rev. Sydney Smith {Elementary Sketches 
of Moral Philosophy, chap. 1, p. 3,) with as much caution as if it had heen a hand- 
grenade. 

" There is a word/' he exclaimed, when lecturing with his deep, sonorous^ warn- 
ing voice, '* of dire sound and horrible import, which I would fain have kept con- 
cealed if I possibly could, hut as this is not feasible, I shall even meet the danger at 
once, and get out of it as well as I can. The word to which I allude is that very 
tremendous one of ^ metaphysics^^ yiliioh in a lecture on moral philosophy, seems 
likely to produce as much alarm as the cry of 'fire' in a crowded playhouse; when 
Belvidera is left to cry by herself, and every one saves himself in the best manner 
he can. I must beg of my audience, however, to sit quiet, and in the meantime to 
make use of the language which the manager would probably adopt on s.uch an 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 313 

METAPHYSICS— 

But there is and must be a science of heing^ otherwise 
there is and can be no science of knowing, 

''If by metapliysics we mean those truths of the pure 
reason which always transcend, and not seldom appear to 
contradict the understanding, or (in the words of the great 
apostle) spiritual verities which can only be spiritually dis- 
cerned, and this is the true and legitimate meaning of meta- 
pliysics^ ueroc TOL <^voiytct^ then I affirm, that this very con- 
troversy between the Arminians and the Calvinists (as to 
grace), in which both are partially right in what they affirm, 
and both wholly wrong in what they deny, is a proof that 
without metaphysics there can be no light of faith/' — 
Coleridge, Notes on Eng. Div.^ vol. i., p. 340. 

In French the word metapliysique is used as s}'Tionymous 
with pJiilosopJiie^ to denote the first principles, or an inquiry 
into the first principles of any science. La Metapliysique du 
Droit, La Metapliysique du Moral, &c. It is the same in 
German. 
IflETEITIPSYCMOSIS (^£r«, beyond, ^w^vx,^^ I animate) — is 
the transmigration or passage of the soul from one body to 
another. "We read in Plato, that from the opinion of 
metempsychosis^ or transmigration of the souls of men into 
the bodies of beasts most suitable unto their human condi- 
tion, after his death, Orpheus the musician became a swan.** 
— Browne, Vulgar Errors^ b. iii., c. 27. 

This doctrine implies a belief in the pre-existence and 
immortality of the soul. And, according to Herodotus 
(lib. ii., sect. 123), the Egj-ptians were the first to espouse 
both doctrines. They believed that the soul at death 
entered into some animal created at the moment ; and that 



occasion : I can assure ladies and gentlemen, there is not the smallest degree of 
danger." 

The blacksmith of Glamis' description of metaphysics was—" Twa folk disputin' 
thegither ; he that's listenin ' disna ken what he that's speakin' means, and he that's 
speakin' disna ken what he means himsel'— that's metuphysics.'' 

Another said, "God forbid that I should say a word against metaphysics, only if a 
man should try to see down his own throat with a lighted candle in liis hand, let 
him take care lest he set his head on fire." 



814 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

METEMPSYCHOSIS— 

after having inhabited the forms of all animals on earth, in 
the water, or in the air, it returned at the end of three 
thousand years into a human body, to begin anew a similar 
course of transmigration. (Among the inhabitants of India 
the transmigration of the soul was more nearly allied to the 
doctrine of emanation^ — q, ?;.) The common opinion is, 
that the doctrine of transmigration passed from Egypt into 
Greece. But before any communication between the two 
countries, it had a place in the Orphic mysteries. Pytha- 
goras may have given more precision to the doctrine. It 
was adopted by Plato and his followers, and was secretly 
taught among the early Christians, according to one of St. 
Jerome's letters. The doctrine, when believed, should lead 
to abstaining from flesh, fish, or fowl, and this, accordingly, 
was one of the fundamental injunctions in the religion of 
Brahma, and in the philosophy of Pythagoras. 

METII01> (^/^idolog, ^sroc and ooog) — means the way or path by 
which we proceed to the attainment of some object or aim. 
In its widest acceptation, it denotes the means employed to 
obtain some end. Every art and every handicraft has its 
method. Cicero translates f/>i&o^o; by via^ and couples it 
with ars. {Brutus^ c. 12. Compare De Finihus^ ii., 1, and 
also De Orat.^ i., 19). 

Scientific or philosophical method is the march which the 
mind follows in ascertaining or communicating truth. It is 
the putting of our thoughts in a certain order with a view to 
improve our knowledge or to convey it to others. 

Method may be called, in general, the art of disposing well 
a series of many thoughts^ either for the discovering truth when 
we are ignorant of it^ or for proving it to others when it is 
already known. Thus there are two kinds of method., one 
for discovering truth, which is called analysis., or the method 
of resolution., and which may also be called the method of 
invention ; and the other for explaining it to others when we 
have found it, which is called synthesis^ or the method of 
composition^ and which may also be called the method af 
doctrine. — Fort Roy. Logic, part 4, ch. 2. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 315 

'* Method^ which is usuallv described as the fourth part of 
Logic, is rather a complete practical Logic. It is rather a 
power or spirit of the intellect, pervading all that it does, 
than its tangible product." — Thomson. Outline of Laws of 
Thought, sect. 119. 

Everj^ department of Philosophy has its own proper 
method; but there is a universal method or science of method. 
This was caUed by Plato, dialectic : and represented as leading 
to the true and the real. (Repuh.. lib. vii.) It has been said 
that the word ^t/J^o^oc, as it occurs in Aristotle's Ethics, should 
be translated "system,'' rather than ••method." — (Paul, 
Analysis of Aristotle'' s Ethics, p. 1.) But the construction of 
a system implies method. And no one was more thoroughly 
aware of the importance of a right method thsji Ai-istotle. He 
has said (Metophys., Kb. ii.), " that we ought to see well what 
demonstration (or proof) suits each particular subject : for 
it would be absurd to mix together the research of science 
and that of method: two things, the acquisition of which 
offers great difficulty." The Deductive method of philosophy 
came at once finished from his hand. And the Inductive 
method was more extensively and successfully followed out 
by him than has been generally thought. 

James Acontius, or Concio, as he is sometimes called, 
was born at Trent, and came to England iu 1567. He 
published a work, De Methodo^ of which Mons. Degerando 
{Hist. Compar. des Systemes de Philosophie, part 2. tom. ii., 
p. 3) has given an analysis. According to him. aU know- 
ledge deduced from a process of reasoning pre -supposes 
some primitive truths, founded in the nature of man. and 
admitted as soon as announced : and the great aim of method 
should be to bring these primitive truths to Hght, that by 
their light we may have more light. Truths obtaiued bv 
the senses, and by repeated experience, become at length 
positive and certain knowledge. 

Descartes has a discourse on Method. He has reduced 
it to four general rules. 

I. To admit nothins: as true of which we have not a clear 



316 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

METHOD— 

and distinct idea. We have a clear and distinct idea of our 
own existence. And in proportion as our idea of anything 
else approaches to, or recedes from, the clearness of this 
idea, it ought to be received or rejected. 

II. To divide every object inquired into as much as 
possible into its parts. Nothing is more simple than the 
ego, or self- consciousness. In proportion as the object of 
inquiry is simplified^ the evidence comes to be nearer that 
of self-consciousness. 

III. To ascend from simple ideas or cognitions to those 
that are more complex. The real is often complex : and to 
arrive at the knowledge of it as a reality, we must by 
synthesis reunite the parts which were previously separated. 

lY. By careful and repeated enumeration to see that all 
the parts are reunited. For the synthesis will be deceitful 
and incomplete if it do not reunite the whole, and thus give 
the reality. 

This method begins with provisory doubt, proceeds by 
analysis and synthesis, and ends by accepting evidence in 
proportion as it resembles the evidence of self-consciousness. 

These rules are useful in all departments of philosophy. 
But different sciences have different methods suited to their 
objects and to the end in view. 

In prosecuting science with the view of extending our 
knowledge of it, or the limits of it, we are said to follow the 
method of investigation or inquiry, and our procedure will be 
chiefly in the way of analysis. But in communicating what 
is already known, we follow the method of exposition or 
doctrine, and our procedure will be chiefly in the way of 
synthesis. 

In some sciences the principles or laws are given, and the 
object of the science is to discover the possible application 
of them. In these sciences the method is deductive, as in 
geometry. In other sciences, the facts or phenomena are 
given, and the object of science is to discover the principles 
or laws. In these sciences the proper method is inductive, 
proceeding by observation or experiment, as in psychology 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 317 

3TIE THOD— 

and physics. The method opposed to this, and which was 
long followed, was the constructive method; which, instead 
of discovering causes by induction, imagined or assigned 
them a priori^ or ex hypothesis and afterwards tried to verify 
them. This method is seductive and bold, but dangerous 
and insecure, and should be resorted to with great caution. 
— V. Hypothesis. 

The use of method^ both in obtaining and applying know- 
ledge for ourselves, and in conveying and communicating it 
to others, is great and obvious. " Currenti extra viara, quo 
habilior sit et velocior, eo majorem contingere aberrationem." 
— Nov, Org,^ i., 61. " Une bonne methode donne a I'esprit 
une telle puissance qu'elle pent en quelque sorte remplacer 
le talent. C'est un levier qui donne a I'homme faible, qui 
Temploye, une force que ne sauvait posseder Thomme le 
plus fort qui serait prive d'un semblable meyen." — Comte, 
Traite de V Legislation ^ lib. i., c. 1. La Place has said, — " La 
connaissance de la methode qui a guide I'homme de genie, 
n'est pas moins utile au progres de la science, et meme a 
sa propre gloire, que ses decouvertes." 

" Marshal thy notions into a handsome method. One will 
carry twice as much weight, trussed and packed up in 
bundles, than when it lies untoward, flapping and hanging 
about his shoulders." — Pleasures of Liter atiire^ 12mo, Lond., 
1851, p. 104. 

See Descartes, On Method. 

Coleridge, On Method^ Litrod. to Encydop. Metropol, 

Coleridge, Friend^ vol. iii. — V. System. 

METONYMY. — V. TntENTIOX. 

MICROCOSM. — V. ]\L^CI10C0SM. 

MINI> is that which moves, body is that which is moved. — 
Monboddo, Ancient Metophys.., book ii., chap. 3. See his 
remarks on the definition of Plato and Aristotle, chap. 4. 

"By mind we mean something which, when it acts, 
knows what it is going to do ; something stored with ideas 
of its intended works, agi'eeably to which ideas those works 
are fashioned." — Harris, Hermes^ p. 227. 



318 VOCABULARY OF, PHILOSOPHY. 

" Mind^ that wHcli perceives, feels, thinks, and wills." — 
Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

" Among metaphysicians, mind is becoming a generic, and 
soul an individual designation. Mind is opposed to matter; 
soul to body. Mind is soul without regard to personality ; 
soul is the appropriate mind of the being under notice. 
Et}Tiiologically, mind is the principle of volition, and soul 
the principle of animation. ^'I mean to go" was originally 
^'I mind to go." Soul^ at first identical with self is from 
sellan, to say, the faculty of speech being its characteristic. 

Dumb, and without a soul, beside such beauty 
He has no mind to marry. — Taylor, Synonyms. 

— F. Soul. 

MNEMONICS.-— F. MeMORIA TeCHNICA. 

1»I02>AIL.ITY is the term employed to denote the most general 
points of view under which the different objects of thought 
present themselves to our mind. ^KTow all that we think of 
we think of as possible^ or contingent^ or impossible^ or 
necessary. The possible is that which may equally be or 
not be, which is not yet, but which may be ; the contingent 
is that which already is, but which might not have been ; 
the necessary is that which always is ; and the impossible is 
that which never is. These are the modalities of being, 
which necessarily find a place in thought, and in the expres- 
sion of it in judgments and in propositions. Hence arise 
the four modal propositions which Aristotle has defined and 
opposed (Yl^pi kpy.:i>2iocg^ c. 12-14.) He did not use the 
term modality^ but it is to be found among his commen- 
tators and the scholastic philosophers. In the philosophy 
of Kant, our judgments are reduced under the four heads 
of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. In reference 
to modality thej Sire either problematic, or assertory, or 
apodeictical. And hence the category of modality includes 
possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, 
necessity or contingency. But existence and non-existence 
should have no place, the contingent and the necessary are I 
not different from being. — Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. 



VOCABULARY OF t»HILOSOPHY. 319 

]!IXO]>£* — ''The manner in whicli a thing exists is called a 
mode or affection ; shape and colour are modes of matter, 
memory and joy are modes of mind." — Taylor, Elements of 
TlioughL 

" Modes^ I call such complex ideas, which, however com- 
pounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting 
by themselves, but are considered as dependencies on, or 
affections of substances." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Under- 
stand,^ b. ii., chap. 12, sec. 4. 

" There are some modes which may be called internal,, 
because they are conceived to be in the substance, as round, 
square ; and others which may be called external,, because 
they are taken from something which is not in the substance, 
as loved, seen, desired, which are names taken from the 
action of another ; and this is what is called in the schools an 
external denomination^ — Port Roy. Logic, part 1, chap. 2. 
" Modes or modifications of mind,, in the Cartesian school, 
mean merely what some recent philosophers express by 
states of mind ; and include both the active and passive 
phenomena of the conscious subject. The terms were used 
by Descartes as well as by his disciples." — Sir William 
Hamilton, Pieid^s Works,, p. 295, note. 

Mode is the manner in w^hich a substance exists ; thus 
wax may be round or square, solid or fluid. Modes are 
secondary or subsidiary, as they could not be without 
substance, which exists by itself. Substances are not con- 
fined to any mode,, but must exist in some. Modes are 
all variable conditions, and though some one is necessary 
to every substance, the particular ones are all accidental. 
Modification is properly the bringing of a thing into a mode,, 
but is sometimes used to denote the mode of existence itself. 
State is a nearly synonymous but a more extended term 
than mode. 

A mode is a variable and determinate affection of a sub- 
stance, a quality which it may have or not without affect- 
ing its essence or existence. A body may be at rest or in 
motion, a mind may affn^m or deny, without ceasing to be. 
They are not accidents because they arise directly from 



320 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MOI>ES— 

the nature of tlie substance which experiences them. Nor 
should they be called phenomena which may have or not 
have their cause in the object which exhibits them. But 
modes arise from the nature of the substance affected by 
them. It is true that one substance modifies another, and 
in this view modes may sometimes be the effect of causes 
out of the substance in which they appear. They are then 
called modifications. Fire melts wax, the liquidity of wax 
in this view is a modijication. 

All beings which constitute the universe modify one 
another ; but a soul endowed with liberty is the only being 
that modifies itself, or which can be altogether and in the 
same mode^ cause and substance, active and passive. — • 
Diet, des Sciences PhilosopJi. 

That quahty which distinguishes one genus, one species, 
or even one individual, from another, is termed a modifica- 
tion ; then the same particular that is termed a property or 
quality., when considered as belonging to an individual, or a 
class of individuals, is termed a modification when con- 
sidered as distinguishing the individual or the class from 
another ; a black skin and soft curled hair, are properties 
of a negro ; the same circumstances considered as marks 
that distinguish a negro from a man of a different species, 
are denominated modifications.''^ — Kames, Elements of Cri- 
ticism., app. 

MOliECUliE (molecula, a little mass) — ^is the smallest portion 
of matter cognizable by any of our senses. It is something 
real, and thus differs from atom., which is not joerceived but 
co72ceived. It is the smallest portion of matter which we 
can reach by our means of dividing, while atom is the last 
possible term of all division. When molecules are of simple 
homogeneous elements, as of gold or silver, they are called 
integrant — when they are of compound or heterogeneous 
elements, as salts and acids, they are called constituent. 

M01VAJ>, MONAI>OI.OOY, {^ovoLg, unity, one). — According 
to Leibnitz, the elementary particles of matter are vital 
forces not acting mechanically, but from an internal prin- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 321 

Itt:ONAI>— 

ciple. They are incorporeal or spiritual atoms, inaccessible 
to all change from without, but subject to internal move- 
ment. This h}^othesis he explains in a treatise entitled 
Monadologie- He thought inert matter insufficient to 
explain the phenomena of body, and had recourse to the 
entelechies of Aristotle, or the substantial forms of the scho- 
lastic philosophy, conceiving of them as primitive forces, 
constituting the substance of matter, atoms of substance but 
not of matter, real and absolute unities, metaphysical points, 
full of vitality, exact as mathematical points, and reaZ as phy- 
sical points. These substantial unities which constitute 
matter are of a nature inferior to spirit and soul, but they 
are imperishable, although they may undergo transformation, 

'' Monadology rests upon this axiom — Every substance is 
at the same time a cause, and every substance being a cause, 
has therefore in itself the principle of its own development : 
such is thoi monad; it is a simple force. Each 7?<o?2ao? has 
relation to all others ; it corresponds with the plan of the 
universe ; it is the universe abridged ; it is, as Leibnitz says, 
a living mirror which reflects the entire universe under its 
own point of view. But every monad being simple, there 
is no immediate action of one monad upon another ; there 
is, however, a natural relation of their respective develop- 
ment, which makes their apparent communication ; this 
natural relation, this harmony which has its reason in the 
wisdom of the supreme director is pre- estahlished liarmomj.^' 
— Cousin, Hist, Mod. Philosopli.^ vol. ii., p. 86, 

Mr. Stewart (Dissert.^ part 2, note 1, p. 219) has said, — 
^' After studying, with all possible diligence, w^hat Leibnitz 
has said of his monads in different parts of his works, I find 
myself quite incompetent to annex any precise idea to the 
word as he has employed it." The most intelligible passage 
which he quotes is the following. (Tom. ii., p. 50.) "A 
monad is not a material but 2i formal atom, it bemg impos- 
sible for a thing to be at once material, and possessed of a 
real unity and indivisibility. It is necessary, therefore, to 
revive the obsolete doctrine o^ substantial forms (the essence 

Y 



322 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

I?IONAI>— 

of whicli consists in /orce), separating it, however, from the 
various abuses to which it is liable." 
mONOOAMY {jJLovoi yct^of , one marriage) — is the doctrine that 
one man should have only one wife. It has also been inter- 
preted to mean that a man should not marry more than 
once. — F. Polygamy. 
MONOTHElsm {f^Qvog hog^ one God) — is the belief in one 
God only. 

''The general propensity to the worship of idols was 
totally subdued, and the Jews became monotheists^ in the 
strictest sense of the term." — Cogan, Discourse on Jewish 
Dispensation.^ c. 2, s. 7. 

V. Theism, Polytheism. 
IVIORAlLi (moralis^ mos, manner) — is used in several senses in 
philosophy. 

In reasoning, the word moral is opposed to demonstrative., 
and means prohahle. Sometimes it is opposed to material., 
and in this sense it means mental or that the object to which 
it is applied belongs to mind and not to matter. Thus we 
speak o^ moral science as distinguished from. physical science. 

It is also opposed to intellectual and to what is cesthetic. 
Thus we distinguish between a moral Tiahit and an intel- 
lectual hahit^ between that which is morally becoming and 
that which pleases the powers of taste. 

Moral is opposed to positive, '•'• Moral precepts are pre- 
cepts, the reasons of which we see ; positive precepts are 
precepts, the reasons of which we do not see. Moral 
duties arise out of the nature of the case itself prior to 
external command ; positive duties do not arise out of the 
nature of the case, but from external command ; nor would 
they be duties at all, were it not for such command received 
from him whose creatures and subjects we are." — Butler, 
Analogy., part 2, ch. 1. 

'' A j> 052 ^zY'e precept concerns a thing that is right because 
commanded ; a moral precept respects a thing commanded 
because it is right. A Jew, for instance, was bound both 
to honour his parents, and also to worship at Jerusalem ; 



VOCABULAPv'^ OF PHILOSOPHY. 323 

but the former was commanded because it was right, and 
the latter was right because it was commanded." — Whately, 
Lessons on Morals, 
mORAIi FACUIiTY.— F. CONSCIENCE. 

IWOBAIilTY. — " To lay down, in their universal form, the 
laws according to which the conduct of a free agent ought 
to be regulated, and to apply them to the different situa- 
tions of human life, is the end of morality ^ 

^'•A body of moral truths^ definitely expressed^ and arranged 
according to their rational connections'^'' is the definition of 
a ''system of morality ^^ by Dr. Whewell, On Systematic 
Morality^ lect. i. 

'' The doctrine which treats of actions as right or wrong 
is morality y — Whewell, Morality^ sect. 76. 

''There are in the world two classes of objects, persons 
and things. And these are mutually related to each other. 
There are relations between persons and persons, and 
between things and things. And the peculiar distinctions 
of moral actions, moral characters, moral principles, moral 
habits, as contrasted with the intellect and other parts of 
man's nature, lies in this, that they always imply a relation 
between two persons^ not between two things." — Sewell, 
Christ. Morals^ p. 339. 

" Morality commences with, and begins in, the sacred 
distinction between thing and person. On this distinction 
all law, human and divine, is grounded." — Coleridge, Aids 
to Reflection^ vol. i., p. 265. 

"What the duties of morality are, the apostle instructs 
the believer in full, comprising them under the two heads of 
negative and positive ; negative, to keep himself pure from 
the world ; and positive, beneficence from lo^dng-kindness, 
that is, love of his fellow-men (his kind) as himself. Last 
and highest come the spiritual, comprising all the truths, 
acts, and duties, that have an especial reference to the 
timeless, the permanent, the eternal, to the sincere love of 
the true as truth, of the good as good, and of God as both 
in one. It comprehends the whole ascent from upright- 



324 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MORAIilTY— 

ness (morality, yirtue, inward rectitude) to godlikeness, 
with all the acts, exercises, and disciplines of mind, will, 
and affections, that are requisite or conducive to the great 
design of our redemption from the form of the evil one, 
and of our second creation or birth in the divine image. 

"It may be an additional aid to reflection, to distinguish 
the three kinds severally, according to the faculty to which 
each corresponds, the part of our human nature which is 
more particularly its organ. Thus, the prudential corre- 
sponds to the sense and the understanding ; the moral, to 
the heart and the conscience ; the spiritual, to the will and 
the reason, that is, to the finite will reduced to harmony 
with, and in subordination to, the reason, as a ray from 
that true light which is both reason and will, universal 
reason and will absolute," 

How nearly this scriptural division coincides with the 
Platonic, see Prudence. — Coleridge, Aids to Reflection^ 
vol. i., pp. 22, 23. 
MORAJli PHlIiOSOPHY is the science of human duty. 
The knowledge of human duty implies a knowledge of 
human nature. To understand what man ought to do, it 
is necessary to know what man is. ISTot that the moral 
philosopher, before entering upon those inquiries which 
peculiarly belong to him, must go over the science of 
human nature in all its extent. But it is necessary to 
examine those elements of human nature which have a 
direct bearing upon human conduct. A full course of 
moral philosophy should consist, therefore, of two parts — 
the first, containing an analysis and illustration of those 
powers and principles by which man is prompted to act, 
and by the possession of which, he is capable of acting 
under a sense of duty ; the second, containing an arrange- 
ment and exposition of the duties incumbent upon him as 
the possessor of an active and moral nature. As exhibiting 
the facts and phenomena presented by an examination of 
the active and moral nature of man, the first part may be 
characterized as psychological ; and as laying down the 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 325 

duties arising from the various relations in which man, as 
a moral agent, has been placed, the second part may be 
designated as deontological. — V. Ethics. 
inORAi. SENSE. — V, Sense Keflex. 

MOTION {x,ivYi(Tig) — is the continued change of place of a body, 
or of any ^a?' ^5 of a body ; for in the cases of a globe turning 
on its axis and of a wheel revolving on a pivot, the parts of 
these bodies change their places, while the bodies them- 
selves remain stationary. 

Motion is either physical, that is, obvious to the senses, 
or not physical, that is, knowable by the rational faculty. 

Aristotle has noticed several kinds of physical motion. 
Change of place, as when a body moves from one place to 
another, remaining the same. Alteration or aliation, as 
when a body from being round, becomes square. Aug- 
mentation or diminution, as when a body becomes larger 
or smaller. All these are changes from one attribute to 
another, while the substance remains the same. 

But body only moves because it is moved. And Aris- 
totle traced all motion to impulses in the nature of things, 
rising from the spontaneous impulse of life, appetite, and 
desire, up to the intelligent contemplation of what is good. 

As Heraclitus held that all things are continually chang- 
ing, so Parmenides. and Zeno denied the possibility of 
motion. The best reply to their subtle sophisms, was that 
given by Diogenes the Cynic, who walked into the presence 
of Zeno in refutation of them. 

The notion of movement or motion, like that of exten- 
sion, is acquired in connection with the exercise of the 
senses of sight and touch. 
MOTIVE* — ^' The deliberate preference by which we are moved 
to act, and not the object for the sake of which we act is the 
principle of action ; and desire and reason, which is for the 
sake of something, is the origin of deliberate preference." 
— Aristotle, Ethic, lib. vi., cap. 2. 

Kant distinguishes between the subjective principle of 
appetition which he calls the mobile or spring (die Trieb- 



326 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MOTIVE — 

feder)^ and the objective principle of the will, which he 
calls motive or determining reason (heweggrund) ; hence 
the difference between subjective ends to which we are 
pushed by natural disposition, and objective ends^ which are 
common to us with all beings endowed with reason. — 
Willm, Hist, de la Philosoph, Allemande^ torn, i., p. 357. 

This seems to be the difference expressed in French 
between mobile and motif, 

'-'• A motive is an object so operating upon the mind as 
to produce either desire or aversion." — ^Lord Karnes, Essay 
on Liberty and Necessity. 

"By motive^'''' said Edwards (Inquiry^ part i., sect. 2), 
" I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites, 
the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or 
many things conjunctly. Many particular things may con- 
cur and unite their strength to induce the mind ; and when 
it is so, all together are, as it were, one complex motive. 
.... Whatever is a motive^ in this sense, must be some- 
thing that is extant in the view or apprehension of the under- 
standing^ or perceiving faculty. N^othing can induce or 
invite the mind to will or act anything, any further than 
it is perceived, or is in some way or other in the mind's 
view ; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of 
the mind's view, cannot affect the mind at all." 

Hence it has been common to distinguish motives as 
external or objective^ and as internal or subjective. Re- 
garded objectively^ motives are those external objects or 
circumstances, which, when contemplated, give rise to views 
or feelings which prompt or influence the will. Regarded 
subjectively^ motives are those internal views or feelings 
which arise on the contemplation of external objects or 
circumstances. In common language, the term motive is 
applied indifferently to the external object, and to the 
state of mind, to which the apprehension or contemplation 
of it may give rise. The explanation of Edwards includes 
both. Dr. Reid said, that he "understood a motive^ when 
apphed to a human being, to be that for the sake of which 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 327 

IWEOTITE — 

he acts, and therefore that what he never was conscious 
of, can no more be a motive to determine his will, than it 
can be an argument to determine his judgment."* ( Corre- 
spondence prefixed to Ms Works^ p. 87). In his Essays on 
the Active Powers (essay iv., chap, 4), he said, ^' Every- 
thing that can be called a motive is addressed either to the 
animal or to the rational part of our nature.'*' Here the 
word motive is applied objectively to those external things, 
which, when contemplated, affect our intelligence or our 
sensitivity. But, in the very next sentence, he has said, 
^' motives of the former kind are common to us with the 
brutes." Here the word motive is applied subjectively to 
those internal principles of our nature, such as appetite, 
desire, passion, &e., which are excited by the contem- 
plation of external objects, adapted and addressed to 
them. 

But, in order to a more precise use of the term motive^ 
let it be noted, that, in regard to it, there are three things 
clearly distinguishable, although it may not be common, 
nor easy, always to speak of them distinctively. These 
are, the external object, the internal principle, and the state 
or affection of mind resulting from the one being addressed 
to the other. For example, bread or food of any kind, is 
the external object, which is adapted to an internal prin- 
ciple which is called appetite, and hunger or the desire of 
food is the internal feeling, which is excited or allayed, as 
the circumstances may be, by the presentment of the ex- 
ternal object to the internal principle. In popular lan- 
guage, the term motive might be applied to any one of 
these three ; and, it might be said, that the motive for such 
an action was bread^ or appetite^ or hunger. But, strictly 
speaking, the feeling of hunger was the motive ; it was that, 
in the preceding state of mind, which disposed or inclined 
the agent to act in one way rather than in any other. The 

* "This is Aristotle's definition (to ivixoc ou) of end oi\final cause: and as a 
synonym for end or final cause the term motive had been long exclusively em- 
ployed-" — Sir Will. Hamilton. 



328 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

MOTIVE— 

same may be said of motives of eveiy kind. In every case 
there may be observed the external object, the internal 
principle, and the resultant state or affection of mind ; and 
the term motive may be applied, separately and succes- 
sively, to any one of them ; but speaking strictly, it should 
be applied to the terminating state or affection of mind 
which arises from a principle of human nature having been 
addressed by an object adapted to it ; because, it is this state 
or affection of mind which prompts to action. The motive 
of an agent, in some particular action, may be said to have 
been injury^ or resentment, or on^er— meaning by the first 
of these words, the wrongous behaviour of another ; by the 
second, the principle in human nature affected by such be- 
haviour ; and by the third, the resultant state of mind in 
the agent. When it is said that a man acted prudently, it 
may intimate, that his conduct v/as in accordance with the 
rules of propriety and prudence ; or, that he adopted it, 
after careful consideration and forethought, or, from a 
sense of the benefit and advantage to be derived from it. 
In like manner, when it is said that a man acted conscien- 
tiously y it may mean, that the particular action was regarded 
not as a matter of interest, but of duty^ or, that his moral 
faculty approved of it as right, or, that he felt himself 
under a sense of obligation to do it. In all these cases, 
the term motive is strictly applicable to the terminating 
state or affection of mind, which immediately precedes the 
volition or determination to act. 

To the question, therefore, whether motive means some- 
thing in the mind or out of it, it is replied, that what 
moves the will is something in the preceding state of 
mind. The state of mind may have reference to something 
out of the mind. But what is out of the mind must be 
apprehended or contemplated — must be brought within the 
view of the mind, before it can in any way affect it. It is 
only in a secondary or remote sense, therefore, that ex- 
ternal objects or circumstances can be called motives^ or be 
said to move the will. Motives are^ strictly speaking, suh^ 



TOCAB CLARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ' 829 

MOTITE— 

jective — as they are internal states or affections of mind in 
the agent. 

And motives may be called siibjective, not only in contra- 
distinction to the external objects and circumstances which 
may be the occasion of them, but also in regard to the 
different effect which the same objects and circumstances 
may have, not only upon different individuals, but even 
upon the same individuals, at different times. 

A man of slow and narrow intellect is unable to perceive 
the value or importance of an object when presented to 
him, or the propriety and advantage of a course of conduct 
that may be pointed out to him, so clearly or so quickly as 
a man of large and vigorous intellect. The consequence 
will be, that with the same motives (objectively considered) 
presented to them, the one may remain indifferent and in- 
dolent in reference to the advantage held out, while the 
other will at once apprehend and pursue it. A man of 
cold and dull affections will contemplate a spectacle of pain 
or want, without feeling any desire or making any exertion 
to relieve it ; while he whose sensibilities are more acute 
and lively, will instantly be moved to the most active and 
generous efforts. An injury done to one man will rouse him 
at once to a phrenzy of indignation, which will prompt him 
to the most extravagant measures of retaliation or revenge ; 
while, in another man, it will only give rise to a moderate 
feeling of resentment. An action which will be contem- 
plated with horror by a man of a tender conscience, will 
be done without compunction by him whose moral sense 
has not been sufficiently exercised to discern between good 
and evil. In short, an}i:hmg external to the mind will be 
modified in its effect, according to the constitution and 
training of the different minds within the view of which it 
may be brought. 

And not only may the same objects differently affect 
different minds, but also the same minds, at different times, 
or under different circumstances. He who is suffering the 
pam of hunger may be tempted to steal, in order to satisfy 



330 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. * 

MOTIVE-— ^ 

his hunger ; but he who has bread enough and to spare, is 
under no such temptation. A sum of money which might 
be sufficient to bribe one man, would be no trial to the 
honesty of another. Under the impulse of any violent 
passion, considerations of prudence and propriety have not 
the same weight as in calmer moments. The young are 
not so cautious, in circumstances of danger and difficulty, 
as those who have attained to greater age and experience. 
Objects appear to us in very different colours, in health 
and in sickness, in prosperity and in adversity, in society 
and in solitude, in prospect and in possession. 

It would thus appear, that motives are in their nature 
subjective^ in their influence individual^ and in their issue 
variaMe. 
MYSTICISM and MYSTERY have been derived from fivstu^ 
to shut up ; hence f^mTng^ one who shuts up. 

" The epithet sublime is strongly and happily descrip- 
tive of the feelings inspired by the genius of Plato, by" the 
lofty mysticism of his philosophy, and even by the remote 
origin of the theological fables which are said to have 
descended to him from Orpheus." — Stewart, Philosoph, 
Essays^ ii., chap. 5. 

Mysticism in philosophy is the belief that God may be 
known face to face, without anything intermediate. It is a 
yielding to the sentiment awakened by the idea of the 
infinite, and a running up of all knowledge and all duty 
to the contemplation and love of Him. — Cousin, Hist, de 
la Philosoph Mod.^ 1st series, tom. ii., le9on 9, 10. 

Mysticism despairs of the regular process of science ; it 
believes that we may attain directly, without the aid of the 
senses or reason, and by an immediate intuition, the real 
and absolute principle of all truth, God. It finds God 
either in nature, and hence a physical and naturalistic 
mysticism ; or in the soul, and hence a moral and meta- 
physical mysticism. It has also its historical views ; and in 
history it considers especially that which represents mysti- 
cism in full, and under its most regular form, that is reli- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 331 

MtirSTICISIWE— 

gious : and it is not to the letter of religions, but to their 
spirit, that it clings ; hence an allegorical and symbolical 
mysticism. Van Helmont, Ames, and Pordage, are natu- 
ralistic mystics; Poiret is morale and Bourignon and Fene- 
lon are Divine mystics. Swedenborg's mysticism includes 
them all. 

The Germans have two words for mysticism; mystik and 
mysticismus. The former they use in a favourable, the 
latter in an unfavourable sense. Just as we sslj piety and 
jnetism^ or rationality and rationalism ; keeping the first of 
each pair for use, the second for abuse. — Yaughan, Hours 
ivith the Mystics^ vol. i., p. 23. 

Cousin, Hist, of Mod, PhilosopJi., vol. ii., pp. 9^-7. 

Schmidt (Car.), Essai siir les Mystiques du quatorzieme 

siecle, Strasbm^g, 1836. 

.^lYTH and MYTHOI^OOY (^vhg^ a fable ; Xgys/i/, to tell). 

— " I use this term (myth) as s}TiomTQOus with 'invention,' 

• having no historical basis." — Pococke, India in Greece^ 

p. 2, note. 

The early history and the early religion of all nations are 
full of fables. Hence it is that myths have been divided 
into the traditional and the theological^ or the historical 
and the religious,"^ 

A mijth is a narrative framed for the piu'pose of express- 
ing some general truth, a law of natm-e, a moral pheno- 
menon, or a religious idea, the diiferent phases of which 
correspond to the turn of the narrative. An allegory agrees 
with it in expressing some general idea, but differs from it 
in this, — that in the allegory the idea was developed before 
the form,, which was invented and adapted to it. The 
allegory is a reflective and artificial process, the myth springs 
up spontaneously and by a kind of inspu'ation. A symbol 
is a silent myth^ which impresses the truths which it con- 

* Among the early nations, eveiy truth a little remote from common apprehen- 
sion, -svas embodied in their religious creed; so that this second class -would contain 
myths concerning Deity, morals, physics, astronomy, and metaphysics. These last 
are properly csdled philoscphemes. 



332 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MYTH— 

veys not by successive stages, but at once (aw ^ot,'h>.iiy) 
throws together significant images of some truth. 

Plato has introduced the myth into some of his writings 
in a subordinate way, as in the Gorgias^ the Republic^ and 
the Timceus. 

Huttner, De Mytliis Platonis^ 4to, Leipsic, 1788. 

Bacon, On the Wisdom of the Ancients, 

Muller, Mythology. Translated by Leitch, 1844. 

On the philosophic value of myths^ see Cousin, Cours^ 
1828; 1 and 15 lemons, and the Argument of his Transla- 
tion of Plato. 

Some good remarks on the difference between the 
parable^ the fable^ the myth.^ &c., will be found in Trench, 
introduction to his work On the Parables. 

On the different views taken of Greek mythology^ see 
Creuzer and Godfrey Hermann. 

See an Essay on Comparative Mythology^ in the Oxford 
Essays for 1856. 



iVATURAli, as distinguished from Supernatural or Miraculous. 

— " The only distinct meaning of the word natural is stated., 
fixed., or settled; since what is natural as much requires and 
presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, that is, to 
effect it continually or at stated times, as what is super- 
natural or miraculous does to effect it for once." — Butler, 
Analogy., part 1, chap. 1. 
Natural, as distinguished from Innate or Instinctive. 

'' There is a great deal of difference," said Mr. Locke 
(Essay on Hum. Understand.., book i., ch. 3), '' between 
an innate law., and a law of Nature ; between something 
imprinted on our minds in their very original, and some- 
thing that we being ignorant of, may attain to the know- 
ledge of by the use and application of our natural faculties. 
And I think they equally forsake the truth who, running 
into contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law., or deny 
that there is a law knowable by the light of nature., without 
the help of positive revelation." 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 333 

NATURAI.— 

'' Of the various powers and faculties we possess, there 
are some which nature seems both to have planted and 
reared, so as to have left nothing to human industry. Such 
are the powers which we have in common with the brutes, 
and which are necessary to the preservation of the indivi- 
dual, or to the continuance of the kind. There are other 
powers, of which nature hath only planted the seeds in our 
minds, but hath left the rearing of them to human culture.* 
It is by the proper culture of these that we are capable of 
all those improvements in intellectuals, in taste, and in 
morals, which exalt and dignify human nature ; while on 
the other hand, the neglect or perversion of them makes 
its degeneracy and corruption." — Eeid, Inquiry^ ch. 1, sect. 2. 

'^ Whatever ideas, whatever principles we are necessarily 
led to acquire by the circumstances in which we are placed, 
and by the exercise of those faculties which are essential to 
our preservation, are to be considered as parts of human 
nature, no less than those which are implanted in the mind 
at its first formation." — Stewart, Active and Moral Powers^ 
vol. i., p. 351. 

'^ Acquired perceptions and sentiments may be termed 
natural^ as much as those which are commonly so called, if 
they are as rarely found wanting." — Mackintosh, Prelimin. 
Dissert.^ p. 67. 
NATURAIiiSM is the name given to those systems of the 
philosophy of nature which explain the phenomena by a 
blind force acting necessarily. This doctrine is to be found 
in Lucretius, De Rerum Natura^ and was held by Leucippus 
and Epicurus. The Systeme de la Nature of D'Holbach, 
the Traite de la Nature of Robinet, and the Philosophie de 
la Nature of Delisle de Sales, also contain it. 

Naturalism in the fine arts is opposed to idealism. Of 
Albert Durer it is said that '^ he united to the brilliant deli- 
cacies of Flemish naturalism the most elevated and varied of 
Italian idealism.^ ^ — Labarte, Handbook oftlie Middle Ages. 

* Yet Dr. Reid, when speaking of natural rights {Active Potcers, essay v., ch. 5) 
uses innate as synonymous witli natural. 



334 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NATURE (natum^ nascor^ to be born, to be). — According to 
its derivation, nature should mean that which is produced 
or bom ; but it also means that which produces or causes 
to be born. The word has been used with various shades 
of meaning, but they may all be brought under two heads, 
Natura Naturans^ and Natura Naturata, 

I. Natura Naturans. — a. The Author of nature^ the 
uncreated Being who gave birth to everything that is. 
h. The plastic nature or energ^^ subordinate to that of the 
Deity, by which all things are conserved and directed to 
their ends and uses. c. The course of nature^ or the 
established order according to which the universe is regu- 
lated. 

Alii naturam censent esse vim quandam sine Ratione, 
cientem motus in corporibus necessarios ; alii autem vim 
participem ordinis, tanquam via progredientem. — Cicero, 
De Nat. Deorum^ lib. ii. 

n. Natura Naturata, — a, 1. The works of 72a^i«re, both 
mind and matter. 2. The visible or material creation, as 
distinct from God and the soul, which are the objects of 
natural science. 

" The term nature is used sometimes in a wider, some- 
times in a narrower extension. When employed in its 
most extensive meaning, it embraces the two worlds of 
mind and matter. When employed in its more restricted 
signification, it is a synonym for the latter only, and is 
then used in contradistinction to the former. In the Greek 
philosophy, the word (pvaig was general in its meaning ; and 
the great branch of philosophy, styled '-physical or physio- 
logical^'' included under it not only the sciences of matter, 
but also those of mind. With us, the term nature is more 
vaguely extensive than the terms physics., physical., physi- 
ology., physiological., or even than the adjective, natural; 
whereas in the philosophy of Germany, natur and its 
correlatives, whether of Greek or Latin derivation, are, 
in general, expressive of the world of matter in contrast 
to the world of intelhgence." — Sir William Hamilton, 
Reid's Works, p. 216, note. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 335 

NATURE — 

&. Nature as opposed to art^ all physical causes, all the 
forces which belong to physical beings, organic or inor- 
ganic, c. The nature or essence of any particular being or 
class of beings, that which makes it what it is. 

Aristotle (JMetaphys.^ lib. v., cap. 4), after noticing vari- 
ous significations of (^vaig^ says, '-'- Nature^ properly so 
called, is the essence of beings, which have in themselves 
and by themselves the principle of their movement." And 
he says (^In Physic. Auseult.}^ '' Things which exist natu- 
rally, have all in themselves the principle of motion or rest ; 
some that of motion in space, others that of growth and 
decay; and others that of change. On the contrary, a 
litter, a dress, all that is the product of art, carries no 
principle of change in itself ; and it is because these things 
are of stone, or earth, or a mixture of elements ; it is this 
accidental cause which is for them the principle of motion 
or rest. Nature is thus a principle, a cause which im- 
presses motion and rest, a cause inherent in the essence of 
the object, not a cause accidental." 

'' Nature^ then (according to the opinion of Aristotle), 
is the beginning of motion and rest, in that thing wherein 
it is properly and principally, not by accident ; for all 
things to be seen (which are done neither by fortune nor 
by necessity, and are not divine, nor have any such 
efficient cause), are called natural, as having a proper and 
pecuhar nature of their own." — Holland, Plutarch., p. 659. 

" The word nature has been used in two senses, — viz., 
actively and passively; energetic (^= forma for mans)., and 
material (^= forma formatd). In the first it signifies the 
inward principle of whatever is requisite for the reality of 
a thing as existent ; while the essence., or essential property, 
signifies the inner prmciple of all that appertains to the 
possibility of a thing. Hence, in accurate language, we 
say the essence of a mathematical circle or geometrical 
figure, not the nature., because in the conception of forms, 
purely geometrical, there is no expression or implication of 
their real existence. In the second or material sense of 



336 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NATURE— 

the word nature^ we mean by it the sum total of all things, 
as far as they are objects of our senses, and consequently 
of possible experience — the aggregate of phenomena, 
whether existing for our outer senses, or for our inner 
sense. The doctrine concerning nature^ would therefore 
(the word physiology being both ambiguous in itself, and 
already otherwise appropriated) be more properly entitled 
phenomenology, distinguished into its two grand divisions, 
somatology* and psychology." — Coleridge, Friend^ p. 410. 
NATURE (Course or Power of) — '' There is no such thing 
as what men commonly call the course of nature^ or the 
power of nature. The course of nature^ truly and properly 
speaking, is nothing else but the will of God producing 
certain effects in a continued, regular, constant, and uni- 
form manner; which course or manner of acting, being 
in every movement perfectly arbitrary^ is as easy to be 
altered at any time as to be preserved. And if (as seems 
most probable), this continual acting upon matter be per- 
formed by the subserviency of created intelligences ap- 
pointed to that purpose by the Supreme Creator, then it 
is easy for any of them, and as much within their natural 
power (by the permission of God), to alter the course of 
nature at any time, or in any respect, as it is to preserve 
or continue it." — Clarke, Evidences of Nat, and Revealed 
Religion,^ p. 300, 4th edit. 

'' Nature^"^ said Dr. E,eid {Active Powers,, essay i., ch. 
5), ''is the name we give to the efficient cause of innumer- 
able effects which fall daily under observation. But if it 
be asked what nature is? whether the first universal cause f 
or a subordinate one? whether one or many? whether 
intelligent or unintelligent? — upon these points we find 
various conjectures and theories, but no solid ground upon 
which we can rest. And I apprehend the wisest men are 

* Both these are included in the title of a work which appeared more than thirty 
years ago,— viz., Somatopsychonologia, 

t Natura est principium et causa efficiens omnium remm naturaliura, quo sensu 
a veterihus philosophis cum Deo confundehatur. — Cicero, De Nat. Dea.., lib. i., c. 8, 
and lilb. ii., c. 22^ 32. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 667 

NATURE— 

they who are sensible that they know nothing of the 
matter." 

The Hon. Kobert Boyle wrote an Enquiry into the vul- 
garly received notion of Nature^ in which he attempted to 
show the absurdity of interposing any subordinate energy 
between the Creator and His works, 12mo, Lond., 1785. 
Nature ov Force (Plastic) (ttAoc^^o, formare) — was the 
name given by ancient physiologists to a power to which 
they attributed the formation of the germs and tissues of 
organized and living beings. In opposition to the doctrine 
of Democritus, who explained all the phenomena of nature 
by means of matter and motion, and in opposition to the 
doctrine of Strato, who taught that matter was the onh' 
substance, but in itself a living and active force, Cudworth 
maintained that there is a plastic nature^ sl spiritual energ}' 
intermediate between the Creator and His works, by which 
the phenomena of nature are produced. To ascribe these 
phenomena to the immediate agency of Deity would be, he 
thought, to make the course of nature miraculous ; and he 
could not suppose the agency of the Deity to be exerted 
directly and yet monstrosities and defects to be found in 
the works of nature. How far the facts warrant such an 
hypothesis, or how far such an hypothesis explains the 
facts, may be doubted. But the hypothesis is not much 
different from that of the anima mundi^ or soul of matter, 
which had the countenance of Pythagoras and Plato, as 
well as of the school of Alexandria, and later philosophers. 
— F. Anima Mundi. 
Nature (Philosophy of). — The philosophy of nature includes 
all the attempts which have been made to account for the 
origin and on-goings of the physical universe. Some of 
these have been noticed under Matter^ q. v. And for an 
account of the various philosophies of nature^ see T. H. 
Martin, Philosoph. Spiritualiste de la Nature^ 2 torn., Paris, 
1849; J. B. Stallo, A.M., General Principles of Philosoph. 
of Nature, Lond., 1848. 
NATURE (liaw of). — By the law of Nature is meant that law 

z 



838 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NATURE— 

of justice and benevolence which is written on the heart ot 
every man, and which teaches him to do to others as he 
would wish that they should do unto him. It was long 
called the law of nature and of nations^ because it is natural 
to men of all nations. But by the phrase law of nations is 
now meant international law, and by the law of nature^ 
natural law. It is not meant by the phrase that there is a 
regular system or code of laws made known by the light of 
nature in which all men everywhere acquiesce, but that 
there are certain great priaciples universally acknowledged, 
and in accordance with which men feel themselves bound 
to regulate their conduct. 

<-'- Why seek the law or rule in the world? What would 
you answer when it is alleged to be within you, if you 
would only listen to it ? You are like a dishonest debtor 
who asks for the bill against him when he has it himself. 
Quod petis intus habes. All the tables of the law — the two 
tables of Moses, the twelve tables of the Romans, and all 
the good laws in the world, are but copies and extracts, 
which ^vill be produced in judgment against thee who hidest 
the original and pretendest not to know what it is, stifling 
as much as possible that light which shines within thee, but 
which would never have been without and humanly pub- 
lished but that that which was within, all celestial and divine, 
had been contemned and forgotten." — Charron, De la 
Sagesse^ liv. 2, chap. 3, N'o. 4. 

According to Grotius, "Jus naturale est dictatum rectss 
rationis, indicans, actui ahcui, ex ejus convenientia, vel 
disconvenientia cum ipsa natura rationali, inesse moralem 
turpitudinem, aut necessitatem moralem ; et consequentur 
ab authore naturae, ipso Deo, talem actum aut vetari aut 
prsecipi." 

" Jw5 gentium is used to denote, not international law, 
but positive or instituted law, so far as it is common to all 
nations. When the Romans spoke of international law, 
they termed it Jus Feciale^ the law of heralds, or interna- 
tional envoys." — Whewell, Morality^ No. 1139. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 339 

NATURE— 

Selden, De Jure Naturally lib, 1, c. 3. 

Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis^ Prolegom.^ sect. 5-6, lib. T, 
cap. 1, sect. 10. 

PuffendorfF, De Officio Hominis et Civis^ lib. 3, c. 3. 

Sanderson, De Ohlig. Conscientice^ Prselect. Quarta. 
sect. 20-24. 

Culverwell, Discourse of the Light of Nature. 
NATURE (Human). — As to the different senses in whicl: 
nature may be understood, and tlie proper meaning of 
the maxim, follow nature^ — see Butler, Three Sermons on 
Hum. Nature, 
NECESSITY (ne and cesso^ that which cannot cease). — ''I 
have one thing to observe of the several kinds of necessity.. 
that the idea of some sort of firm connection runs through 
them all : and that is the proper general import of the 
name necessity. Connection of mental or verbal proposi- 
tions, or of their respective parts, makes up the idea of 
logical necessity^ — connection of end and means makes up 
the idea of moral necessity^ — connection of causes and effects 
is physical necessity^ and connection of existence and essence 
is metaphysical necessity. ^^ — Waterland, WorJcs^ vol. iv., p. 432. 

Logical necessity is that which, according to the terms of 
the proposition, cannot but be. Thus it is necessary that 
man be a rational animal, because these are the terms in 
which he is defined. 

Moral necessity is that without which the effect cannot 
well be, although absolutely speaking it may. A man whc 
is lame is under a moral necessity to use some help, but 
absolutely he may not. 

" The phrase moral necessity is used variously ; sometimes 
it is used for necessity of moral obligation. So we say, a 
man is under necessity^ when he is under bonds of duty and 
conscience from which he cannot be discharged. Sometimes 
l^y moral necessity is meant that sm^e connection of things 
that is a foundation for infallible certainty. In this senst 
moral necessity signifies much the same as that high degrci 
of probability, which is ordinarily sufiicient to satisfy \\\i\n 



340 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NECESSITY— 

kind in their conduct and behaviour in the world. Some- 
times by moral necessity is meant that necessity of connection 
and consequence which arises from such moral causes as the 
strength of inclination or motives, and the connection which 
there is in many cases between them, and such certain 
vohtions and actions. It is in this sense that I use the 
phrase moral necessity in the following discourse." — Edwards. 
Works ^ vol. i., p. 116. 

''By natural (or physical) necessity^ as appHed to men, I 
mean such necessity as men are under through the force of 
natural causes. Thus men placed in certain circumstances, 
are the subjects of particular sensations by necessity; they 
feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the 
objects placed before them in a clear light, when their eyes 
are opened : so they assent to the truths of certain proposi- 
tions as soon as the terms are understood ; as that two and 
two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel 
lines can never cross one another ; so by a natural (a physi- 
cal) necessity men's bodies move downwards when there is 
nothmg to support them." — Edwards, Works^ vol. i., p. 146. 

Necessity is characteristic of ideas and of actions, A 
necessary idea is one the contrary of which cannot be 
entertained by the human mind ; as every change implies 
a cause. Necessity and universality are the marks of certain 
ideas which are native to the human mind, and not derived 
from experience. A necessary action is one the contrary of 
which is impossible. Necessity is opposed to freedom, or to 
free-will. — V. Liberty. 

" There are two schemes of necessity^ — the necessitation 
by efficient — the necessitation hj final causes. The former 
is brute or blind fate ; the latter rational determinism. 
Though their practical results be the same, they ought to 
be carefully distinguished." — Sir W. Hamilton, Eeid's 
Works,^ p. 87, note. 

Physical necessity is when a thing is necessary according 
to physical causes, as, an eclipse of the sun is necessary 
when the moon is interposed, or a stone when not upheld 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. o41 

NECESSITY— 

necessarily falls to the ground. Metaphysical necessity is 
when the contrary cannot be conceded, as that a whole is 
greater than a part. 

Leibnitz in his Fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke, p. 157, distin- 
guishes between — 

1. Hypothetical necessity^ as opposed to absolute neces- 
sity^ as that which the supposition or hypothesis of God's 
foresight and preordination lays upon future contingents. 

2. Logical^ metaphysical or mathematical necessity^ 
which takes place because the opposite implies a contra- 
diction, and 

3. Moral necessity^ whereby a wise being chooses the 
best, and every mind follows the strongest inclination. 

Dr. Clarke replies, p. 287, '''-Necessity^ in philosophical 
questions, always signifies absolute necessity. Hypothetical 
necessity and moral necessity are only figurative ways of 
speaking, and in philosophical strictness of truth, are no 
necessity at all. The question is not, whether a thing must 
be, when it is supposed that it is^ or that it is to he (which 
is hypothetical necessity). Neither is it the question whether 
it be true, that a good being, continuing to be good, can- 
not do evil ; or a wise being, continuing to be wise, cannot 
act unwisely; or a veracious person, continuing to be vera- 
cious^ cannot tell a lie (which is moral necessity). But the 
true and only question in philosophy concerning liberty, is, 
whether the immediate physical cause., ot principle of action 
be indeed in him whom we call the agent ; or whether it 
be some other reason., which is the real cause by operating 
upon the agent, and making him to be not indeed an agent. 
but a mere patient.'''' 

The scholastic philosophers have denominated one species 
of necessity — necessitas consequeniice., and another necessitas 
consequentis. The former is an ideal or formal necessity; 
the inevitable dependence of one thought upon another, by 
reason of our intelligent nature. The latter is a real or 
material necessity; the inevitable dependence of one thing 
upon another because of its own nature. The former is a 



342 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NECESSITY— 

logical necessity^ commoii to all legitimate consequence, 
whatever be tlie material modality of its objects. The 
latter is an extra-logical necessity^ over and above the syllo- 
gistic inference, and wholly dependent upon the modality 
of the consequent. This ancient distinction modern philo- 
sophers have not only overlooked but confounded. See 
contrasted the doctrines of the Aphrodisian, and of Mr. 
Dugald Stewart, in Dissertations upon Reid, p. 701, note. 
— Sir William Hamilton, Discussions^ p. 144. 

^EIxATlON (negare^ to deny) — is the absence of that which 
does not naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, 
or which has no right, obligation, or necessity, to be pre- 
sent with it ; as when we say — A stone is inanimate, or blind, 
or deaf, that is, has no life, nor sight, nor hearing; or 
when we say — A carpenter or fisherman is unlearned ; 
these are mere negations. — Watts, Logic ^ part i., chap. 2, 
sect. 6. 

In simple apprehension there is no affirmation or denial, 
so that, strictly speaking, there are no negative ideas, 
notions, or conceptions. In truth, some that are so called 
represent the most positive realities ; as infinity, immensity, 
immortality, &c. But in some ideas, as in that of blindness, 
deafness, insensibility, there is, as it were, a taking away 
of something from the object of which these ideas are 
entertained. But this is privation {aTspYiaig) rather than 
negation (ajVo(p«ff/f). And in general it may be said that 
^legation implies some anterior conception of the object of 
which the negation is made. Absolute negation is impos- 
sible. We have no idea of nothing. It is but a word. — 
Diet, des Sciences PMlosopli. 

NlHIlilSM {nihil., nihilum^ nothing) — is scepticism carried to 
the denial of all existence. 

''The sum total," says Fichte, "is this. There is abso- 
lutely nothing permanent either without me or within me, 
but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing 
of any existence, not even of my own, I myself know 
nothing, and am nothing. Images (Bilder-) there are ; 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 343 

NIHILiISI?!— 

they constitute all tliat apparently exists, and what they 
know of themselves is after the manner of images ; images 
that pass and vanish without there being aught to witness 
their transition ; that consist in fact of the images of im- 
ages, without significance and without an aim. I myself 
am one of these images ; nay, I am not even thus much, 
but only a confused image of images. All reality is con- 
verted into a marvellous dream without a life to dream of, 
and without a mind to dream ; into a dream made up only 
of a dream itself Perception is a dream ; thought, the 
source of all the existence and all the reality which I ima- 
gine to myself of my existence, of my power, of my desti- 
nation — is tho dream of that dream." — Sir Will. Hamilton, 
ReicTs Works^ p. 129, note. ' - "~. - - -*. ' - - = 

In like manner, Mr. Hume resolved the phenomena of 
consciousness into impressions and ideas. And as accord- 
ing to Berkeley, sensitive impressions were no proof of 
-external realities, so according to Hume, ideas do not 
prove the existence of mind — so that there is neither 
matter nor mind, for anything that we can prove. 

HIIIII.UM or NOTHIIV« — '4s that of which everything can 
truly be denied, and nothing can be truly affirmed. So 
that the idea of nothing (if I may so speak) is absolutely 
the negation of all ideas. The idea, therefore, either of a 
finite or infinite nothing^ is a contradiction in terms." — 
Clarke^ Aiiswer to Itli Letter^ note. 

Nothing^ taken positively^ is what does not but may exist, 
as a river of milk —taken negatively^ it is that which does not 
and cannot exist, as a square circle, a mountain without a 
valley. Nothing positively is ens potentiate. Nothing 
negatively is non ens, 

NOifllNAliiSM (iiomen^ a name)— is the doctrine that general 
notions, such as the notion of a tree, have no realities 
corresponding to them, and have no existence but as names 
or words. The doctrine directly opposed to it is realism. 
To the intermediate doctrine of conceptuallsm^ nominalism 
is closely alb'ed. It may be called the envelope of concep- 



344 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NOlWEINAIilSm— 

tualism^ while conceptualism is the letter or substance oi 
nominalism. '' If nominalism sets out from conceptualism^ 
conceptualism should terminate in nominalism^'''' says Mons. 
Cousin, Introduction Aux Ouvrages Inedits d^Ahailaird^ 
4to, Paris, 1836, p. 181. 

Universalia ante rem^ is the watchword of the Realists ; 
Universalia in re, of the Concepttualists ; Universalia post 
rem^ of the Nominalists, The Nominalists were called 
Terminists about the time of the Reformation. — ^Ballantyne, 
Examin. of Hum, Mind^ chap. 8, sect. 4. 

NOOGONIE {uQvg^mmd] ygz/of, birth, or generation). — '' Leib- 
nitz has intellectualized sensations, Locke has sensualized 
notions, in that system which I might call a noogonie^ in 
place of admitting two different sources of our represen- 
tations, which are objectively valid only in their connection." 
— Kant, Crit. de la Raison Pure, pp. 826, 327. 

NOOIiOOY (voy?, mind ; 'hoyog^ discourse) — is a term proposed 
by Mons. Paffe {^Sur la Sensihilite^ p. 30), to denote the 
science of intellectual facts, or the facts of intellect ; and 
pathology (psycJiological)^ to denote the science ofthepheno" 
menes affectifs^ or feeling, or sensibility. 

The use of the term is noticed by Sir W. Hamilton, 
(Reid^s Works^ note A, sect. 5, p. 770) as the title given to 
Treatises on the doctrine of First Principles, by Calovius, 
in 1651 ; Mejerus, in 1662 ; Wagnerus, in 1670 ; and 
Zeidlerus, in 1680 — and he has said, ""The correlatives 
noetic and dianoetic would afford the best philosophical 
designations, the former for an intuitive principle, or truth 
at first hand ; the latter for a demonstrative proposition, 
or truth at second hand. Noology or noological, dianoi- 
alogy and dianoialogical^ would be also technical terms of 
much convenience in various departments of philosophy," 

Mons. Ampere proposed to designate the sciences which 
treat of the human mind Les sciences Noologiques, 

'-^ If, instead of considering the objects of our knowledge, 
we tjonsider its origin^ it may be said that it is either 
derived from experience alone, or from reason alone ; 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 345 

NOOIiOOY— 

hence empirical philosophers and those which Kant calls 
noologists: at their head are Aristotle and Plato among 
the ancients, and Locke and Leibnitz among the modems." 
— Henderson, PJiilosoph. of Kant ^ p. 172. 
NOTION (noscere^ to know). — Bolingbroke says (essay i., On 
Human Knowledge^ sect. 2), ''I distinguish here between 
ideas and notions^ for it seems to me, that, as we compound 
simple into complex ideas, so the composition we make of 
simple and complex ideas may be called, more properly, 
and with less confusion and ambiguity, notions y 

Mr. Locke says (^Essay on Hum. Under staiid.^ hook ii.j 
ch. 22), '^ The mind being once furnished with simple 
ideas, it can put them together in several compositions, 
and so make variety of complex ideas^ without examining 
whether they exist so together in nature, and hence I think 
it is that these ideas are called notions^ as they had their 
original and constant existence more in the thoughts of 
men than in the reahty of things." 

'' The distinction of ideas^ strictly so called, and notions., 
is one of the most common and important in the philo- 
sophy of mind. Nor do we owe it, as has been asserted, to 
Berkeley. It was virtually taken by Descartes and the 
Cartesians, in their discrimination of ideas of imagination, 
and ideas of intelligence ; it was in terms vindicated against 
Locke, by Serjeant, Stillingfleet, ISTorris, Z. Mayne, Bishop 
Brown, and others. Bonnet signalized it ; and under the 
contrast of Anschauangen and Begriffe^ it has long been an 
established and classical discrimination with the philo- 
sophers of Germany. l!^ay, Reid himself suggests it in 
the distinction he requires between imagination and con- 
ception., — a distinction which he unfortunately did not carry 
out, and which Mr. Stewart still more unhappily perverted. 
The terms notion and conception (or more correctly concept 
in this sense), should be reserved to express what we com- 
prehend but cannot picture in imagination., — such as a 
relation, a general term, &c. The word idea^ as one prosti- 
tuted to all meanings, it were better to discard. As for 



346 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NOTION— 

the representations of imagination or phantasy, I would 
employ the term image or phantasm^ it being distinctly 
understood that these terms are applied to denote the 
representations not of our visible perceptions merely, as the 
term taken literally would indicate, but of our sensible 
perceptions in general." — Sir Will. Hamilton, ReicTs Works^ 
p. 291, note. 

Notion is more general in its signification than idea. 
Idea is merely a conception.^ or at most a necessary and 
universal conception. Notion implies all this and more, — 
a judgment or series of judgments, and a certain degree of 
knowledge of the object. Thus we speak of having no 
notion or knowledge of a thing, and of having some notion 
or knowledge. It began to be used by Descartes in his 
Eegulce ad Directionein Ingenii., and soon came into current 
use among French philosophers. It enables us to steer 
clear of the ideas of Plato, of the species of the scholastics, 
and of the images of the empirical school. Hence Dr. Eeid 
tells us that he used it in preference. — Diet, des Sciences 
PJiilosopli. 

Des Maistre (^Soirees de St. PetershourgJi., p. 164), uses 
the French word notion as synonymous with pure idea, or 
innate idea, underived from sense. 

Chalybseus, in a Letter to Mr. Eddersheim (the translator 
of his work), says, '' In English as in French, the word 
idea.) idee., is applied, without distinction, to a representa- 
tion, to a notion., m short to every mental conception ; 
while in German, in scientific language, a very careful 
distinction is made between sensuous '' vorstellung^'' (re- 
presentation), abstract ^' verstandesdegriff^'' (intellectual 
notion), and '-'- ideen.^''"' (ideas) of reason. 

Notions or concepts are clear and distinct., or obscure and 
indistinct, " A concept is said to be clear when the degree 
of consciousness is such as enables us to distinguish it as a 
whole from others, and obscure when the degree of con- 
sciousness is insufi&cient to accomplish this. A concept is 
said to be distinct when the amount of consciousness is such 



VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 347 

NOTION— 

as enables us to discriminate from each other the several 
characters or constituent parts of which the concept is the 
sum, and indistinct or confused when the amount of con- 
sciousness requisite for this is wanting." In the darkness 
of night there is no perception of objects, this is obscurity. 
As light dawns we begin to see objects, this is indistinctness. 
As morning advances we make a distinction between trees 
and houses, and fields, and rivers, as wholes differing from 
one another, this is clearness. At length when day ap- 
proaches noon, we see the parts which make up the wholes, 
and have a distinct view of everything before us. 

We have a clear notion of colours, smells, and tastes ; for 
we can discriminate red from white, bitter from sweet. But 
we have not a distinct notion of them, for we are not 
acquainted with the qualities which form the difference ; 
neither can we describe them to such as cannot see, smell, 
and taste. We have a clear notion of a triangle when we 
discriminate it from other figures. We have a distinct 
notion of it when we think of it as a portion of space 
bounded by three straight lines, as a figure whose three 
angles taken together are equal to two right angles. 
First Notions and Second Notions. 

The distinction (which we owe to the Arabians) o^ first 
and second notions (notiones^ conceptus, intentiones^ intellecta 
prima et secunda) is a highly philosophical determination.* 
.... A. first notion is the concept of a thing as it exists of 
itself and independent of any operation of thought ; as 
man, John, animal, &c. A second notion is the concept, 
not of an object as it is in reality, but of the mode under 
which it is thought hy the mind ; as individual, species, genus, 
&c. The former is the concept of a thing^ real^ immediate, 
direct: the latter the concept of a concept^ formal^ mediate, 
reflex.''^ — Sir WilUam Hamilton, Discussions, p. 137. 

'''• Notions are of two kinds; they either have regard to 

* The Americans call a cargo of fashionable goods, trinkets, &c., being "laden 
with notions" and on being hailed by our ships, a fellow (without an idea perhaps 
in his head) will answer through a speaking trumpet that he is "laden with notions."' 
—Moore, Diary^ p. 249. 



348 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NOTION— 

tilings as they are^ as horse, ship, tree, and are called first 
notions ; or to things as they are understood^ as notions of 
genus, species, attribute, subject, and in this respect are 
called second notions^ which, however, are based upon the 
first, and cannot be conceived without them. Now logic is 
not so much employed upon first notions of things as upon 
second ; that is, it is not occupied so much with things as 
they exist in nature, but with the way in which the mind 
conceives them. A logician has nothing to do with ascer- 
taining whether a horse, or a ship, or a tree exists, but 
whether one of these things can be regarded as a genus or 
species, whether it can be called a subject or an attribute, 
whether from the conjunction of many second notions a 
proposition, a definition, or a syllogism can be formed. 
The first intention of every word is its real meaning ; the 
second intention^ its logical value according to the function 
of thought to which it belongs."* — Thomson, Outline of 
the Laws of Thought^ 2d ed., pp. 39, 40. 
Notions, Intuitive and Symbolical. 

Leibnitz was the first to employ intuitive and intuition to 
denote our direct ostensive cognitions of an individual 
object either in sense or imagination, and in opposition to 
our indirect and symbolical cognitions acquired through 
the use of signs or language in the understanding. 

''When our notion of any object or objects consists of a 
clear insight into all its attributes, or at least the essential 
ones, he would call it intuitive. But where the notion is 
complex and its properties numerous, we do not commonly 
realize all that it conveys ; the powers of thinking would be 
needlessly retarded by such a review. We think more 
compendiously by putting a symbol in the place of all the 
properties of our notion,, and this naturally is the term by 

* *' See Buhle (Aristot, 1, p. 432), whose words I have followed. See also Cracan- 
thorp {Logic. Proem.), and Sir W. Hamilton {Edin. Rev., No. 115, p. 210). There is 
no authority whatever for Aldrich's view, which makes second intention mean, 
apparently, 'a term defined for scientific use;' though with the tenacious vitality 
of error it still lingers in some quarters, after wounds that should have been mortal." 
—V. Intention. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 349 

NOTION— 

which we are accustomed to convej^ the notion to others. 
A name, then, employed in thought is called a symbolical 
cognition; and the names we employ in speech are not 
always symbols to another of what is explicitly understood 
by us, but quite as often are symbols both to speaker and 
hearer, the full and exact meaning of which neither of them 
stop to unfold, any more than they regularly reflect that every 
sovereign which passes through their hands is equivalent to 
240 pence. Such words as the State, Happiness, Liberty, 
Creation, are too pregnant with meaning for us to suppose 
that we realize their full sense every time we read or pro- 
nounce them. If we attend to the working of our minds, 
we shall find that each word may be used, and in its proper 
place and sense, though perhaps few or none of its attributes 
are present to us at the moment. A very simple notion is 
always intuitive ; we cannot make our notion of brown or 
red simpler than it is by any symbol. On the other hand 
a highly complex notion, like those named above, is seldom 
fully realized — seldom other than symbolical.^'' — Thomson, 
Outline of the Laws of Thought^ p. 47. 

NOTIONES COmi^UNES, also called prcenotiones^ anticipa- 
tiones^ communes notitice, tt^oT^yi-^h;, tcoiuui hvotca—frst truths^ 
natural judgments^ principles of common sense, are phrasCv^^ 
employed to denote certain notions or cognitions which are 
native to the human mind, which are intuitively discerned, 
being clear and manifest in their own light, and needing no 
proof, but forming the ground of proof and evidence as to 
other truths. — V. Anticipation, Truths (First). 

NOUMENON, in the philosophy of Kant (an object as con- 
ceived by the understanding, or thought of by the reason, 
uovg), is opposed to phenomenon (an object such as we re- 
present it to ourselves by the impression which it makes 
on our senses). Noumenon is an object in itself, not 
relatively to us. But we have, according to Kant, no 
such knowledge of things in themselves. For besides the 
impressions which things make on us, there is nothing in 
us but the forms of the sensibility and the categories of 
the understanding, according to which, and not according 



350 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NOUIW[ENOJ¥— 

to the nature of things in themselves, it may be, are our 
conceptions of them. 

Things sensible considered as in themselves and not as 
they appear to us, Kant calls negative noumena ; and 
reserves the designation o^ positive noumena^ to intelligibles 
properly so called, which are the objects of an intuition 
purely intellectual. — Willm, Hist, de la Philosophy Alle- 
mande, tom. i., p. 200. 

The two kinds of noumena taken together are opposed 
to phenomena^ and form the intelligible world. This world 
we admit as possible, but unknown. Kantism thus trends 
towards scepticism. 

'' The word phenomenon has no meaning except as 
opposed to something intelligible — to a noumenon^ as Kant 
says. Now, either we understand by the latter word a 
thing which cannot be the object of a sensuous intuition, 
without determining the mode in which it is perceived, and 
in this case we take it in a negative sense ; or we under- 
stand it as the object of a real intuition, though not a 
sensuous one, an intellectual one, and then we take it in a 
positive sense. Which of these two is the truth ? It 
cannot unquestionably be affirmed a priori that the only 
possible manner of perception is sensuous intuition, and 
it implies no contradiction to suppose that an object may 
be known to us otherwise than by the senses. But, says 
Kant, this is only a possibility. To justify us in affirming 
that there really is any other mode of perception than 
sensuous intuition, any intellectual intuition, it must come 
within the range of our knowledge ; and in fact we have 
no idea of any such faculty. We, therefore, cannot adopt 
the word noumenon in any positive sense ; it expresses but 
an indeterminate object, not of an intuition, but of a con- 
ception — in other words a hypothesis of the understanding. '^ 
— Henderson, Philosophy of Kant^ p. 76. 
NOVEIiTY (novus^ new) — " is not merely a sensation in the 
mind of him to whom the thing is new ; it is a real relation 
which the thing has to his knowledge at that time. But 
we are so constituted, that what is new to us commonly 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY- 351 

NOVEIiTY— 

gives pleasure upon that account, if it be not in itself 
disagreeable. It rouses our attention, and occasions an 

agreeable exertion of our faculties Curiosity 

is a capital principle in the human constitution, and its 

food must be what is in some respect new 

Into this part of the human constitution, I think, we may 
resolve the pleasure we have from novelty in objects." — Eeid, 
IntelL Powers, essay viii., chap. 2. 

Any new or strange object, whether in nature or in art, 
when contemplated gives rise to feelings of a pleasing kind, 
the consideration of which belongs to Esthetics — or that de- 
partment of philosophy which treats of the Powers of Taste. 
NUMBEK was held by Pythagoras to be the ultimate principle 
of being. His views were adopted to a certain extent by 
Plato, and attacked by Aristotle. In the Middle Ages, 
numbers and the proportions subsisting between them, were 
employed in the systems of the alchemists and cabalists. 
But in proportion as the true spirit of philosophy prevailed, 
numbers were banished from metaphysics, and the considera- 
tion of them was allotted to a separate science — arithmetic 
and algebra. 



OATM. — An oath is a solemn appeal to God, as the author of 
all that is true and right, and a solemn promise to speak 
the truth and to do what is right ; renouncing the divine 
favour and imprecating the divine vengeance, should we 
fail to do so. Oaths have been distinguished as — 1. The 
assertory^ or oath of evidence, and 2. The promissory^ or 
oath of office — the former referring to the past, and the 
latter to the future. But both refer to the future, inas- 
much as both are confirmatory of a promise to give true 
evidence or to do faithful service. — F. Affirmation. 

OBJECTIVE (objicere^ to throw against) — is now used to 
describe the absolute independent state of a thing ; but b}- 
the elder metaphysicians it was applied to the aspect of 
things as objects of sense or understanding. So Berkeley, 
^' Natural phenomena are only natural appe^arances. They 



352 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

OBJECTIVE— 

are, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. Their 
real and objective natures are, therefore, one and the same." 
Siris^ sect. 292, where real and objective are expressly 
distinguished. The modern nomenclature appears to me 
very inconvenient." — Fitzgerald, Notes to Aristotle^ p. 191. 

With Aristotle ^' viroKii^%mv signified the subject of a 
proposition, and also substance. The Latins translated 
it subjectum. In Greek object is ocvTiytitf/^ivov^ translated 
oppositum. In the Middle Ages mbject meant substance^ 
and has this sense in Descartes and Spinoza ; sometimes 
also in Reid. Subjective is used by Will. Occam to denote 
that which exists independent of mind, objective that which 
the mind feigned. This shows what is meant by realitas 
objectiva in Descartes {Med. 3). Kant and Fichte have 
inverted the meanings : subject is the mind which knows — 
object that which is known. Subjective the varying condi- 
tions of the knowing mind — objective that which is in the 
constant nature of the thing known. — Trendlenburg, Notes 
to AristotWs Logic. 

By objective reality Descartes meant the reality of the 
object in so far as represented by the idea or thought of it 
— by formal., or actual reality the reality of the object as 
conform to our idea of it. Thus the sun was objectively 
in our thought or idea of it — actually or formally in the 
heavens. He had also a third form of reality which he 
called eminent — that is an existence superior at once to the 
idea and the object., and which contained in posse what both 
these had in esse, — Response aux Seconde Objection. 

'•'• In philosophical language, it were to be wished that 
the word subject should be reserved for the subject of in- 
hesion — the materia in qua ; and the term object exclu- 
sively applied to the subject of operation — the materia circa 
quam. If this be not done, the grand distinction of sub- 
jective and objective^ in philosophy, is confounded. But if 
the employment of subject for object is to be deprecated, the 
employment of object for purpose or final cause (in the 
French and English languages) is to be absolutely con- 
demned, as a recent and irrational confusion of notions which 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 353 

OBJECTIVE— 

should be carefully distinguished." — Sir W. Hamilton, ReicTs 
Works, p. 97, note, and App., note B. — V. Subject. 
OBIilCrATION (ph'ligare^ to bind) — is legal or moral. 

" Obligation^ as used in moral inquiry, is derived from the 
doctrine of justification in the scholastic ages. In conse- 
quence of original sin man comes into the world a debtor 
to Divine justice. He is under an obligation to punishment, 
on account of his deficiency from that form of original 
justice in which he rendered to God all that service of 
love which the great goodness of God demanded. Hence 
our terms due and duty^ to express right conduct." — Hamp- 
den, Bampton Lect.^ vi., p. 296. 
Obligation (Moral) — has been distinguished as internal and 
external; according as the reason for acting arises in the 
mind of the agent, or from the will of another. 

In seeing a thing to be right we are under obligation to 
do it. This is internal obligation^ or that reason for actmg 
which arises in the mind of the agent, along with the per- 
ception of the rightness of the action. It is also called 
rational obligation. Dr. Adams (^Sermon on the Nature and 
Obligation of Virtue) has said, '' Rigid implies duty in its 
idea. To perceive that an action is right., is to see a reason 
for doing it in the action itself, abstracted from all other 
considerations whatever. Now, this perception, this 
acknowledged rectitude in the action, is the very essence of 
obligation ; that which commands the approbation of choice, 
and binds the conscience of every rational being." And Mr. 
Stewart {Active and Moral Powers., vol. ii., p. 294) has 
said, '' The very notion of virtue implies the notion of 
obligation,'^'' 

External obligation is a reason for acting which arises 
from the will of another, having authority to impose a law. 
It is also called authoritative obligation. Bishop Warburton 
{Div. Legat,^ book i., sect. 4) has contended that all oi//^a- 
tion necessarily implies an obliger different from the party 
obliged ; and moral obligation^ being the obligation of a 
free agent, implies a law ; and a law implies a lawgiver. 
2 A 



354 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

OBltlOATION— 

The will of God, therefore, is the true ground of all ohliga- 
tion^ strictly and properly so called. The perception of the 
difference between right and wrong can be said to oblige 
only as an indication of the will of God. 

There is no incompatibility between these two grounds 
of obligation. — See Whewell, Sermons on the Foundation of 
Morals^ pp. 26-76. And Dr. Chalmers, Bridgewater 
Treatise^ vol. i., p. 78. 

By some philosophers, however, this stream of living 
waters has been parted. They have grounded obligation 
altogether on the will of God, and have overlooked or made 
light of the oUigation which arises from our perception of 
rectitude. Language to this effect has been ascribed to 
Mr. Locke. (Life ly Lord King^ vol. ii., p. 129.) And 
both Warburton and Horseley, as well as Paley and his 
followers, have given too much, if not an exclusive, pro- 
minence to the rewards and punishments of a future life, as 
prompting to the practice of virtue. But, although God, 
in accommodation to the weakness of our nature and the 
perils of our condition, has condescended to quicken us, in 
the discharge of our duty, by appealing to our hopes and 
fears, both in regard to the life that now is and that which 
is to come, it does not follow that self-love, or a concern 
for our own happiness, should be the only, or even the 
chief, spring of our obedience. On the contrary, obedience 
to the divine will may spring from veneration and love to 
the divine character, arising from the most thorough con- 
viction of the rectitude, wisdom, and goodness of the 
divine arrangements. And that this, more than a regard 
to the rewards of everlasting life, is the proper spring of 
virtuous conduct, is as plain as it is important to remark. 
To do what is right, even for the sake of everlasting life, is 
evidently acting from a motive far inferior, in purity and 
power, to love and veneration for the character and com- 
mands of Him who is just and good, in a sense and to an 
extent to which our most elevated conceptions are inade- 
quate. That which should bind us to the throne of the 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 355 

OBI.IOATION— 

Eternal is not the iron chain of selfishness, but the golden 
links of a love to all that is right ; and our aspirations to 
the realms of bliss should be breathings after the preyalence 
of universal purity, rather than desires of our own indi- 
vidual happiness. Self and its little circle is too narrow to 
hold the heart of man, when it is touched with a sense of 
its true dignity, and enlightened with the knowledge of its 
lofty destination. It swells with generous admiration of 
all that is right and good ; and expands with a love which 
refuses to acknowledge any limits but the limits of life and 
the capacities of enjo}Tnent. In the nature and will of 
Him from whom all being and all happiness proceed, it 
acknowledges the only proper object of its adoration and 
submission ; and in surrendering itself to His authority is 
purified from all the dross of selfishness, and cheered by the 
light of a calm and unquenchable love to all that is right 
and good. 

See Sanderson, De Juramenti Otligatione^ praelec. i., sect. 
11. 

Sanderson, De Ohligatione Conscientke^ prgelec. v. 

^^Tiewell, Mo7'ality^ book i., chap. 4, pp. 84-89. 

King, Essay on Evil^ Prelim. Dissertat., sect. 2. — V. 
Right. 

OBSERVATION. — "The difference between experiment and 
observation^ consists merely in the comparative rapidity 
with which they accomplish their discoveries ; or rather in 
the comparative command we possess over them, as instru- 
ments for the investigation of truth." — Stewart, Pliilosopli. 
Essays^ Prelim. Diss., chap. 2. 

Mr. Stewart {Pliilosopli. Hum, Mind., vol. i., p. 106, note) 
has said that according to Dr. Reid, '' Attention to external 
things is observation., and attention to the subjects of our own 
consciousness is reflection. Yet Dr. Reid (Intell. Poivers., 
essayed., chap. 1) has said that ''reflection in its proper 
and common meaning, is equally applicable to objects of 
sense and to objects of consciousness — and has censured 
Locke for restricting it to that reflection which is employed 



356 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

OBSERVATION— 

about the operations of our minds. In like manner we may 
observe tlie operations of our own minds as well as external 
phenomena. Observation is better charactei*ized by Sir 
John Herschell as passive experience. — V. Experience. 

It is the great instrument of discovery in mind and 
matter. According to some (Edin, Eev.^ vol. iii., p. 269), 
experiment can be applied to matter, but only observation to 
mind. But to a certain extent the study of mind admits 
experiment. — See Hampden, Introd, to Mor, Phil., sect, ii., 
p. 51 ; and Mr. Stewart, Philosoph. Essays, Prelim. 
Dissert., chap. 2. 

''Instead of contrasting observation and experiment, we 
should contrast spontaneous and experimental phenomena 
as alike subjects of observation. Facts furnished by artificial 
contrivances require to be observed just in the same way 
as those which are presented by nature without our inter- 
ference ; and yet philosophers are nearly unanimous in 
confining observation to the latter phenomena, and speaking 
of it as of something which ceases where experiment begins ; 
while in simple truth, the business of experiment is to 
extend the sphere of observation, and not to take up a sub- 
ject where observation lays it down." — S. Bailey, Theory o/ 
Reasoning, pp. 114-15, 8vo, Lond., 1851. 

All men are apt to notice likenesses in the facts that 
come before them, and to group similar facts together. 
The faculty by which such similarities are apprehended is 
called observation ; the act of grouping them together 
under a general statement, as when we say, ''All seeds 
grow — all bodies fall," has been described 2i^ generalization, 
— V. Generalization. 

According to M. Comte (^Cours de Philosoph, Positive, 
tom. ii., p. 19), there are three modes of observation : — 

1. Observation, properly so called, or the direct exami- 
nation of the phenomenon as it presents itself naturally. 

2. Experiment, or the contemplation of the phenomenon, 
so modified more or less by artificial circumstances intro- 
duced intentionally by ourselves, with a view to its more 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 857 

OBSERVATION— 

complete investigation. 3. Comparison^ or the successive 
consideration of a series of analogous cases, in which the 
phenomenon becomes more and more simple. The third 
head (as to which see tom. iii., p. 343) seems not so much 
a species of observation, as a mode of arranging observations^ 
with a view to a proper investigation of the phenomena. — 
Lewis, Methods of Observat. in Politics^ chap. 5, note. 

According to Humboldt (Cosmos^ vol. ii., p. 212) there 
are three stages of the investigation of nature — passive 
observation^ active observation^ and experiment. 

The difference between active and passive observation 
is marked in Bacon (^Nov. Org.., 1, Aphor. 100). The 
former is when, Experientia lege certa procedit., seriatim et 
continenter^ 

^' This word experiment alhiis the defect of not appearing 
to comprehend the knowledge which flows from observa- 
don^ as well as that which is obtained by experiment. The 
Crerman word empirical is applied to all the information 
which experience affords ; but it is in our language degraded 
hj another application. I therefore must use experimental 
In a larger sense than its etymology warrants." — Sir J. 
Mackintosh, On Bacon and Locke^ Works^ vol. i., p. 333. 

ExperientialhsiS been proposed as equivalent to empirical. 
— F. Experience. 
OCCASION. — Cicero (1, De Inventione) says : — Occasio est 
pars temporis^ Jiabens in se alicujus rei idoneam faciendi 
opportunitatem, {De Offic, lib. i.) Tempus autem actionis 
opportunum^ Graece, evKUioicc ; Latine, appellatur occasio. 
The watchman falling asleep gives occasion to thieves to 
break into the house and steal. 

*' There is much difference between an occasion and a 
proper cause: these two are heedfully to be distinguished. 
Critical and exact historians, as Polybius and Tacitus, 
distinguish betwixt the oc(i')cr. and the oiirioc, the beginning 
occasions and the real causes, of a war."— Flavell, Dis- 
course of the Occasions.^ Causes., Nature^ Rise., Growth, 
and Remedies of Mental Errors., 20. Observat. 



358 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

OCCASIONAIi CAUSES (Doctrine of).— V, CauSE. 

OCCUI.T QUAlLiITIES. — V. QUALITY. 

ONEIROHIANCY.— V, DREAMING, 

ONTOXiOO^K" (o!/ ovTog and ^.oyog^ the science of being). — 
'^ Ontology is a discourse of being in general, and the 
various or most universal modes or affections, as well as 
the several kinds or divisions of it. The word heing here 
includes not only whatsoever actually is, but whatsoever 
can be." — Watts, On Ontology^ c. 1. — See also Smith, 
Wealth of Nations^ book v., c. 1. 

Ontology is the same as metaphysics. !N^either the one 
name nor the other was used by Aristotle, He called the 
science now designated by them pMlosopMa prima ^ and 
defined it as 'iTriGTYif^n tov ovrog ^ ourog — Scientia Entis 
Quantenus Entis ^ that is, the science of the essence of 
things ; the science of the attributes and conditions of being 
in general, not of being in any given circumstances, not as 
physical or mathematical, but as being. The name onto- 
logy seems to have been first made current in philosophy 
by Wolf. He divided metaphysics into four parts — onto- 
logy., psychology, rational cosmology, and theology. It 
was chiefly occupied with abstract inquiries into possibility, 
necessity, and contingency, substance, accident, cause, &c., 
without reference to the laws of our intellect by which we 
are constrained to believe in them. Kant denied that we 
had any knowledge of substance or cause as really existing. 
But there is a science of principles and causes, of the prin- 
ciples of being and knowing. In this view of it, ontology 
corresponds with metaphysics, — q. v. 

'' Ontology may be treated of in two different methods, 
according as its exponent is a believer in to oV, or in Tot 
oi/T5«, in one or in many fundamental principles of things. 
In the former, all objects whatever are regarded as pheno- 
menal modifications of one and the same substance, or as 
self-determined effects of one and the same cause. The 
necessary result of this method is to reduce all metaphy- 
sical philosophy to a Rational Theology, the one Substance 
or Cause, being identified with the Absolute or the Deity. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 359 

ONTOI.OOY— 

According to the latter method, which professes to treat of 
different classes of beings independently, metaphysics will 
contain three co-ordinate branches of inquiry, Eational 
Cosmology, Eational Psychology, and Rational Theology. 
The first aims at a knowledge of the real essence, as dis- 
tinguished from the phenomena of the material world ; the 
second discusses the nature and origin, as distinguished 
from the faculties and affections of the human soul and of 
other finite spirits ; the third aspires to comprehend God 
himself, as cognizable a priori in his essential nature, apart 
from the indirect and relative indications furnished by his 
works, as in Nat. Theology, or by his word, as in Revealed 
Religion. 

''These three objects of metaphysical inquiry, God, the 
World, the Mind, correspond to Kant's three ideas of the 
Pure Reason ; and the object of his Critique is to show that 
in relation to all these, the attainment of a system of specu- 
lative philosophy is impossible." — Mansell, Prolegom. Log., 
p. 277» 

''The science of ontology comprehends investigations of 
every real existence, either beyond the sphere of the pre- 
sent world, or in any other way incapable of being the 
direct object of consciousness, which can be deduced im- 
mediately from the possession of certain feelings or prin- 
ciples and faculties of the human soul." — Archer Butler, 
Lectures on Ancient Philosophy. 

OPERATIONS (of the Mind) "By the operations of the 

mind;'^ says Dr. Reid {Intellect. Powers, essay i., chap 1), 
"we understand every mode of thinking of which we are 
conscious. 

" It deserves our notice, that the various modes of think- 
ing have always and in all languages, as far as we know, been 
called by the name of operations of the mind, or by names 
of the same import. To body, we ascribe various proper- 
ties, but not operations, properly so called : it is ex- 

* Operation, act, and energy, are nearly convertible terms ; and are opposed to 
faculty, as the actual to t\\Q potential.~^iv Will. Hamilton. 



860 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

OPERATIONS— 

tended, divisible, moveable, inert ; it continues in any 
state in which it is put ; every change of its state is the 
effect of some force impressed upon it, and is exactly pro- 
portional to the force impressed, and in the precise direc- 
tion of that force. These are the general properties of 
matter, and these are not operations; on the contrary, they 
all imply its being a dead, inactive thing, which moves only 
as it is moved, and acts only by being acted upon. But 
the mind is, from its very nature, a living and active 
being. Everything we know of it implies life and active 
energy ; and the reason why all its modes of thinking are 
called is operations^ is that in all, or in most of them, it is not 
merely passive as body is, but is really and properly active." 
— F. States of Mind. 
OPINION (0/6^, I think, hence otviust^ opinion). — ''The essen- 
tial idea of opinion seems to be that it is a matter about 
which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons 
can without absurdity think differently. . . . Any pro- 
position, the contrary of which can be maintained with 
probability, is matter of opinion." — Lewis, Essay on Opinion^ 
p. i., iv. 

According to the last of these definitions, matter of 
opinion is opposed not to matter oifact^ but to matter of 
certainty. Thus, the death of Charles I. is a fact — his 
authorship of Icon Basilike^ an opinion. It is also used, 
however, to denote knowledge acquired by inference, as 
opposed to that acquired by perception. Thus, that the 
moon gives light, is matter oi fact ; that it is inhabited or 
uninhabited, is matter o^ opinion. 

It has been proposed {Edin. Eev.^ April 1850, p. 511) 
to discard from philosophical use these ambiguous expres- 
sions, and to divide knowledge, according to its sources, 
into matter of perception and matter of inference ; and, as 
a cross division as to our conviction, into matter of cer- 
tainty and matter of douht. 

Holding for true ^ or the subjective validity of a judgment 
in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, ob- 



TOCABI'LARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 361 

OPINION— 

jectiyely valid), has the three following degrees : — opinion, 
beliefs and knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient 
judgment, subjectiyely as well as objectively. Belief is 
subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objec- 
tively insufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and 
objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed con- 
viction (for myself) ; objective sufficiency is termed cer- 
tainty (for all). — Meiklejohn, Translat. of Critique of Pure 
Reason, p. 498. — V. Belief, Knowledge, Certae^ty, 
Fact. 

OPPOSE©, OPPOSITION (to cc'jriKS{f4.zuou, that which lies 
over against). — Aristotle has said (In Categor.^ 9), that 
' • one thing may be opposed to another in four ways ; by 
relation, by contrariety, or as privation is to possession, 
affirmation to negation. Thus, there is the opposition of 
relation between the double and the half; of contrariety 
between good and evil ; blindness and seeing are opposed 
in the way of privation and possession : the propositions he 
sits, and he does not sit, in the way of negation and affir- 
mation." — F. Contrary, Privation. 

OPTI:uis:ti (optimum, the superlative of honum. good) — is 
the doctrine, that the universe, being the work of an iiffin- 
itely perfect being, is the best that could be created. 

This doctrine under various forms appeared in all the 
great philosophical schools of antiquity. Duiiag the 
^Middle Ages it was advocated by St. Anselm and St. 
Thomas. In times comparatively modern, it was embraced 
by Descartes and Malebranche. But the doctrine has been 
developed in its highest form by Leibnitz. 

According to him, God being infinitely perfect, could 
neither will nor produce evil. And as a less good com- 
pared with a greater is evil, the creation of God must not 
only be good, but the best that could possibly be. Before 
creation, all beings and all possible conditions of things 
were present to the divine mind in idea, and composed an 
mfinite number of worlds, from among which infinite wis- 
dom chose the best. Creation was the frivinij existence to 



362 VOCABULARY OF THILOSOPHY. 

OPTIMCIftlU— 

the most perfect state of things which had been ideally 
contemplated by the Divine Mind. 

The optimism of Leibnitz has been misunderstood and 
misrepresented by Yoltaire and others. But the doctrine 
which Leibnitz advocated is not that the present state of 
things is the best possible in reference to individuals, nor 
to classes of beings, nor even to this world as a whole, but 
in reference to all worlds, or to the universe as a whole — 
and not even to the universe in its present state, but in 
reference to that indefinite progress of which it may con- 
tain the germs. — Leibnitz, Essais de Theodicee. 

Malebranche, Entretiens MetapJiysiques. 

According to Mr. Stewart {Active and Mor. Pow., b. iii., 
ch. 3, sect. 1), under the title of optimists, are compre- 
hended, those who admit and those who deny the freedom 
of human actions and the accountableness of man as a 
moral agent. 
OROSK means rank, series means succession ; hence there is 
in order something of voluntary arrangement, and in series 
something of unconscious catenation. The order of a pro- 
cession. The series of ages. A series of figures in uniform 
— soldiers in order of battle. — ^Taylor, Synonyms, 

Order is the intelligent arrangement of means to accom- 
plish an end, the harmonious relation established between 
the parts for the good of the whole. The primitive belief 
that there is order in nature, is the ground of all experi- 
ence. In this belief we confidently anticipate that the same 
causes, operating in the same circumstances, will produce 
the same effects. This may be resolved into a higher 
belief in the wisdom of an infinitely perfect being, who 
orders all things. 

Order has been regarded as the higher idea into which 
moral rectitude may be resolved. Every being has an end 
to answer, and every being attains its perfection in accom- 
plishing that end. But while other beings tend blindly 
towards it, man knows the end of his being, and the place 
he holds in the scheme of the universe, and can freely and 



VOCABrL^^vT OF PHILOSOPHY. 363 

ORDER— 

intelligently endeavour to realize that universal order of 
which he is an element or constituent. In doing so he 
does what is right. 

Such is the theory of Malebranche, and more recently of 
Joulfi'oy. In like manner, science, in all its discoveries, 
tends to the discovery of universal order. And art, in its 
highest attainments, is only realizing the truth of natinre ; 
so that the ti-ne. the beautiliil, and the good, ultimately 
resolve themselves into the idea of order. 

The following just strictures upon the delusion which 
finds a worthier object of admiration in the extraordi- 
naiy than in the ordinary operations of natiu-e, are made 
by Seneca i^Xatur. QutEst.^ vii., 1) : — 

• • Sol spectatorem, nisi qiinm deficit non habet. Xemo 
observat limam nisi laborantem. Time iu*bes conclamant, 
tunc pro se qiiisqiie superstitione vana trepidat. Quanto ilia 
majora simt. quod sol totidem, ut ita dicam, gradus, c[uot 
dies habet. et annmn cii'cuitu suo claudit : quod a solstitio 
ad minuendos dies vertitur, quod a solstitio statum in- 
clinat, et dat spatium noctibns ; c[uod sidera abscondit : quod 
terras, Cjuum tanto major sit illis. non lu-it, sed calorem 
suimi intensionibus et remissionibus temperando fovet : 
quod limam nimqnam implet, nisi adversam sibi, nee 
obsciirat. Hcee tamen non annotamus, quamdiu ordo ser- 
vatur. Si quid tm-batum est, aut pr^eter consuetudinem 
emicuit, spectamus, interrogamus, ostendimus. Adeo natu- 
rale est magis nova, quam magna, mirari." 
ORGA^r. — An 07'gan is a part of the body fitted to perform a 
particular action, which, or rather the performance of which 
action is denominated its flmction. 

•• By the term orgatiy'' says GaU (vol. i., p. 2:^8), ^'I 
mean the material condition which renders possible the 
manitestation of a faculty. The muscles and the bones are 
the material condition of movement, but are not the facult}' 
which causes movement : the whole organization of the eye 
is the material condition of sight, but it is not the tacidty 
of seeing. By the term ' organ of the soul,' I mean a 



864 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

OKOAN— 

material condition wliich renders possible the manifesta- 
tion of a moral quality, or an intellectual faculty. I say 
tliat man in this life thinks and wills by means of the brain ; 
but if one concludes that the brain is the thing that thinks 
and wills, it is as if one should say that the muscles are the 
faculty of moving ; that the organ of sight and the faculty 
of seeing are the same thing. In each case it would be to 
confound the faculty with the organ^ and the organ with 
the faculty.'''' 

" An organ of sense is an instrument composed of a 
peculiar arrangement of organized matter, by which it is 
adapted to receive from specific agents definite impres- 
sions. Between the agent that produces and the organ 
that receives the impressions, the adaptation is such, that 
the result of their mutual action is, in the first place, the 
production of sensation ; and, in the second place, of 
pleasure." — Dr. Southwood Smith. 

According to phrenological writers, particular parts of 
the brain are fitted to serve as instruments for particular 
faculties of the mind. This is organology. It is farther 
maintained, that the figure and extent of these parts of 
the brain can be discerned externally. This is organ- 
oscopy. Some who beheve in the former, do not believe 
in the latter. 
ORCrANON or OROANum is the name often applied to a 
collection of Aristotle's treatises on logic ; because, by the 
Peripatetics, logic was regarded as the instrument of 
science rather than a science or part of science in itself. 
In the sixth century, Ammonius and Simplicius arranged 
the works of Aristotle in classes, one of which they called 
logical or organical. But it was not till the fifteenth 
century that the name Organum came into common use 
(Bartholemy St. Hilaire, De la Logiqiie (T Aristote^ tom. i., 
p. 19). Bacon gave the name of Novum Organum to the 
second part of his Instauratio Magna. And the German 
philosopher, Lambert, in 1763, published a logical work 
under the title, Das Neue Organon. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 365 

OROANON— 

Poste, in bis translation of the Posterior Analytics^ gives 
a sketch of the Organum of Aristotle, which he divides 
into four parts, — viz.. General Logic^ the Logic of Deduc- 
tion^ the Logic of Lndiiction^ and the Logic of Opinion ; the 
third, indeed, not sufficiently articulated and' disengaged 
from the fourth, and hence the necessity of a Novum 
Organum, 

" The Organon of Aristotle, and the Organon of Bacon, 
stand in relation, but the relation of contrariety ; the one 
considers the laws under which the subject thinks, the 
other the laws under which the object is to be known. To 
compare them together, is therefore to compare together 
qualities of different species. Each proposes a different 
end ; both, in different ways, are useful ; and both ought 
to be assiduously studied." — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid's 
Works^ p. 712, note. 

ORIOINATE, ORlCrlNATlON. — These words and their con- 
jugates are coming to be used in the question concerning 
liberty and necessity. Does man originate his own actions? 
Is man a principle of origination ? are forms of expression 
equivalent to the question, Is man a free agent ? 

'' To deny all originating power of the will, must be to 
place the primordial and necessary causes of all things in 

the Di^dne nature Whether as a matter of 

fact an originating power reside in man^ may be matter of 
inquiry ; but to maintain it to be an impossibility, is to 
deny the possibility of creation." — Thompson, Christ. Theism^ 
book i., chap. 6. See also. Cairns, On Moral Freedom. 

OUOBITNESS. — F. Duty. 

OUTiVESS. — '' The word outness^ which has been of late 
revived by some of Kant's admirers in this country, T\ps 
long ago used by Berkeley in his Principles of Human 
Knowledge (sect. 43) ; and at a still earlier period of his 
life, in his Essay towards a Neiv Theory of Vision (sect. 
46). I mention this as I have more than once heard the 
term spoken of as a fortunate innovation." — Stewart, 
Philosoph, Essays.) part 1, essay 2. — V, Exi ernality. 



366 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PACT. — F. Contract, Promise. 

PANTHEISM (ttocu hog, all is God, or God is all). — '' It 
supposes God and nature, or God and tlie whole universe, 
to be one and the same substance — one universal being ; 
insomuch that men's souls are only modifications of the 
Divine substance." — Waterland, Works, vol. viii., p. 81. 

Pantlieistce qui contendunt unicam esse substantiam cujus 
partes sunt omnia entia quse existunt. — Lacoudre, Instit, 
Pliilosopli., tom. ii., p. 120. 

Pantheism, when explained to mean the absorption of the 
infinite in the finite — of God in nature — is atheism ; and 
the doctrine of Spinoza has been so regarded by many. 
When explained to mean the absorption of nature in God 
— of the finite in the infinite — it amounts to an exaggera- 
tion of theism. But pantheism, strictly speaking, is the 
doctrine of the necessary and eternal co-existence of the 
finite and the infinite — of the absolute consubstantiahty of 
God and nature — considered as two different but insepar- 
able aspects of universal existence ; and the confutation of 
it is to be found in the consciousness which every one has of 
his personality and responsibility, ^Yh\ch. pantheism destroys. 

PARABIiS: (^TTotQot/So'hY}, from ica^ou^aWnv, to put forth one 
thing before or beside another) — has been defined to be a 
'' fictitious but probable narrative taken from the afiairs of 
ordinary life to illustrate some higher and less known 
truth." " It differs from the Fable, moving, as it does, in 
a spiritual world, and never transgressing the actual order 
of things natural ; from the Myth, there being in the latter 
an unconscious blending of the deeper meaning with the 
outward symbol, the two remaining separate, and separ- 
able in the parable; from the Proverb, inasmuch as it is 

^ longer carried out, and not merely accidentally and occa- 
sionally, but necessarily figurative ; from the Allegory, com- 
paring, as it does, one thing with another, at the same time 
preserving them apart as an inner and an outer, not trans- 
ferring, as does the Allegory, the properties, and qualities, 
and relations of one to the other." — Trench, On the Par- 
ables, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 367 

PARA]>OX (ttocpos, Io^ol, beyond, or contrary to appearance) 
— is a proposition which seems not to be true, but which 
turns out to be true ; so that to deny it would be to main- 
tain an absurdity. Cicero wrote '-'- Paradoxa^"" and the Hon. 
Eobert Boyle published, in 1666, Hydrostatical Paradoxes^ 
made out by new experiments. 

PARCIlflONY (liaw of) (parcimonia^ sparingness). — " That 
substances are not to be multiplied without necessity ;" in 
other words, '^ that a plurality of principles are not to be 
assumed, when the phsenomena can possibly be explained 
by one." This regulative principle may be called the law 
or maxim of parcimony. — Sir Will. Hamilton, itezcZ'5 Works^ 
p. 751, note A. 

Entta non sunt multplicanda prceter necessitatem. Frustra 
Jit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora. These are 
expressions of this prmciple. 

PARONYMOUS.— F. CONJUGATE. 

PART {jA^ipog^ pars^ part, or portion). — " Part^ in one sense, 
is applied to anything divisible in quantity. For that 
which you take from a quantity, in so far as it is quantity, 
is a part of that quantity. Thus two is a part of three. 
In another sense, you only give the name of part to what 
is an exact measure of quantity ; so that, in one point of 
view, two will be a part of three, in another not. That 
into which you can divide a genus, animal, for example, 
otherwise than by quantity, is still a part of the genus. In 
this sense species are parts of the genus. Part is also 
applied to that into which an object can be divided, whether 
matter or form. Iron is part of a globe, or cube of iron ; 
it is the matter which receives the form. An angle is also 
a part. Lastly, the elements of the definition of every par- 
ticular being are parts of the whole ; so that, in this point 
of view, the genus may be considered as part of the species ; 
in another, on the contrary, the species is part of the 
genus.'' — Aristotle, Metapliys.^ lib. v., cap. 2b. 

'' Of things which exist hj parts ^ there are three kinds. 
The first is of things, the parts of which are not co-existent^ 



368 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PART— 

but successive; such as time or motion^ no two parts of 
which can exist together. 

'^ The next kind of things consisting of parts, is such where 
parts are co-existent and contiguous. Things of this kind 
are said to be extended; for extension is nothing else but 
co-existence and junction of parts. 

" The third kind of things existing hy parts is, when the 
parts are co- existent, yet not contiguous or joined, but 
separate and disjoined. Of this kind is number^ the parts 
of which are separated by nature.^ and only united by the 
operation of the mind." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., 
book ii., chap. 13. 
PASSIOiX (passio^ '7rotdy}^ TTocax^iu, to suffer) — is the contrary 
of action. '^ A passive state is the state of a thing while it 
is operated upon by some cause. Every thing and every 
being but God, is liable to be in this state. He is pure 
energy — always active, but never acted upon ; while every- 
thing else is liable to suffer change." — See Harris, Dialogue 
concerning Happiness^ p. 86, note, for the meaning of 
Passion. 
"PASSIONS (The). — This phrase is sometimes employed in a 
wide sense to denote all the states or manifestations of the 
sensibility — every form and degree of feehng. In a more 
restricted psychological sense, it is confined to those states 
of the sensibility which are turbulent, and weaken our 
power of self-command. This is also the popular use of 
the phrase, in which passion is opposed to reason. 

Plato arranged the passions in two classes, — the con- 
cupiscible and irascible, trndv^^Kx. and h^og ; the former 
springing from the body and perishing with it, the latter 
connected with the rational and immortal part of our 
nature, and stimulating to the pursuit of good and the 
avoiding of excess and evil. 

Aristotle included all our active principles under one 
general designation of orectic, and distinguishing them into 
the appetite irascible, the appetite concupiscible, which 



VCCABULARy OF PHILOSOPHY. 369 

I»ASSIOIVS— 

had their origin in the body ; and the appetite rational ' 
(/3oyA)5<7;^), which is the will, under the guidance of reason. 

Descartes and Ma^lebranche have each given a theor}- 

and classification of the passions; also, Dr. Isaac Watts. 

Dr. Cdgan, and Dr. Hutcheson. 

S^ERCEPTlOiV (capere^ to take or lay hold, per, by means 

of, — that is, to apprehend by means of the organs of sense). 

Descartes (Princip. Philosoph.^ pars 1, sect. 32), says. 
*' Omnes modi cogitandi, quos in nobis experimur, ad duos 
generales referri possunt : quorum unus est perception sive 
operatic intellectus ; alius vero, volitio^ sive operatio volun- 
tatis. Nam sentire^ imaginari^ et pure intelligere^ sunt tan- 
tum diversi modi percipiendi ; ut et cupere, aversari, affir- 
mare, negare, dubitare, sunt diversi modi volendi." 

Locke (Essay on Hum. Understand. ^ book ii., chap. 6), 
says, '^ The two principal actions of the mind are these 
two : perception or thijiking, and volition or willing. The 
power of thinking is called the understanding ^ and the 
power of volition the will ; and these two powers or 
abilities of the mind, are called faculties." 

Dr. Reid thought that ^' perception is most properly 
applied to the evidence which we have of external objects 
hj our senses." He says {Intell. Powers., essay i., chap. 1), 
^' The perception of external objects by our senses, is an 
operation of the mind of a peculiar nature, and ought to 
have a name appropriated to it. It has so in all languages. 
And, in English, I know no word more proper to express 
this act of the mind than perception. Seeing, hearing, 
smelling, tasting, and touching or feeling, are words that 
express the operations proper to each sense ; perceiving 
expresses that which is common to them all." 

The restriction thus imposed upon the word by Eeid. i^ 
to be found in the philosophy of Kant ; and, as conveni- 
ent, has been generally acquiesced in. 

In note D* to Reid's Works, p. 876, Sir Will. HamHton 
notices the following meanings o^ perception, as applied to 
different faculties, acts, and objects : — 
2 B 



370 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PERCEPTION— 

1. Perception in its primary pliilosopMcal signification, 
as in the mouths of Cicero and Quintilian, is vaguely 
equivalent to comprehensiou, notion, cognition in general. 

2. An apprehension, a becoming aware of, consciousness. 
Perception^ the Cartesians really identified with idea^ and 
allowed them only a logical distinction ; the same repre- 
sentative act being called idea^ inasmuch as we regard it 
as a representation ; and perceptioii^ inasmuch as we re- 
gard it as a consciousness of such representation. 

8. Perception is limited to the apprehension of sense alone. 
This limitation was first formally imposed by Eeid, and 
thereafter by Kant. 

4. A still more restricted meaning, through the authority 
of Reid, is perception (proper), in contrast to sensation 
(proper). 

He defines sensitive perception^ or perception simply, as 
that act of consciousness whereby we apprehend in our 
body. 

a. Certain special affections, whereof, as an animated 
organism, it is contingently susceptible ; and 

h. Those general relations of extension, under which, as a 
material organism, it necessarily exists. 

Of these perceptions, the former, which is thus con- 
versant about a suhject-ohject, is sensation proper; the latter, 
which is thus conversant about an object-object, is percep- 
tion proper, 
PERCEPTIONS (Obscure) — or latent modifications of mind. 

Every moment the light reflected from innumerable 
objects, smells and sounds of every kind, and contact of 
different bodies are affecting us. But we pay no heed to 
them. These are what Leibnitz {Avant Propos de ses Nouv. 
Essais) calls obscure perceptions —diudi what Thurot (Z)e 
V Entendement^ &c., tom. i., p. 11) proposes to call impres- 
sions. But this word is already appropriated to the changes 
produced by communication between an external object 
and a bodily organ. 

The sum of these obscure perceptions and latent feelings, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 371 

PERCEPTIONS— 

which never come clearly into the field of consciousness, is 
what makes us at any time well or ill at ease. And as the 
amount in general is agreeable it forms the charm which 
attaches us to life— even when our vaore denned perceptions 
and feelings are painful. 

The following account of Leibnitz's philosophy as to 
{obscure) perceptions is translated from Tiberghien, Essai 
des Connaiss. Hum., p. 566. 

'^ We have perceptions and ideas, sense, and reason. 

•* Perceptions are the internal representation of what passes 
without. They are either clear or confused. But both 
have this in common that they cannot attain to absolute 
truth, but have always reference to facts and things con- 
tingent. They are also closely connected with one another 
by the law of continuity^ which does not allow nature to 
proceed 796r saltum^ so that we can acquire a clear percep- 
tion without passing through the lower degrees of percep- 
tion. 

'''' Clear perceptions are accompanied with consciousness, 
and engrave themselves on the memory. But howsoever 
distinct, they cannot engender certainty, because the 
external world in which they are placed, is all tied together, 
and every thing has its reason in all other things. Percep- 
tion always involves what is infinite ; it cannot be exhaus- 
tively analyzed. All that we can do as to what is infinite 
is to know distinctly that it is. It belongs only to the 
Supreme Eeason, whom nothing escapes, to comprehend 
what is infinite, all the reasons and all the consequences of 
things. 

'^ Confused or insensible perceptions are without conscious- 
ness or memory. It is difficult enough to seize them in 
themselves, but they must be, because the mind always 
thinks. A substance cannot be without action, a bod}' 
without movement, a mind without thought. There are a 
thousand marks which make us judge that there is, every 
moment, in us an infinity of perceptions ; but the habit in 
which we are of perceiving them, by depriving them of the 



372 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

I»JERCEPTI01VS— 

attraction of novelty, turns away our attention and prevents 
them from fixing themselves in our memory. How could 
Yv^e form a clear perception without the insensible perceptions 
which constitute it ? To hear the noise of the sea, for 
example, it is necessary that we hear the parts which com- 
pose the whole, that is, the noise of each wave, though 
each of these little noises does not make itself known but 
in the confused assemblage of all the others together with it, 
A hundred thousand nothings cannot make anything. And 
sleep, on the other hand, is never so sound that we have 
not some feeble and confused feeling ; one would not be 
v/akened by the greatest noise in the world, if one had not 
some perception of its commencement, which is small. 

''It is important to remark how Leibnitz attaches the 
greatest questions of philosophy to these insensible percep- 
tions^ in so far as they imply the law of continuity , It is by 
means of these we can say that the present ' is full of the 
past and big with the future,' and that -in the least of 
substances may be read the whole consequences of the 
things of the universe. They often determine us without 
our knowing it, and they deceive the vulgar by the 
appearance of an indifference of equilibrium. They supply 
the action of substances upon one another, and explain the 
pre-established harmony of soul and body. It is in virtue 
of these insensible variations that no two things can ever 
be perfectly alike (the principle of indiscernibles), and that 
their difference is always more than numerical, which 
destroys the doctrine of the tablets of the mind being 
empty, of a soul without thought, a substance without 
action, a vacuum in space, and the atoms of matter. There 
is another consequence — that souls, being simple sub- 
stances, are always united to a body, and that there is no 
soul entirely separated from one. This dogma resolves all 
the difficulties as to the immortality of souls, the difference 
of their states being never anything but that of more or 
less perfect, which renders their state past or future as ex- 
plicable as their present. It also supplies the means of 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 373 

PERCEPTIOXS— 

recovering memory, by the periodic clevelopments which 
may one day aiiive." 

PERFECT, PERFECTION {per-fac€re^ perfectunu^ made out, 
completed — To be perfect is to want nothing. Perfection 
is relative or absolute. A being possessed of all the qualities 
belonging to its species in the highest degree may be called 
perfect in a relative sense. But absolute perfection can only 
be ascribed to the Supreme Being. "We have the idea of 
a Being inlimtely/^e/Ttc^ — and from this Descartes reasoned 
that such a being really exists. 

The perfections of God are those qualities which he has 
commimicated to his rational creatm-es, and which are in 
Him in an m^mxely perfect degree. They have been dis- 
tinguished as natural and moral —the former belonging to 
Deity as the great fii'st cause — such as independent and 
necessary existence — the latter as manifested in the creation 
and government of the imiverse — such as goodness, justice, 
^c. But they are all natiu-al in the sense of being essential. 
It has been proposed to call the former attributes, and the 
latter perfections. But this distinctive use of the terms has 
not prevailed : indeed it is not well-founded. In God 
there are nothing hut attributes — ^because in him every- 
thing is absolute and involved in the substance and unity 
of a perfect being. 

PERFECTIBILITY (The I>ocb*iue of) — is — that men as 
individuals, and as communities have not attained to that 
hiippiness and development of which their nature and con- 
dition are capable, but that they are in a contuiual progress 
to a state of perfection, even ui this life. That men as a 
race are capable of progress and improvement is a fact 
attested by experience and history. But that this improve- 
ment may be carried into his whole nature — and to an 
indefinite extent —that all the evils which affect the body 
or the mind may be removed — cannot be maintained. 
Bacon had faith in the intellectual progress of man when 
he entitled his work '* Of the Advancement of Learnmg.'' 
Pascal has articulately expressed this laith in a preface 



374 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PERFECTIBIJLITY— 

to his "Treatise of a Vacuum." ''Not only individual 
men advance from day to day in knowledge, but men as a 
race make continual progress in proportion as the world 
grows older, because the same thing happens in a succes- 
sion of men as in the different periods of the life of an 
individual ; so that the succession of men during a course 
of so many ages, ought to be considered as the same man 
always living and always learning. From this may be seen 
the injustice of the reverence paid to antiquity in philo- 
sophy : for as old age is the period of life most distant from 
infancy, who does not see that the old age of the universal 
man is not to be sought for in the period nearest his birth, 
but in that most remote from it." Malebranche {Search 
after Truths book ii., part 2, chap. 4) expressed a similar 
opinion ; and the saying of a great modem reformer is 
well known — ''If you talk of the wisdom of the ancients— 
we are the ancients." It cannot be denied that in arts and 
sciences, and the accommodations of social life, and the 
extension of social freedom, the administration of justice, 
the abolition of slavery, and many other respects, men have 
improved, and are improving, and may long continue to 
improve. But human nature has limits beyond which it 
cannot be carried. Its life here cannot be indefinitely pro- 
longed — its liability to pain cannot be removed — ^its reason 
cannot be made superior to error, and all the arrange- 
ments for its happiness are liable to go wrong. 

Leibnitz, in accordance with his doctrine that the universe 
is composed of monads essentially active, thought it possible 
that the human race might reach a perfection of which we 
cannot well conceive. Charles Bonnet advocated the 
doctrine of a palingenesia^ or transformation of all things 
into a better state. In the last century the great advocates 
of social progress are Fontenelle, and Turgot, and Condorcet, 
in France; Lessing, Kant, and Schiller, in Germany; 
Price and Priestley, in England. Owen's views are also 
well known. — Mercier, De la Perfectibilite Humaine^ 8vo, 
Paris, 1842. 



VOCABULAKY OF PniLOSOPIIY. O/O 

PERIPATETIC (^£^/9r«THT;xo5-, ambulator ^ from Ts^i'Trursi:^. t; 
walk about) — is applied to Aristotle and his followers, whr. 
seem to have carried on their philosophical discussions while 
walking about in the halls or promenades of the Lyceum. 

PERSON, PERSOIVAIilTY, — Persona^ in Latin, meant the 
mask worn by an actor on the stage, within which the 
sounds of the voice were concentrated, and through which 
{personuit) he made himself heard by the immense audi- 
ence. From being applied to the mask it came next to be 
applied to the actor, then to the character acted, then to 
any assumed character, and lastly, to any one having any 
character or station. Martinius gives as its composition — 
per se una^ an individual. ''Person," says Locke (Essay on 
Hum. Understand.^ book ii., chap. 27), '' stands for a thinking 
intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can 
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different 
times and places ; which it does only by that consciousness 
which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me 
essential to it : it being impossible for any one to perceive 
without perceiving that he does perceive." "" We attribute 
personality^^'' says Mons. Ahrens (^Cours de Paycliologie^ 
tom. ii., p. 272), "to every being which exists, not solely 
for others, but which is in the relation of unity with itself 
in existing, or for itself. Thus we refuse personality to a 
mineral or a stone, because these things exist for others, 
but not for themselves. An animal, on the contrary, 
which exists for itself, and stands in relation to itself, 
possesses a degree of personality . But man exists for him- 
self in all his essence, in a manner more intimate and more 
extensive ; that which he is, he is for himself, he has con- 
sciousness of it. But God alone exists for himself in a 
manner infinite and absolute. Grod is entirely in relation 
to himself; for there are no beings out of him to whom he 
could have relation. His whole essence is for himself, and 
this relation is altogether internal : and it is this intimate 
and entire relation of God to himself in all his essence, 
which constitutes the di\4ne personality.''^ 

*' The seat of intellect," says Faley, ''is ajjtrson.''' 



376 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PERSON— 

A being intelligent and free, everj spiritual and moral 
agent, eyery cause wMcli is in possession of responsibility 
and consciousness, is a person. In this sense, God con- 
sidered as a creating cause, distinct from the universe, is a 
person. 

Personality is that character or quality in virtue of which 
any being deserves to be called a person. The divine per- 
sonality has been disputed. Human personality after death 
has been disputed. Reason has been called impersonal. 

'' The intimate relation of God, as Being, to all His attri- 
butes and to all His essence, constitutes the divine personal- 
ity., which for God is His entire being. God only exists 
for Himself in a manner infinite and absolute. God has 
relation entirely to Himself; for there is no being out of 
Him, to which He can have relation. His whole essence is 
for Himself, and this relation is altogether internal. The 
divine consciousness or divine personality embraces all that 
is in God, aJl of which He is the reason. 

'' All is present to God, and He is present to all things." 
— ^Tiberghien, Essai des Connaiss. Hum.., p. 140. 

According to Boethius, Persona est rationalis naturae ' 
individua substantia. 

''Whatever derives its powers of motion from without, 
from some other being, is a tiling. Whatever possesses a 
spontaneous action within itself, is a person,, or, as Aris- 
totle (Nicom. Eth.., lib. iii.) defines it, an oLo-^n Trpu^m.g.''^ — 
Sewell, ClrisL Mor., p. 152. 

'' Personality is individuality existing in itself, but with a 
nature as its ground." — Coleridge, Notes on Eng, Div.y 
vol. i., p. 4B. 

"If the substance be unintelligent in which the quality 
exists, we call it a thing or substance, but if it be intelli- 
gent, we call it a person., meaning by the word person to 
distinguish ^ thing or substance that is intelligent, from a 
thing or substance that is not intelligent. By the word 
person,, we therefore mean a thing or substance that is in- 
telligentj or a conscious being ; including in the word, tho 



TOCABULAr.T OF PHILOSOPHY. Ot t 

PERSON— 

idea hotli of the substance and its properties together." — 
Henry Taylor. A,::' . -" B: . M /-/.v,:'. letter!., p. 85. 

"A -u'-i^ting -u:.-:ancc or >;_ ^: .>:::.. '/^ endued with 
r: an is. that is. capable of religion, is a person,'' 

— ^^ r:::s-'^, p. 319. 

- ::> Deity, expresses the definite and 
/: . iha: Gl'O is a living being, and not a dead 

11: r::'v. TMicther spoken of the Creator or the 

1 . : ::. : : : . v^ay sigTiify either the unknown but 
abi'biiig -i;b-ruiiCc ''A' the attributes by which he is known 
to lis : or the imity of these attributes considered m them- 
selves." — R. A. Thompson. Christian Theism, book ii., 
chap. 7. — T'. Ii>extityPeeso>'-al. Eeasox. Subsiste:stia. 
P-.^ :".'.. in jurisprudence, denotes the capacity of 
ligb:- :.uA obligations which btlong to an intelligent will. 
— Jouffi'oy. Droit. Xat. p. 19. 

PETITIO PRIAXIPII (^7c •:; xcv-r cci7-i'j9xi x,cii ?.5i.a>5d«>f/:'. 
or begging the question") — is one of the seven paralogisms 
or talse reasonings which A:Ar::-0 r;-f;.Tes in the fifth 
chapter of his So^~\h:i:c.i i?;-. o :.\ •^, It consists in 
assuming or taking for gTanted in some way the point 
which is really in dispute. Xow. in all reasoning, that 
which is employed as proof should be more clear and better 
known than that which it is employed to prove. To infer 
the actual occurrence of ecHpses. recorded in Chinese 
annals, from an assumpri::: ^f the authenticity of these 
annals, is an example oi ^ ■::':'.? ^■•ivicipii, 

PSAXTAsi?!.— T". Idea. Peeceptiox. 

PHE>0?IE>OEOQY. — T'. XatIEE. 

PWEXO-^IEXON (r5i.>s'..,af.:;-. fi'om Xar.zuxi. to appear)— is 
tha: ' 'A ' - vcd. It is generally appHed to some 

^t'-:r . - . uie occurience in the course of nature. 

But in mental philosophy it is appHed to the various and 
changing states of mmd. •• How pitiliil and ridiculous are 
the gi'oimds upon which such men pretend to account for the 
very lowest and Qomm.o\ieiX pfienomena of nature, without re- 
cuning to a God and Providence 1'' — South, vol. iv., sei*m. Lx. 



378 VOCABULAHY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

'•^ Among the various phenomena which the human mind 
presents to our view, there is none more calculated to ex- 
cite our curiosity and our wonder, than the communication 
which is carried on between the sentient, thinking, and 
active principle within us, and the material objects with 
which we are surrounded." — Stewart, Pliilosopli. of Hum, 
Mind^ c. 1, sect. 1. 

In the philosophy of Kant, phenomeno7i means an object 
such as we represent it to ourselves or conceive of it, in 
opposition to noumenon^ or a thing as it is in itself. 

The definition of phenomenon is, " that which can be 
known only along with something else." — Ferrier, Instit, of 
Metaphys,^ p. 319. — F. Noumenon. 
JPHIIiANTHROPY (cpiT^ocud^coTrioc^ from 0i?.siu^ to love, and 
<>li/dpa)7ro;^ a man) — is a love of mankind. '^ They thought 
themselves not much concerned to acquire that God-like 
excellency, a philanthropy and love to all mankind." — 
Bp. Taylor, vol. iii., serm. i. 

This state or affection of mind does not differ essentially 
from charity or brotherly love. Both spring from bene- 
volence or a desire for the well-being of others. When 
our benevolence is purified and directed by the doctrines 
and precepts of religion, it becomes charity or brotherly 
love. When sustained by large and sound views of human 
nature and the human condition, it seeks to mitigate social 
evils and increase and multiply social comforts, it takes the 
name of philanthropy. But there is no incompatibility 
between the two. It is only when philanthropy proceeds 
on false views of human nature and wrong views of human 
happiness, that it can be at variance with true charity or 
brotherly love. 

Philanthropy or a vague desire and speculation as to 
improving the condition of the whole human race is some- 
times opposed to nationality or patriotism. But true 
charity or benevolence, while it begins with loving and 
benefiting those nearest to us by various relations, will 
expand according to the means and opportunities afforded 



VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. O < 9 

PfHrAXTHROPY— 

of doing good. And wliile we are duly attentive to the 
sti'onger claims of intimate connection, as the waves on the 
bosom of the waters s|:)read wider and wider, so we are to 
extend our regards beyond the distinctions of fiiendsldp. 
of family, and of society, and grasp in one benevolent em- 
brace the mii verse of hrnnan beings. God hath made of 
one blood all nations of men that dwell upon the face of 
the earth : and. althougli the s^-mpathies of fi-iendship and 
the charities of patriotism demand a more early and 
warm acknowledgment, we are never to forget those gTeat 
and general relations which bind together the kindi'eds 
of mankind — who ai'e all childi'en of one common parent, 
heii's of the same frail nattu-e. and shai'ei*s in the same 
tmbotmded goodness : — 

'• FrieiiGS, paients, neighbours, first it nill embrace. 
Our country next, and next all hmnani race. 
"Wide and more wide, the o'erflowing of the mind. 
Takes every creatare in of every krnd. 
Earth smiles aronnd, in boundless beauty dressed. 
And heaven reiiecrs its image in her breast, —Pcy e. 

PHILOSOPinr (<^M<kro^/a, (pihifx.^ ao^iat. the love of wisdom). 

— The origin of the word is traced back to P^-chagoras, 
who did not call himself g^c'or like the wise men of Greece. 
but merely declared himselt'to be a lover of wisdom. ^;/,s; 
acZici:. PJii'oso^:' :^ '-'. so much the love of wisdom, as 
the love of wisdcm i„..y be said to be its spiing. The 
desii'e of knowledge is natiu-al to man. Ignorance is 
painful: knowledge is :_:{r:.ll:. S.uTOimded with ever 
changing phenomena, h- rci-is :: ^^n:-- rheii' causes and 
tnes to bring their multiplicity to something like imity. 
and to reduce their variety to law and nile. T^Tien so 
employed he is prosecuting pfiilosophy. It was delined 
by Cicero (De Ojficiis^ lib. ii., c. 2). Etrum divinarum 
et humanarum^^ causarumque quihus lia res continentur^ 
scientia. But what man can attain or aspire to such 

* According to Lord Monboddo {Anckni Mettiphiii.^ b. L. ch. 5), the Romans had 
only tlie word sapientin for philosophy, till about the time of Cicero, when they 
adopted the Greek word phUosophicu 



380 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

knowledge, or even to the knowledge of one of the 
several departments into which philosophy may be divided. 
''In philosophy^'''' says Lord Bacon {Of the Advancement of 
Learning^ book ii.), ''the contemplations of man do either 
penetrate unto God, or are circumferred to nature, or are 
reflected or reverted upon himself. Out of which several 
inquiries there do arise three knowledges, Divine philosophy ^ 
natural philosophy, and human philosophy ^ or humanity." 
Now the object-matter of philosophy may be distinguished 
as God, or nature, or man. But, underlying all our in- 
quiries into any of these departments, there is ^^, first philo- 
sophy^ which seeks to ascertain the grounds or principles of 
knowledge, and the causes of all things. Hence philosophy 
has been defined to be the science of causes and principles. 
It is the investigation of those principles on which all know- 
ledge and all being ultimately rest. It is the exercise of 
reason to solve the most elevated problems which the 
human mind can conceive. How do we know ? and what 
do we know? It examines the grounds of human certitude, 
and verifies the trustworthiness of human knowledge. It in- 
quires into the causes of all beings, and ascertains the nature 
of all existences by reducing them to unity. It is not peculiar 
to any department, but common to all departments of know- 
ledge. Or if each department of knowledge may be said 
to have its philosophy^ it is because it rests upon that know- 
ledge of principles and causes which is common to them all. 
Man first examines phenomena, but he is not satisfied till 
he has reduced them to their causes, and when he has done 
so he asks to determine the value of the knowledge to 
which he has attained. This is philosophy properly so 
called, — the mother and governing science — the science of 
sciences. 

"It is the proper business of philosophy to show in many 
things, which have difference, what is their common char- 
acter ; and in many things which have a common character 
through what it is they differ." — Philoponus, Com, MS,^ 
quoted in Harris, Hermes^ p. 222, note. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 381 

PHII^OSOPBTt— 

'^Philosophy is the science of the connecting principles of 
nature." — ^Adam Smith, Hist, of Astronomy. 

'''-^Philosophy is the science of first principles,' that, 
namely, which investigates the primary grounds^ and deter- 
mines the fundamental certainty^ of human knowledge 
generally." — IMorell, Philosoph. Tendencies of the Age, 8vo, 
Lond., 1848, p. 13. 

Peemans, Introd. ad Philosoph.^ 12mo, Levan., 1810, 
sect. 107, proposes the following definition : — '-' Philosophia 
est scientia reruni per causas primas, recto rationis usu 
comparata." 

By this definition it is distinguished from other kinds of 
knowledge. 1. From simple intelligence^ which is intuitive^ 
while philosophical knowledge is discursive. 2. From 
natural sciences^ which do not always reach to frst causes. 
3. From arts^ which do not proceed by causes or principles, 
but by rule. 4. From faith or belief which rests not on 
evidence, but authority. 5. From opinion, which is not 
certain knowledge. And fi:om the common love of know- 
ledge and truth, which does not prosecute and acqaii-e it 
scientifically, 
PHRENOIiOOY ((?)g>]y, mind ; Aoyo^, discourse). — This word 
ought to mean Psychology, or mental philosophy, but has 
been appropriated by Craniologists, on accoimt of the light 
which theii' observations of the convolutions of the brain 
and corresponding elevations of the skull are supposed to 
throw on the nature and province of our different faculties. 
According to Dr. Gall, the foimder of Craniolog}-, '' its end 
is to determine the fimctions of the brain in general, and of 
its difierent parts in particular, and to prove that you may 
recognize different dispositions and inclinations by the pro- 
tuberances and depressions to be fotmd on the cranium. 
The cranium being exactly moulded upon the mass of bram, 
every portion of its stu'fiice will present dimensions and 
developments according to the corresponding portion of the 
])rain. But indi\iduals in whom such or such a portion of 
the craniimi is largely developed, have been observed by 



382 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PHRENOIiOOY— 

plirenologists to be remarkable for sucb or sucli a faculty, 
talent, or virtue, or vice ; and the conclusion is, that the 
portion of brain corresponding to that development of the 
cranium is the seat of that faculty, or virtue, or vice — is its 
special organ.'''' — See writings of Gall, Spurzheim, and 
Combe. 

''If it be true that the multitudinous cerebral fibres act 
always in the same specific fasciculi, or in the same combi- 
nation of specific fasciculi, in order to produce the same 
faculty in the same process of ratiocination, then phrenology 
is so far true ; and if the action of these fasciculi has the 
effect of elongating them, so as to produce pressure on the 
corresponding internal surface of the cranium, and if the 
bony case make a corresponding concession of space to the 
elongation of these specific fasciculi, then cranioscopy is true 
also ; but there are so many arbitrary assumptions in arriving 
at such a result, that a vastly gTcater mass of evidence must 
be brought forward before phrenologists and cranioscopists 
have a right to claim general assent to their doctrine." — 
Wigan, on Duality of Mind ^ p. 162. 

The British Association, established several years ago, 
refused to admit phrenology as a section of their society. 
PHYSIOONOMY {(pvatg^ nature ; yi/af^^au^ an index, from 
ytyvauica^ I know)— is defined by Lavater to be the ''art 
of discovering the interior of man from his exterior^ In 
common language, it signifies the judging of disposition and 
character by the features of the face. In the Middle Ages, 
physiognomy meant the knowledge of the internal properties 
of any corporeal existence from external appearances. 

They found, i' ihQ physiognomies 

Of the planets, all men's destinies.— ^Mc?/&r«5. 

It does not appear that among the ancients physiognomy 
was extended beyond man^ or at least beyond animated 
nature. Aristotle has formally treated of it. And all men 
in the ordinary business of life seem to be influenced by 
the belief that the disposition and character may in some 



YOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 383 

t 
PHYSIOONOIWCY— 

measure be indicated by the form of the body, and espe- 
cially by the features of the face. See Lavater, Spurzheim. 
J. Cross, Attampt to estaUish Pliysiognomy upon Scientific 
Principles^ Glasg., 1817. 
PHYSIOI^OOY and PHYSICS were formerly used as syno- 
nymous. The former now denotes the laws of organized 
bodies, the latter of unorganized. The former is distin- 
guished into animal and vegetable. Both imply the neces- 
sity of nature as opposed to liberty of intelligence^ and nei- 
ther can be appropriately applied to mind. Dr. Brown, 
however, entitled the first part of one of his works, the 
Physiology of mind. — V. Psychology. 

Physiology determines the matter and the form of living 
beings. It describes their structure and operations, and 
then ascends from phenomena to laws ; from the knowledge 
of organs and their actions it concludes their function and 
their end or purpose ; and from among the various mani- 
festations it seeks to seize that mysterious principle which 
animates the matter of their organization, which maintains 
the nearly constant form of the compound by the continual 
renewal of the component molecules, and which at death, 
leaving this matter, surrenders it to the common laws, from 
the empire of which it was for a season withdraT\Ti. 

. . . The facts which belong to it are such as we can 
touch and see — matter and its modifications. — Diet, des 
Sciences Philosoph. 
PICTURESQUE — ''properly means what is done in the style 
and with the spirit of a painter, and it was thus, if I am 
not much mistaken, that the word was commonly em- 
ployed when it was first adopted in England. . . . But 
it has been frequently employed to denote those combina- 
tions or groups or attitudes of objects that are fitted for 
the purposes of the painter." — Stewart, Philosoph. Essays^ 
part 1, chap. 5. 

''''Picturesque is a word applied to every object, and 
every kind of scenery, which has been or might be repre- 
sented with good eifect in painting — just as the word 



384 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PICTURE SQUE — 

beautiful^ when we speak of visible nature, is applied to 
every object and every kind of scenery that in any way 
give pleasure to the eye — and these seem to be the signifi- 
cations of both words, taken in their most extended and 
popular sense." — Sir Uvedale Price, On the Picturesque^ c. 3. 
" The two qualities of roughness and of sudden variation^ 
joined to that of irregularity ^ are the most efficient causes 
of the picturesque.^^* — Ibid. 

'* Beauty and picturesqueness are founded on opposite 
qualities ; the one on smoothness, the other on roughness ; 
the one on grandeur, the other on sudden variation ; the 
one on ideas of youth and freshness, the other on those of 
age and even of decay." — Chap. 4. 

PNEUMATICS is now applied to physical science, and means 
that department of it which treats of the mechanical pro- 
perties of air and other elastic fluids. It was formerly used 
as synonymous with pneumatology, 

PNEUlTIATOIiOOY Q7rviV{A0i, spirit; T^oyog., discourse). — The 
branch of philosophy which treats of the nature and 
operations of mind, has by some, been called pneumatology. 
Philosophy gives ground for belief in the existence of our 
own mind and of the Supreme mind, but furnishes no evi- 
dence for the existence of orders of minds intermediate. 
Popular opinion is in favour of the belief. But philosophy 
has sometimes admitted and sometimes rejected it. It has 
found a place, however, in all rehgions. There may thus be 
said to be a religious pneumatology^ and a philosophical 
pneumatology. In religious pneumatology y in the East, 
there is the doctrine of two antagonist and equal spirits of 
good and evil. In the doctrines of Christianity there is 
acknowledged the existence of spirits intermediate between 
God and man, some of whom have fallen into a state of evil, 
while others have kept their first estate. 

* " A picturesque object may be defined as that which, from the greater facihties 
wliich it possesses for readily and more effectually enabling an artist to display his 
art, is, as it were, a provocation to painting."— Sir Thos, L. Dick, Note to above 
chap. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 385 

PNEU:«ATOJLOOY— 

Philosophy in its early stages is partly religious. Socra- 
tes had communication with a demon or spirit. Plato did 
not discountenance the doctrine, and the Xeo-Platonicians 
of Alexandria carried pneumatology to a great length, and 
adopted the cabalistic traditions of the Jews. In the scho- 
lastic ages, the belief in return from the dead, apparitions 
and spirits, was universal. And Jacob Boehm, in Saxon}-, 
Emanuel Swedenborg, in Sweden, and in France, Martinez 
Pasqualis and his disciple St. Martin, have all given accoimts 
of orders of spiritual beings who held communication with 
the living. And in the present day a behef in spirit rapping 
is prevalent in America. 

Bp. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge^ sect. 81, 
and throughout, admits the existence of orders of spirits. 

Considered as the science of mind or spirit, pneumatology 
consisted of three parts treating of the Divine mind, Theo- 
logy — the angelic mind, Angelolog}', and the human mind. 
This last is now called Psychology, "a term to which no 
competent objection can be made, and which affords us, 
what the various clumsy periphrases in use do not, a con- 
venient adjective — psychological.'''' — Sir W. Hamilton, Beid's 
Works^ p. 219, note. 

POiii.iciTATiO]V. — V. Promise. 

POI^YCrA:Tlir (^o?.yc, many ; yu^uo;^ mamage) — means a plu- 
rality of wives or husbands. It has prevailed under various 
forms in all ages of the world. It can be shown, however, 
to be contrary to the hght of nature ; and has been con- 
demned and punished by the laws of many nations. About 
the middle of the sixteenth centur}-, Beraardus Ochinus, 
general of the order of Capuchins, and afterwards a Pro- 
testant, published Dialogues in favour of polygamy^ to which 
Theodore Beza wrote a reply. In 1682, a work entitled 
Polygamia TriumpJiatrix appeared under the name of 
Theophilus Aletheus. The true name of the author was 
Lyserus, a native of Saxony. In 1780, Martin Madan 
published ThelyphtJiora^ or a Treatise on Female Ruin^ in 
which he defended polygamy^ on the part of the mal»\ 
2c 



386 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

See some sensible remarks on this subject in Paley's Moral 
and Political Philosophy. 

POIiYTBLEISM (^oXy^, many ; ^so^, god).^ — '-'• To believe no one 
supreme designing principle or mind, but rather two, three, 
or more (though in their nature good) is to be 2i polytheist^ — 
Shaftesbury., b. i., pt. 1, sect. 2. 

Three forms of polytheism may be distinguished. 1. 
Idolatry., or the worship of idols and false gods, which pre- 
vailed in Greece and Rome. 2. Sahaism^ or the worship 
of the stars and of fire, which prevailed in Arabia and in 
Chaldea. 3. Fetichism^ or the worship of anything that 
strikes the imagination and gives the notion of great power, 
which prevails in Africa and among savage nations in 
general. 

POSITIVISM, — '' One man affirms that to him the principle 
of all certitude is the testimony of the senses; this is: 
positivism^ — Morell, Philosoph. Tenden.., p. 15. 

Of late years the name positivism has been appropriated 
to the peculiar principles advocated by M. Auguste Comte, 
in his Cours de Philosophie Positive. This philosophy 
is thus described by an admirer (G. H. Lewes, Comte's 
Philosoph. of Sciences., 1853, sect. 1)]: — ''This is the mission 
of positivism., to generalize science, and to systematize 
sociality ; in other words, it aims at creating a philosophy 
of the sciences, as a basis for a new social faith. A social 
doctrine is the aim of positivism., a scientific doctrine the 
means; just as in a man, intelligence is the minister and 
interpreter of life. 

'' The leading conception of M. Comte is : — There are 
but three phases of intellectual evolution — the theological 
(supernatural), the metaphysical., and XhQ positive. In the 
supernatural phase, the mind seeks causes., unusual pheno- 
mena are interpreted as the signs of the pleasure or dis- 
pleasure of some god. In the metaphysical phase, the 
supernatural agents are set aside for abstract forces inherent 
in substances. In the positive phase, the mind restricts 
itself to the discovery of the laws of phenomena." 



TOCABUULRY OF PHILOSOPHY. 387 

f*0<ftSrBl.E (jpotis-esse^ posse^ to be able). — That which mar or 
can be. "'Tis possible to infinite power to endue a 
creatnre with the power of beginning motion." — Clarke. 
On Attributes^ prep. 10. 

PossibUUas est consensio inter se^ sen non repugnantia 
partium vel aUribwtorum quibus res seu ens constituatur. 

A thing is said to be passible when though not actnaUj 
in existence all the conditions necessary for realizing its 
existence are ^ven. Thns we say it is possible that a 
plant or animal may be bom, because there are in nature 
causes by which this may be bron^t about. But as erery 
thing which is bom dies, we say it is impossible that a plant 
or animal should live for CTer. A thing is/iosst&fe, when there 
is no contradiction between the idea or conception of it 
and the realization of it ; and a thing is impossible when the 
conception of its realization or existence implies absurdity 
or contradiction. 

We apply the terms possible and impossible both to beings 
and eTents, chiefly on the ground of experience. In pro- 
portion as our knowledge of the laws of nature increases, 
we say it is possible that such things may be produced ; and 
in proportion as our knowledge of human nature is enlarged, 
we say it is possible that such events may happen. But it 
is safer to say what is posdble than what is impossible. 
because our knowledge of causes is increasing. 

Th^re are three wa]^ in whidi what is possible may be 
brought about; supemataraUy, naturalbf, and morally. 
Hie resurrection of the ^eaAis supernaiuraBy possible^ since 
it can only be realized by the power of God. The burning 
of wood is maturaUy or physically possiblef because fire has 
the power to do so. It is morally possible that he who has 
often done wrong should yet in some particular iostance do 
light. These epithets apply to the causes by which the 
possible existence or event is realized. 

" Possible relates sometimes to contingency, sometimes to 
potcer or liberty, and these senses are firequently confounded. 
In the first sense we say, e.g.^ ' It is possible this patient may 
recover.' not meaning that it depends on his choice, but 



388 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

that we are not sure whether the event will not be such. 
In the other sense it is ^possible ' to the best man to violate 
every rule of morality ; since if it were out of his power to 
act so if he chose it, there would be no moral goodness in 
the case, though we are quite sure that such never will be 
his choice." — Whately, Logic ^ appendix i. 
POSTUliATE (diTYi^uoc^ postiilatum^ that which is asked or 
assumed in order to prove something else). — '' According 
to some, the difference betAveen axioms and postulates is 
analogous to that between theorems and problems ; the 
former expressing truths which are self-evident, and from 
which other propositions may be deduced; the latter 
operations which may be easily performed, and by the help 
of which more difficult constructions may be effected." — 
Stewart, Pldlosopli. Hum, Mind^ vol. ii., chap. 2, sect. 3, 
From Wallis. 

Aristotle says {Poster. Analyt.^ lib. i., cap. 10, sect. 5, 6), 
*' The axiom being a necessary truth and necessarily believed, 
is distinct from hypothesis, and from petition or postulate. 
What is capable of proof, but assumed without proof, if 
believed by the learner, is relatively to the learner, though 
not absolutely, an hypothesis ; if the learner has no belief or 
a disbelief, it is a petition; and this is the difference. 
Petition is an assumption opposed to thebelief of the learner, 
or, still wider, a demonstrable preposition assumed without 
demonstration." 

There is a difference between a postulate and an hijpo- 
thesis. When you lay down something which may be, 
although you have not proved it, and which is admitted by 
the learner or the disputant, you make an hypothesis. 
The postulate not being assented to, may be contested 
during the discussion, and is only established by its con- 
formity with all other ideas on the subject. 

In the philosophy of Kant, a postulate is neither an 
hypothesis nor a corollary^ but a proposition of the same 
binding certainty, or whose certainty is incorporated with 
that of another, so that you must reject that other, all 



VOCABUL.\RY OF PHILOSOPHT. 389 

posTriiATi:— 

evident as it is in self, or admit at the same tlm^ ^vn:u i; 
necessarily supposes. 

1. I am under obligation, therefore I am free. 

2. Practical reason tends necessarily to the sovereign 
good which supposes an absolute conformity with the moral 
law ; such conformity is holiness : a perfection which man 
can only attain by an indefinite continuity of effort and 
of progress. This pro^n^ess supposes continiuty of existence, 
personal and identical, therefore the soul is immortal, or the 
sovei^eign good is a chimera, 

3. On the other hand, the sovereign good supposes /^Zi'aY^, 
but this results fi-om the conformity of thiugs with a will, 
and has for its condition, obedience to the moral law : there 
must then be a harmony possible between morality and 
felicity, and this necessarily supposes a cause of the universe 
distinct from nature, — an intelligent cause, who is at the 
same time the Author of the moral law, and guarantee of 
this harmony of virtue and happiness, from which results 
the sovereign good; then God exists^ and is himself the 
primitive sovereign good, the source of all good. Kant's 
postulates of the practical reason are thus freedom, immor- 
tality, and God. — Willm, Hist de la Philosoph. Allemande. 
torn., i, p. 4:20. 

POTFER {potis esse^ to be able, in Greek Iwxfttg) — says Mr. 
Locke {Essay on Hum. Understand.., b. ii., eh. 21), ^^may 
be considered as twofold, viz., as able to make, or able to 
receive, any change : the one may be called active, and the 
other passive power." Dr. Eeid, in reference to this dis- 
tinction, says {Active Powers., essay L, chap. 3), ^' ^\Tiereas 
he distinguishes power into active and passive, I conceive 
passive poicer to be no poiver at aU. He means by it the 
possibility of being changed. To call this power, seems to 
be a misapplication of the word. I do not remember to 
have met with the phrase passive poicer in any other good 
author. iVlr. Locke seems to have been unlucky in invent- 
ing it ; and it deserves not to be retained in our language.*' 
•' This paragraph," says Sir W. Hamilton {Eeid^s Works, p. 



390 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

POTTJER— 

519, note), '^ is erroneous in almost all its statements." The 
distinction between power as active and passive, is clearly- 
taken by Aristotle. But he says that in one point of view 
they are but oxiq power (Metaphys.^ lib. v., cap. 12), while 
in another they are two {MetapJiys.^ lib. ix., cap. 1). He 
also distinguishes powers into rational and irrational — into 
those which we have by nature, and those which we acquire 
by repetition of acts. These distinctions have been generally 
admitted by subsequent philosophers. Dr. Eeid, however, 
only used the word power to signify active power. That 
we have the idea of power^ and how we come by it, 
he shows in opposition to Hume (Active Powers^ essay i., 
chap. 2, 4). 

According to Mr. Hume, we have no proper notion of 
power. It is a mere relation which the mind conceives to 
exist between one thing going before, and another thing 
coming after. All that we observe is merely antecedent 
and consequent. Neither sensation nor reflection furnishes 
us with any idea of power or efficacy in the antecedent to 
produce the consequent. The views of Dr. Brown are 
somewhat similar. It is when the succession is constant — 
when the antecedent is uniformly followed by the conse- 
quent, that we call the one cause, and the other effect ; but 
we have no ground for believing that there is any other 
relation between them or any virtue in the one to originate 
or produce the other, that is, that we have no proper idea 
of power, Xow that our idea of power cannot be explained 
by the philosophy which derives all our ideas from sensation 
and reflection is true. Power is not an object of sense. 
All that we observe is succession. But when we see one 
thing invariably succeeded by another, we not only connect 
the one as effect and the other as cause, and view them 
under that relation, but we frame the idea of pjower^ and 
conclude that there is a virtue, an efficacy, a force, in the 
one thing to originate or produce the other ; and that the 
connection between them is not only uniform and unvaried, 
but universal and necessary. This is the common idea of 



TOCABULAP.Y OF PHILOSIPHY. 391 

poller^ and that there is such an idea, firamed and enter- 
tained by the human mind cannot be denied. The legiti- 
macT and validity of the idea can be folly vindicated- 

'^ Our inquiries into the laws of nature carry ns no 
farther than to ascertain what events are uniformly conse- 
quent, the one to the other. 

" We know of no power but that which belongs to mind. 
It is an old definition of mind and matter. Agreeable to this 
explanation of power ^ mind is that which moves; matter is 
that which is moved.^^ — Taylor, Elements ofTkoughi. 

'^ In the strict sense, power and agency are attributes of 
mind only ; and I think that mind only can be a cause in 
the strict sense. This power ^ indeed, may be where it is 
not exerted, and so may be without agency or causation : 
but there can be no agency or causation without power to 
act and to produce the effect. As far as I can judge, to 
evenlhing we call a cause we ascribe power to produce the 
effect. In intelligent causes, the power may be without 
being exerted : so I havepoirer to run when I sit still or 
walk. But in inanimate causes we conceive no power bnt 
what is exerted, and, therefore, measure the power of the 
cause by the effect which it actually produces. The power 
of an acid to dissolve iron is measured by what it actually 
dissolves. We get the notion of active power ^ as well as 
of cause and effect, as I think, from what we feel in our- 
selves. We feel in om^selves a power to move onr limbs, 
and to produce certain effects when we choose. Hence we 
get the notion of power ^ agency, and cavsation. in the strict 
and philosophical sense: and this I take to be our first 
notion of these three things.'' — ^Dr. Reid. Correspondenct. 
pp. 77. 78. 

^^ The habihty of a thing to be infiuenced by a cause is 
called passive power, or more properly susceptibUitj ; while 
the efiicacy of the cause is called active power. Heat has 
the power of melting wax : and in the language of some, ice 
has the power of being melted.** — Bay, On the Will, p. 33. 
— r. Cause. 



392 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

PO^VER — 

Aristotle, Metaphys.^ lib. vlii., cap. 1. 

Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book ii., chap. 21. 

Hobbes, Opera, torn, i., p. 113, edit, by Moleswortk 

'^ Tlie word power is used in two senses. In one, it refers 
to the capacity or potentiality residing in a substance, and 
is the name of an energy, or of energy, which may be put 
forth by that in which it inheres. Thus various things are 
said to ' have ' various powers. But, in its second meaning, 
this word refers to that unity of both substance and accident 
which constitutes being or reality, and is the name of some- 
thing, or of anything which asserts positive being. All 
such things are ' powers.' Thus of the soul, it is properly 
said when the body is yielding up the ghost, 
''A power is passing from the earth."*— 526?«o^7^eca Sacra, No. 50, p. 391. 

It is usual to speak of a power of resistance in matter : 
and of a power of endurance in mind. Both these are 
passive power. Active power is the principle of action, 
whether immanent or transient. Passive power is the prin- 
ciple of bearing or receiving. 
PR^DICATIE:, PR^I>I€ABIiX:, and PR^DICAmXINT, 
are all derived from prcedicare., to affirm. A prcedicate is 
that which is actually affirmed of any one, as wisdom of 
Peter. A prcedicahle is that which may be affirmed of 
many, as sun may be affirmed of other suns besides that of 
our system. A prcedicament is a series, order, or arrange- 
ment of predicates and predicaMes in some summum genus,- 
as substance, or quality. 
Prscdicables. — ''Whatever term can be affirmed of several 
things, must express either their whole essence^ which is 
called the species; or a part of their essence (viz., either 
the material -psirt, which is called the genus^ or ihe formal 
and distinguishing part, which is called differentia.^ or in 
common discourse, characteristic)., or something joined to 
the essence ; whether necessarily (i. <?., to the y:hole species^ 
or in other words universally^ to every individual of it), 
which is called a property; or contingently (i.e., to some 
individuals only of the species), which is an accident. 



VOCABULAPcY OF PHILOSOPHY. 393 

PB.i:i>ICATE — 

Every PraBclicable expresses either 

The whole essence of its ^ . ... p™^,^^ Or something joined 

subject. Yiz., Species. ^^ P'^^^ ^\ ^^^ essence, ^^ .^^ essence. 



r 



Genus, differentia. 






HTTTN 



rniversal but Peculiar but Universal and^ t ,^^,,,ki^ c^^o^.-ki« 

not Peculiar, not Univei-sal. PecuUar. Inseparable, beparable, 

Prtedicables. — *' Genus, species, diiferentia, proprimn, acci- 
dens, might, with more propriety perhaps, have been called 
the five classes of predicates ; but use has determined them 
to be called the^i-g predicahles.''^ — Keid, Account of Aris- 
totle's Lofjic. 

Prapdicament. — These most comprehensive signs of things 
(the categories) are called in Latin the prcedicaments. because 
they can be said or predicated in the same sense of all other 
terms, as well as of all the objects denoted by them, whereas 
no other term can be correctly said of them, because no 
other is employed to express the full extent of their mean- 
ing.'' — Gillies, Analysis of Aristotle^ c. 2. 

Praedicate. — AVhat is affirmed or denied is called the predicate ; 
and that of which it is affirmed or denied is called the 
suhject. — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., vol. v., p. 152.— 

F. AXTPIBUTE, CaTEGORT, UNIVERSAL. 
PraB-prspdicaaienia and Post-pr^edicamenta. — "The Greek 
Logicians divided their speculations on this subject into 
three sections, calling the first section to tco tcdv xotrryooiwj : 
the second, rd 'tzsdi Hv-c^-j xa,Tr,yooiau; the third, to uirx 
Totg KOLTnyooiotg. — Ammon. in PrcediCj p. 14:6. The Latins, 
adhering to the same division, coin new names : ante- 
prcedicamenta. or prce-prcedicamenta, prcedic amenta and j905/- 
prcedicamenta'' — Sanderson, pp. 22, 51, 55, ed. Oxon., 1672. 
PREJinoiCE (prcE'jtidicare, to judge before inquiry-). — A 
prejudice is a pre-judging, that is forming or adopting an 
opinion concerning an\i:hing, before the grounds of it have 
been faii-ly or fully considered. The opiraon may be true 



394 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

or false, but in so far as the grounds of it have not been 
examined, it is erroneous or without proper evidence. 
"In most cases prejudices are opinions which, on some 
account, men are pleased with, independently of any con- 
viction of their truth ; and which, therefore, they are 
afraid to examine, lest they should find them to be false. 
Prejudices^ then, are unreasonable judgments, formed or 
held under the influence of some other motive than the 
love of truth. They may therefore be classed according 
to the nature of the motives from which they result. 
These motives are either, 1, Pleasurable, innocent, and 
social; or, 2, They are malignant." — ^Taylor, Elements of 
Thought. 

Dr. Reid (Intell Powers^ essay vi., chap. 8) has treated 
of prejudices or the causes of error, according to the classi- 
fication given of them by Lord Bacon, under the name of 
idols (v. Idol). Mr. Locke has treated of the causes of 
error (Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book iv., chap. 20). And 
some excellent observations on the prejudices peculiar to 
men of study, may be seen in Malebranche, Search after 
Truth, book ii., part 2. 

PREIWISS (propositiones prcEmissce^ propositions which go 
before the conclusion, and from which it is inferred.) — A 
regular syllogism consists of two premisses and a conclusion. 
The two premisses are sometimes called the antecedent, and 
the conclusion the consequent. 

IPRESCIENCE (prm-scire^ to know before it happens). — " The 
prescience of God is so vast and exceeding the comprehen- 
sion of our thoughts, that all that can be safely said of it 
is this, that this knowledge is most exquisite and perfect, 
accurately representing the natures, powers, and properties 
of the thing it does fore-know." — More, Immortality of Soul., 
b. ii., c. 4. 

The prescience of God may be argued from the perfection 
of his nature. It is difficult or rather impossible for us to 
conceive of it, because we have no analogous faculty. Our 
obscure and inferential knowledge of what is future, is not 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 395 

PRESCIENCE— 

to be likened to his clear and direct* beholding of all things. 
Many attempts have been made to reconcile the prescience 
of God with the liberty of man. Each truth must rest upon 
its own proper evidence. — St. Augustin, On the Spirit and 
the Letter; Bossuet, Traite du Libre Arhitre; Leibnitz, 
Theodicee ; Fenelon, Existence de Dieu. 
PRIMARY (primus^ first) — is opposed to secondary. ''Those 
qualities, or properties, without which we cannot even 
imagine a thing to exist, are called primary qualities. 
Extension and solidity are called primary qualities of 
matter — colour, taste, smell, are called secondary qualities 
of matter." — Taylor, Elements of Thought, 

Descartes. 

Locke. 

Reid. 

Stewart, Phil. Essays^ ii., chap. 2. 

Su' W. Hamilton, Reid's Works^ note D. 
PRINCIPIA ESSENDI or PRINCIPI.ES OF REINO are 
distinguished into the principle of origination and the prin- 
ciple of dependence. 

The only proper principle of origination is God, who 
gives essence and existence to all beings. 

The principle of dependence is distinguished into that of 
causality and that of inherence^ or effective dependence^ as 
the effect depends upon its cause, and suhjective depen- 
dence^ as the quality inheres or depends on its subject or 
substance. 
PRlNClpiiE (principium^ oipx'^t ^ beginning). — ''A principle 
is that which being derived from nothing, can hold of no- 
thing. 'Principio autem nulla est origo,' said Cicero, 'nam 

* When the late Sir James Mackintosh was visiting the school for the deaf and 
dumb at Paris, then under the care of the Ahhe Sicard, he is said to have addressed 
this question in Avriting, to one of the pupils,—" Doth God reason ? " The pupil for 
a short time appeared to he distressed and confused, but presently wrote on his slate, 
the following answer:— "To reason is to hesitate, to doubt, to inquire, it is the 
highest attribute of a limited intelligence. God sees all things, fore-sees all things, 
knows all things; therefore God doth not reason."— Gurney, on Ilabit and Discip- 
line, p. 138. 



396 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

ex principio oriuntur omnia : ipsum autem nulla ex re ; 
nee enim id esset principium quod gigneretur aliunde.' " — 
Sir Will. Drummond, Acad. Quest. ^ p. 5. 

Aristotle {Metapliys.^ lib. v., cap. 1) has noticed several 
meanings of oi^x^i which is translated principle., and has 
added — '' What is common to all principles is that they 
are the primary source from which anything is^ becomes., or 
is known.'''' 

The word is applied equally to thought and to being ; 
and hence principles have been divided into those of being 
and those of knowledge, or principia essendi and principia 
cognoscendif or according to the language of German philo- 
sophers, principles formal and principles real. Principia 
essendi may also be principia cognoscendi., for the fact that 
things exist is the ground or reason of their being known. 
But the converse does not hold ; for the existence of things 
is in no way dependent upon our knowledge of them. 

Ancient philosophy was almost exclusively occupied with 
principles of heing., investigating the origin and elements of 
all things, while, on the other hand, modern philosophy 
has been chiefly devoted to principles of knowledge., ascer- 
taining the laws and elements of thought, and determining 
their validity in reference to the knowledge which they give. 
jPRIiVCIPIiES OF KNOWliEDOE are those truths by means 
of which other truths are known. They have been distin- 
guished into simple and complex., that is, they may be found 
in the form of ideas, as substance, cause — or in the form of 
propositions, as in the affirmation, that every change implies 
the operation of a cause, or in the negation, that qualities 
do not exist without a substance. Complex principles have 
been arranged in three classes, viz., hypotheses, definitions, 
and axioms. Hypotheses and definitions have been called 
^£T/x^, that is, conventional principles or truths assumed 
or agreed on for the purpose of disputation or teaching, 
and are confined to the department of knowledge to which 
they peculiarly belong. Axioms are principles true in 
themselves and extending to all departments of knowledge. 



VOCABULAPvY OF PHILOSOPHY. 397 

principi.es— 

These were called (^vgikoo or ?^{??:^t«, and are such as the 
mind of man natm^ally and at once accepts as true. They 
correspond with the first truths, primitive beliefs, or prin- 
ciples of common sense of the Scottish philosophy. — V. 
Common^ Sense, Axiom. 

'' The word principle^'''' says Mr. Stewart (Philosoph, 
Hum, Mind^ vol. i., chap. 1, sect. 2), "in its proper accep- 
tation, seems to me to denote an assumption (whether 
resting on fact or on hypothesis), upon which, as a datum^ 
a train of reasoning proceeds ; and for the falsity or incor- 
rectness of which no logical rigour in the subsequent pro- 
cess can compensate. Thus the gravity and the elasticity 
of the air are pririciples of reasoning^ in our speculations 
about the barometer. The equality of the angles of inci- 
dence and reflection ; the proportionality of the sines of 
incidence and refraction ; are principles of reasoning in 
catoptrics and in dioptrics. In a sense perfectly analogous 
to this, the definitions of geometry (all of which are merely 
hypothetical) are the first principles of reasoning in the 
subsequent demonstration, and the basis on which the 
whole fabric of the science rests." 

Lord Herbert, De Veritate. 

Buffier, Treatise of First Truths. 

Reid, Intell. Powers^ essay vi. 
Principles as Express or as Operative correspond to 
principles of knowing and of heing. An express prin- 
ciple asserts a proposition ; as, truth is to be spoken. 
An operative principle prompts to action or produces 
change, as when a man takes food to satisfy hunger. An 
express principle asserts an original law and is regulative. 
An operative principle is an original element and is consti- 
tutive. 
PRINCIPJLES OF ACTION may either mean those express 
principles which regulate or ought to regulate human 
action, or those operating or motive principles which prompt 
human action. The latter, which is the common applica- 
tion or phrase, is its psychological meaning. 



398 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PRINCIPIiES— 

When applied to human action psychologically, the word 
principle is used in the sense of the principle of dependence ; 
and to denote that the action depends upon the agent for 
its being produced. It may signify the dependence of 
causality^ that is, that the action depends for its production 
on the agent, as its efficient cause ; or it may signify the 
dependence of inherence^ that is, that the action depends 
for its production on some power or energy which inheres 
in the agent as its subject. Hence it has been said that a 
principle of action is twofold — -the principium qiiod^ and 
the principium quo. Thus, man as an active being, is the 
principium quod or efficient cause of an action being pro- 
duced ; his will, or the power by which he determines to 
act, is the principium quo. 

But the will itself is stimulated or moved to exert itself ; 
and in this view may be regarded as the principium quod^ 
while that which moves or stimulates it, may be regarded 
as the principium quo. Before we act, we deliberate, that 
is, we contemplate the action in its nature and conse- 
quences ; we then resolve or determine to do it or not to 
do it, and the performance or omission follows. Volition, 
then, or an exercise of will is the immediate antecedent of 
action. But the will is called into exercise by certain in- 
fluences which are brought to bear upon it. Some object 
of sense or of thought is contemplated. We are affected 
with pleasure or pain. Feelings of complacency or dis- 
placency, of liking or dislildng, of satisfaction or disgust, 
are awakened. Sentiments of approbation or disappro- 
bation are exp erienced. We pronounce some things to be 
good, and others to be evil, and feel corresponding inclin- 
ation or aversion ; and under the influence of these states 
and aflections of mind, the will is moved to activity. The 
forms which these feelings of pleasure or pain, of inclination 
or tendency, to or from an object, may assume, are many 
and various ; arising partly from the nature of the objects 
contemplated, and partly from the original constitution 
and acquired habits of the mind contemplating. But they 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. S09 

PRINCIPIiES— 

are all denominated, in a general way, principles of 
action, 
PRIVATION (aTi^mig^ privatio). — " A privation is tlie 
absence of what does naturally belong to the thing we are 
speaking of, or which ought to be present with it ; as when 
a man or a horse is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a physi- 
cian or a divine be unlearned, these are called privations-''^ 
— Watts, Logic ^ part 1, c. 2. 

Aristotle (MetapJiys.^ lib. v., cap. 22) says : — ''There is 
privation when a being wants some quality which is not 
natural to it — as when we say a plant wants eyes, or when 
the quality is natural to the being — as when we say a man 
is blind. There is also privation when a beiag has not 
yet attained to a quality which belongs to its nature — as 
when we say a puppy does not see. 

The principles of all natural bodies are matter and form. 
"To these Aristotle has added a third which he calls o-rg^- 
Yiffig or privation^ an addition that he has thought proper 
to make to the Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy, in 
order to give his system the appearance of novelty; but 
without any necessity, as I apprehend ; for it is not a cause, 
as he himself admits, such as matter and/b?'/?!, but is only 
that without which the first matter could not receive the 
impression of any/o7'm; for it must be clear of eyery form, 
which is what he calls privation, before it can admit of any. 

" Now, this is necessarily implied in the notion of matter ; 
for as it has the capacity of all /or???, so it has the privation 
of all form. In this way, Aristotle himself has explained 
the nature of matter (^Physic, lib. i., cap. 8). And Plato, 
in the Timceus, has very much insisted upon this quality of 
matter as absolutely necessary, in order to fit it to receive 
all forms ; and he illustrates his meaning by a comparison : 
— Those, says he, who make unguents or perfumes, prepare 
the liquid so, to which they are to give the perfume, that 
it may have no odour of its own. And, in like manner, 
those who take off an impression of anything upon any soft 
matter, clear that matter of every other impression, making 



400 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PKIVATION— 

it as smooth as possible, in order that it may better receive 
the figure or image intended. In like manner, he says, 
matter^ in order to receive the specieses of all things, must 
in itself have the species of nothing." — ^Llonboddo, Ancient 
Metapliys.^ book ii., chap. 2. YIqtlcq privation was defined — 
Negatio formcB in subjecto apto ad habendam talemformam. 
According to Plato, privation^ in the sense of limitation, 
imperfection, is the inherent condition of all finite existence, 
and the necessary cause of evil. — Leibnitz, after Augustin, 
Aquinas, and others, held similar views (Causa Dei^ sect. 
69, 72). Essais Sur la Bonte de Dieu^ 1, partie, sect. 
29, 31 ; 3, partie, sect. 378. 
PROBASliE: (jprohahilis^ proveable). — That which does not 
admit of demonstration and does not involve absurdity or 
contradiction, is probable or admits of proof. '' As demon- 
stration is the showing the agreement or disagreement of 
two ideas, by the intervention of one or more proofs, which 
have a constant, immutable, and visible connection one 
with another ; so probability is nothing but the appearance 
of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention 
of proofs, whose connection is not constant and immutable, 
or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for 
the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind 
to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than 

the contrary The entertainment the mind gives 

this sort of propositions, is called belief, assent, or opinion, 
which is admitting or receiving any proposition for true, 
upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to 
receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. 
And herein lies the difference between probability and cer- 
tainty^ faith and knowledge, that in all the parts of know- 
ledge there is intuition ; each immediate idea, each step, 
has its visible and certain connection ; in belief, not so. 
That which makes us believe, is something extraneous to 
the thing I believe ; something not evidently joined on 
both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement 
or disagreement of those ideas that are under consideration. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILC SOPHY. 401 

PROBABLE-^ 

'^The grounds of probability are first, the conformity of 
anything with our own knowledge, observation, and experi- 
ence. Second, the testimony of others, touching their 
observation and experience." — Locke, Essay on Hum. 
Understand.^ book iv., chap. 15. 

Keid, Intell. Powers., essay vii., chap. 3. 

^'The word probable,'' says Mr. Stewart (PMlosoph. of 
Hum, Mind., part 2, chap. 2, sect. 4), " does not imply 
any deficiency in the proof, but only marks the particular 
nature of that proof, as contradistinguished from another 
species of evidence. It is opposed not to what is certain, 
but to what admits of being demonstrated after the manner 
of the mathematicians. This differs widely from the mean- 
ing annexed to the same word in popular discourse ; 
according to which, whatever event is said to be probable, 
is understood to be expected with some degree of doubt. 
.... But although, in philosophical language, the 
epithet probable be applied to events which are acknow- 
ledged to be certain, it is also applied to events which 
are called probable by the vulgar. The philosophical 
meaning of the word, therefore, is more comprehensive than 
the popular ; the former denoting that particular species 
of evidence of which contingent truths admit ; the latter 
being confined to such degrees of this evidence as fall short 
of the highest. These different degrees of probability the 
philosopher considers as a series^ beginning with bare possi- 
bility, and terminating in that apprehended infallibility, 
with which the phrase moral certainty is synonymous. To 
this last term of the series, the word jjrobable is, in its ordi- 
nary acceptation, plainly inapplicable." 
PROBIiEl^ (7r()OiSXY}/iioc, from Trpo (loc^'Kiiv, proponere, to throw 
down, to put in question). — Any point attended wntli doubt 
or difficulty, any proposition which may be attacked or 
defended by probable arguments, may be called a problem. 
Every department of inquiry has questions, the answers to 
which are problematical. So that, according to the branch 
of knowledge to which they belong, problems may be called 



402 VOCABUL/.HY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

„PK©BIL.EM— 

Physical, Metaphysical, Logical, Moral, Matliematicai, 
Historical, Literary, &c. In his Topic, (lib. i., cap. 9), 
Aristotle distinguishes three classes,— the morale or practical 
which may influence our conduct ; as, whether pleasure is 
the chief good: the speculative or scientific^ which merely add 
to our knowledge ; as, whether the world is eternal : and the 
auxiliai^y^ or those questions which we seek to solve with a 
view to other questions. 

PROCURESS. — F. Perfectibility'. 

S»Ii0MISE and I»01.i:.I€ITATI©N. Promittimus rogati — 
pollicemur vitro. — K pollicitation is a spontaneous expression 
of our intention to do something in favour of another. It 
does not necessarily imply the presence of the party in 
reference to whom it is made ; and it does not confer upon 
him a right to exact its performance. But in so far as it 
has become known to him, and has awakened expectations 
of its being performed, we may be brought under a moral 
obligation to perform it, especially if its performance is seen 
to be highly beneficial to him, and in no way prejudicial to 
ourselves. 

A promise is made in consequence of a request preferred 
to us. It implies the presence of the party preferring the re- 
quest, or of some one for him, and confers upon him a perfect 
moral right to have it fulfilled, and brings us under a moral 
obligation to fulfil it. In order to constitute a promise^ 
three things are necessary. 1. The voluntary consent or 
intention of the promiser. 2. The expression or outward 
signification of that intention. 3. The acceptance of the 
promise by the party to whom it is made. 

A promise implies tv/o parties at least — the promiser and 
the promisee. A pact implies two or more. In this it 
agrees with a contract^ — q. v. 

It is a dictate of the law of nature, that promises should 
be fulfilled, — not because it is expedient to do so, but 
because it is right to do so. 

The various questions concerning the parties competent 
to give a valid promise^ the interpretation of the terms in 



VOaiBULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 403 

PRO:^IISE— 

Trhich it may be given, and the cases in whicli the obliga- 
tion to fulfil it may be relaxed or dissolved, belong to what 
maybe called the Casuistry of Ethics^ imd Natural Juris- 
prudence. — T". Contract. 

PROOF. — '-To conform our language more to common use. 
we ought to di\ide arguments into demonstrations, proofs. 
and probabilities. By proofs^ meaning such arguments 
from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition." 
— Hume, On the Understanding^ sect. 6, note. AVhately says 
that proving may be defined ''the assigning of a reason or 
argument for the support of a given proposition,** and it f er- 
ring ''the deduction of a conclusion from given premises. 
In the one case our conclusion is given, and we have to seek 
for arguments; in the other our premises are given^ and we 
have to seek for a conclusion. Proving may be compared 
to the act of putting away any article into the proper recep- 
tacle of goods of that description, wferring to that of 
bringing out the article when needed." — See Evidence. 
Inference. 

PROPERTi: may be distinguished from quality or attribute, 
and also from faculty. 

QuaHties are primary or secondary, essential or non- 
essential. The former are called attributes^ and the latter 
properties. Extension is the attribute of matter, taste and 
smell are properties of body. 

Faculty implies understanding and wiU. and so is appli- 
cable only to mind. AVe speak of the properties of bodies, 
but not of their faculties. Of mind we may say will is a 
faculty ov property : so that while alltaculties a.Ye properties, 
all properties are not faculties. 

PROPOSITION. — A judgment of the mind expressed in words 
is a proposition. 

''A pj'oposition, according to Aristotle, is a speech 
wherein one thing is aftirmed or denied of another. Hence 
it is easy to distmguish the thing afiii'med or denied, whicli 
is called the predicate^ from the thing of which it is athrmed 
or denied, which is Cvilled the subject; and these two are 



404 VOOABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PROPOSITION— 

called tlie terms of the proposition. Hence, likewise, It 
appears that propositions are either affirmative or negative ; 
and this is called their quality, 

" When the subject of Si propositioii is a general term, the 
predicate is affirmed or denied either of the whole, or of a 
part. Hence propositions are distinguished into universal 
and particular. '- All men are mortal,' is an universal pro- 
position. ' Some men are learned,' is a particular ; and this 
is called the quantity of a proposition."" — Reid, Account of 
Aristotle'' s Logic ^ chap. 2, sect. 6. 

As to relation — Propositions are distinguished as catego- 
rical^ hypothetical^ Sind figurative^ according as the relation 
between the predicate and the subject is that of phenomenon 
to substance, or of effect to cause, or that of reciprocal 
action between the two terms. 

In reference to modality^ — as viewed with regard to the 
validity of the connection between subject and predicate, 
according as it is barely possible^ or contingent^ or necessary., 
propositions have been so called ; or by Kant problematic, 
assertory, and apodeictic. 

^' Propositions are divided according to their matter into 
true and/aZ^e." — Port Roy. Log.., part 2, chap. 3. 

As to matter., propositions have also been distinguished 
into contingent and necessary^ according as the terms agree 
in part and disagree in part, or agree essentially and in- 
variably. — V. Judgment. 
PROPRIETY {to tt^sttou., that which is fit or congruous to 
the agent and the relations in which he is placed). — 
This, according to some, is that which characterizes an 
action as right, and an agent as virtuous "According to 
Plato, to Aristotle, and to Zeno, virtue consists in the 
propriety of conduct, or in the suitableness of the affection 
from which we act, to the object which excites it." 

Adam Smith {Theory of Moral Sentiments., part 7, lect. ii., 
chap. 1) treats of those systems which make virtue consist 
in propriety. 
PROPRIum (The) or Property is a predicable which denotes 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 405 

PROPRIUITI— 

something essentially conjoined to the essence of the species. 
— Whately, Logic^ book ii., chap. 5, sect. 3. 

Proprium is applied, — 1. To what belongs to some one 
but not to all, as to be a philosopher in respect of man. 2, 
To what belongs to a species, but not to it only, as black- 
ness in respect of a crow. 3. To what belongs to all of the 
species, and to that only, but not always, as to grow hoary 
in respect of man. 4. To what belongs to species, to all of 
it, to it only, and always, as laughter in respect of man. 
This last is truly the proprium. 'Quod speciei toti^ soli et 
semper convenit. — Derodon, Xo^., p. 37. 

'' There is a proprium which belongs to the ichole species, 
but not to the sole species, as sleeping belongs to man. 
There is a proprium which belongs to the sole species, but 
not to the whole species, as to be a magistrate. There is a 
proprium which belongs to the whole species, and to the 
sole species, but not always., as laughing ; and there is a 
proprium which always belongs to it, as to be risible, that 
is, to have the faculty of laughing. Can one forbear laugh- 
ing when he represents to himself these poor things, uttered 
with a mouth made venerable by a long beard, or repeated 
by a trembling and respectful disciple?" — Crousaz, Art of 
Thinking^ part 1, sect. 3, chap. 5. 
PROVERB. — "Not to detain the reader with any long dis- 
course concerning the nature, definition, and use of pi^overhs^ 
my notion of a proverb in brief is this ; a short sentence or 
phrase in common use, containing some trope, figure, 
homonymy, rhyme, or other novity of expression."— Eay, 
Preface to Proverbs. 

The Editor of the fourth edition of Ray's Proverbs says, 
''A Proverb is usually defined, an instructive sentence, or 
common and pithy saying, in which more is generally 
designed than expressed ; famous for its peculiarity and 
elegance, and therefore adopted by the learned as well as 
the vulgar, by which it is distinguished from counterfeits, 
which want such authority." 

Proverbs embody the current and practical })hiIosophy of 



406 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

an age or nation. Collections of tliem have been made 
from the earliest times. The book of Scripture called the 
Proverbs of Solomon, contains more than one collection. 
They have always been common in the East. Burckhardt 
made a collection of Arabian proverbs^ which was pub- 
lished at London in 1830. Seller published at Augsburgh, 
in 1816, The Wisdom of the Streets^ or, the Meaning arid 
Use of German Proverbs. Ray's Proverbs^ Allan Ramsay's 
Proverbs^ Henderson's Proverbs^ have been published among 
ourselves. 
F:KtJl>ENCE (prudentia^ contracted for prcevidentia^ foresight 
or forethought) — is one of the virtues which were called 
cardinal by the ancient ethical writers. It may be de- 
scribed as the habit of acting at all times v^rith deliberation 
and forethought. It is equally removed from rashness on 
the one hand, and timidity or irresolution on the other. 
It consists in choosing the best ends, and prosecuting them 
by the most suitable means. It is not only a virtue in 
itself, but necessary to give lustre to all the other virtues. 

''The rules of prudence in general, like the laws of the 
stone tables, are for the most part prohibitive. Thou 
shalt not is their characteristic formula : and it is an espe- 
cial part of Christian prudence that it should be so. Nor 
would it be difficult to bring under this head all the social 
obligations that arise out of the relations of the present 
life, which the sensual understanding (ro Q:'(}ovvi^oc Trig 
uccpy.og^ Rom. viii. 6) is of itself able to discover, and the 
performance of which, under favourable circumstances, the 
merest worldly self-interest, without love or faith, is suffi- 
cient to enforce ; but which Christian prudence enlivens by 
a higher principle and renders symbolic and sacramental 
(Ephes. V. 32)." 

'' Morality maybe compared to the consonant ; prudence 
to the vowel. The former cannot be uttered (reduced to 
practice) but by means of the latter. 

''The Platonic division of the duties of morality com - 
inences with the prudential or the habit of act and purpose 



VOCABFL-Un- OF PHILOSOPHY. 407 

proceeding ^-om eniiglitened self-interest (qui animi im- 
perio, corporis servitio, rerum auxilio, in proprium sui com- 
modiim et sibi pi*OA-idiis utitiir, hiinc esse pnidentem statiii- 
miis) ascends to the moral, that is, to the purifsing and 
remedial A-iitues ; and seeks its summit in the imitation of 
the diyine natrnv. In this last division, answering to that 
which we have called the spiritual, Plato includes all those 
inward acts and aspirati(His, waitings, and watchings, which 
have a growth in godHkeness tor their immediate purpose, 
and the union of the human soul with the supreme good as 
their ultimate object." — Coleridge, Aids to Be fleet ion, 

TOl. i., pp. 13, 21, '2'2. — V. AIORALITT. 

PSXCHlsm (from -if^vxit ^oul) — is the word chosen by Mons. 
Quesne (Lettres sur le PsycMsiiu, Svo, Paris, 1852) to 
denote the doctrine that there is a limd, ditfused through- 
out all nature, animating equally all K^^ng and organized 
beings, and that the diiFerence which appears in their 
^^ctions comes of their particidar organization. The Huid 
is general, the organization is individual. 

This opinion differs from that of Pythagoras, who held 
that the soul of a man passed individually into the body of 
a brute. He (Mons. Qnesae) holds that while the body 
dies the soul does not ; the organization peiishes, but not 
psv'chal or psychical liuid. 

I»!$XCllor,OOi: (y «/%«», the soul: A:yor. i^liseom-se). — Thenamv 
may be new, but the study is old. It is recommended in 
the saving ascribed to Socrates — Know thyself. The recom- 
mendation is renewed ui the Co^uto trgo sum of Descartes; 
and in the wi-itiags of Malebranche, Amaidd, Leibnitz, 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hiune, psychological inquiries held 
a prominent place. StiU further prominence was given to 
them by the followers of Kant and Reid, and }\<f/choIogy^ 
instead of being partially tivated as an introiluction to 
Logic, to Etliics, and to ^Metaphysics, which all rest on it, 
is now treated as a sepai*ate department ot* science. It is 
that knowledge of the mmd and its faculties which we 
derive from a cai\^ful examination of tlie facts of conscious- 



408 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

JPSYCMOIiOOY— 

ness. Life and the functions of our organized body belong 
to physiology ; and, although there is a close connection 
between soul and body, and mutual action and reaction 
between them, that is no reason why the two departments 
of inquiry should be confounded, unless to those who think 
the soul to be the product or result of bodily organization. 
Broussais said, he could not understand those philosophers 
who shut their eyes and their ears in order to hear them- 
selves think. But if the capacity of thinking be anterior 
to, and independent of, sense and bodily organs, then the 
soul which thinks and its faculties or power of thinking 
deserve a separate consideration. — V. Memoire, par 
Mons. Jouffroy, De la Legitimite et de la Distinction de la 
Psychologic et de la Physiologic (published in his Nouveaux 
Melanges^ and also in the 11th vol. of Memoires de VAcad. 
des Sciences Morales et Politiques). 

Mr. Stewart (Prelim. Diss, to Philosoph. Essays^ p. 24) 
objects to the use of the term psychology^ though it is sanc- 
tioned by Dr. Campbell and Dr. Beattie, as implying a 
hypothesis concerning the nature or essence of the sentient 
or thinking principle, altogether unconnected with our 
conclusions concerning its phenomena and general laws. 
The hypothesis implied is that the sentient or thinking 
principle is different in its nature or essence from matter. 
But this hypothesis is not altogether unconnected with its 
phenomena. On the contrary, it is on a difference of the 
phenomena which they present that we ground the dis- 
tinction between mind and matter. It is true that the 
reality of the distinction may be disputed. There are 
philosophers who maintain that there is but one substance — 
call it either matter or mind. And the question when 
pushed to this extremity cannot be solved by the human 
intellect. God only knows whether the two substances 
which we call matter and mind have not something which 
is common to both. But the phenomena which they 
exhibit are so different as to lead us to infer a difference 
in the cause. And all that is implied in using the term 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 409 

PSYCHOIiOOY— 

psychology is, that the phenomena of the sentient or think- 
ing principle are different from the phenomena of matter. 
And, notwithstanding the objection of Mr. Stewart, the 
term is now cm^ent, especially on the continent — to denote 
the science of the human mind as manifested by conscious- 
ness. 

Dr. Priestley at one time maintained the materiality of 
mind, and at another the spirituality of matter. The 
apostle speaks of a spiritual body. A body which is spirit 
sounds to us contradictory. 

Coleridge, in his Treatise upon Method^ employs the 
word psychological^ and apologizes for using an insolens 
verhum, '^ Goclenius is remarkable as the author of a 
work, the title of which is -ipuxo'^^oytoc (Marburg, 1590). 
This I think the first appearance of psychology^ under its 
own name in modern philosophy. Goclenius had, as a 
pupil. Otto Casmann, who wrote Psychologia Anthropo- 
logical sive animce humance doctrina (Hanau, 1594)." — 
Cousin, Hist, of Mod, Philosoph,^ translated by Wlight, 
sect. 10. 

Psychology has been divided into two parts — 1. The 
empirical^ having for its object the phenomena of con- 
sciousness and the faculties by which they are produced. 
2. The rational^ having for its object the nature or sub- 
stance of the soul, its spirituality, immutability, &c. 

Rational psychology^ which had been chiefly prosecuted 
before his day, was assailed by Kant, who maintained that 
apart from experience we can know nothing of the soul. 
But even admitting that psychology rests chiefly on obser- 
vation and experience, we cannot well separate bet^veen 
phenomena and their cause, nor consider the cause apart 
from the phenomena. There are, however, three things to 
which the psychologist may successively attend. 1. To the 
phenomena of consciousness. 2. To the faculties to which 
they may be referred. 3. To the Ego, that is, the soul or 
mind in its unity, individuality, and personality. These 
three things are inseparable ; and the consideration of 



410 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FSYCHOIiOC^-Y— 

tliem belongs to psychology. Subsidiary to it are inquiries 
concerning tlie mutual action and reaction of soul and 
body, the effect of organization, temperament, age, health, 
disease, country, climate, &c. 
l^emesius, De Natuy^a Hominis. 
Buchanan (David), Historia Animce Humance. 
Casmannus, Psychologia. 

Carus, History of Psychology^ 8vo, Leipsig, 1808, in 
German. 
PS'S'CIIOPANNYCMISM (^^^X^ soul; and ttxi^^ all; i^v^, night 
— the sleep of the soul)— is the doctrine, to which Luther, 
among divines, and Formey, among philosophers, were 
inclined —that at death the soul falls asleep and does not 
awake till the resurrection of the body. 
l»YltKHONiSM.- F. Academics, Scepticism. 



^UAWRiviuin.— F. Trivium. 

^lUAIilTY ('TTowc, 'TTQioTYig, qualis^ qualitas^ suchness) — is the 
difference which distinguishes substances. "Thus man is 
an animal who has such a quality— he is a biped; a horse 
is a quadruped. The circle is a figure which has a quality : 
it has no angles." — Arist., Metaphys.^ lib. v., cap. 14. 

"There may be substances devoid of quantity f such as 
the intellective and immaterial ; but that there should be 
substances devoid of quality^ is a thing hardly credible, 
because they could not then be characterized and distin- 
guished from one another." — Harris, Philosoph. Arrange,, 
chap. 8. 

" Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the im- 
mediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, 
that I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our 
mind I call the quality of the subject wherein that power 
is." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.., book ii., chap. 8, 
sect. 8. 

" We understand by a quality that which truly constitutes 
the nature of a thing— what it is — what belongs to it per- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 411 

4|UAr.ITY— 

manently, as an individual, or in common with others like 
it — not that which passes, which vanishes, and answers to 
no lastmg judgment. A body falls : it is a fact, an accident : 
it is hea^y, that is a quaUtij. Every fact, every accident, 
every phenomenon, supposes a quality by which it is pro- 
duced, or by which it is undergone : and reciprocally every 
quality of things which we know by experience manifests 
itself by certain modes or certain phenomena ; for it is pre- 
cisely in this way that things discover themselves to us." — 
Diet, des Sciences PMlosoph. 

Descartes (^Princip. Philosopli.^ par prima, sect. 56) says, 
— Et hie quidem per modos plane idem intelhgimus, quod 
alibi per attrihuta vel quaUtates. Sed cum consideramus 
substantiam ab iUis affici, vel variari, vocamus modos ; cum 
ab ista variatione talem posse denominare, vocamus quaUtates; 
ac denique, cum generalius spectamus tantum ea substantive 
inesse, vocamus attributa. Ideoque in Deo non proprie 
modos aut quaUtates sed attributa tantum esse dicimus, quia 
nulla in eo variatio est intelligenda. Et etiam in rebus 
creatis, ea quae nunquam in iis diverso modo se habent, ut 
existentia et duratio in re existente et dm'ante, non quaU- 
tates aut rnodi^ sed attributa dici debent." 

^'As qualities help to distinguish not only one soul from 
another soul, and one body from another body, but (in a 
more general way) every soid from every body, it follows 
that qualities^ by having this common reference to both, are 
naturally divided into corporeal and incorporeal.''^ — Harris, 
PJiilosoph. Arrange,^ chap. 8. 

Hutcheson also {Metaphys.^ part 1, cap. 5) reduces all 
qualities to two genera. Thought, — proper to mind. 
]\iotion, — proper to matter. 

Qualities are distinguished as essential^ or such as are 
inseparable from the substance — as thought from mind, or 
extension from matter ; and non-essential^ or such as we can 
separate in conception from the substance — as passionateness 
or mildness from mind, or heat or cold from matter. 

••A\'ith respect to all kinds of qualities^ there is one thuig 



412 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

to be observed, that some degree of permanence is always 
requisite ; else they are not so prpperly qualities as inciden- 
tal affections. Thus we call not a man passionate, because 
he has occasionally been angered, but because he is prone 
to frequent anger ; nor do we say a man is of a pallid or 
a ruddy complexion, because he is red by immediate exercise 
or pale by sudden fear, but when that paleness or redness 
may be called constitutional." — Harris, Philosoph, Arrange.^ 
chap. 8. 

On the question, historical and critical, as to the distinc- 
tion of the qualities of matter as primary or secondary, 
see ReifTs Works ^ by Sir W. Hamilton, note D. 

"Another division of qualities is into natural and acquired. 
Thus in the mind, docility may be called a natural quality; 
science an acquired one : in the human body, beauty may 
be called a natural qualty; gentility (good carriage) an 
acquired one. This distinction descends even to bodies 
inanimate. To transmit objects of vision is a quality natural 
to crystal ; but to enlarge them while transmitted, is a char- 
acter adventitious. Even the same quality may be natural 
in one substance, as attraction in the magnet ; and acquired 
in another, as the same attraction in the magnetic bar." — 
Harris, Philosoph. Arrange.^ chap. 8. 
Quality (Occuli). — "' It was usual with the Peripatetics, when 
the cause of any phenomenon was demanded, to have 
recourse to their faculties or occult qualities^ and to say, for 
instance, that bread nourished by its nutritive faculty 
(quality); and senna purged by its purgative." — Hume, 
Dial, on Nat. Relig.^ part 4. 

" Were I to make a division of the qualities of bodies as 
they appear to our senses, I would divide them first into 
those that are manifest., and those that are occult. The 
manifest qualities are those which Mr. Locke calls j9r^mar?/; 
such as Extension, Figure, Divisibility, Motion, Hardness, 
Softness, Fluidity. The nature of these is manifest even to 
sense ; and the business of the philosopher with regard to 
them is not to find out their nature, which is well known, 



VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 413 

Q UAI.it Y— 

but to discover the effects produced by their various com- 
binations ; and. with regard to those of them which are not 
essential to matter, to discover theii' causes as far as he 
is able. 

'•The second class consists of occult qualities^ which may 
be subdivided into various kinds ; as Jirst^ the secondary 
qualities; secondly, the disorders we feel in our own bodies; 
and thirdly, all the qualities Y^hich we call powers of bodies, 
whether mechanical, chemical, medical, animal, or vegetable : 
or if there be any other powers not comprehended under 
these heads. Of all these the existence is manifest to sense, 
but the nature is occult ; and here the philosopher has an 
ample held."' — Eeid, Intell. Powers^ essay ii., ch. 18. 
QiTA^fTlTX (jroaov^ quardum^ howmtich) — is defined by mathe- 
maticians to be '^that which admits of more or less." 

"Mathematics contain properly the doctrine of measure ; 
and the object of this science is commonly said to be quantity : 
therefore, quantity ought to be defined, what may be mea- 
sured. Those who have defined quantity to be whatever 
is capable of more or less^ have given too wide a notion of 
it, which, it is apprehended, has led some persons to apply 
mathematical reasoning to subjects that do not admit of it. 
Pain and pleasiu^e admit of various degrees, but who can 
pretend to measiu'e them.'' — Eeid. Essay on Quantity. 

••According to the common definition, quantity is that 
which is susceptible of augmentation or diminution. But 
many things susceptible of augmentation or diminution, and 
that even in a cominuous manner, are not quantities. A 
sensation, painliil or pleasing, augments or diminishes, and 
rims through different phases of intensity. But there is 
nothing in common between a sensation and quantity.'^ — 
Diet, des Sciences PhUosoph. 

According to Aristotle (Metaphys.^ lib. v., cap. 13), by 
quantity we understand what is divisible into constitutive 
elements, of which one or other, or each, has unity and of 
its own natiu-e a proper existence. Plurality is quantity 
which can be counted ; magnitude can be measured. You 



414 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

QUANTITY— 

call that plurality wMch can be divided into parts not 
continuous ; magnitude^ that which can be divided into 
parts continuous. Continuous magnitude in one sense 
is lengthy in another breadth^ and in a third depth. Plu- 
rality finite is number ; finite length is a line. Deter- 
minate breadth is a plane^ determinate depth, a body. 
Finally, things are quantities in themselves, others acci- 
dentally. 

Of things which are quantities in themselves, some are 
so by their essence ; as, for example, a line, for quantity 
enters into the definition of a line ; others are but modes 
or states of quantify ; as much or little, long and short, 

&c Quantity^ taken accidentally, means white, 

musician, in so far as they are found in beings having 
quantity. Motion and time are called quantities in another 
sense. We say they are qiiantities^ that they are contin- 
uous, because of the divisibility of the beings of which 
they are the modifications — divisibility, not of the being 
in motion, but of the being to which motion is applied. 
It is because this being has quantity^ that there is also 
quantity in the movement ; and time is but one quantity^ 
because it has only one movement. 

" There are some quantities which may be called j>rqper, 

and others improper That properly is quantity 

which is 7neasured by its own kind ; or which, of its own 
nature, is capable of being doubled or tripled, without 
taking in any quantity of a different kind as a measure of 
it. Improper quantity is that which cannot be measured by 
its own kind ; but to which we assign a measure by the 
means of some proper quantity^ that is related to it. Thus 
velocity of motion, when we consider it by itself, cannot 
be measured." We measure it by the space passed in a 
given time. — E,eid, Essay on Quantity. 

"The reason why quantity^ whether continuous or discrete, 
though it be but an accident or property of substance, is a 
subject of science, is, that each kind of it furnishes a stan- 
dard or measure for itself. Thus extension^ which is quan- 



VOCABULAr.Y OF PHILOSOPHY. 4:15 

QUANTITY— 

tity continuous, can be measured by any part of itself ; and, 
in like manner, number^ which is quantity discrete, can be 
measured by number or by unit; whereas qualities^ such as 
hot and cold^ black and white^ hard and soft ^ &c., have no 
common measure, and therefore cannot be scientifically 
compared together; for which reason, as Aristotle has 
observed in the chap, of his Categories concerning quahty, 
it is only of quantity that we say. That it is equal or unequal, 
whereas, to qualities we can only apply the terms more or 
less. For the same reason, he might have said, there can 
be no ratios or proportions of qualities ; for we cannot 
say of them, as we can say of quantities, that the one is a 
half or a third of the other." — ]Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys.^ 
book ii., chap. 26, note. 
Quantity (Discrete and Continuous). — " In magnitude and 
multitude we behold the two primary, the two grand and 
comprehensive species, into which the genus of quantity is 
divided ; magnitude, from its union, being called quantity 
continuous ; multitude, from its separation, quantity dis- 
crete. Of the continuous kind is every solid ; also the bound 
of every sohd, that is, a superficies ; and the bound of 
every superficies, that is, a line ; to which may be added 
those two concomitants of every body, namely, time and 
place. Of the discrete kind are fleets and armies, herds, 
flocks, the syllables of sounds articulate, &c." — Hams, 
Philosoph. Arrange.^ chap. 9. 

^' Discrete quantity is that of which the parts have no 
continuity, as in number. The number, e. g.^ of inches 
in a foot rule, is the same whether the solid inches remain 
continuous, or are cut asunder and flimg about the world ; 
but they do not constitute a foot length (which is a con- 
tinuous quantity)^ unless they are so joined together that 
the bounding lines of one coincide with those of another. 
Of continuous quantities there are two kinds ; one, of which 
the parts are co-existent, as in extension ; another, in which 
the parts are successive, as In duration. Discrete and con- 
tinuous quantities are sometimes called niuUitude and magni- 



416 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

QUAIVTITY— 

tudey — Fitzgerald, Notes to Aristotle's Ethics^ 8vo, Dublin, 
1850, p. 151.— See Aristotle in Categor.^ c. 6. 

According to Derodon (JPhys,^ pars 1, cap. 5), quantity 
is either — 1. Permanent^ when its parts are together ; or 
2. Successive^ when they exist some after others. Time 
and motion are quantity successive. Permanent quantity 
is — 1. Continuous^ as a /me which is length — superficies^ 
which is length and breadth, and mathematical hody^ which 
is length, breadth, and depth ; 2. Discrete^ as number and 
speec?t. 

Hutcheson notices magnitude, time, and number, as 
three genera of quantity. — Metaphys.^ part 1, cap. 5. 

Quantity is called discrete when the parts are not con- 
nected, as number ; continuous^ when they are connected, 
and then it is either successive^ as time, motion ; or per- 
manent^ which is what is otherwise called space or exten- 
sion, in length, breadth, and depth ; length alone consti- 
tutes lines ; length and breadth, surfaces ; and the three 
together, solids. — Port Roy. Logic, part 1, ch. 2. 

QtJII>l>ITY or QUII>ITir (quiditas^ from quid^ what). — This 
term was employed in scholastic philosophy as equivalent 
to the TO Ti 7}u uuoci of Aristotle, and denotes what was 
subsequently called the substantial form. It is the answer 
to the question. What is it ? quid est f It is that which 
distinguishes a thing from other things, and makes it what it 
is and not another. It is synonymous with essence, and com- 
prehends both the substance and qualities. For quahties 
belong to substance, and by qualities substance manifests 
itself. It is the known essence of a thing ; or the comple- 
ment of all that makes us conceive of anything as we con- 
ceive of it, as different from any or every other thing. 

QUIETISITI (quies^ rest) — '4s the doctrine that the highest 
character of virtue consists in the perpetual contemplation 
and love of supreme excellence." — Sumner, Records of Cre- 
ation^ vol. ii., p. 239. 

The two following propositions from Fenelon's Maxims 
of the Saints^ were condemned by Innocent XII. in 1699. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 417 

QUIETISI^— 

1. There is attainable in this life a state of perfection ui 
which the expectation of reward, and the fear of punish- 
ment have no place. 2. Souls may be so inflamed with 
love to God, and so resigned to his will, that if they believed 
that God had condemned them to eternal pain, they would 
absolutely sacrifice their salvation. 

Madame Guyon thought she had learned a method by 
which souls might be carried to such a state of perfection 
that a continual act of contemplation and love might be 
substituted for all other acts of religion. 

A controversy was carried on by Fenelon and Bossuet on 
the subject. See a dissertation by M. Bonnel, De la Con- 
troverse de Bossuet et Fenelon^ sur le Quietisme, 8vo, Macon. 
1850. 

Upham, Life of Madame Guyon, 



RACE— F. Species. 

RATIO. — When two subjects admit of comparison with 
reference to some quality which they possess in common, 
and which may be measured, this measure is their ratio^ or 
the rate in which the one exceeds the other. With this 
term is connected that of proportion^ which denotes the 
portions^ or parts of one magnitude which are contained in 
another. In mathematics, the term ratio is used for pro- 
portion ; thus, instead of the proportion which one thing 
bears to another, we say, the ratio which one bears to the 
other, meaning its comparative magnitude. 

In the following passage ratio is used for reason or cause. 
''In this consists the ratio and essential ground of the 
gospel doctrine." — Waterland, Works^ vol. ix., serm. 1. — 
V. Eeason. 

RATIOCINATION. — ''The conjunction of images mth aflir- 
mations and negations, which make up propositions, and the 
conjunction of propositions one to another, and illation of 
conclusions upon them, is ratiocination or discourse. 

" Some consecutions are so intimately and evidently cou- 
2e 



418 TOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

RATIOCIWATION— 

nexed to, or found in, the premises, tlaat tlie conclusion is 
attained quasi per saltum^ and without anything of ratio- 
cinative process, and as the eye sees its objects immediately 
and without any previous discourse." — Hale, Origin, of 
Mankind, pp. 50, 51. 

'^The schoolmen make a third act of the mind which 
they call ratiocination, and we may style it the genera- 
tion of a judgment from others actually in our under- 
standing.'^ — Tucker, Light of Nature, vol. i., part 1, c. 11, 
sect. 13. 

'^When from a general proposition, by combining it 
with other propositions, we infer a proposition of the same 
degree of generality with itself, or a less general proposi- 
tion, or a proposition merely individual, the process is 
ratiocination (or syllogism)." — Mill, Log., 2d edit,, vol. i., 
p. 223.— F. Kea^oning. 
MATIONAliE. — -"The chairs of theology and philosophy (dur- 
ing the scholastic ages), were the oracular seats, from which 
the doctrines of Aristotle were expounded, as the rationale 
of theological and moral truth." — Hampden, On Scholastic 
Philosophy, lect. i,, p. 9. 

^^ There cannot be a body of rules mthout a rationale^ 
and this rationale constitutes the science. There were 
poets before there were rules of poetical composition ; but 
before Aristotle, or Horace, or Boileau, or Pope could 
write their arts of poetry and criticism, they had considered 
the reasons on which their precepts rested, they had con- 
ceived in their own minds a theory of the art. In like 
manner there were navigators before there was an art of 
navigation ; but before the art of navigation could teach 
the methods of finding the ship's place by observations of 
the heavenly bodies, the science of astronomy must have 
explained the system of the world." — Sir Gr. Cornewall 
Lewis, Method of Observat, in Politics, chap. 19, sect. 2. 

Anthony Sparrow, bishop of Exeter, is the author of a 
work entitled, A Rationale upon the Book of Common Prayer, 
12mo, Lond., 1668. — V. Science, Akt. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 419 

RATIONAIilSin, in philosophy, is opposed to sensualism^ 
sensuism^ or sensism^ according to all which, all our know- 
ledge is derived from sense. It is also opposed to empiri- 
cism^ which refers all our knowledge to sensation, and 
reflection, or experience. According to rationalism^ reason 
furnishes certain elements, without which, experience is not 
possible. The philosophy of Condillac is of the former 
kind, — that of Roger Collard of the latter. The philosophy 
of Locke and Reid have been contrasted in the same manner, 
but not quite correctly. — V. Sensism, Sensuism, Sen- 
sualism. 
Rationalism, in religion, as opposed to supernaturalism^ 
means the adoption of reason as our sufficient and only 
guide, exclusive of tradition and revelation. Spinoza, in 
his Tractatus Tlieologico-PoliticuSy tried to explain all that 
is supernatural in religion by reason. And Strauss and 
others in modern Germany have carried this line of specu- 
lation much farther. 

RATIONAlilSTS. — "The empmcaZ philosophers are like pis- 
mires ; they only lay up and use then- store. The rational- 
ists are like the spiders ; they spin all out of their own 
bowels. But give me a philosopher, who, like the bee, 
hath a middle faculty, gathering from abroad, but digesting 
that which is gathered by his own virtue." — Bacon, 
Apoplitliegms, 

RHAIi (Tiie). — " There is no arguing from ideal to real exis- 
tence, unless it could first be shown, that such ideas must 
have their objective realities^ and cannot be accounted for, 
as they pass within, except it be by supposing such and such 
real existences, ad extra^ to answer them." — Waterland, 
Works ^ vol. iv., p. 435. 
The term real always imports the existent. It is used — 

1. As denoting the existent^ as opposed to the non-exis- 
tent, something, as opposed to nothing. 

2. As opposed to the nominal or verbal, the thing to 
the name. 

3. As synonymous with actual, and thus opposed — 1. 
To potential, and 2. To possible, existence. 



420 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

REAIi— 

4. As denoting tlie absolute in opposition to the pheno- 
menal^ things in themselves in opposition to things as they 
appear to us, relatively to our faculties. 

5. As indicating a subsistence in nature in opposition to 
a representation in thought, ens reale as opposed to ens 
rationis. 

6. As opposed to logical or rational^ a thing which in 
itself or really^ re, is one, may logically, ratione^ be con- 
sidered as diverse or plural, and vice versa. — Sir William 
Hamilton, ReicTs WorJcs^ note 13. — F. Virtual. 

HEAI^ISM, as opposed to idealism^ is the doctrine that in per- 
ception there is an immediate or intuitive cognition of the 
external object, while according to idealism our knowledge 
of an external world is mediate and representative, i. e., 
by means of ideas. — F. Idea and Idealism. — Sir Will. 
Hamilton, Reid^s Works ^ note C. 
Edin. Rev., vol. lii., pp. 175-181. 
Realism, as opposed to nojuinalism, is the doctrine that 
genus and species are 7'eal things, existing independently of 
our conceptions and expressions ; and that as in the case 
of singular terms, there is some real individual corre- 
sponding to each, so, in common terms also, there is some- 
thing corresponding to each ; which is the object of our 
thoughts, when we employ the term." — Whately, Logic j 
book iv., ch. 5, sect. 1. 

Cousin has said that the Middle Age is but a development 
of a phrase of Porphj^ry; which has been thus translated 
by Boethius — Mox de generibus et speciebus illud quidem 
sive subsistant, sive in solis nudis intellectibus posita sint, 
sive subsistantia corporalia sint an incorporalia, et utrum 
j separata a sensibihbus an in sensibilibus posita et citra 
j hgec consistentia, dicere recusabo. — F. Conceptualism, 

ISTOMINALISM. 

KEASON (Ratio, ratus, from reor, I think). — ''The word 
reason in the English language has difierent significations : 
sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles, some- 
times for clear and fair deductions from these principles 



VOCABULATir OF PHILOSOPHY. 421 

KEASON— 

and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final 
cause. But the consideration I shall have of it here is 
in a signification different from all these ; and that is, as it 
stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is 
supposed to be distinguished from beasts,* and wherein it 
is evident he much surpasses them." — Locke, Essay on 
Hum. Understand.^ book iv., chap. 17. 

"All the operations of the mind v/hen it thinks of the 
qualities of things separately from the things to which they 
belong ; or when it forms general notions, and employs 
general terms ; or when it judges of the agreement or dis- 
agreement of different things ; or when it draws inferences ; 
are comprehended under the term reason. Reason seems 
chiefly to consist in the power to keep such or such 
thoughts in the mind ; and to change them at pleasure ; 
instead of their flowing through the mind as in dreams ; 
also in the power to see the difference between one thought 
and another, and so compare, separate, or join them to- 
gether afresh. Though animals seem to have some little 
power to perform these operations, man has so much more 
of it, that he alone is said to be endowed with reason.''"' — 
Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

''This word is used to signify — 1. All the intellectual 
powers collectively. 2. Those intellectual powers exclusively 
in which man differs from brutes. 3. The faculty of carry- 
ing on the operation of reasoning. 4. The premiss or pre- 
mises of an argument, especially the minor premiss ; and 
it is from reason in this sense that the word reasoning is 
derived. 5. A cause, as when we say that the reason of an 
eclipse of the sun is,t that the moon is interposed between 
it and the earth." — Whately, Logic ^ appendix i. 

* La Raison, dans sa definition la plus simple, est la faculte do comprendre, 
qui'l ne faut pas a confondre avec la faculte de connaitre. En eifet les animanx 
connaissent, ils ne paraissent pas comprendre, et c'est la qui les distingue de 
riiomme.— Jouffroy, Droit. Nat, torn, i., p. 38. 

t Tlie idea of the reason is higher than that of cause. The ground or reason of 
all existence, actual or possible, is the existence of God. Had He not existed, 
nothing could ever have existed. But God is the cause only of sucli tilings as He 
has created in time; while he is the ground or reason of everything possible. 



^1 



422 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

REASON-. 

''In common and popular discourse, reason denotes that 
power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, and 
right from wrong ; and by which we are enabled to com- 
bine means for the attainment of particular ends." — 
Stewart, Philosopli. of Hum. Mind, vol. ii., chap. 1. 

" Reason is used sometimes to express the whole of those 
powers which elevate man above the brutes, and constitute 
his rational nature, more especially, perhaps, his intellec- 
tual powers ; sometimes to express the power of deduction 
or argumentation." — Stewart, Outlines^ part 2, c. 1, sect. 6. 
Considering it as a word denoting a faculty or complement 
of faculties. Sir W. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ note A, sect. 
5, says, '' Reason has been employed to denote 

''1. Our intelligent nature in general, as distinguished 
from the lower cognitive faculties, as sense, imagination, 
and memory ; and in contrast to the feelings and desires, 
including — 1. Conception; 2. Judgment; 3. Eeasoning ; 
4. Intelligence ; i^ovg. 

'' 2. The right and regular use of our rational faculties. 
''3. The dianoetic and noetic functions oi reason^ as by 
Reid, Intell. Powers^ essay vi., chap. 2. 

''4. The dianoetic function or ratiocination, as by Reid in 
his Inquiry^ introd., sect. 3, chap. 2, sect. 5 and 7. 

''5. The noetic function or common sense. And by Kant 
and others opposed to the understanding as comprehending 
the other functions of thought." 
Reason (Spontaneity of). — "I call spontaneity of reason^ the 
development of reason anterior to reflection, the power 
which reason has to seize at first upon truth, to compre- 
hend it and to admit it, without demanding and rendering 
to itself an account of it." — Cousin, Hist, of Mod. Philosoph., 
vol. i., p. 113. 
Reason and llnderstanding — " Pure reason or intuition 
holds a similar relation to the understanding that percep- 
tion holds to sensation. As sensation reveals only suhjec- 
tive facts, while perception involves a direct intuition of 
the objective world around us ; so with regard to higher 



VOCABULARY Or PKILOSOPIlY. 4:^:.) 

REASOX— 

truths and laws, the understanding furnishes merely the 
subjective forms, in which they may be logically stated, 
while intuition brings us face to face with the actual 
matter, or reality of truth itself."' — Morell, Pldlnsopli. of 
Relig., p. 19. 

*'The faculty of thought manifests itself both as under- 
standing and reason. By the understanding we inquh'e 
after and investigate the grounds, causes, and conditions 
of our representations, feelings, and desires, and of those 
objects standing in immediate connection with them ; by 
reason we inquire after ultimate grounds, causes, and con- 
ditions. By the understanding we evolve rules for the regu- 
lation of our desiring faculty; by reason we subordinate 
these rules to a higher law, to a law which determines the 
unconditioned form, the highest end of acting. Through 
the power of thought, therefore, our knowledge, both theo- 
retical and practical, is comprehended in unity, connection, 
and in being..'' — Tenneman, Grundriss^ sect. 41. 

^'By the understanding^ I mean the faculty of thinking and 
forming judgments on the notices furnished by the sense, 
according to certain rules existing in itself, which rules 
constitute its distmct nature. By the pure reason^ I mean 
the power by which we become possessed of principles (the 
eternal verities of Plato and Descartes) and of ideas 
(w, &., not images) as the ideas of a point, a line, a circle, in 
mathematics : and of justice, holiness, free-will, &c., in 
morals. Hence in works of pure science, the definitions of 
necessity precede the reasoning ; in other w^orks they more 
aptly form the conclusion." — Coleridge, Friend^ pp. 150, 
151.' 

"The definition and proper character of man — that, 
namely, which should contradistinguish him from other 
animals, is to be taken from his reason rather than his 
understanding ; in regard that in other creatures there 
may be something of understanding^ but there is nothing 
of reason."' — Harrington, quoted in Aids to Rejiection^ vol 
L, p. 162. 



424: VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

REASON— 

In the plillosopliy of Kant tlie understanding is distin- 
guished from the reason- — 

1. By the sphere of their action. The sphere of the 
7mder standing is coincident with the sensible world and 
cannot transcend it ; but the reason ascends to the snper- 
sensuoiis. 

2. By the ohjects and results of their exercise. The 
understanding deals with conceptions^ the reason with ideas. 
The knowledge obtained by the understanding is particular 
and contingent, the product of the reason is necessary and 
universal knowledge or truth. 

Criticism of Pure Reason^ see English translat., pp. 7, 20, 
57, 268, 7, 277, Prolegomena^ sect. 59. See also Morell, 
Philosophy of Belig.^ chap. 2 ; and Pkilosoph. Tendencies j 
p. 71. 

Coleridge, Aids to Reflection. 

''The faculty which combines the simple perceptions, 
and so gives the knowledge of the complex objects, has 
been called the under standiiig. It is an energy of the 
mind as intelligent. It is an ultimate fact of knowledge, 
that the mind is conscious of itself as unity, of the world as 
diversity. The outward world is seen as diverse through 
the various sensations, but is bound in certain relations — 
those of space — which are independent of the perceiving 
subject. The mind requires a cause external to itself, of 
the constant representation of unity in diversity, no less 
than of the representation of different qualities. The 
reason^ therefore, in virtue of its causal principle refers 
these relations to the object. Precisely as the intelligence 
refers the single perception to an external cause, so it refers 
the combination of perceptions to one object. The under- 
standing is thus the same faculty with the reason^ but in 
certain particular applications." — R. A. Thompson, Chris- 
tian Theism^ book i., chap. 3. 

" The assertion of a faculty of the mind by which it appre- 
hends truth, which faculty is higher than the discursive 
reason^ as the truth apprehended by it is higher than mere 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 425 

REASON— 

demonstrative truth, agrees witb the doctrine tanght and 
insisted on by the Lite Samuel Taylor Coleridge. And so 
far as he was the means of inculcating this doctrine, which 
is the doctrine of Plato, and I might add, of Aristotle, and 
of many other philosophers, let him have due honour. 
But in his desu'e to impress the doctrine upon men's minds, 
he combined it with several other tenets, which will not 
bear examination. He held that the two faculties by 
which these two kinds of truth are apprehended, and which 
our philosophical writers call the intuitive reason ^ and the 
discursive reason^ may be called, and ought to be called 
respectively, the reason and the understanding ; and that 
the second of these is of the nature of the instinct of ani- 
mals, so as to be something intermediate between reason 
and instinct. These opinions, I may venture to say, are 
altogether erroneous. The intuitive reason and the dis- 
cursive reason are not, by any English writers, called the 
reason and the understanding ; and accordingly, Coleridge 
has had to alter all the passages, \iz., those taken from 
Leighton, Harrington, and Bacon, from which his exposi- 
tion proceeds. The understanding is so far from being 
especially the discursive or reasoning faculty, that it is, in 
universal usage, and by our best writers, opposed to the 
discursive or reasoning faculty. Thus this is expressly 
declared by Sir John Davies in his poem '- On the Immor- 
tality of the Sold.' He says of the soul : — 

' When she rates thinc^s, and moves from ground to ground, 
The name of reason {ratio) she acquires from this ; 
But Avhen hy reason she the truth hath found, 
And standeth fixt, she understanding is,- 

*^ Instead of the reason being fixed, and the understanding 
discursive, as ]Mr. Coleridge says, the reason is distinctively 
discursive ; that is, it obtains conclusions by running from 
one point to another. This is what is meant by discursus ; 
or, taking the full term, discursus ration is^ discourse of 
reason. Understanding is fixed, that is, it dwells upon one 
\aew of a subject, and not upon the steps by which that. 



426 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

REASON— 

view is obtained. The verb to reason^ implies the sub- 
stantive, tbe reason, though it is not co- extensive with it ; 
for, as I have said, there is the intuitive reason as well as 
the discursive reason. But it is by the faculty of reason 
that we are capable of reasoning ; though undoubtedly the 
practice or the pretence of reasoning may be carried so far 
as to seem at variance with reason in the more familiar 
sense of the term ; as is the case also in French. Moliere's 
Crisale says (in the Femmes Savantes) — 

* Raisonner est Vemploi de toute ma maison 
Et le raisonnement en l)annit la Ruison.' 

"If Mr. Coleridge's assertion were true, that the under- 
standing is the discursive and the reason the fixed faculty, 
we should be justified in saying that the understanding is 
the faculty by which we reason., and the reason is the faculty 
by which we understand. But this is not so. . . . 

'•'' Mr. Coleridge's object in his speculations is nearly the 
same as Plato's, viz., to declare that there is a truth of a 
higher kind than can be obtained by mere reasoning ; and 
also to claim, as portions of this higher truth, certain funda- 
mental doctrines of morality. Among these, Mr. Coleridge 
places the authority of conscience, and Plato, the supreme 
good. Mr. Coleridge also holds, as Plato held, that the 
reason of man in its highest and most comprehensive form, 
is a portion of a supreme and universal reason ; and leads 
to truth, not in virtue of its special attributes in each 
person, but by its own nature. 

" The view thus given of that higher kind of knowledge 
which Plato and Aristotle place above ordinary science, as 
being the knowledge of and faculty of learning first prin- 
ciples, will enable us to explain some expressions which 
might otherwise be misunderstood. Socrates, in the con- 
cluding part of the Sixth Book of the Republic, says, that 
this kind of knowledge is 'that of which the reason (T^oyog) 
takes hold,* in virtue of its power of reasoning.'' Here we 

* 77] 7011 ^loiXsyiirdoct ^uvccfjcu. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 



427 



REASON— 

are plainly not to understand tliat we arrive at first prin- 
ciples by reasoning ; for the very opposite is true, and is here 
taught, viz., that first principles are not Tvhat we reason to^ 
but what we reason from. The meaning of this passage 
plainly is, that first principles are those of which the reason 
takes hold in virUie of its power of reasoning ; they are the 
conditions which must exist in order to make any reasoning 
possible ; they are the propositions which the reason must 
involve implicitly, in order that we may reason explicitly ; 
they are the intuitive roots of the dialectical power. 
' ' Plato's views mav be thus exhibited : — 





Intelligible World, yc^rcv. 


Visible World, ooccrov. 


i 

Object, .. 


Ideas. 


Conceptions. 


Thinjrs. 


Images. 


Process, .. 


Intuition. 


Demonstration. 


Belief. 

rio-ris. 


Conjecture, i 


Faculties, . 


Intuitive 
Eeason. 


Discursive 
Reason 
?.oyoc. 


Sensation. 



From a paper by Dr. Whewell, On tlie Intellectual 
Powers according to Flato^ in the Cambridge Pliilosoph, 
Trans. ^ 1855. — V, Understanding. 
Reason (Impersonal). — Reason^ according to Cousin and 
other French philosophers, is the faculty by which we have 
knowledge of the infinite and the absolute, and is imper- 
sonal. 

'* Licet enim intellectus mens sit individuus et separatus ab 
intellectu tuo, tamen secundum quod est individuus non 
habet universale in ipso, et ideo non individuatur id quod 
est in intellectu ... Sic igitur universale ut universale est 
ubique et semper idem omnmo et idem in animabus omnium, 
non recipiens individuationem ab anima." 

These words are quoted from AveiThcies, by ]\Ions. Hau- 
reau, in his Examen de la Philosopli. Scolastique, torn. i.,p. 09, 



428 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

MEASON— 

who exclaims, " Yoila la these de I'mtelligence ou de la 
raison impersonelle T^ But the truth is, that the root and 
germ of this doctrine may be found in the doctrine of Plato, 
that human reason is a ray of the divine reason, 

"He, the great Father! kindled at one flame 

The world as rational— one spirit pour'd 

From spirit's awfal fountain, poured himself 

Through all their souls, but not in equal stream : 

Profuse or frugal of the inspiring God, 

As his wise plan demanded ; and when past 

Their various trials in their commcm spheres 

(If they continue rational as made) 

Resqrhs them all into himself again, 

His throne their centre, and his smile their crown." — Young. 

"In truth," observes Fenelon, "my reason is in myself, for 
it is necessary that I should continually turn inward upon 
myself in order to find it ; but the higher reason which 
corrects me when I need it, and which I consult, is not my 
own, it does not specially make a part of myself. Thus, 
that which may seem most our own, and to be the founda- 
tion of our being, I mean our reason^ is that which we are 
to believe most borrowed. We receive at every moment a 
reason superior to our own, just as we breathe an air which 
is not ourselves. There is an internal school, where man 
receives what he can neither acquire outwardly for himself, 
nor learn of other men who live by alms like himself." — 
Existence of God^ chap, iv., sect. 3. 

"While we reflect on our own idea of reason^ we know 
that our souls are not it, but only partake of it ; and that 
we have it x,oiToc ^g^gj/z/, and not koctsc ovgiyiu. ISTeither can 
it be called a faculty, but far rather a light, which we enjoy, 
but the source of which is not in ourselves, nor rightly by 
any individual to be denominated miney — John Smith, 
Posthumous Tracts, 1660. 

See Coleridge, Liter, Rem.^ vol. iii., p. 464. 

" Reason is impersonal in its nature," says Cousin 
(Exposit. of Eclecticism^ translated by Ripley, p. 69), "it 
is not we who make it. It is so far from being individual, 
that its peculiar characteristics are the opposite of indivi- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 429 

REASON— 

duality, viz., universality and necessity ; since it is to reason 
that we owe tlie knowledge of universal and necessary 
truths, of principles which we all obey and cannot but 
obey."" .... " It descends from God and approaches man ; 
it makes its appearance in the consciousness as a guest who 
brings intelligence of an unknown world, of which it at once 
presents the idea and awakens the want. If reason were 
personal it would have no value, no authority beyond the 
limits of the individual subject Reason is a revela- 
tion, a necessary and universal revelation which is wanting 
to no man, and which enlightens every man on his coming 
into the world. Reason is the necessary mediator between 
God and man, the T^oyog of Pythagoras and Plato, tlie 
Word made flesh, which serves as the interpreter of God, 
and the teacher of man, divine and human at the same 
time. It is not, indeed, the absolute God in his majestic 
individuality, but his manifestation in spirit and in truth : 
it is not the Being of beings, but it is the revealed God of 
the human race." — Ibid, p. 79. 

'' Reason or intelligence is not individual, is not ours, is 
not even human ; it is absolute, it is divine. What is personal 
to us is our free and voluntary activity ; what is not fi^ee 
and not voluntary is adventitious to man, and does not 
constitute an integrant part of his individuality. Intelli- 
gence is conversant with truth ; truth as necessary and 
universal is not the creature of my volition ; and reason^ 
which, as the subject of truth is also universal and neces- 
sary, is consequently impersonal. We see, therefore, by a 
light which is not ours ; and reason is a revelation of God in 
man. The ideas of which we are conscious belong not to 
us, but to absolute intelligence." — Sir Will. Hamilton, Bi.^- 
cussions^ &c., 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 8, giving the vie^vs of 
Cousin. 

This doctrine of the impersonal reason is regarded by 
BouiUier (Theorie de la Raison Impersonelle^ 8vo, Paris, 
1846) and others as the true ground of all certainty. 
Admit the personality of reason and man becomes the 



430 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

REASON— 

measure of all tMngs — truth is individual. But the truths 
of reason are universal. No one, says Malebranche, can 
feel the pain which I feel ; but any one or every one may 
contemplate the truth which I know. The scepticism of 
Kant as to the relative nature of knowledge is thus demo- 
lished. 
Reason (determining or Sufficient). — "There are two great 
principles of reasoning : the one is the principle of contra- 
diction^ which means that of two contradictory propositions, 
the one is true, the other false : the other is the principle of 
raison deter mi nante^ which is, that nothing happens without 
a cause, or at least a reason determining, that is, some- 
thing which may serve to render a reason a priori^ why that 
thing is as it is rather than otherwise." — Leibnitz, Theodicee^ 
partie 1, sect. 44. 

**Xothing is done without a sufficient rea.s'0?2, that is, nothing 
happens without its being possible to him who knew things 
sufficiently to render a reason which is sufficient to deter- 
mine why it is so, and not otherwise." — Leibnitz, Principes 
de la Nat. et de la Grace^ sect. 7. — V. Sufficie:nt Reasois". 
REASONINO, — "in one of its acceptations, means syllogising, 
or the mode of inference which may be called concluding 
from generals to particulars. In another of its senses, to 
reason is simply to infer any assertion, from assertions 
already admitted : and in this sense induction is as much 
entitled to be called reasoning as the demonstrations of 
geometry. Writers on Logic have generally preferred the 
former acceptation of the term ; the latter and more exten- 
sive signification is that in which I mean to use it." — Mill, 
Logic, 2d edit., vol. i, p. 3. 

" Reasoning is that operation of the mind through which 
it forms one judgment from many others ; as when, for 
instance, having judged that true virtue ought to be referred 
to God, and that the virtue of the heathens was not referred 
to him, we thence conclude that the virtue of the heathens 
was not true virtue." — Port Roy. Logic. 

" Some appear to include under the title of reasoning 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 431 

REASONIXO— 

every case in which a person believes one thing in conse- 
quence of his believing another thing, however far he may 
be from having any gi'ounds to warrant the inference : and 
they accordingly include those processes which take place 
in the minds of infants and of brutes ; which are apt to 
associate \vith the appearance of an object before them the 
remembered impression of something that formerly accom- 
panied it. Such a process is attended to in the familiar 
proverbs that ' a burnt child dreads the fire ;' or as it is ex- 
pressed in another form ^the scalded cat fears cold water;' 
or again in the Hebrew proverb, ' he who has been bitten 
by a serpent is afraid of a rope.' Most logical ^vriters, 
however, have confined the name of reasoning to valid 
argument ; which cannot exist without a universal premiss, 
implied, if not expressed.'' — "Whately, Logic^ (Introd. 4). 

Mr. Stewart says that to adapt means to a proximate end 
is to reason, 
RECTITri>JE. — ''Rectitude of conduct is intended to express 
the term Kocroo^aaig^ which Cicero translates recta effectio : 
Kceroo^auot he translates rectum factum^ De Fin.^ lib. iii.. 
cap. 4. Xow the definition of y.oLTooSaf/.cc was voy.ov 
-TT^oarccyy.cc, 'A thing commanded by law' (that is, by the 
Iciw of nature, the imiversal law). Antoninus, speaking of 
the reasoning faculty, how, without looking farther, it rests 
contented in its own energies, adds, ' for which reason are 
all actions of this species called rectitudes {koltoo^-gsi:, kutc^ 
oo^of, right onwards), as denoting the dii'ectness of their 
progression right onwards.'" — Harris, Dialogue on Happi- 
ness, p. 73, note. 

'' Goodness in actions is like unto straiglitness ; wherefore 
that which is done well we term rigJit^ for as the straight 
way is most acceptable to him that travelleth, because hy 
it he Cometh soonest to his journey's end : so in action, that 
which doth lye the evenest between us and the end we desire, 
must needs be the fittest for our use." — Hooker, Eccles. 
Pol, b. i., s. 8. 

J£ a term is to be selected to denote that, in action and 



432 V0CA13ULAIIY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

KECTITIJI^E— 

in disposition, of whicli the Moral Faculty approves, per- 
haps the most precise and appropriate is rectitude or riglit- 
ness. Dr. Adams has remarked, (Sermon on the Nature and 
Obligation of Virtue)^ '' The man who acts virtuously is said 
to act rightly. This appears more proper than to say that 
he acts according to truth ; and more clear and distinct than 
to say that he acts according to the nature and reason of 
things ; the meaning of which will, in all cases, be found to 
be only this — that he acts according to what reason, in the 
present circumstances of the agent, and the relation he 
stands in to the objects before him, pronounces to be right." 
In like manner. Dr. Eeid has said (Active Powers^ essay v., 
chap. 5), '' Prudence is a virtue, benevolence is a virtue; 
but the essence and formal nature of virtue must lie in 
something that is common to all these, and to every other 
virtue. And this, I conceive, can be nothing else but the 
Rectitude of such conduct and Turpitude of the contrary., 
which is discerned by a good man. And so far only he is 
virtuous as he pursues the former and avoids the latter." 
Rectitude., then, is that, in action and in disposition, of which 
the moral faculty approves. The contrary of what is right 
is wrong. Rightness and wrongness., then, are the charac- 
teristics of action and disposition, as contemplated by the 
moralist. So that the foundation of morals., the ground 
upon v/hich moral distinctions are taken, is in the essential 
difference between what is right and what is wrong. 

But what is rectitude or rightness as the characteristic of 
an action? According to Price and others, this term 
denotes a simple and primitive idea, and cannot be ex- 
plained. It might as well be asked, what is truth., as the 
characteristic of a proposition? It is a capacity of our 
rational nature to see and acknowledge truth ; but we 
cannot explain what truth is. We call it the conformity of 
our thoughts with the reality of things. But it may be 
doubted how far this explanation makes the nature of 
truth more intelligible. In like manner, some explain 
rectitude by saying, that it consists in a congruity between 



VOCABI3XARY OF PHILOSOPHT. 433 

BECTITIJDE— 

an aodon and the relations of the agent. It is the idea we 
tbrm of an action, when it is, in eTery way, conformable to 
the relations of the agent and the eircmnstances in which 
he is placed. On contemplating such an action, we approve 
of it, and feel that if we were placed in snch circumstances, 
and in snch relations, we should be mider an obligation to 
perform it. Xow, the circnmstances and relations in which 
man is placed arise from his nature and from the mitmre of 
thing s in general : And hence it has been said, that recti- 
tude is founded in the nature and JiiTness of things; that is, an 
action is right when it is fit or suitable to aU the relations 
and circumstances of the agent ; and of this fitness con- 
sdence or reason is the judge. Conscience or reason does 
not constitote the relations; these must arise from the 
nature of man and the nature of thiugs : but conscience or 
reason judges and determines as to the conformity of actions 
to those relations ; and those relations arising necessarily 
from the very nature of things, the conformity with them 
which constitutes rectitude^ is said to be eternal and immu- 
taMr:. — T' Bight. 
REFLECTION (jre-flectere^ to bend back). — "By reflection I 
would be midei^tood to mean that notice which the mind 
takes of its own operations, and the manner of them : by 
reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations 
in the understanding. Those two, viz., — external material 
things, as the objects of sensation ; and the operations of our 
own minds within, as the objects of rejieciionj are to me the 
only originals fr*om whence all our ideas take their begin- 
nings. The term operations here I use in a hirge sense, as 
comprehendiog not barely the actions of the mind about its 
ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes fi*om 
them, such as ui the satisfiiction or uneasiness arising from 
any thought." — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book iL, 
chap. 1. 

^*WTien we make our own thoughts and passions, and 
the various operations of our minds, the objects of our 
attention, eithpT* ^^"^" ^^ - ,, , \ -^ ^ - ^^^^ 



434 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

REF1L.ECTION— 

recent and fresh in our memory, this act of the mind is 
called reflection,^'' — Reid, IrdelL Powers^ essay i., chap. 2, 
Also chap. 5, and essay vi. 

Reid gives a more extensive (but less proper) significa- 
tion to reflection. — Intell. Powers,^ essay iii., chap. 5. Also 
essay vi., chap. 1. 

Attention is the energy of the mind directed towards 
things present. Reflection has to do with things past 
and the ideas of them. Attention may employ the organs 
of the body. Reflection is purely a mental operation. 
It is not a simple act. In reflection we may analyze and 
compound, abstract and generalize. These operations 
of mind so arranged as to gain some end constitute a 
method. And a method is just the act of reflecting or 
properly employing the energies of the mind on the objects 
of its knowledge. 

'' Reflection creates nothing, — can create nothing ; every- 
thing exists previous to reflection in the consciousness, but 
everything pre-exists there in confusion and obscurity ; it 
is the work of reflectio7t in adding itself to consciousness, to 
illuminate that which was obscure, to develop that which 
was enveloped. Reflection is for consciousness what the 
microscope and the telescope are for the natural sight : 
neither of these instruments makes or changes the objects ; 
but in examining them on every side, in penetrating to 
their centre, these instruments illuminate them, and dis- 
cover to us their characters and their laws." — Cousin, Hist. 
of Mod. Phil, vol. i., p. 275. — V. Observation. 

l^EFliEX SENSES— F. Sense and Idea. 

MEEATION {re-ferre, relatum.^ to bear back). — '-'- When the 
mind so considers one thing that it does as it were bring 
it to and set it by another, and carries its view from one to 
the other, this is, as the words import, relation and re- 
sped ; and the denominations given to positive things, 
intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the 
thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated, to some- 
thmg distinct from it, are what we call relatives ; and the 



VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. ioo 

REIiATION— 

things so brought together, related. Thus, when the mind 
considers Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing 
into that idea but what really exists in Caius ; v. g.^ when 
I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but 
the complex idea of the species man. So, likewise, when 
I say Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare 
consideration of a man who hath that white colour. But 
when I give Caius the name husband, I intimate some 
other person ; and when I give him the name whiter. I 
intimate some other thing ; in both cases my thought is 
led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things 
brought into consideration." — Locke, Essay on Human 
Understand.^ book ii., chap. 25. The two things thus 
brought into consideration are called relatives or correlates, 
as father and son, husband and wife. 

''In all relation there must be a subject whence it com- 
mences, as snoic ; another where it terminates, as a swan : 
the relation itself, similitude ; and lastly, the source of that 
relation^ whiteness; the swan is related to the snow by 
both of them being wliite.'^^ — Harris, Plnlosopli. Arrange.., 
chap. 10. 

This is called predicamental relation.^ and forms one of 
the categories (^^o^ ri) of Aristotle. 

''Any sort of connection which is perceived or imagined 
between two or more things ; or any comparison which is 
made by the mind, is a relation. When we look at these 

two lines we do not merely think of them 

separately, as this straight line, and tliat straight line ; but 
they are immediately connected together by a comparison 
which takes place in the mind as soon as they meet the 
eye. We perceive that these two lines are alike ; they are 
both straight ; and we call the notion that is formed by the 
comparison, the relation of sameness. We may then think 
of them as the same in length ; this comparison gives us 
the notion which we call the relation of equality. We 
think of them again as equally distant from each other, 
from end to end, and then we say they are parallel lines : 



436 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

REIiATION— 

this word parallel represents notliing existing in the lines 
themselves, but only the notion formed by measuring the 
distance between them. All these notions spring up in 
the mind from the comparison of the two objects ; they 
belong entirely to the mind^ and do not exist in the things 
themselves." — Taylor, Elements of Thouglit. 

Although relations are not real entities, but merely men- 
tal modes of viewing things, let it be observed that our 
ideas of relation are not vague nor arbitrary, but are deter- 
mined by the known qualities of the related objects. We 
cannot at will see relations for which there is no foundation 
in the nature of the related objects. Of all relations^ the 
relations of number are the clearest and most accurately 
appreciated. 

" Another way," says Dr. Reid (Intell. Pov)ers^ essay vi., 
chap. 2), in which we get the notion of relations (which 
seems not to have occurred to Mr. Locke), is when, by 
attention to one of the related objects, we perceive or 
judge that it must, from its nature, have a certain relation 
to something else, which before, perhaps, we never thought 
of; and thus our attention to one of the related objects 
produces the notion of a correlate and of a certain relation 
between them. Thus, when I attend to colour, figure, 
weight, I cannot help judging these to be qualities which 
cannot exist without a substance ; that is, something which 
is coloured, figured, heavy. If I had not perceived such 
things to be qualities, I should never have had any notion 
of their subject, or of their relation to it. By attending to 
the operations of thinking, memory, reasoning, we perceive 
or judge that there must be something which thinks, re- 
members, and reasons, which we call the mind. When we 
attend to any change that happens in nature, judgment in- 
forms us that there must be a cause of this change which had 
power to produce it ; and thus we get the notions of cause 
and effect, and of the relation between them. When we 
attend to body, we perceive that it cannot exist without 
space ; hence we get the notion of space (which is neither 



VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 437 

REIiATION— 

an object of sense nor of consciousness), and of the relation 
which bodies have to a certain portion of unlimited space, 
as their place." — See also Eeid, Inquiry^ chap. 1, sect. 7. 
Buffier calls relation^ in this view, Occasio quam prcehet 
ohjectmn cogitandi de alio. — V. Suggestion. 

BEI.ATIVE is opposed to absolute, q. v. 

A thing is called relative when the conception of it im- 
plies the conception of some other thing to which it has 
reference. A master implies a servant. A thing is called 
absolute when the conception of it does not imply the con- 
ception of any other thing to which it is referred, as sub- 
stance, man. 

An absolute term is that which can be applied to a thing 
without imph-ing comparison with any other thing : as 
whiteness may be predicated of one body without compar- 
ing it with any other body. 

A relative term is that which is applied in consequence 
of the collation of two or more things : as equality, which 
implies that one body has been compared to another in 
quantity. 

REIilOlON {re-lego^ re-Ugo, re-eligo). — This word according 
to Cicero {De Xat. Deoriim, ii., 28) is derived from, or 
rather compounded of, re-legere^ to read over again, to 
reflect upon or to stndy the sacred books in which religion 
is delivered. According to Lactantius (D/r. Instit.^ -1) it 
comes from re-ligare. to bind back — because religion is 
that which furnishes the true ground of obligation. St. 
Augustine (De Vera Relig.. c. 55) gives the same deriva- 
tion of the word. But he gives another origin of it {De 
Civit. Dei^ lib. x., c. 3), where he says, *' Deum, qui tons 
est nostrse beatitudinis, et omnis desiderii nostri finis, eli- 
gentes, immo potius religentes^ amiseramus enim negU- 
gentes : huuc, inquam, religentes^ unde et religio dicta est, 
ad eum elilectione tendamus, ut perveniendo quiescamus.*' 

Muller, Professor of Theology at Bale, published a 
Dissertation on this word in 1834:. 

Religion is distinguished into natural and revealed, or 



4:38 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

that knowledge of God and of our duty which is derived 
from the light of nature or reason — and that knowledge 
of God and our duty which comes to us from positive 
revelation. 

The epithet natural (or physical) has been objected to as 
applied to religion^ inasmuch as all knowledge of God is 
super-sensuous. — F. Theology. 

In all forms of religion there is one part, which may be 
called the doctrine or dogma, which is to be received by 
faith ; and the cultus^ or worship, which is the outward 
expression or mode of manifesting the religious sentiment. 
KEMEMBRANCE, REMINISCENCE, RECOIiEECTION 
(re-coUigere^ to gather together again ; rursus menisci^ or 
re-minisci^ to remember). — " The perception which actu- 
ally accompanies, and is annexed to any impression on the 
body, made by an external object, furnishes the mind with 
a distinct idea, which we call sensation ; which is, as it 
were, the actual entrance of any idea into the under- 
standing by the senses. The same idea, when it again 
recurs without the operation of the like object on the 
external sensory, is remembrance ; if it be sought after by 
the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought 
again into view, it is recollection; if it be held there long 
under attentive consideraiton, it is contemplation.'''' — Locke, 
Essay on Hum. Understand..^ book ii., chap. 19. 

^'In other cases, the various particulars which compose 
our stock of knowledge are recalled in consequence of an 
effort of our will. This latter operation, too, is often called 
by the same name (memory), but is more properly distin- 
guished by the word recollection.'''' — Stewart, Philosoph. of 
Hum. Mind., chap. 6, sect. 1. 

'-^Reminiscence is the act of recovering, ^n^ recollection 
the act of combining remembrances. Those eminences to 
which we attach the subordinate parts of an object come 
first into reminiscence ; when the intervening portions pre- 
sent themselves in order, the recollection is complete."— 
Taylor, Synonyms, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 439 

REMINISCEJ^CE (reminisci^ to remember). — Memory is know- 
ledge of some former consciousness. Reminiscence is the 
act by which we endeavour to recall and reunite former 
states of consciousness. It is a kind of reasoning by which 
we ascend from a present consciousness to a former, and 
from that to a more remote, till the whole facts of some 
case are brought again back to us. It is peculiar to man, 
while memory, as spontaneous, is shared by the brutes. 
" When we have a reminiscence^''^ said Aristotle (JDe Mem. et 
Reminiscentia^ c. 2), "we reason to the effect that we 
formerly experienced some impression of such or such a 
kind, and the mind makes a search after it. But an effort of 
this kind is not possible, except to animals who are endowed 
mth will ; and to will is a kind of reasoning or syllo- 
gism." 

''There is yet another kind of discussion, beginning with 
the appetite to recover something lost, proceeding from the 
present backward, from thought of the place where we 
miss at, to the thought of the place from whence we came 
last ; and from the thought of that to the thought of a 
place before, till we have in our mind some place, wherein 
we had the thing we miss : and this is called reminiscence.^' 
— Hobbes, Hum. Nat.., chap. 4. — F. Coxtemplation, 
Memory, Eetention. 
Reminiscence according to Plato. 

''Plato imagined, after more ancient philosophers, that 
every man is born with a certain reminiscence^ and that when 
we seem to be taught we are only put in mind of what we 
knew in a former state." — Bolingbroke, essay ii., Pre- 
sumption of Philosophers. 

The term employed by Plato was dvotf^vmi;, which may 
be translated " knowing up." He did not apply it to ever\- 
kind or degree of knowledge, but to that spontaneous 
movement of the mind by which it ascended from mere 
opinion (ho^oL) to science (sTTiar'/j^uYi). On such occasions 
the appearances of truth and beauty suggested or evolved 
the ideas of the true and the beautiful ; which seemed to 
belong to the soul and to have been formerly known. 



440 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

There was a stirring up or calling into act what was in the 
soul potentially. That they had been known in that former 
state of existence which Plato, in a myth, represented the 
soul to have enjoyed, and were now merely recalled or re- 
membered, is the view commonly given (Cicero, Tuscul.^ 
i. , 24) . But what Plato meant more specially to intimate by 
the use of this word was, that all science or certainty is in- 
tuitive, and belongs to the reason which gives knowledge in 
the last and highest degree. Conjecture (iiKotaioc)^ belief 
(^iriGTig)^ which, when conjoined, give opinion (^6^ci\ and 
reasoning (liocvotoc)^ which are the other degrees of know- 
ledge, according to Plato, being unable to give ground for 
science or certainty. — Heusde, Init. Philosoph. Platon.^ 8vo, 
1827, tom. i., pp. 33, 34. 

Olympiodorus in a MS. Commentary on the Phcedo of 
Plato, quoted by Harris {Hermes^ p. 232) says : — '' Inas- 
much as the soul, by containing the principles of all 
beings, is a sort of omniform representation or exemplar ; 
when it is roused by objects of sense it recollects those 
principles which it contains within, and brings them 
forth." 

'' Plato, it is believed, proposed his theory of reminis- 
cence as a sort of allegory, signifying the power which the 
mind has to draw from itself, on occasion of perceptions, 
universal ideas, and the manner in which it rises to them 
resembling the manner in which is awakened all at once 
within us the remembrance of what we have dreamed." — 
Manuel de Pliilosopliie^ 8vo, Paris, 1846, p. 139. 

It was in the same sense that Socrates called himself a 
midwife of the mind. He assisted in bringing to the birth 
truths with which the mind was big and in labour. He 
unfolded what was infolded. 

Boethius, De Consolat.^ says, the mind by teaching is 
only excited to know. And Aquinas, De Magistro^ says, 
'^ Omnis disciplina fit ex pre-existenti cognitione. 
Ex homine docente certitudinem sciential non acciperemus, 
nisi inesset nobis certitudo principiorum." 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 441 

REMIJ^ISCEIVCE 

According to Mons. Cliastel (Les Piationallstes et les Tra- 
ditionalistes^ 12mo, Paris, 1850, p. 150), Thomas Aquinas 
in liis Treatise, De Magistro^ maintains tbe following 
points : — 

1. To the acquisition of science you must admit as pre- 
existent in us the knowledge of general principles, e\4dent 
of themselves, and all those notions which the mind frames 
immediately to itself, by the aid of the first sensations ; for 
all teaching supposes in him who learns some anterior 
knowledge. 

2. But these first truths, conditions pre-requisite for all 
teaching, these general principles, these principles which 
are native and not taught, are known to us by that light of 
reason which God hath put in us, as the image of that un- 
created truth which is reflected in our mind. They are 
given to us by nature as the germ of all the cognitions to 
which we ultimately attain. 

There are certain notions of which it is impossible for a 
man to be ignorant. 

3. It is from these principles, known in advance, that he 
who teaches should set out with us, to teach us other 
truths connected with these. His teaching consists in 
showing us this connection. Properly speaking, it is the 
knowledge of these principles and not teaching which gives 
us secondary knowledge, although teaching is the mediate 
cause. It would be impossible for us to learn of a man the 
knowledge which he wishes to teach us, if there were not 
in us beforehand those principles to which he connects his 
knowledge ; and all the certainty of that knowledge comes 
to us from the certainty of those principles, and ultimately 
from God who has given us the light of reason to know 
them. 

4. Thus the knowledge of first principles is not from 
teaching, although teaching may give secondary truths 
connected with them. 

5. But these secondary truths we receive or reject 
according to their conformity with the truth that is in us. 



442 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

REMINISCENCE— 

6. Of these secondary truths which teaching gives, there 
are many which the mind may discover by its own force, 
as there are many diseases which cure themselves. 

Augustine also has a treatise, De Magistro, in which, 
from a different point of view, he comes to conclusions sub- 
stantially the same. '' The certainty of science comes to 
us from God who hath given to us the light of reason. 
For it is by this light that we know principles, and it is 
from principles that we derive the certainty of science. 
And yet it is true, in a certain sense, that man produces in 
us knowledge. The pupil, if interrogated before teaching, 
could answer as to those principles by aid of which all 
teaching proceeds; but he could not answer upon those 
things which are taught, which are the consequences of 
those principles. So that he does not learn principles but 
only the consequences of them." 

D'Alembert, as quoted by Mr. Stewart (vol. ii., p. 23), 
says, '-'• It should seem that everything we learn from a 
good metaphysical book is only a sort of reminiscence of 
what the mind previously knew." 

On the Reminiscence of Plato, see Piccolomineus, PJiilo- 
soph. De Morihus^ Francof , 1583, p. 450. 

RESERVATION or RESTRICTION (as it is called by 
casuists) — has reference to the duty of speaking what is 
true; and is distinguished as real and mental. 
Real Restriction takes place when the words used are not 
true if strictly interpreted, but there is no deviation from 
truth if the circumstances be considered. One man asks 
another. Have you dined? and the answer given is, No. The 
party giving this answer has dined, times without number. 
But his answer is restricted by the circumstances to to-day ; 
and in that sense is true. 
Mental Restriction or Reservation consists in saying SO far 
what is true, and to be believed, but adding mentally some 
qualification which makes it not to be true. A debtor 
asked by his creditor for payment of his debt says, — ''I will 
certainly pay you to-morrow" — adding to himself — "in 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 443 

RESERVATION-^ 

part," — whereas the words audibly uttered referred to the 
whole amount. 

There was published in 12mo, Lond., 1851, A Treatise 
of Equivocation^ from a MS. in the Bodleian Library, 
written about 1600. It was referred to in the trials on the 
Gunpowder Plot. 

The following occurs at p. 17 : — '^A farmer hath come to 
sell corn. He selleth all that he can seU, because he re- 
serveth the rest for his own necessary use. Then cometh 
one and desireth to buy corn. He may truly say, and 
swear (if it be needful) that he hath none ; for the circum- 
stance of the person interpreteth the meaning to be that he 
hath none to sell." — This is Reservation or Restriction^ 
rather than Equivocation, 

At p. 29 : — " If I be asked whether such a one be in my 
house, who is there indeed, I may answer in Latin, ' Non est 
hie,' meaning he doth not eat in my house." — This is Equi- 
vocation. — q. V. 
RETENTION (re-tenere^ to keep hold of). 

'^ The power of reproduction (into consciousness) supposes 
a power of retention (out of consciousness). To this con- 
servative power I confine exclusively the term Memory." — 
Sii' Will. Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 912. 

" There seems good reason for confining the appellation of 
memory to the simple power of retention., which undoubtedly 
must be considered as an original aptitude of mind, irre- 
solvable into any other. The power of recalling the pre- 
served impressions seems on the other hand rightly held to 
be only a modified exercise of the suggestive or reproduc- 
tive faculty." — Dr. Tulloch, Theism., p. 206. — F. Memory. 
KIOMT. — -^^ Right and d?^ti/ are things very different, and have 
even a kind of opposition ; yet they are so related that the 
one cannot even be conceived without the other ; and he 
that understands the one must understand the other. They 
have the same relation which credit has to debt. As all 
credit supposes an equivalent debt, so all right supposes a 
eoiTesponding duty. There can be no credit in one party 



444 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

RIOHT— 

witliout an equivalent debt in another party ; and there can 
be no right in one party, without a corresponding duty in 
another party. The sum of credit shows the sum of debt ; 
and the sum of men's rights shows, in like manner, the sum 
of their diity to one another. 

'•'• The word iHght has a very different meaning, according 
as it is applied to actions or to persons. A right action 
(rectum) is an action agreeable to our duty. But when we 
speak of the rights of men (jus)^ the word has a very differ- 
ent, and a more artificial meaning. It is a term of art in 
law, and signifies all that a man may lawfully do, all that he 
may lawfully possess and use, and all that he may lawfully 
claim of any other person. 

"We can be at no loss to perceive the duties corresponding 
to the several kinds of rights. What I have a right to do, it 
is the duty of all men not to hinder me from doing. What 
is my property or real right^ no man ought to take from 
me ; or to molest me in the use and enjoyment of it. And 
what I have a right to demand of any man, it is his duty to 
perform. Between the right on the one hand, and the duty 
on the other, there is not only a necessary connection, but, 
in reality, they are only different expressions of the same 
meaning ; just as it is the same thing to say, I am your 
debtor, and to say, you are my creditor ; or as it is the 
same thing to say I am your father, and to say, you are my 
son." 

''As there is a strict notion of justice, in which it is dis- 
tinguished from humanity and charity, so there is a more 
extensive signification of it, in which it includes those vir- 
tues. The ancient moralists, both Greek and Koman, under 
the cardinal virtue of Justice, included Beneficence ; and in 
this extensive sense, it is often used in common language. 
The like may be said of rights which in a sense not un- 
common, is extended to every proper claim of humanity 
and charity, as well as to the claims of strict justice. But, 
as it is proper to distinguish these two kinds of claims by 
different names, writers in natural jurisprudence have given 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 445 

RIGHT — 

the name oi perfect rights to the claims of strict justice, and 
that of imperfect rights to the claims of charity and human- 
ity. Thus all the duties of humanity have imperfect rights 
corresponding to them, as those of strict justice have perfect 
rights.^' — Eeid, Active Powers^ essay v., chap. 3. 

" 84. The adjective right has a much wider signification 
than the substantive right. Ever^'thing is right which is 
conformable to the supreme rule of human action ; but that 
only is a rigid which, being conformable to the supreme 
rule, is realized in society and vested in a particular person. 
Hence the two words may often be properly opposed. We 
may say that a poor man has no right to relief, but it is 
right he should have it. A rich man has a right to destroy 
the harvest of his fields, but to do so would not be right, 

** 85. To a right., on one side, corresponds an obligation on 
the other. If a man has a right to my horse, I have an 
ohligation to let him have it. If a man has a right to the 
fruit of a certain tree, all other persons are under an obli- 
gation to abstain from appropriating it. Men are oMiged to 
respect each others' rights. 

*' 86. My ohligation is to give another man his right ; my 
duty is to do what is right. Hence duty is a wider term 
than obhgation ; just as right^ the adjective, is wider than 
right the substantive. 

*'• 88. Duty has no correlative, as obligation has the corre- 
lative right. What it is our duty to do, we must do, because 
it is rights not because any one can demand it of us. We 
may, however, speak of those who are particularly benefited 
by the discharge of our ditties, as having a moral claim upon 
us. A distressed man has a moral claim to be relieved, in 
cases in which it is our duty to relieve him. 

''89. The distinctions just explained are sometimes ex- 
pressed by using the terms perfect obligation and imperftct 
obligation., for obligation .and duty respectively : and the 
terms perfect right and imperfect right for right and moral 
claim respectively. But these phrases have the incon- 
venience of makinsc it seem as if our duties arose from the 



446 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

RIOHT— 

rights of others ; and as if duties were only legal obliga- 
tions, with an inferior degree of binding force." — Whewell, 
Elements of Morality^ book i. — V. Jurispkudence, Rec- 
titude. 
RUliC — ''Rectitude is a law^ as well as a rule to us; it not 
only directs^ but hinds all, as far as it is perceived." — Price, 
Rev. of Morals^ chap. 6. 

A rule prescribes means to attain some end. But the 
end may not be one which all men are to aim at ; and the 
rule may not be followed by all. A law enjoins something 
to be done, and is binding upon all to whom it is made 
known. 

''A rule^ in its proper signification, is an instrument, by 
means of which we draw the shortest line from one point to 
another, which for this very reason is called a straight 
line. 

" In a figurative and moral sense, a rule imports nothing 
else but a principle or maxim, which furnishes man with a 
sure and concise method of attaining to the end he proposes." 
Burlamaqui, Principles of Nat. Laiv^ part 1, chap. 5. 



SABAlSlwr (from «i!?, signifying a host, or from tsaha^ in Syriac, 
to adore ; or from Saha the son of Cush, and grandson of 
Seth) — means the worship of the stars, or host of heaven, 
which prevailed from an early period in the East, especially 
in Syria, Arabia, Chaldea, and Persia The Sabseans are 
not mentioned by the Greek or Roman writers, and by the 
Arabian authors they are called JSTabatheans, as if descen- 
dants from ISTebaioth, son of Ishmael. Their doctrines are ' 
expounded by Moses Maimonides in the third part of his 
work, De More NevocMm. There v/as a popular and a 
philosophic creed with them. According to the former the 
stars were worshipped ; and the sun, as supreme God, ruled 
over heaven and earth, and the other heavenly bodies were 
but the ministers of his will. According to the philosophic 
creed, the stars consisted of mat^ter and mind. God is not 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 447 

tlie matter of the universe, but the spiiit which animates it. 
But both are eternal, and will eteraally exist, for the one 
cannot pass into, or absorb the other. 

Pocock. Specimen Hist. Aral., 4to, Oxf., 1649, p. 138. 

Hyde. Vtterum Persaram Hidoria. 8vo, Oxf.. 17G6. 

Spencer, Be Legibus Hebrceoriim^ 2 vols.. fob, Camb., 1727. 
^A.TIE, in its primary sense, denotes identity. — q. v. 

In a secondary sense it denotes great similar ittj^ and in 
popular usage admits of degrees, as when we speak of two 
things being ntarly the same. To this ambiguity, ^Vhately 
refers much of the error of realism; of Plato's theory of 
ideas: of the personihcation and deification in poetical, 
mythology, &c. — Whately, Logic, app. i. 
SANCTION {sancire^ to ratify or confirm). — ''I shall declare 
the sanction of this law of natm'e. viz.. those rewards which 
God hath ordained for the observation of it. and those 
punishments He hath appointed for its breach or trans- 
gression." — Tyrell, On tlie Law of Nature., p. 125. 

The consequences which natm-ally attend virtue and ^ice 
are the sanction of duty, or of doing what is right, as they 
are mtended to encom\age us to the discharge of it, and to 
deter us from the breach or neglect of it. And these 
natiu'al consequences of virtue and ^dce are also a declar- 
ation, on the part of God, that He is in favoui' of the one 
and against the other, and are intimations, that His love of 
the one and His hatred of the other may be more fidly 
manifested hereafter. By Locke, Paley, and Bentham, the 
term sanction, or enforcement of obedience is appHed to 
reward as well as to pimishment. But Mr. Austin (Pro- 
vince of Juri.^priid. Determined, p. 10) confines it to the 
latter, perhaps, because human laws only pimish, and do 
not reward. 
SAVAOE and BARBAROUS.— Ferguson (Essay on Hist, of 
Civ. Soc, part 2, sect. 2) states that the history of man- 
kind, in their rudest state, may be considered under two 
heads, viz., that of the savage^ who is not yet acquainted 
with property, and that of the barbarian, to whom it is. 



448 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

although not ascertained by laws, a principal object of care 
and desire. 

The distinction here made between the savage and the 
barbarous states of society, resolves itself into the absence 
or presence of political government ; for without political 
government, property cannot exist. The distinction is an 
important one ; and it would be convenient to apply the 
term savage to communities which are permanently in a 
state of anarchy, which ordinarily exist without govern- 
ment, and to apply the term barbarous to communities 
which, though in a rude state as regards the arts of life, 
are nevertheless subject to a government. In this sense, 
the N. American Indians would be in a savage^ while the 
Arab tribes, and most of the Asiatic nations, would be in a 
barbarous state. Montesquieu's distinction between savages 
and barbarians (Esprit des Lois^ xviii., 11), is different in 
form, but in substance it is founded on the same principle. 
Hugh Murray {Enquiries respecting the Character of 
Nations^ and the Progress of Society^ Edin., 1808) lays it 
down (p. 230) that the savage form of society is without 
government. 

According to many ancient and modern philosophers, 
the savage state was the primitive state of the human race. 
But others, especially Bonald and De Maistre, have main- 
tained that the nations now found in a savage state have 
accidentally degenerated from the primitive state, which 
was a state of knowledge and civilization. 
SCEFTICISH: {ayJ^rrsiu^ to look, to seek) — is used as synony- 
mous with doubt, — q. v. But doubt may be removed by 
evidence, and give way to conviction or belief. The char- 
acteristic of scepticism is to come to no conclusion for or 
against — STroxyi-, holding off, and consequent tranquillity — 
olrocQoc^iot. Absolute objective certainty being unattain- 
able, scepticism holds that in the contradictions of the 
reason, truth is as much on one side as on the other — ovhi/ 
f^othT^ou. It was first taught by Pyrrho, who flourished in 
Greece about 340, B.C. Hence it is sometimes called 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 449 

SCEPTICISM— 

Pyrrhonism. The word is generally used in a bad sense, 
as equivalent to infidelity or unbelief. But in the follow- 
ing passages it means, more correctly, the absence of 
determination. 

" We shall not ourselves venture, to determine anything, 
in so great a point ; but sceptically leave it undecided." — 
Cudworth, Intellect. Syst.^ p. 806. 

" That all his arguments (Bp. Berkeley's) are, in reahty, 
merely sceptical^ appears from this; that they admit of no 
answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to 
cause that momentary amazement, and irresolution, and 
confusion, which is the result o^ scepticism y — Hxvone^^ Essay s., 
note, p. 369, 4to edit. 

Scepticism is opposed to dogmatism. — q. v. 

'* The writings of the best authors among the ancients 
being fall and solid, tempt and carry me which way almost 
they will. He that I am reading seems always to have the 
most force ; and I find that every one in tm^n has reason, 
though they contradict one another." 

This is said by Montaigne, book ii., chap. 12, in the true 
spirit of scepticism. 

Lord Byron said, — 

"I doubt if doubt itself be doubting." 

Glanvil (Joseph) has a work which he entitled. Scepsis 
Scientijica^ or the Folly of Dogmatising. 

Staudlin wrote the History and Spirit of Scepticism^ 
2 vols., Leipsic, 1794-5. 

Sanchez (Fr.) or Sanctius wrote a Tractatus de Multum 
nohili et prima universali scientia^ quod niJiil scitur^ 4to, 
Lyons, 1581. Crousaz has Examen du PyrrJionism Ancien 
et Moderne. 
^CHOIiJiSTlC. — Scholasticus^ as a Latin word, was first 
used by Petronius. Quintilian subsequently applied it to 
the rhetoricians in his day : and we read in Jerome, that 
Serapion, having acquired great fame, received a^ a title 
2g 



450 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, 

SCHOI.ASTIC— 

of honour the surname Scolasticus. When the schools of 
the Middle Ages were opened, it was applied to those 
charged with the education of youth. 

''We see the original sense of the word scholastic^'''' says 
Dr. Hampden (Bampton Led,, i., p. 7), ''in the following 
passage : — Omnes enim in scriptis suis causas tantum ege- 
runt suas ; et propriis magis laudibus quam aliorum utili- 
tatibus consulentes, non id facere adnisi sunt ut salubres et 
salutiferi, sed ut scholastici ac diserti haberentur." — Salvi-^ 
anus, De Gubernat. Dei^ Prcefat. 
Scholastic Philosophy.— This phrase denotes a period rather 
than a system of philosophy. It is the philosophy that was 
taught in the schools during the Middle Ages. The Middle 
Ages extend from the commencement of the ninth to the 
sixteenth century. What has been called the Classic Age 
of the scholastic philosophy, includes the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries. It begins when the metaphysics of 
Aristotle were introduced into France by Latin trans- 
lations, and terminates with the Council of Florence and 
the taking of Constantinople. The only philosophy that 
was taught during that period, was taught by the clergy ; 
and was therefore very much mixed up with theology. 
The only way of teaching was by lectures or dictates ; 
and hence the phrase, leg ere in philosophia. There was no 
one system uniformly taught ; but different and conflicting 
opinions were held and promulgated by different doctors. 
The method was that of interpretation. Grammar was 
taught by prgelections on Donatus and Priscian^ and rhe- 
toric, by prgelections on some parts of Cicero or Boethius. 
But Logic shared most of their attention, and was taught 
by preelections on such of the works of Aristotle as were 
best known. The Timoeus of Plato also occupied much of 
their attention ; and they laboured to reconcile the doc- 
trines of the one philosopher with those of the other. 

Mr. Morell says (Philosoph. of Religion^ p. 369), " It has 
been usual to divide the whole scholastic periods into three 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 451 

SCHOliASTIC— 

eras.* — 1. That which was marked by the absolute subordi- 
nation of philosophy to theology, that is, authority. 2. 
That which is marked by the friendly alliance of philosophy 
with dogmatic theology. 3. The commencement of a separ- 
ation between the two, or the dawn of the entire indepen- 
dence of philosophy. 

The first years of scholastic pliilosopTiy were marked by 
authority. In the ninth century, Joannes Scotus Erigenii 
attempted to assert the claims of reason. Two hundred 
years after, the first era was brought to a close by Abe- 
lard. The second is marked by Albertus Magnus, Thomas 
Aquinas, and Duns Scotus. Raymond Lully, Eoger Bacon, 
followed by Occam and the Nominalists, represent the third 
and declining era. 

The taking of Constantinople by the Turks, the inven- 
tion of printing, and the progress of the Eeformation, put 
an end to the scholastic philosophy. Philosophy was no 
longer confined to the schools and to praelections. The press 
became a most extensive lecturer, and many embraced 
the opportunities oftered of extending knowledge. 

In addition to general histories of philosophy, see 

Rousselot, Etudes sur la Philosophic dans le Moyen Age, 
3 tom., 8vo, Paris, 1840-2. 

Haureau, De let Philosophic Scholastique^ 2 tom., 8vo. 
Paris, 1850. 

Cousin, Fragmens Philosophiques^ tom. iii., Paris, 1840. 
!8ICIENCE {scientia^ iaKo or I/cx^j, an old verb, signifying to 
cleave) — means knowledge emphatically so called, that is, 
knowledge of principles and causes. 

'-''Science (i'TriaTYif^yi) has its name fi:'om bringing us {stti 
(jTuaiv) to some stop and boundary of things, taking us 
away from the unbounded nature and mutability of parti- 
culars ; for it is conversant about subjects that are general 
and invariable." This etymology given by Blemmides, and 



* Teniieman makes four periods of scholastic philosophy, according to tlic prcN 
lence of Realism or Nominalism. 



452 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SCIENCE — 

long before him adopted by the Peripatetics, came origin- 
ally from Plato, as may be seen in bis Cratylus. 

'•''Absolute science as distinct from the sophists' acciden- 
tal science, is, according to the common conception, know- 
ledge of the necessity and reason of a law It is 

certain there is such a thing as demonstrative knowledge : 
demonstration means scientific proof; and the possession 
of scientific proof is science.'^'' Poster. Analyt.^ lib. i., cap. 
2. And in Ethic. ^ lib. vi., cap. 3, Aristotle says — "In 
matters of opinion we are liable to be deceived ; not so in 
matters of science. The former relates to things variable 
in their nature, of whose very existence we may doubt, un- 
less when they are actually perceived ; the latter is con- 
versant about things unalterable, necessary and eternal, 
incapable of being generated, exempt from corruption ; 
the knowledge of which admits not of degrees between 
total ignorance and absolute certainty." 

"' Or; scientice fundamentum est^ Itonfastigium,^^ — Trend- 
lenburg, Elementa Log. Arist.^ p. 76. 

'^ Sir Will. Hamilton, in his Lectures on Logic.) defined 
science as a ' complement of cognitions, having in point of 
form the character of logical perfection, and in point of 
matter, the character of real truth.' " — Dove, Political 
Science., p. 76. 

Science is knowledge certain and evident in itself, or 
by the principle from which it is deduced, or with which 
it is certainly connected. It is subjective as existing in 
a mind — objective^ as embodied in truths — speculative., 
as resting in attainment of truths, as in physical science — 
practical., as leading to do something, as in ethical science. 

Science, art, and empiricism, are defined by Sopater, On 
Hermogenes, apud Khet. Gr., vol. v., pp. 3-5, ed. Walz, as 
follows : — 

Science consists in an infallible and unchanging know- 
ledge of phenomena. 

Art is a system formed from observation and directed to 
a useful end. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 453 

SCIENCE— 

Empiricism is an unreasoning and instinctive imitation of 
previous practice. 

Art is of three kinds — theoretic, practical, and mixed. 
''No art, however, is purely theoretic or contemplative. 
The examples given are of science^ not art. It is a part 
of grammatical science to say that all words with a certain 
termination have a certain accent. When this is converted 
into a rule, it becomes part of an art." — Lewis, On Methods 
of Ohservat. in Politics^ chap. 19, sect. 2. 

''''J.n science^ scimus ut sciamus; in art, scimus utproducamus. 
And, therefore, science and art may be said to be investiga- 
tions of truth:* but one, science^ inquires for the sake of 
knowledge ; the other, art, for the sake of production : f 
and hence science is more concerned with the higher truths, 
art with the lower : and science never is engaged as art is 
in productive application. J And the most perfect state of 
science^ therefore, will be the most high and accurate in- 
quiry ; the perfection of art will be the most apt and effi- 
cient system of rules : Art always throwing itself into the 
form of rules. "§ — Karslake, Aids to Logic^ b. i., p. 24. — V. 
Art, Demonstration. 
SCIENTIA (Media). — " According to Mohna, the objects of the 
divine knowledge are the possible^ the actual^ and the condi- 
tional. The knowledge of the possible is simple intelligence ; 
of the actual^ scientia visionis ; and of the conditional^ scientia 
media^ intermediate between that of intelligence and vision. 
An example of scientia media is that of David asking the 
oracle if the inhabitants of the city of Keilah, in which he 
meant to take refuge, would deliver it up to Saul if he laid 
siege to it. The answer was in the affirmative, whereupon 
David took a different course." — Leibnitz, Sur la Bonte de 
Dieu^ par tie 1, sect. 40. 

In La Cause de Dieu^ &c., sec. 17, Leibnitz has said. 

* This is, speaking logically, *'the Genus," of the two. 
t These are tlieir differentia^ or distinctive characteristics. 
X Tliese are their specific properties. 

§ This distinction of Science and Art is given in Aristotle.— See Poster. Anali/t., i., 
191, ii., 13. 



454 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SCIENTIA- 

'-'' scientia media might rather be understood to mean the 
science not only of future conditionals but universally 
of all future contingents. Then science of simple intelli- 
gence would be restricted to the knowledge of truths pos- 
sible and necessary ; scientia visionis to that of truths con- 
tingent and actual. Scientia media would thus have it in 
common with the first that it concerned truths possible; 
and with the second, that it applied to truths contingent.^'' 
— See Reid, Active Poioers^ essay iv., chap. 11. 

SClOtilST (sciolus^ one who thinks he knows much and knows 
but little). — '' Some have the hap to be termed learned men, 
though they have gathered up but the scraps of knowledge 
here and there, though they be but smatterers and mere 
sciolists.^'' — Howell, Letters^ b. 3, let. 8. 

SCIOMACMY (ffKtoi^ a shadow ; and /^c^^cyi^ a fight). — "But pray, 
countryman, to avoid this sciomacJiy^ or imaginary combat, 
with words, let me know, sir, what you mean by the name 
of tyrant." — Cowley, On the Government of Oliver Cromwell. 

SEILdFlSHNESS — " consists not in the indulging of this or 
that particular propensity, but in disregarding for the 
sake of any kind of personal gratification or advantage, the 
rights or the feelings of other men. It is, therefore, a 
negative quality ; that is, it consists in not considering what 
is due to one's neighbours, through a deficiency of justice 
or benevolence. And selfishness^ accordingly, will show 
itself in as many different shapes as there are different dis- 
positions in men. 

" You may see these differences even in very young chil- 
dren. One selfish child, who is greedy, will seek to keep 
all the cakes and sweetmeats to himself; another, who is 
idle, will not care what trouble he causes to others, so he 
can save his own ; another, who is vain, will seek to obtain 
the credit which is due to others ; one who is covetous, will 
seek to gain at another's expense, &c. In short, each 
person ' has a self of his own.' And, consequently, though 
you may be of a character very unlike that of some selfish 
person, you may yet be, in your own way, quite as selfish 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 455 

SEIiFISHEN E SS— 

as he. And it is possible to be selfish in the highest de- 
gree, without being at all too much actuated by self-love, 
but unduly neglectful of others when your own gratifica- 
tion, of whatever kind, is concerned." — Whately, Lessons 
on Morals^ p. 143. 
.^EliF-liOVE— is sometimes used in a general sense to denote 
all those principles of our nature which prompt us to seek 
our own good, just as those principles which lead us to 
seek the good of others are all comprehended under the 
name of benevolence. All our desires tend towards the 
attainment of some good or the averting of some evil — 
having reference either to ourselves or others, and may 
therefore be brought under the two heads of benevolence 
and self-love. 

But besides this general sense of the word to denote all 
those desires which have a regard to our own gratification 
or good, self-love is more strictly used to signify '' the de- 
sire for our own welfare, as such." In this sense, "it is 
quite distinct from all our other desires and propensities." 
says Dr. T\Tiately {Lessons on Morals^ p. 142), '•'- though 
it may often tend in the same direction with some of them. 
One person, for instance, may drink some water because he 
is thirsty; and another may, without thirst, drink — suppose 
from a mineral spring, because he believes it will be good 
for his health. This latter is impelled by self-love., but not 
the other. 

'' So again, one person may pursue some course of study, 
in order to qualify himself for s>oviiQ profession by which he 
may advance in life, and another, from having a taste for 
that study, and a desire for that branch of knowledge. 
This latter, though he may perhaps be, in fact, promoting 
his own welfare, is not acting from self-love. For as the ob- 
ject of thirst is not happiness, but drink, so the object of curi- 
osity is not happiness, but knowledge. And so of the rest.'" 

Self-love may, like any other of our tendencies, be cher- 
ished and indulged to excess, or it may be ill-directed. 
But Avithin due bounds it is allowable and riiiht. and b^ uu 



456 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SEIiF-I.OTE— 

means incompatible "witli benevolence, or a desire to pro- 
mote tlie happiness of others. And Dr. Hutcbeson, who 
maintains that kind affection is what constitutes an agent 
virtuous, has said, that he who cherishes kind affection to- 
wards all, may also love himself; may love himself as a 
part of the whole system of rational and sentient beings ; 
may promote his own happiness in preference to that of 
another who is not more deserving of his love ; and may 
be innocently solicitous about himself, while he is wisely 
benevolent towards all. — Inquiry concerning Moral Good 
and Evil^ sect. 3. 

The error of Hobbes, and the school of philosophers who 
maintained that in doing good to others our ultimate aim 
is to do good to ourselves, lay in supposing that there is 
any antagonism between benevolence and self-love. So 
long as self-love does not degenerate into selfishness ^ it is 
quite compatible with true benevolence. 

In opposition to the views of Hobbes and the selfish 
school of philosophers, see 

Butler, Sermons^ On Hum. Nat.., On Compassion., &c. 

Turnbull, Nature and Origin of Laws., vol. ii., p. 258. 

Hume, On General Principles of Morals^ sect. 2. 

Hutcheson, Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil^ 
sect. 2. 

Hazlitt, Essay on Principles of Hum, Action., p. 239. 

Mackintosh, View of Ethical Philosophy^ p. 192. 
SEMATOl.OOY (ariiucc, a sign; and Aoyo?, discourse) — the doc- 
trine of signs. — q. v. 
SENSATlOrv. — " The earliest sign by which the Ego becomes 
perceptible is corporeal sensation. 

'^ Without this general innate sensation we should not 
possess the certainty that our body is our body ; for it is as 
much an object for the other senses as anything else that 
we can see, hear, taste, or feel. This original general 
innate sensation is necessary to the existence of all other 
particular sensations, and may exist independently of the 
nervous system. Polypi, animals of the simplest structure, 



tocabuxjlrx of philosophy. 457 

—■.-':. ' :. iicXToiis sj^Tslem disdnct from the rest of the or- 

A5S, show traces of innate settsalwm. The light bj- 

V see^ acts not onlj on the Tisoal nerres, 

i? of the eye, and the sm^tkms of dglit 

rjndnre of the eye. This smnZnK^, 

^ : fa necessanr attribute of animated 



eTen pain is i^ : '-at the place where it 

esisis. Eqoall J obsenre is the notion which it entertains of 
an ol^edL Thoo^ Brach, therefore^ is light in ascribing 
something oljediTe, eiren to the general semsaikm^ since 
condilions cannot: communicate themselTes, without com- 
mnnicaling (thon^ erer so obscorely) something of that 
which prodnces the condition — nay, strictly speaking, as 
eTen in the idea " sabject," that of an '^ object^ is ioTohred, 
yet it is adxisable to abide by the distinction fennded by 
fijant, according to which, by innate saisalioii, we e^peciaUy 
perceive onr own personality (subject), and by the senses 
we specmlbf peroere oljects, and thi^ in the ascending hne, 
Feefing, Taste, SmeD, Hearing, and i^^t. 

* The nest stq^firom this obscnreori^nal innate 9&msaikm 
is particnlar setisatkm throng Om medium of the nerrons 
sipstem, whidi, in its more pro&mnd, and yet more obscure 
^here^ prodnces common smsatiam (C<ksie:stb:esis% and in a 
higgler manifestation, the perc^tions of the senses. CoEneS" 
Aesis^ or common feeling, is rdferred to the gan^onic 
nenpes. It may be called sabjeetrre, inasmuch as the body 
itself gires the excitement to the nerre concerned.* By 
the C<]enesthesis, states of onr botdhr are rerealed to ns which 
haTe their seat in the sphere of the Tegetatire lilfe. These 
states i 



* HovvivrsaliSeeChretliibsnsadtknis^ia^ ahrajs in It Uie mffintioR of am 
•t^ed;, as Bnch dmws; iMnce illwtrating llie inatiiftct of i 
liM^ diieii^ iKkngis to fkis ^yalcm. 



^58 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SENSATION— 

'^ 1. General: — corporeal liea\dness and buoyancy, atony, 
toniety. 

"2. Special: — hunger, tMrst, sexual instinct, &c. 

'' The sensations of pain, titillation, itching, &c., which are 
generally cited here, belong, in their more common accep- 
tation to the general corporeal feeling ; in their more local 
limitation, with distinct perception of the object exciting, to 
the sense of Touch ; but when they arise from the nervous 
system allotted to the vegetative sphere of the body, they 
certainly belong to the Coenesthesis in the more limited 
sense of the word. 

'' To this class belongs especially the anxiety arising from 
impediment in respiration, and from nausea. 

"In the analysis of the psycho -physical processes proceed- 
ing outwards from sensation to perception, we encounter 
after the organs of the Coenesthesis, the organs of sense." — 
Feuchtersleben, Med. P.<ycJiology, 1847, p. 83. 
Sensation and Perception.— " A conscious presentation, if it 
refers exclusively to the subject, as a modification of our 
own being, is = sensation. The same if it refers to an ob- 
ject, \^ ^ perception.'''' — Coleridge, Church and State; — 
quoted by Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought., p. 104. 

Kousseau distinguished sensations as affectives., or giving 
pleasure or pain ; and representatives^ or giving knowledge 
of objects external. 

Paffe (Sur la Sensihilite) distinguishes the element affectif 
and the element instructif 

In like manner Dr. Eeid regards sensation not only as a 
state of feeling, but a sign of that which occasions it. 

Bozelli {De V Union de la Philosoph. avec la Morale^ calls 
sensations., in so far as they are representative, in their 
philosophical form, in so far as they give pleasure or pain, 
in their moral form or character. 

" To sensation, I owe all the certainty I have of my exis- 
tence as a sentient being, to perception., a certainty not less 
absolute, that there are other beings besides me." — Thurot. 
De V Entejidenient., &c., torn, i., p. 43. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 459 

SENSATION— 

Sensation properly expresses that change in the state of 
the mind^ ivliich is produced by an impression upon an 
organ of sense (of whicli change we can conceive the mind 
to be conscious, without any knowledge of external ob- 
jects) : perception^ on the other hand, expresses the know- 
ledge or the intimations we obtain, by means of our sensa- 
tions^ concerning the qualities of matter ; and consequently 
involves, in every instance, the notion of externality or out- 
ness^ which it is necessary to exclude in order to seize the 
precise import of the word sensation. 

Sensation has been employed to denote — 

1. The process of sensitive apprehension, both in its 
subjective and its objective relations ; like the Greek 
jBsthesis. 

2. It was limited first in the Cartesian school, and there- 
after in that of Reidtothe subjective phasis of our sensitive 
cognitions. — Sir W. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ note D.* 

" Sensation proper, is not purely a passive state, but 
implies a certain amount of mental activity. It may be 
described, on the psychological side, as resulting directly 
from the attention which the mind gives to the affections of 
its own organism. This description may at first sight 
appear to be at variance with the facts of the case, inas- 
much as every severe affection of the body produces pain, 
quite independently of any knowledge we may possess of 
the cause or of any operation of the will being directed 
towards it. Facts, however, rightly analyzed, show us, 
that if the attention of the mind be absorbed in other 
things, no impulse, though it amount to the laceration of 
the nerves, can produce in us the slightest feeling. Ex- 
treme enthusiasm, or powerful emotion of an}- kind, can 
make us altogether insensible even to physical injury. For 
this reason it is that the soldier on the field of battle is 
often wounded during the heat of the combat, without dis- 
covering it till exhausted by loss of blood. Numerous facts 
of a similar kind prove demonstrably, that a certain appli- 
cation and exercise of mind, on one side, is as necessary to 



460 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SENSATION— 

the existence of sensation^ as the occurrence of physical 
impulse, on the other."— Morell, Psychology^ p. 107. 

Stewart, Philosoph. Essays^ note F (it is G in last edit.) 
See also 

Stewart, Outlines^ sect. 14. 

Reid, Essay fi^ In tell. Powers^ essay i., chap. 1. 

Morell, Philosoph. of Religion^ p. 7. 
SENSE, in psychology, is employed ambiguously — 1. For the 
faculty of sensitive apprehension. 2. For its act. 3. For 
its organ. 
Sense and Idea. — In the following passage from Shaftesbury 
(Moralists^ part 3, sect. 2), sense is used as equivalent to 
idea. '' N^othing surely is more strongly imprinted on our 
minds, or more closely interwoven with our souls than the 
idea or sense of order and proportion. 

In like manner Dr. Hutch eson has said, " There is a 
natural and immediate determination to approve certain 
affections and actions consequent upon them ; or a natural 
sense of immediate excellence in them, not referred to any 
other quality perceivable by our senses or by reasoning." 
We speak of a determination of blood to the head. This 
is a physical determination or tendency. Xow, there 
may be a mental tendency, and this, in Dr. Hutcheson's 
philosophy, is called determination or sense. He defined a 
sense in this application of it ' a determination to receive 
ideas^ independent of our will,' and he enumerates several 
such tendencies or determinations which he calls reflex 
senses. 
SENSES (REFINE X).— Dr. Hutcheson seems to have been in 
some measure sensible of the inadequacy of Mr. Locke's 
account of the origin of our ideas, and maintained, that in 
addition to those which we have by means of sensation and 
reflection, we also acquire ideas by means of certain powers 
of perception, which he called internal and reflex senses. 
According to his psychology, our powers of perception 
may be called direct or antecedent^ and consequent or reflex. 
We hear a sound, or see colour, by means of senses which 



VOCABULARY OF PHLLOSOrHY, 461 

SENSES— 

operate directly on their objects ; and do not suppose any 
antecedent perception. But we perceive the harmony of 
sound, and the beauty of colour, by means of faculties 
which operate reflexly, or in consequence of some preced- 
ing perception. And the moral sense was regarded by him 
as a faculty of this kind. Eeflection, from which, accord- 
ing to iMr, Locke, we derive the simple ideas of the passions 
and affections of mind, was considered by Hutcheson, as 
an internal sense or faculty, operating directly. But that 
faculty by which we perceive the beauty or deformity, the 
virtue or ^dce, of these passions and affections, was called 
by Hutcheson, a reflex^ internal sense. — Illustrations of tJie 
Moral Sense, sect. 1 ; Inquiry concerning Moral Good and 
Evil^ sect. 1 ; Mor. Pliil.^ book i., chap. 4, sect. 4, and also 
sect. 5. 

SENSIBII.ITY or SENSITITITIT {to x{adyiTtx,ou)—is now 
used as a general term to denote the capacity of feeling, as 
distinguished from intellect and will. It includes sensa- 
tions both external and internal, whether derived from 
contemplating outward and material objects, or relations 
and ideas, desires, affections, passions. It also includes the 
sentiments of the sublime and beautiful, the moral senti- 
ment and the religious sentiment ; and in short, every 
modification of feeling of which we are susceptible. By 
the ancient philosophers the sensibility under the name of 
appetite was confounded with the will. The Scotch philo- 
sophers have analyzed the various forms of the sensibility 
under the name of active principles : but they have not 
gathered them under one head, and have sometimes treated 
of them in connection with things very different. 

SENSrBl.ES, CO-Ti.iiON and PROPER (sensile or sensibile, 
that which is capable of affecting some sense ; that which is 
the object of sense). 

Aristotle distinguished sensibles, into common and proper 
(De Anima^ lib. ii., c. 2; lib. iii., c. 1. De Sensu et Sen- 
sili^ c. 1). The common^ those perceived by all or by a 
plurality of senses, were magnitude, iigure, motion, rest, 



462 , VOCABULARY OF PJIILOSOPIIY. 

number. To these five, some of the schoohnen (but out of 
Aristotle) added place, distance, position, and continuity. 
—Sir W. Hamilton, PieicVs Works ^ p. 124, note. Aris- 
totle admitted, however {De Anima^ lib. iii., chaps. 1, 4), 
that the common sensihles are not properly objects of sense ; 
but merely con-comitants or con-sequents of the perception 
of the proper sensihles. This is noticed by Hutcheson 
(ilfor. PJiilosoph.^ book i., chap. 1), commended by Price 
(Review^ p. 56, first edit.), by Mr. Stewart (Philosopli. 
Essays^ pp. 31, 46, 551, 4to), and by Royer CoUard 
(CEuvres de Reid^ tom. iii., p. 431). 

'' Sensihile commune dicitur quod vel percipitur pluribus 
sensibus, vel ad quod cognoscendum, ab intellectu vel im- 
aginatione desumitur occasio^ ex variis sensibus ; ut sunt 
figura, motus, ubicatio, duratio, magnitudo, distantia, 
numerus, &c." — Compton Carleton, Philosopli. Univ. De 
Anima, diss. 16, lect. ii., sect. 1. 

The proper sensihles are those objects of sense which are 
peculiar to one sense ; as colour to the eye, sound to the 
ear, taste to the palate, and touch to the body. 
SENSISIfl, SENSUAIilSin, or SENSUISM — is the doctrine 
that all our knowledge is derived originally fi'om sense. 

It is not the same as empiricism^ though sometimes con- 
founded with it. Empiricism rests exclusively on experience, 
and rejects all ideas which are a priori. But all experi- 
ence is not that of sense. Empiricism admits facts and 
nothing but facts, but all facts which have been observed. 
Sensism gives the single fact of sensation as sufficient to 
explain all mental phenomena. Locke is empirical^ Con- 
dillac is sensual. 

Sensuism^ ''in the emphatic language of Fichte, is called 
'the dirt-philosophy.'" — Sir WiU. Hamilton, Discussions^ 
p. 38, see also p. 2. — V. Empiricism, Ideology. 
SENSORIUM (^oiiadYiTYi^iov) — is the organ by which, or place 
in which, the sensations of the several senses are reduced 
to the unity of consciousness. According to Aristotle it 
was in all warm blooded animals the heart, and therefore so 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 4G3 

SENSORIUHl— 

in man. According to modern philosophers the central 
organ is the brain, the pmeal gland accordmg to Descartes, 
the ventricles, or the corpus callosum according to others. 

Sensorium signifies not so properly the organ as the place 
of sensation. The eye, the ear, &c., are organs ; but they 
are not sensoria. Sir Isaac Xewton does not say that space 
is a sensorium ; but that it is (by way of comparison), so to 
say, the sensorium^ &c. — Clarke, Second Reply to Leibnitz. 

Leibnitz adopted and defended {Answer to the Second 
Reply of Clarke) the explanation of Eudolphus Goclenius, 
who, in his Lexicon PJiilosopldcum^ under Sensitoriinn^ says, 
^^Barbarum scholasticorum, qiu inter dum simt Simia^ Grae- 
corum. Hi dicunt 'A/V^j^ttj^/ov. Ex quo iUi fecerunt sen- 
siioriuni pro sensorio^ id est, organum sensationis." 
SENSUS COiyXMlINIS (koiuyi oitadrtuig). — This latter phrase 
was employed by Aristotle and the Peripatetics " to denote 
the faculty in which the various reports of the several 
senses are reduced to the unity of a common appercep- 
tion.'' — Sir W. Hamilton, Reid^s Woi^ks., p. 756, note. 

This faculty had an organ which was called Sensorium 
Commune. — q. v. 

Mr. Stewart (note D, to part 2 of Plulosopli. of Hum. 
Mind) says : — The sensus communis of the schoolmen de- 
notes the power whereby the mind is enabled to represent 
to itself any absent object of perception, or any sensation 
which it has formerly experienced. Its seat was supposed 
to be that part of the brain (hence called the sensorium, 
or sensorium commune) where the nerves from all the 
organs of perception terminate. Of the pecuHar function 
allotted to it in the scale of om- intellectual faculties, the 
following account is given by Hobbes : — '' Some say the 
senses receive the species of things and dehver them to the 
common sense ; and the common sense deHvers them over to 
the fancy ; and the fancy to the memory ; and the memory- 
to the judgment — like handing of things from one to 
another, with many words making nothing understood.'' — 
Of Man ^ part 1, chap. 2. 



464 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SENSUS— 

Mr. Stewart says the sensus communis is perfectly synony- 
mous with the word conception, as defined in the first yoI. 
of his work, that is, the power by which we represent an 
object of sense, whether present or absent. But it is 
doubtful whether sensus comm,unis was applied by the 
schoolmen to the re -production of absent objects of 
sense. 
SENTlJUiEJVT implies an idea (or judgment), because the will 
is not moved nor the sensibility affected without knowing. 
But an idea or judgment does not infer feeling or sentiment. 
— Buffier, Log. ii., art. 9. 

" The word sentiment.^ in the English language, never, as 
I conceive, signifies mere feeling, hut judgment accompanied 
with feeling.'^ It was wont to signify opinion or judgment 
of any kind, but, of late, is appropriated to signify an 
opinion or judgment, that strikes, and produces some 
agreeable or uneasy emotion. So we speak of sentiments of 
respect, of esteem, of gratitude ; but I never heard the pain 
of the gout, or any other severe feeling, called a sentiment." 
— Reid, Act. Powers., essay v., chap. 7. 

'' Mr. Hume sometimes employs (after the manner of the 
French metaphysicians) sentiment as synonymous with feel- 
ing; a use of the word quite unprecedented in our tongue." 
— Stewart, PhilosopJi. Essays^ last ed., note E. 

"There are two sensibilities — the one turned towards 
nature and transmitting the impressions received from it, 
the other hid in the depths of our organization and receiving 
the impression of all that passes in the soul. Have we 
discovered truth — we experience a sentiment. Have we 
done a good deed — we experience a sentiment. A sentiment 
is but the echo of reason, but is sometimes better heard than 
reason itself. Sentiment^ which accompanies the intelligence 
in all its movements, has, like the intelligence, a spontaneous 
and a reflective movement. By itself it is a source of emo- 
tion, not of knowledge. Knowledge or judgment is invari- 

* " This is too unqualified an assertion. The terai sentiment is in English applied to 
the higher f^ielings."— Sir William Hamilton, 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 465 

SENTIMENT — 

able, whatever be our health or spirits. Sentiment varies 
with health and spirits. I always judge the Apollo Belvidere 
to be beautiful, but I do not always feel the sentiment of 
his beauty. A bright or gloomy day, sadness or serenity 
of mind, affect my sentiments^ but not my judgment. 

''Mysticism would suppress reason and expand senti- 
ment,''^ — See Cousin, (Euvres^ torn, ii., p. 96. 

Those pleasures and pains which spring up in connection 
with a modification of our organism or the perceptions of 
the senses, are called sensations. But the state of our mind, 
the exercise of thought, conceptions purely intellectual, are 
the occasion to us of high enjoyment or lively suffering ; for 
these pleasures and pains of a different kind is reserved the 
name of sentiments. — Manuel de Philosophies 8vo, Paris, 
1846, p. 142. 

'' The word sentiment ^ agreeably to the use made of it by 
our best English writers, expresses, in my opinion, very 
happily those complex determinations of the mind which 
result from the co-operation of our rational powers and our 
moral feelings. We do not speak of a man's sentiments con- 
cernmg a mechanical contrivance, or a physical hypothesis, 
or concerning any speculative question whatever, by which 
the feelings are not liable to be roused or the heart affected. 

'' This account of the meaning of the word corresponds, 
I think, exactly with the use made of it by Mr. Smith in 
the title of his Theory (of Moral Sentiments).^'' — Stewart, 
Philosoph. Essays s note D. 
Sentiment and Opmioii.— Dr. Beattie (Essay on Truth., pt. 2, 
chap, i., sec. 1) has said, " that the true and the old English 
sense of the word sentiment^ is a formed opinion^ notion or 
principle." Dr. Reid, in his Essays on the Intell. Powers^ 
speaks of the sentiments of Mr. Locke concerning percep- 
tion ; and of the sentiments of Arnauld, Berkeley, and Hume 
concerning ideas. 

The title of chap. 7, essay ii., of Reid on InteU. Powers j 
is Sentiments of Philosophers., ho,., on which SirVv^. Hamilton's 
note, p. 269, is, " Sentiment^ as here and elsewhere employed 
2n 



466 YOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SENTIIWIENT— 

by Reid, in the meaning of opinion (sententid)^ is not to be 
imitated." 

'•'• By means of our sensations we feel, by means of our ideas 
we think: now a sentiment (from sentire) is properly a 
judgment concerning sensations, and an opinion (from 
opinari) is a judgment concerning ideas : our sentiments 
appreciate external, and our opinions internal, phenomena. 
On questions of feeling, taste, observation, or report, we 
define our sentiments. On questions of science, argument, 
or metaphysical abstraction, we define our opinions. The 
sentiments of the heart. The opinions of the mind. It is 
my sentiment that the wine of Burgundy is the best in the 
world. It is my opinion that the religion of Jesus Christ is 
the best in the world. There is more of instinct in sentiment^ 
and more of definition in opinion. The admiration of a work 
of art which results from first impressions, is classed with 
our sentiments ; and when we have accounted to ourselves 
for the approbation, it is classed with our opinions,'''' — 
Taylor, Synonyms. 

SION (signare^ to mark). — The definition of a sign is "that 
which represents anything to the cognitive faculty." We 
have knowledge by sense and by intellect, and a sign may 
be addressed to either or to both — as smoke, which to the 
eye and to the intellect indicates or signifies fire, so that a 
sign has a twofold relation — to the thing signified and to 
the cognitive faculty. 

" Signs are either to represent or resemble things, or only 
to Ultimate and suggest them to the mind. And our ideas 
being the signs of what is intended or supposed therein, are 
in such sort and so far right, as they do either represent or 
resemble the object of thought, or as they do at least inti- 
mate it to the mind, by virtue of some natural connection 
or proper appointment." — Oldfield, Essay on Reason^ p. 184. 
Signs are divided into natural and conventional. A 
natural sign has the power of signifying fi:om its own nature, 
so that at all times, in all places, and with all people it 
signifies the same thing, as smoke is the sign of fire. A 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 467 

SIGN— 

conventional sign has not the power of signifpng in its own 
nature, but supposes the knowledge and remembrance of 
what is signified in him to whom it is addressed, as three 
balls are the conventionally understood sign of a pawn- 
broker's shop. 

In his philosophy Dr. Reid makes great use of the doctrine 
of natural signs. He arranges them in three classes, — 
1. Those whose connection with the thing signified is 
established by nature, but discovered only by experience, 
as natural causes are signs of their effects; and hence 
philosophy is called an interpretation of nature. 2. Tliose 
wherein the connection between the sign and thing signified 
is not only established by nature, but discovered to us by a 
natural principle without reasoning or experience. Of this 
class are the natural signs of human thoughts, purposes, and 
desires, such as modulations of the voice, gestures of the 
body, and features of the face, which may be called natural 
language, in opposition to that which is spoken or written. 
3. A third class of natural signs comprehends those which, 
though we never before had any notion or conception of the 
thing signified, do suggest it and at once give us a concep- 
tion and create a belief of it. In this way consciousness, in 
all its modifications, gives the conception and belief of a 
being who thinks — Cogito ergo sum, 

'' As the first class of natural signs is the foundation of 
true philosophy, so the second is the foundation of the fine 
arts or of taste, and the last is the foundation of common 
sense." — Reid, Inquiry^ chap. 5, sec. 3. 

The doctrine or science of signs has been called Semato- 
logij. And as the signs which the mind makes use of in 
order to obtain and to communicate knowledge are words : 
the proper and skilful use of words is in different ways tlie 
object of— 1. Grammar; 2. Logic; and 3. Rhetoric. — 
Smart, Sematology., 8vo, Lond., 1839. 

See Berkeley, Minute Phil., dial, iv., sect. 7, 11, 12. 
New Theory of Vision, sect. 144, 147. Theory of Vision 
Vindicated., sect 38-43. 



468 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPnY. 

Slow— 

Hutcheson, Synopsis Metaphys.^ part 2, chap. 1. Mor, 
Philosoph.^ b. i., ch. 1, p. 5. 

De Gerando, Des Signes et de VArt de Penser, 

Adam Smitli, On the Formation of Language. 
SINOUIiAR TERM (A) is one wHcli stands for one indivi- 
dual, as James, John. 
.^OCIAIilSM. — In the various forms under which society has 
existed, private property, individual industry and enter- 
prise, and the rights of marriage and of the family, have 
been recognized. Of late years several schemes of social 
arrangement have been proposed, in which one or all of 
these principles have been abandoned or modified. These 
schemes may be comprehended under the general term of 
socialism. The motto of them all is solidarite. 

Communism demands a community of goods or property. 
Fourier ism or Phalansterism would deliver men over to the 
guidance of their passions and instincts, and destroy all 
domestic and moral discipline. Saint Simonism or Humani- 
tarianism holds that human nature has three great func- 
tions, that of the priesthood, science, and industry. Each 
of these is represented in a College, above which is the 
father or head, spiritual and temporal, whose will is the 
supreme and living law of the society. Its rehgion is pan- 
theism, its morality materiahsm or epicurism, and its poli- 
tics despotism. — Diet, des Sciences Philosop)li. 
S©€lETir (l>esire of). — '' God having designed man for a 
sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, 
and under a necessity to have fellowship with those 
of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, 
which was to be the great instrument and common tie of 
society.''^ — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.., book iii., 
chap. 1. 

That the desire of society is natural to man, is argued by 
Plato in the Second Book of his Republic. It is also hinted 
at in his dialogue entitled Protagoras. The argument is 
unfolded by Harris in his Dialogue concerning Happiness^ 
sect. 12. Aristotle has said at the beginning of his 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 469 

SOCIETY— 

Politics^ — ''The tendency to the social state is in all men 
by nature." The argument in favour of society from our 
being possessed of speech, is insisted on by him, Politic.^ 
lib. i., cap. 2. Also by Cicero, De Legihus^ lib. i., cap. 
9 ; De Officiis^ lib. i., cap. 16 ; De Nat. Deorum^ lib. ii., 
cap. 59. 

In modern times, Hobbes argued that man is naturally 
an enemy to his fellow-men, and that society is a device to 
defend men from the evils which they would bring on one 
another. Hutcheson wrote his inaugural oration when 
admitted Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, in 
opposition to Hobbes, De Naturali Hominum Socialitate, 
4:to, Glasg., T}^is Academ., 1730. 

Man is a social animal^ according to Seneca (De Clem., 
i., 3). Lactantius says that he is a social animal by nature 
(^Div, Inst.., vi., 10), in which he follows Cicero (De Offic, 
i., 14). ''Mankind have always wandered or settled, 
agreed or quarrelled, in troops and companies. — Ferguson, 
Essay on Hist, of Civ. Soc, p. 26. See also Lord Karnes, 
Hist, of Man., book ii., sketch 1 ; Filangieri, Scienza delta 
Legislazione. lib. i., c. 1. " La nature de I'homme le porte 
a vivre en societe. Quelle qu'on soit la cause, le fait se 
manifesto en toute occasion. Partout ou Ton a rencontre 
des hommes, ils vivaient en troupes, en hordes, en corps de 
nation. Peut-etre est ce afin d'unir leur forces pour leur 
surete commune ; peut-etre afin de pourvoir plus aisement 
a leur besoins ; toujours il est \Tai qu'il est dans la nature 
de I'homme de se reunir en societe, comme font les abeilles 
€t plusiers especes d' animaux ; on remarque des traits 
communs dans toutes ces reunions d'hommes, en quelque 
parti dumonde qu'ils habitent." — Say, Cours cTEcon. Poli- 
tiq.., torn. vi. Compare Comte, ibid, torn, iv., p. 54. 

This gregarious propensity is different from the political 

capacity, which has been laid down as the characteristic 

of man. 

Society (Political, Capacity of).— Command and obedience, 

which arc essential to government, are peculiar to man- 



470 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SOCIETY— 

kind. Man is singular in commanding not only tlie in- 
ferior animals, but his own species. Hence men alone 
form a political community. It lias been laid down by 
Aristotle and others, tbat tbis difference is owing to tbe 
exclusive possession of reason and speech by man, and to 
his power of discriminating between justice and injustice 
(Polit.^ i., 2). Animals, says Cicero, are unfitted for poli- 
tical society, as being ''rationis et orationis expertes." De 
Offic, i., 16. Separat haec nos a grege mutorum. Juve- 
nal, XV., 142-158. 

SOMATOl^OOY.— F. ISTatuRE. 

SOPHIS]W[, SOPHISTER, SOPHISTICAI. (;2o(pi(if/.oL, from 
GoCpioi, wisdom). — "They were called sopJiisters, as who 
would say. Counterfeit wise men." — N'orth, Plutarch, p. 
96. 

'Tor lyke wyse as though a ^S'o^^^^er woulde with a 
fonde argumente, prove unto a symple soule, that two 
egges were three, because that ther is one, and that ther 
be twayne, and one and twayne make three ; yt symple 
unlearned man, though he lacke learnying to soyle hys 
fonde argument, hath yet wit ynough to laugh thereat, 
and to eat the two egges himself, and byd the Sophyster 
tak and eat the thyrde."— Sir T. More, Works, p. 475. 

'' Sophism is a false argument. This word is not usually 
applied to mere errors in reasoning ; but only to those 
erroneous reasonings of the fallacy of which the person who 
maintained them is, in some degree, conscious ; and which 
he endeavours to conceal from examination by subtilty 
and by some ambiguity, or other unfairness in the use of 
words." — Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

According to Aristotle, the sophism is a syllogismus con- 
tentiosus, a syllogism framed not for enouncing or proving 
the truth, but for disputation. It is constructed so as to 
seem to warrant the conclusion but does not, and is faulty 
either in form or argument. — Trendlenburg, Lineamenta 
Log. Aristot., sect. 33, 8vo, Berol., 1842. 
See Reid, Account cf AristotWs Log., chap, v., sect. 3. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 471 

SOPHISJWL— 

On the difference of meaning between (pt\oao(pog and 
(7o(piaTYis, see Sheppard, Characters of Theophrastus, 8vo. 
Lend., 1852, p. 81, and p. 269. See also Grote, Hist, of 
Greece^ vol. viii., pp. 434-486, and the Cambridge Journal 
of Philosophy^ No. 2. 

l§ORlTl£^ (from (76j^oV, a heap)— is an argument composed 
of an indeterminate number of propositions, so arranged 
that the predicate of the first becomes the subject of 
the second, the predicate of the second the subject of the 
third, and so on till you come to a conclusion which unites 
the subject of the first with the predicate of the last. 

j^OUfi (■^v^v}', anima, soul). 

This word had formerly a wider signification than now. 
In the Second Book of his Treatise UspI -^vx^i Aristotle 
has given two definitions of it. In the first of these he 
calls it '' the Entelechy or first form of an organized body 
which has potential life." The word 'EyTHA£;^H/ot, which Dr. 
Reid begged to be excused from translating, because he 
did not know the meaning of it, is compounded of fr/rgAs-, 
perfect ; 'ix^iv<, to have ; and nT^og^ an end. Its use was 
revived by Leibnitz, who designated by it that which pos- 
sesses in itself the principle of its own activity, and tends 
towards its end. According to his philosophy, the universe 
is made up of monads or forces, each active in itself, and 
tending by its activity to accomplish its proper end. In 
the philosophy of Aristotle, the word Entelechy or first 
form had a similar meaning, and denoted that which in 
virtue of an end constituted the essence of things, and gave 
movement to matter. When the soul then is called the 
entelechy of an organized body having potential life, the 
meaning is, that it is that force or power by which life de- 
velops itself in bodies destined to receive it. 

Aristotle distinguished several forms of soul., viz., the nutri- 
tive or vegetative soul, by which plants and animals had 
growth and reproduction. The sensitive., which was the cause 
of sensation and feeling. The motive., of locomotion. The 
appetitive.^ which was the source of desire and will ; and the 



472 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

rational or reasonable^ whicli was the seat of reason or in- 
tellect. These powers or energies of soul exist all in some 
beings ; some of them only in other beings ; and in some 
beings only one of them. That is to say, man possesses 
all ; brutes possess some ; plants one only. In the scho- 
lastic philosophy, desire and locomotion were not regarded 
as simple powers or energies — and only the nutritive or 
vegetative soul^ the sensitive or animal, and the rational or 
human were recognized. 

In the system of Plato, three forms or energies of soul 
were assigned to man. The rational^ which had its seat in 
the head and survived the dissolution of the body — the 
irascible^ which had its seat in the heart and was the spring 
of activity and movement, and the appetitive or concu- 
piscible^ which was the source of the grosser passions and 
physical instincts, and which died with the bodily organs 
with which it was united. A similar distinction between 
the forms or energies of the soul has been ascribed to 
Pythagoras, and traces of it are to be found in several of 
the philosophical systems of the East. 

Among modern philosophers in Germany, a distinction 
is taken between -ipvxvi (Seele) and 'Truivf^oc (Geist), or soul 
and spirit. According to G. H. Schubert, professor at 
Munich, and a follower of Schelling, the soul is the inferior 
part of our intellectual nature — that which shows itself in 
the phenomena of dreaming and which is connected with 
the state of the brain. The spirit is that part of our 
nature which tends to the purely rational, the lofty, and 
divine. The doctrine of the natural and the spiritual man, 
which we find in the writings of St. Paul, may, it has been 
thought, have formed the basis upon which this mental 
dualism has been founded. Indeed it has been main- 
tained that the dualism of the thinking principle is dis- 
tinctly indicated by the apostle when he says of the 
Word of God that it is able to '' divide asunder soul 
and spirit y The words in the original are '4/vx'^ and 
'Tivivf^sc, and it is contended that by the former is meant 



YOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 473 

SOUI.— 

the sentient or animal soiil^ and by the latter the higher 
or rational soiiL A similar distinction has been traced 
in the language of the Old Testament Scriptures, where 
one word is employed to denote the life that is common 
to man with the inferior animals, nil, and another word, 
HQ-a?:? to denote that inspiration of the Almighty which 
giveth him understanding, and makes of him a rational 
soul. It may be doubted, however, whether this distinc- 
tion is uniformly observed, either in the Scriptures of the 
Old or of the New Testament. And it may be better for 
us instead of attempting to define the soul a priori by its 
essence, to define it rather a posteriori by its operations. 
This also has been done by Aristotle, in a definition which 
has been generally adopted. He says, ''The soul is that by 
which we live, feel, or perceive [will], move, and under- 
stand." This is a full enumeration of all the energies 
which Aristotle assigned to the soul., and they are all 
manifested by the soul as it exists in man. Two of them, 
however, the energies of growth and motion, are usually 
treated of by the physiologist, rather than by the ps^xho- 
logist. At the same time, life and movement are not pro- 
perties of matter ; and therefore they were enumerated b}- 
Aristotle as the properties of soul — the soul nutritive., to 
^QSTTTi/cou^ and the soul motive^ ro x.ivovv or to KiyviTDcpv. 
"The animating form of a natural body is neither its 
organization, nor its figure, nor any other of those inferior 
forms which make up the system of its visible qualities ; 
but it is the power which, not being that organization, nor 
that figure nor those qualities, is yet able to produce, to pre- 
serve, and to employ them." — Harris, Pliilosoph. Arrange.., 
p. 279. This is what is now called the principle of life, and 
the consideration of it belongs to the physiologist — for, 
although in the human being life and soul are united, it is 
thought they may still be separate entities. In like manner 
some philosophers have contended that all movement im- 
plies the existence of a soul^ and hence it is that the various 
phenomena of nature have been referred to an anlma mnndi^ 



474 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Souli- 
er soul of the universe. A modern philosopher of great 
name (Jouffi-oy, in his Cours Professe a la Faculte des 
Lettres in 1837), enumerated among the energies of the 
human soul a special faculty of locomotion, and the power 
of originating movement or change is ascribed to it when 
we call it active. Still, life and locomotion are not usually 
treated of as belonging to the soal^ but rather as belonging 
to the bodies in which they are manifested. Hence it is 
that Dr. Reid, in his definition of the human soul^ does not 
enumerate the special energies by which we live and move, 
but calls it that by which we think. '' By the mind of a . 
man," says he {Intell. Powers^ essay i., chap. 1), " we under- 
stand that in him which thinks, remembers, reasons, wills. 
. We are conscious that we think, and that we have 
a variety of thoughts of different kinds — such as seeing, 
hearing, remembering, deliberating, resolving, loving, hat- 
ing, and many other kinds of thought — all which we are 
taught by nature to attribute to one internal principle ; and 
tMs principle of thought we call the mind or soul of man."^ 
It will be observed that Dr. Reid uses the word soul as 
synonymous with mind. And, perhaps, no very clear nor 
important distinction can be taken between them. The 
plainest and most common distinction taken in the use of 
these words is, that in speaking of the mind of man we refer 
more to the various powers which it possesses, or the vari- 
ous operations which it performs ; and in speaking of the 
soul of man we refer rather to the nature and destiny of 
the human being. Thus we say the immortality of the soul^ 



* Dr. Reid's is the psychological definition. But the soul is something different 
from the ego,— from any of its faculties, and from the sum of them all. Some have 
placed its essence in thought, as the Cartesians— in sensation, as Locke and Condillac 
—or in the will or activity, like Maine de Biran. A cause distinguished from its acts, 
distinguished from its modes or different degrees of activity, is what we call a force. 
The soul then is a force, one and identical. It is, as defined by Plato (De Leg., lib. 
10), a self-moving force. Understanding this to mean bodily or local motion, Aris- 
totle has argued against this definition.— 2)e Ardma, lib. i., cap. 3. But Plato, pro- 
bably, meant self-active to be the epithet characteristic of the mind or souL—xivrio-i? 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 475 

SOUIi— 

and the powers of the mind.^ A difference of meaning is 
more observable in our language between the terms spirit 
and mind than between soul and mind. Both the latter 
terms may be and are applied indifferently to the mental 
principle as living and moving in connection with a bodily 
organism. But the term spirit properly denotes a being 
without a body. A being that never had a body is a pure 
spirit. A human soul when it has left the body is a disem- 
bodied spirit. Body is animated matter. Mind or soul is 
incorporated spirit. 

Into these verbal criticisms, however, it is not necessary 
to enter very minutely, because in psychological inquiries 
the term mind is commonly employed to denote that by 
which we feel, know, will, and reason — or in one word the 
principle of thought. We know this inward principle as 
manifested through a system of bodily organization with 
which it is united, and by which it is in many ways affected. 
But "we are taught by nature," says Dr. Reid, or it is a 
primitive belief, that the thinking principle is something 
different from the bodily organism, and when we wish to 
signalize its peculiar nature and destiny, we call it soul or 
spirit. 
Spirit, ITIind, and Soul. — '' The Jirst denoting the animating 
faculty, the breath of intelligence, the inspiring principle, 
the spring of energy and the prompter of exertion ; the 
second is the recording power, the preserver of impres- 
sions, the storer of deductions, the nurse of knowledge, 
and the parent of thought ; the last is the disembodied, 
ethereal, self-conscious being, concentrating in itself all 
the purest and most refined of human excellences, every 
generous affection, every benevolent disposition, every in- 
tellectual attainment, every ennobling virtue, and every 

* Mind and the Latin mens were probably both from a root which is now lost in 
Europe, but is preser\'ed in the Sanscrit inena, to know. The Greek toc$ or vov^, 
from the verb voico, is of similar origin and import. Mind is more Timited than soiil. 
Soul, besides the rational principle, includes the living principle, and may be applied 
to animals and vegetables. Voluntary motion should not be denied to mind, as is 
very generally done. 



476 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SOUIi— 

exalting aspiration." — The Purpose of Existence^ 12mo, 
1850, p. 79. 

'' Animus^ Anima, '^vsv/y.oc and -ij/vx'^ are participles. 
Anima est ab Animus. Animus vero est a Graeco kvi^og^ 
quod dici volunt quasi Ag^t^o?, ab ku sive Ag^/, quod est 
'?:vio) ; et Latinis a Spirando, Spiritus. Immo et •^vx'h est 
•^v-^u quod Hesychius exponit ^yg6)." — ^Yossius — quoted 
from Home Tooke in Stewart's PMiosopli. Essays — essay v. 

Indulsit mundi communis conditor illis 

Tantum animas; nobis Animum quoque.— /i^t?. Sat.., 9, v. 134. 

Anima., which is common to man and brutes, is that by 
which we live, move, and are invigorated ; whilst Animus 
is that which is peculiar to mankind, and by which we 
reason. 

The triple division of man into vovg., -^^vx'^-, oofx^u., occurs 
frequently in ancient authors. Plato, Timceus^ Aristotle, 
Pol. 1. The Hellenist Jews seemed to have used the term 
TTusvfccc to denote what the Greeks called vovg^ with an allu- 
sion to Gen. ii. 7. Josephus' Ant. Jud.^ i., c. 2. Thence 
in the New Test, we have 1 Thess. v. 23, 'Kviv^^x,, '^vx^i-, 
aof^M. — Heb. iv. 12, and Grotius' Note on Matthew^ xxvL 
41. — Fitzgerald's Notes on AristotWs Ethics^ p. 197. 

'^vx% soul, when considered separately, signifies the 
principle of life ; Noi^^, mind, the principle of intelligence. 
Or, according to Plutarch, soul is the cause and beginning 
of motion, and mind of order and harmony with respect 
to motion. Together they signify an intelligent soul {iuuovg 
-ipvx'A) which is sometimes called a rational soul Q'pvx'y] 
"hayiKyi). Hence, when the nature of the soul is not in ques- 
tion, the word -^vx'h is used to express both. Thus in the 
Phcedo the soul (^^v^'h) is said sometimes to use the body 
for the examination of things ; at vfhich times, according to 
Plato, it forms confused and imperfect notions of things, 
and is involved in error. But, when it examines things by 
itself, it arrives at what is pure and always existing, and 
immortal, and uniform, and is free from error. Here the 
highest operations of uovg "mind" are indisputably attri- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 4 m 

sout— 

buted to tJ/v;c'/9, '' soiil." Aristotle describing 4'^'/^'^ (^6 
Anima^ lib. i., cap. 1), says that during anger, confidence, 
desire, &c., it participates with the body; but that the 
act of understanding belongs peculiarly to itself.— Morgan, 
0)1 Trinity of Plato, p. 54. 
sour. OF THE \^^ORr.I>. — AXIMA MUNDI, q. V. 
SPACE (Spatiuvi). — '' Space, taken in the most general sense, 
comprehends whateyer is extended, and may be measured 
by the three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. In 
this sense it is the same with extension. Xow, space, in this 
large signification, is either occupied by hody, or it is not. 
If it be not, but is yoid of all matter, and contaias nothing, 
then it is space in the strictest signification of the word, and 
as it is commonly used in Enghsh philosophical language, 
being the same vaih what is called a vacuum. "^^ — Monboddo, 
Ancient Met, b. iy., ch. 2. 

Mr. Locke has attempted to show that we acqmi'e the 
idea of space by sensation, especially by the senses of 
touch and sight — book ii., ch. 4. But according to Dr. 
Keid, '-^ space is not so properly an object of sense as a 
necessary concomitant of the objects of sight and touch." — 
Intell. Powers, essay ii., ch. 19. It is when we see or touch 
body that we get the idea of space ; but the idea is not fur- 
nished by sense — it is a conception, a priori, of the reason. 
Experience furnishes the occasion, but the mind rises to 
the conception by its natiye energy. This riew has been 
supported by Cousin, Cours tTHistoire de la Philosophic au 
xviii., Sicele, 2 tom., 17 le^on ; and by Eoyer Collard, in 
Jouffroy's (Euvres du Reid, tom. ui., fragmeu 4, p. 424 : 
tom. iy., fragmen 9, p. 338. 

"In the philosophy of Kant space and time are mere 
forms of the sensibility. By means of the external sense 
we represent to ourselyes eyer}i:hmg as in space; and 
by the internal sense all is represented in the relationship 
of time." — Analysis of Kant's Critic, of Pure Etason, 8yo, 
Lond., 1844, p. 9. 

According to Kant, space is a subjectiyc condition of the 



478 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SPACE— 

sensibility, the form of all external phenomena ; and as the 
sensibility is necessarily anterior in the subject to all real 
intuition, it follows that the form of all these phenomena is 
in the mind a priori. There can, then, be no question 
about space or extension but in a human or subjective 
point of view. It may well be said of all things, in so far 
as they appear existing without us, that they are enclosed 
in space ; but not that space encloses things absolutely, seen 
or not seen, and by any subject whatsoever. The idea of 
space has no objective validity, it is real only relatively 
to phenomena, to things, in so far as they appear out of 
us ; it is purely ideal in so far as things are taken in them- 
selves, and considered independently of the forms of the 
sensibility. — Willm, Hist, de la Philosoph. AUemande^ tom. 
i., p. 142. 

"According to Leibnitz, space is nothing but the order of 
things CO -existing, as time is the order of things successive 
— and he maintained, ' that, supposing the whole system 
of the visible world to be moved out of the place which it 
presently occupies, into some other portion of space^ beyond 
the limits of this universe, still it would be in the same 
space^ provided the order and arrangement of the bodies, 
with respect to one another, was continued the same.' 
]^ow, it is true, that bodies placed in any kind of order, 
must necessarily be in space ; but the order in which bodies 
are placed, and the space in which they are placed, must 
necessarily be distinct. "-^Monboddo, Ancient Metaphysics, 
book iv., chap. 1. Letters of Clarke and Leibnitz. 

"1. Space is not pure nothing, for nothing has no capa- 
city ; but space has the capacity of receiving body. 

"2. It is not an ens rationis, for it was occupied by heaven 
and earth before the birth of man. 

" 3. It is not an accident inhering in a subject, i. 6., body, 
for body changes its place, but space is not moved with it. 

''4. It is not the superficies of one body surrounding 
another, because superficies is an accident; and as super- 
ficies is a quantity it should occupy space; but space can- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 479 

SPACE— 

not occupy space. Besides, the remotest heaven occupies 
space^ and has no superficies surrounding it. 

'' 5. It is not the relation or order with reference to certain 
fixed points, as east, west, north, and south. For if the 
whole world were round, bodies would change place and not 
their order, or they may change their order and not their 
place, if the sky, with the fixed points, were moved by itself. 

'^ 6. and 7. It is not body, nor spirit. 

'-'• 8. It may be said with probability that space cannot be 
distinguished from the divine immensity, and therefore 
from God. It is infinite and eternal, which God only is. 
He is the place of all being, for no being is out of Him. 
And although different beings are in different places exter- 
nally, they are all virtually in the divine immensity." — 
Derodon, Physic.^ pars. 1, ch. 6. 

Bardili argued for the reality of time and space from the 
fact that the inferior animals perceive or have notions of 
them. Yet their minds, if they can be said to have minds, 
are not subject to the forms or laws of the human mind. 

But if space be something to the mind, which has the 
idea of it, and to the bodies which exist in it, what is it ? 
'' Perhaps," says Dr. Reid (ut suprd)^ '' we may apply to it 
what the Peripatetics said of their first matter, that what- 
ever it is, it is potentially only, not actually." This, accord- 
ingly, is the view taken of it by a great admirer of the 
Peripatetic philosophy. *' Space^^^ says Lord Monboddo 
{Ancient Metaphys.^ book iv., chap. 2), '' is but a relative ; 
and it is relative to body, and to hody only, and this in three 
respects, firsts as to its capacity of receiving body ; secondly, 
as to its connecting or limiting body ; and lastly^ as to its 
being the distance between bodies that are separated. . . 
Place is space occupied by body. It is different from body 
as that which contains is different from that which is con- 
tained. . . Space^ then, is place^ 'hvvuf^ei^ or potentially : 
and when it is filled with body, then it is place actually^ or 
gi/g^y««." 

Space., as containing all things, was b\' l*hilo iuid others 



480 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SPACE — 

identified with the Infinite. And the text (Acts xvii. 28) 
which says that '' in God we live, and move, and have our 
being," was interpreted to mean that space is an affection 
or property of the Deity. Sir Isaac Newton maintained 
that God by existing constitutes time and space. " JSTon est 
duratlo vel spatium sed durat et adest, et existendo semper 
et ubique, spatium et durationem constituit." Clarke main- 
tained that space is an attribute or property of the Infinite 
Deity. Keid and Stewart, as well as Cousin and Eoyer 
Collard, while they regard space as something real and 
more than a relation, have not positively said what it is. 

As space is a necessary conception of the human mind, as 
it is conceived of as infinite, and as an infinite quality. Dr. 
Clarke thought that from these views we may argue the 
existence of an infinite substance, to which this quality be- 
longs. — See liis Demonstration of the Being and Attributes 
of God^ with Butler's Letters to him and the Answers. 
Stewart, Active and Moral Powers. 
Pownall, Intellectual Physics. 
Brougham, Nat. Theology, 
SPECIES (fi?om the old verb, specio^ to see) — is a word of 
different signification, in difierent departments of philo- 
sophy. 

In Logic, species was defined to be, "Id quod prsedicatur 
de pluribus numero difierentibus, in qusestione quid est ?" 
And genus was defined to be, " Id quod predicatur de pluri- 
bus differentibus specie^ in qusestione quid est ?" According 
to Derodon (Log.., p. 293), the adequate definition of 
genus is, '^ Kes similes eodem nomine substantivo donatse, 
et identificatse cum omnibus inferioribus diverso nomine 
substantivo donatis, et proprietate quadam incommunicabili 
distinctis." And of species., '^Ees similes eodem nomine 
substantivo donatse, et identificatse cum omnibus inferiori- 
bus diverso nomine substantivo donatis, et omnes propri- 
etates ita similes habentibus, ut quodlibet possit habere 
attributa aliorum, nullum tamen habeat actu idem sed 
tantum simile." 



A'OCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 181 

SiPECIES— 

In the process of classification (</. i'.), the first step 
is the formation of a species. A species is a group of in- 
diYidiials agreeing in some common character, and de- 
signated by a common name. When two or more species 
are brought together in the same way they are called a 
genus. 

'^In Logic, genus and species are relative terms ; a con- 
ception is called in relation to its superior, species — to its 
inferior, genus. The summum genus is the last result of the 
abstracting process, the genus which can never in turn be 
a species. The innma species is the species which cannot 
become a genus,- which can only contain individuals, and 
not other species. But there can only be one absolute 
summum genus^ whether we call it -thing,' 'substance,' or 
' essence.' And we can scarcely ever ascertain the injima 
species, because even in a handliil of individuals, we cannot 
say with certainty that there are no distinctions on which a 
farther subdivision into smaller classes might be foimded." 
— Thomson, Outline of Laics of Thought^ second edition. 
sect. '21. 

In JMatJiematics^ the term species was used in its primi- 
tive sense of appearance ; and when the form of a figiu^e 
was given, it was said to be given in species. 

Algehra. in which letters are tised for numbers, was 
called, at one time, the specious notation. 

In Mineralogy^ species is determined by perfect identitv 
of composition ; the form goes for nothhig. 

In the organized kingdoiiis of natm-e, on the contrary. 
species is founded on identity of form and structure, both 
external and internal. The principal characteristic of 
sjyecies in animals and vegetables, is the power to produce 
beings like themselves, who are also productive. A species 
may be modified by external infltiences ; and thus give rise 
to races or varieties : btit it never abandons its own proper 
chaiticter to assume another. 

In Xatural History^ species includes only the following 
conditions ; viz., separate oriorin and distinctness of race, 
2 I ^ 



482 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SPECIES— 

evinced by a constant transmission of some cliaracteristic 
peculiarity of organization. — Dr. Pricliard. 

'' Species ^''^ according to Dr. Morton (author of Crania 
Americana^ ^ ''■is a primordial organic form.^^ See a de- 
scription of species in Lyell's Geology^ cliap. 37. 

'' By maintaining the unity of the human species (says 
A. V. Humboldt, Cosmos^ vol. i., p. 355, Engl, trans.), we 
at the same time repel the cheerless assumption of superior 
and inferior races of men." " This eminent writer appears 
in the passage quoted, to exaggerate the extent of uni- 
formity implied in a common species. It is unquestionable 
that mankind form one species in the sense of the natural 
historian ; but it does not follow from this fact that there 
are no essential hereditary differences, both physical and, 
mental, between different varieties and races of men. The 
analogy of animal species would make it probable that such 
essential differences do exist ; for we see that, although all 
horses, dogs, oxen, sheep, &c., form respectively one species^ 
yet each species contains varieties or races, which possess 
cert am properties in different degrees, — which are more or 
less large, active, gentle, intelligent, hardy, and the like. 
If we are guided by the analogy of animal species^ it is as 
probable that an Englishman should be more intelligent 
than a negro, as that a greyhound should be more fleet 
than a mastiff, or an Arabian horse than a Shetland pony." 
— Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, On Politics^ chap. 27, sect. 10. 
Species in Perception. 

In explaining the process of external perception, or how 
we come to the knowledge of things out of and distant from 
us, it was maintained that these objects send forth species 
or images of themselves which, making an impression on 
the bodily organs, next imprinted themselves on the mind 
and issued in knowledge. 

The species considered as the vicarious representative of 
the object, was called intentional. And as it affected both 
the intellect and the sense, was distinguished as sensible 
and intelligihle. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 483 

SPECIES— 

Species^ as sensible^ was distinguished as species impressa^ 
as making an impression upon the sense — and species ex- 
pressa^ in consequence of the sense or imagination from 
the impression elaborating another species of the object. 

SpecieSy as intelligible^ was also distinguished into species 
impressa and species expressa. The species intelligihilis was 
called impressa^ as it determined the faculty to the appre- 
hension of this object, rather than of that. And it was 
called expressa^ as in consequence of the operation of the 
faculty, knowledge of the object was attained to. 

According to some, the species as intelligible were con- 
genite, and according to others they were elaborated by the 
intellect in the presence of the phantasms. 

The process of perception is thus described by Tellez 
(^Summa Philosoph. Aristot.^ Paris, 1644, p. 47). 

Socrates by his figure, &c., makes an impression upon 
the eye, and vision follows — then a species is impressed upon 
the phantasy, pJiantasma impressum; the phantasy gives the 
pJiantasma expressum^ the intellectus agens purifies " and 
spiritualizes it, so that it is received by the intellectus 
patiens^ and the knowledge of the object is elicited. 

' ' The philosophy schools teach that for the cause of vision. 
the thing seen sendeth forth on every side a visible species 
(in English), a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or a 
being seen, the receiving of which into the eye is seeing. 
.... ]^ay, for the cause of understanding also the thing 
understood sendeth forth an intelligible species^ that is, an in- 
telligible being seen, which, coming into the understanding, 
makes it understood." — Hobbes, Of Man ^ part 1, chap. 1. 

For the various forms under which the doctrine of species 
has been held, see Reid, Intell. Poivers^ essay ii., chap. 8, 
with notes by Sir W. Hamilton, and note J). 

The doctrine was not universally received during the 
Middle Ages. 

'-'' Scholasticism had maintained that between the exterior 
bodies, placed before us, and the mind of man, there are 
images which belong to the exterior bodies, and make more 



484 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SPECIES— 

or less a part of them, as the Uo&}?^oi> of Democritus, images 
or sensible forms which represent external objects by the 
conformity which they have with them. So the mind was 
supposed to be able to know spiritual beings only through 
the medium of intelligible species. Occam destroyed these 
chimeras, and maintained that there is nothing real but 
spiritual or material beings, and the mind of man, which 
directly conceives them. Gabriel Biel, a pupil of Occam 
(born at Spire, and died 1495), exhibited with much 
sagacity and clearness the theory of his master. Occam 
renewed, without knowing it, the warfare of Arcesilaus 
against the Stoics ; and he is in modern Europe the fore- 
runner of Reid and of the Scotch school." — Cousin, Hist, of 
Mod. Phil.., vol. ii., p. 2Q. 

Mons. Haureau (Examinat. de Fliilosoph. Scolast^ torn, i., 
p. 416) says of Durandus de St. Pourcain that he not only 
rejected intelligible species^ but that he would not admit 
sensible species. To feel, to think, said he, are simple acts 
which result from the commerce of mind with an external 
object ; and this commerce takes place directly without 
anything intermediate. 
SPECIFICATION (The Priaiciple of) is — that beings the 
most like or homogeneous, disagree or are heterogeneous 
in some respect. 
SFECUI^ATION (speculare, to regard attentively). — '' To 
speculate is, from premisses given or assumed, but con- 
sidered unquestionable, as the constituted point of obser- 
vation, to look abroad upon the whole field of intellectual 
vision, and thence to decide upon the true form and di- 
mension of ail which meets the view." — ^JMarsh, Prelim. 
Essay to Aids to Reflection, p. 13. 

It is that part of philosophy which is neither practical 
nor experimental. The sjjeculaiive part of philosophy is 
metaphysics. The specidative part of mathematics is that 
which has no application to the arts. 
SPHilTUAlilSlll (spiritus, spirit) — is not any particular 
system of philosophy, but the doctrine, whether grounded 



VOCABULAllY OF PHILOSOPHY. 485 

on reason, sentiment, or faith, that there are substances or 
beings which are not cognizable by the senses, and which 
do not reveal themselves to us by any of the qualities of 
matter, and y^hich we therefore call immaterial or spirituaL 
Materialism denies this. But spiritualism does not deny 
the existence of matter, and, placing itself above materi- 
alism, admits both body and spirit. Hence it is called 
dualism as opposed to the denial of the existence of matter. 
The idealism of Berkeley and Malebranclie may be said to 
reduce material existences to mere phenomena of the mind. 
Mysticism, whether religious or philosophical, ends with 
resolving mind and matter into the Divine substance. 
Mysticism and idealism tend to pantheism, materialism 
to atheism. Spiritualism^ grounded upon consciousness, 
preserves equally, God, the human person, and external 
nature, without confounding them and without isolating 
the one from the other. — Diet, des Sciences PhilosopJi. 

SPONTANEITY. — Leibnitz (Opera^ torn, i., p. 459) explains 
^'•spontaneity to mean the true and real dependence of our 
actions on ourselves." Heineccius calls it " the facult}- of 
directing one's aim to a certain end." — TurnbuU, lYans.. 
vol. i., p. 35. 

SPONTANEOUS is opposed to Reflective. Those operations of 
mind which are continually going on ydthout any effort or 
intention on our part are spontaneous. When we exercise 
a volition, and make an effort of attention to direct our 
mental energy in any particular way, or towards any parti- 
cular object, we are said to reflect^ or to observe. 

|§TAN1>A11]> OF vaRTUE Standard is that by which other 

things are rated or valued. "Labour alone, therefore, never 
varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real stan- 
dard by which commodities can at all times and places be 
estimated and compared." — Smith, Wealth of Nat.., b. i., c. 5. 
A standard is something set up by which to measure the 
quantity or quality of some other thing. Now Rectitude is 
the foundation of Vii-tue. The standard of Virtue is some 
law or rule by w^hich Rectitude can be measured. To the 



486 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

STANDARD— 

law of God, and to the testimony of an enlightened con- 
science, if they agree not, it is because there is no truth nor 
Tightness in them. !N^ow the will of God, as declared by the 
constitution and course of nature, or as revealed by His 
word, is a standard by which we may measure the amount 
of Rectitude, in action or disposition. According as they 
agree, in a greater or less degi^ee, with the indications of 
the divme will, in the same proportion are they right, or in 
accordance with Rectitude. The standard of Virtue, then, 
is the will of God, as declared in His AVord, or some law or 
rule deduced from the constitution of nature and the course 
of Providence. The Foundation of Virtue is the ground or 
reason on which the law or rule rests. — V. Criterion. 
STATE (States of ITIiiid). — '' The reason why madness, idiotism, 
&c., are called states'^ of mind, while its acts and operations 
are not, is because mankind have always conceived the mind 
to be passive in the former and active in the latter." — 
Reid's Correspondence, p. 85. 

Such were the views of Dr. Reid. But since his day, a 
change has passed over the language of Scottish Psycholog}^ 
Xo change of phraseolog}', because no change of doctrine, 
is to be found in the wiitings of Mr. Stewart. But in those 
of Dr. Brown the difference is manifest. Instead of speak- 
ing of the mind as operating^ or as acting^ or as energizing^ 
he delights rather to speak of it as exhibiting phenomena, 
and as passing through, or existing in, different states. This 
phraseolog}' has been by many accepted and applauded. It 
is thought that by adopting it, we neither affirm nor deny 
the activity of the mind, and thus proceed to consider its 
manifestations, unembarrassed by any questions as to the 
way in which these manifestations are brought about. But 
it may be doubted if this phraseology leaves the question as 
to the activity of the mind entire and untouched. 

If Dr. Brown had not challenged the common opinion, he 

* ''The term st >ie lias, more especially oflate year?, and principally "by Xecessitarian 
pliilosophers, been applied to all modifications of mind indifferently." — Sir "Will. 
Hamilton. 



VOCACULAPvY OF PIIILOSOPIIV. 487 

STATE — 

woiild not. probably, have disturbed the language that was 
preTiously in common use ; although it must be admitted 
that he was by no means averse to novel phrases. At all 
events, the tendency of his philosophy is to represent the 
mind in all its manifestations as passive— the mere recipient 
of changes, made upon it from without. Indeed, his system 
of philosophy, which is sensational in its principles, may be 
said to take the bones and sinews out of the mind, and to 
leave only a soft and fielding mass, to be magnetized by the 
palmistry of matter. That the mind in some of its manifes- 
tations is passive, rather than active, is admitted ; and in 
reference to these, there can be no objection to speak of 
it as existing in certain states, or passing into these states. 
But in adopting to some extent this phi-aseolog}', we must 
not let go the testimony which is given in favour of the 
activity- of mind, by the use and structure of language. 
Language is not the invention of philosophers. It is the 
natural expression of the human mind, and the exponent 
of those views which are natural to it. Xow, the phrase 
operations of mind., ]>eing in common use, indicates a com- 
mon opinion that mind is naturally active. That opinion 
may be erroneous, and it is open to philosophers to show if 
they can, that it is so. But the observation of Dr. Eeid is, 
that '*imtil it is proved that the mind is not active in 
thinking, but merely passive, the conunon language with 
regard to its operations ought to be used, and ought not to 
give place to a phraseolog}' invented by philosophers, whioh 
implies its being merely passive.'' 

And in another place (^Intell. Powers, essay i., chap. 1). 
he says, '• There may be distinctions that have a real foun- 
dation, and which may be necessary in philosophy, which 
are not made in common language, because not necessar^- 
in the common business of life. But I believe no instance 
will be found of a distinction made in aU languages, which 
has not a just foundation in nature." 

If any change of phraseology were expedient, the phrase 
*^ manifestations of mind^' would touch less upon the ques- 



488 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

STATE— 

tlon of its activity. But in the language of Dr. Reid — 
''Tlie mind is from its very nature, a living and active 
being. Everything we know of it implies life and active 
energy ; and the reason why all its modes of thinking are 
called its operations, is, that in all or in most of them, it is not 
merely passive, as body is, but is really and properly active. 
In all ages, and in all languages, ancient and modern, the 
various modes of thinkiag have been expressed by words of 
active signification, such as seeing, hearing, reasoning, will- 
ing, and the like. It seems, therefore, to be the natural 
judgment of mankind, that the mind is active in its various 
vfays of thinking ; and for this reason they are called its 
operations, and are expressed by active verbs. It may be 
made a question, what regard is to be paid to this natural 
judgment? May it not be a vulgar error? Philosophers 
who think so, have, no doubt, a right to be heard. But 
until it is proved that the mind is not active in thinking, but 
merely passive, the common language /with regard to its 
operations ought to be used, and ought not to give place to 
a phraseology invented by philosophers, which implies its 
being merely passive." 

One proof of the mind being active in some of its opera- 
tions is, that these operations are accompanied with effort, 
and followed by languor. In attention, we are conscious of 
effort ; and the result of long continued attention is languor 
and exhaustion. This could not be the case if the mind 
was altogether passive— the mere recipient of impressions 
made — of ideas introduced. — V. Operations of Mind. 

STATISTICS. — '' The observation, registration, and arrange- 
ment of those facts in politics which admit of being reduced 
to a numerical expression has been, of late years, made the 
subject of a distinct science, and comprehended under the 
designation of Statistics. Both the name and the separate 
treatment of the subject were due to Achenwall,* who died 

* Godefroy Achenwall was born at Elbingen, in Prussia, in 1719, studied at Jena, 
Halle, and Leipsic, established himself at Marbourg in 1746, and in 1748, where he 
sOon afterwards obtained a chair. He was distinguished as Professor of History and 
Statistics. But he also published several works on the Law of Nature and of Nations. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 489 

STATISTICS— 

ill 1772. Upon the nature and proyince of the science of 
statMcs, see the Introduction to the Journal of the London 
Statistical Society^ yoI. i., 1839. This science, it is there 
remarked, does not discuss causes, nor reason upon pro- 
bable effects : it seeks only to coUect, arrange, and compare, 
that class of facts which alone (?) can form the basis of 
correct conclusions Avith respect to social and poHtical 
gOYernment. ... Its peculiarity is, that it proceeds 
whoUy by the accumulation and comparison of facts, and 
does not admit of any kind of speculation. . . . The 
statist commonly prefers to employ figures and tabidar 
exhibitions/' — Sir G. C. Lewis. Method of Observat. in 
Politics^ chap. 5, sect. 10. 
STOICS (from a TO cc. a porch). — "From the Tnscidan Questions,^^ 
says Bentham, *• I learnt that pain is no cyH. Yirtue is of 
itself sufficient to confer happiness on any man who is dis- 
posed to possess it on these terms. . . . 

**This was the sort of trash which a set of men used to 
amuse themselyes with talking, while parading backwards 
and forwards in colonnades, called porches : that is to say, 
the Stoics^ so called from aroce.^ the Greek name for a porch. 
In regard to these, the general notion has been, that com- 
pared with our cotemporaries iu the same ranks, they were, 
generally speaking, a good sort of men ; and assuredly, m 
all tunes, good sort of men, talking all their liyes long 
nonsense, in an endless Yariety of shapes, noYcr haye been 
wanting : but that, from talking nonsense in this or any 
other shape, they or their successors haye, in any way or 
degree, been the better, this is what does not foUow." — 
DeontoL^ yoI. i., p. 302. 

Their philosophy of mind may be judged of by the motto 
assigned to them — Nihil est in intelkcta nisi prius fucrit in 
sensu. Yet, along vnXh. this, they held that the mind had the 
power of framing general ideas, but these were deriyed from 
experience. Zeno compared the hand open to Sensation ; 
half closed upon some object to Judgment ; fully closed 
upon it to (^oLi/raalx xaTaX;;;rT/x>:,comprehensiYe Judgment, 



490 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

STOICS— 

or Synthesis of Judgment. And when the one hand grasped 
the other, to enable it to hold more firmly, this was universal 
and definitive synthesis or science. In physics they said all 
things were made of Cause and Matter. In morals their 
maxim was '' to live agreeably to nature." Mind ought to 
govern matter. And the gTeat struggle of life was, to lift 
the soul above the body, and the evils incident to it. Their 
two great rules were ui/ex^v and a'lrixov — sustine^ dbstine. — 
Diet, des Sciences PhilosopJi. 

Heinsius (Dan.), PhilosopJi. Stoica^ 4:to, Leyd., 1627. 

Lipsius (Justus), Manuductio ad Stoicam Fhilosoph,^ 4to, 
Antw., 1664. 

Gataker (Thomas), Dissertatio de Disciplina Stoica^ pre- 
fixed to his edition of Ail toninus^ 4to, Camb., 1643. 
SUBJECT, OBJECT, SUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE.— 
"We frequently meet,'' says Dr. Keid, "with a distinction 
between things in the mind and things external to the mind. 
The powers, faculties, and operations of the mind, are 
things in the mind. Everything is said to be in the mind, 

of which the mind is the subject Excepting the 

mind itself and things in the mind, all other things are 
said to be external." 

By the term subject Dr. Reid meant substance, that to 
which powers belong or in which qualities reside or inhere. 
The distinction therefore which he takes between things in 
the mind and things external to the mind, is equivalent to 
that which is expressed among continental writers by the ego 
and the no7i ego^ or self smd not self. The mind and things 
in the mind constitute the ego. " All other things," says 
Dr. Reid, " are said to be external." They constitute the 
7ion ego. Aristotle expressed this distinction by the 
phrases to. yj/i^iu^ things in us — and riz (pvasi^ things in nature. 

In connection with these modes of expression, it may be 
proper to notice the correlative terms subject and object^ 
which are frequently employed in mental science. 

"In the philosophy of mind, subjective denotes what is 
to be referred to the thinking subject, the ego ; objective.^ 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 491 

SUBJECT— 

what belongs to the object of thought, the non egoy — Sir 
W. Hamilton, Discussions^ 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 5, note. 

'' The subject is properly, id in quo ; the object^ id circa 
quod. Hence, m psychological language, the subject abso- 
lutely, is the inincl that knows or thinks, i. e., the mind 
considered as the subject of knowledge or thought — the 
object^ that which is known or thought about. The adjec- 
tives subjective and objective are convenient, if not indis- 
pensable expressions." — Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid^s Worl's, 
p. 221, note. 

In note B to ReicVs Worlcs^ p. 108, Sir ^"\'ill. Hamilton 
explains how these terms should have come into common 
use in Mental Philosophy. 

'* All knowledge is a relation, a relation between that 
which knows (in scholastic language, the subject in which 
knowledge inheres) and that which is known (in scholastic 
language, the object about which knowledge is conversant), 
and the contents of every act of knowledge are made up of 
elements, and regulated by laws, proceeding partly from 
its object and partly from its subject. ISTow, philosophy 
proper is principally and primarily the science of know- 
ledge — its first and most important problem being to deter- 
mine, "What can we know ? that is, what are the condition? 
of our knowing, whether these lie in the nature of the 
object, or in the nature of the subject of knowledge. 

^'But philosophy being the science of knowledge : and 
the science of knowledge supposing, in its most funda- 
mental and thorough going analysis, the distinction of the 
subject and object of knowledge ; it is evident that to philo- 
sophy the subject of knowledge would be by pre-eminence 
the subject, and the object of knowledge., the object. It was 
therefore natural that the object and objective., the subject 
and subjective^ should be employed by philosophers as 
simple terms, compendiously to denote the grand discri- 
mination, about which philosophy was constantly em])loyed, 
and which no others could be found so precisely and 
promptly to express." 



492 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SUBJECT— 

For a disquisition on subject^ see Tappan, Logic^ sect. 4. 
— F. Objective. 
SUBJECTIVISM is the doctrine of Kant, that all human 
knowledge is merely relative ; or rather that we cannot 
prove it to be absolute. According to him, we cannot 
ohjectify the subjective ; that is, we cannot prove that what 
appears true to us must appear true to all intelligent 
beings; or that with different faculties what now appears, 
true to us might not appear true. But to call our knowledge 
relative is merely calling it human or proportioned to the 
faculties of a man ; just as the knowledge of angels may 
be called angelic. Our knowledge may be admitted to be 
relative to our faculties of apprehending it ; but that does 
not make it less certain. 
SUBlilME (The). — '' In reflecting on the circumstances by 
which sublimity in its primitive sense is specifically distin- 
guished, the first thing that strikes us is, that it carries the 
thoughts in a direction opposite to that in which the great 
and universal law of terrestrial gravitation operates." — 
Stewart, Philosoph. Essays^ Essay on Sublime. 

A sense of grandeur and sublimity has been recognized 
as one of the reflex senses belonoinof to man. It is differ- 
ent from the sense of the beautiful, though closely allied 
to it. Beauty charms, sublimity moves us, and is often 
accompanied with a feeling resembling fear, while beaut}' 
rather attracts and draws us towards it. 

There is a sublime in nature^ as in the ocean or the 
thunder — ^in moral action, as in deeds of daring and self- 
denial — and in art. as in statuary and painting, by whicli 
what is sublime in nature and in moral character is repre- 
sented and idealized. 

Kant has accurately analyzed our feelings of sublimity 
and beauty in his Critique du Judgment. 

Cousin, Sur le Beau., le Vrai^ et le Bon, 

Burke, On Sublime and Beautiful 

Addison, Spectator., vol. vi. 
SUBSISTENTIA is a substantial mode added to a singular 



A^OCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 493 

SUBSISTENTIA— 

nature, and constituting a suppositum along with it. It 
means, 1. The thing itself, the suppositum; hence we call 
the three persons of the Trinity three Tiypostases or subsist- 
ences. % The mode added to the singukr nature to com- 
plete its existence ; this is the metaphysical sense. 3. Tlie 
act of existing iper se. 

^^ Suhsistentia est ^ substantia3 completio;' qua carent 
rerum naturalium partes a reliquis divulsse. Suhsistens 
dicitur suppositum aut hypostasis. Persona est suppositum 
ratione pr^editum." — Hutcheson, Metaphys.^ pars. 1, cap. 5. 

SUBSTAIVCE is ''that which is and abides." 

It may be derived from suhsistens {ens per se suhsistens)., 
that which subsists of or by itself; or from suhstans (id quod 
suhstat)^ that which Hes under qualities — the vTrox&iy.si/ov of 
the Greeks. But in Greek substance is denoted by ovaix — 
so that which truly is, or essence, seems to be the proper 
meaning of suhstance. It is opposed to accident; of which 
Aristotle has said (Metaphjs., lib. vii.) that you can scarcely 
predicate of it that it is anything. So also Augustine (Z)e 
Trinitate^ lib. vii., c. 4) derives suhstance from suhsistendo 
rather than from suhstando. " Sicut ab eo quod est esse, 
appellatur essentia ; ita ab eo quod est subsistere^ suhstan- 
tiam dicimus." But Locke prefers the derivation from 
suhstando. He says (Essay on Hum, Understand., book 
ii., ch. 23), ""The idea, then, we have, to Vv^hich we give 
the name of suhstance^ being nothing but the supposed but 
unknown support of these qualities we find existing, which 
we imagine cannot subsist, sine re suhsiante^ without some- 
thing to support them, we call that support substantia ; 
which, according to the true import of the word is, in plain 
English, standing under or upholdmg." 

Dr. Hampden (Banipton Lect.^ vii., p. 337), has said, 
'' Substance., in its logical and metaphysical sense, is that 
nature of a thing which may be conceived to remain when 
every other nature is removed or abstracted from it — the 
ultimate point in analyzing the complex idea of any object. 
Accident denotes all those ideas which the analysis excludes 



494 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SUBSTANCE— 

as not belonging to tlie mere being or nature of the 
object." 

Stihstance bas been defined, ens per se exisiens ; and acci- 
dent^ ens existens non in se sed in alio. 

Our first idea of substance is probably derived from the 
consciousness of self — the conviction that, while our sensa- 
tions^ thoughts, and purposes are changing, we continue 
the same. We see bodies also remaining the same as to 
quantity or extension, while their colour and figure, their 
state of motion or of rest may be changed. 

Substances^ it has been said, are either p^'^^i^'f-Ci'^y') that is, 
singular, individual substances ; or secondary,^ that is 
genera and species of substance. Substances have also been 
divided into complete and incomplete^ fiiite and infinite^ &c. 
But these are rather divisions of being. Substance may, 
however, be properly divided into matter and spirit, or that 
which is extended and that which thinks. — V. Essence. 
Substance (The Principle of) denotes that law of the human 
mind by which every quality or mode of being is referred 
to a substance. In everything which we perceive or can 
imagine as existing, we distinguish two parts, qualities 
variable and multiplied, and a being one and identical ; 
and these two are so united that we cannot separate them 
in our intelligence, nor think of qualities without a sub- 
stance. Memory recalls to us the many modes of our 
mind ; but amidst all these modes we believe ourselves to 
be the same individual being. So in the world around us 
the phenomena are continually varying ; but we believe that 
these phenomena are produced by causes which remain as 
substances the same- And as we know ourselves to be the 
causes of our own acts, and to be able to change the modes 
of our own mind, so we believe the changes of matter to be 
produced by causes which belong to the substance of it. 
And underlying all causes, vfhether of finite mind or matter. 



* Hanreau (PhilosopJi. Scdast.^ tom. i., p, 60), says that what has been called 
second substance is just one of its modes or a species. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 495 

SUBSTANCE— 

we conceive of one universal and absolute cause, one sub- 
stance^ in itself persistent and upholding all things. 

SUBSUMPTION (suh^ under; sumere^ to take). — ''When we 
are able to comprehend why or how a thing is, the belief 
of the existence of that thing is not a primary datum of 
consciousness, but a suhsumption under the cognition or 
belief which affords its reason." — Sir Will. Hamilton, BeicVs 
Works^ note A. 

SUCCESSION.— " By reflecting on the appearing of various 
ideas one after another in our understanding, we get the 
notion of succession,^ ^ — Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand.., 
b. ii., ch. 14. He traces our notion of duration or time to 
the same origin ; or rather he confounds succession and 
duration., the measure with the thing measured. According 
to Cousin and others, the notion of time is logically ante- 
cedent and necessary to the notion of succession. Events 
take place in time, as bodies exist in space. In the philo- 
sophy of Kant, time is not an empirical notion, but like 
space, a form of the sensibility. — F- Duration, Time. 

SUFFICIENT REASON (Boctrine of). — " Of the principle 
of the sufficient reason., the following account is given b}^ 
Leibnitz himself, in his Controversial Correspondence witli 
Dr. Clarke : — " The great foundation of mathematics is the 
principle of contradiction or identity ; that is, that a propo- 
sition cannot be true and false at the same time. But, in 
order to proceed from Mathematics to Natural Philosophy, 
another principle is requisite (as I have observed in my 
Theodiccea)^ I mean, the principle of the Sufficient Reason; 
or, in other words, that nothing happens without a reason 
why it should be so, rather than otherwise. And, accord- 
ingly, Archimedes was obliged, in his book De Equilihrio^ 
to take for granted, that if there be a balance, in which 
everything is alike on both sides, and if equal weights are 
hung on the two ends of that balance, the whole will be at 
rest. It is because no reason can be given why one side 
should weigh down rather than the other. Now by this 
single principle of the Sufficient Reason., may be demon- 



496 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SUFFICIENT REASON— 

strated the being of a God, and all tlie other parts of Meta- 
physics or ]L!»Tatural Theology ; and even, in some measure, 
those physical truths that are independent of mathematics, 
such as the Dynamical Principles, or the Principles of 
Forces." — See Eeid, Active Powers^ essay iv., chap. 9. — F. 
Reason (Determining). 
SUCrOESTlON (suh-gerere^ to bear or place under, to prompt). 

"It is the received doctrine of philosophers, that our 
notions of relations can only be got by comparing the 
related ideas : but it is not by having first the notions of 
mind and sensation, and then comparing them together, 
that we perceive the one to have the relation of a subject 
or substratum, and the other that of an act or operation : 
on the contrary, one of the related things, viz., sensation, 
suggests to us both the correlate and the relation. 

'' I beg leave to make use of the word Suggestion^ because 
I know not one more proper, to express a power of the mind, 
which seems entirely to have escaped the notice of philo- 
sophers, and to which we owe many of our simple notions 
which are neither impressions nor ideas, as well as many 
original principles of belief." — Reid, Enquiry^ ch. 2, s. 7. 

To this power Dr. Reid refers our natural judgments or 
principles of common sense. Mr. Stewart has expressed 
surprise that Reid should have apologized for introducing 
a word which had already been employed by Berkeley, to 
denote those intimations which are the results of experience 
and habit (Dissert.^ p. 167, second ed). And Sir W. 
Hamilton has shown that in the more extensive sense of 
Reid the word had been used by Tertullian ; who, speaking 
of the universal belief of the soul's immortality, has said (J)e 
Anima^ c. 2). ^'ISTatura pleraque suggeruntur^ quasi de^w&- 
lico sensu quo animam Deus ditare dignatus est." — Reid's 
WorJcs^ p. 3, note. 

The word suggestion is much used in the philosophy of Dr. 
Thomas Brown, in a sense nearly the same as that assigned 
to Association, by other philosophers. He calls Judgment, 
relative suggestion, Hutcheson (Logicce Compend.^ cap. 1), 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 497 

SUOOESTION— 

says, '' Sensus est internus qui suggerlt proecipue intellec- 
tiones puras ; quag Conscientia, aut reflectendi vis dicitur.'* 
It is not so properly Consciousness or Reflection whicli gives 
the new ideas, but rather the occasion on which these ideas 
are suggested. It is when we are conscious and reflect on 
one thing, some other thing related to it, but not antece- 
dently thought, is suggested. 
SUICFDE {ccvToyjiPia., sid-ccedes^ self-murder) — is the volun- 
tary taking away of one's own life. The Stoics thought it 
was not wrong to do so, when the pains and inconveniences 
of our lot exceeded its enjoyments and advantages. But 
the command, Thou shalt not kill, forbids suicide as well as 
homicide. It is contrary to one of the strongest instincts of 
our nature, that of self-preservation — and at variance with 
the submission which we owe to God and the duties in- 
cumbent upon us towards om" fellow-creatures. All the 
apologies that can be oflered for it are futile. 

Aristotle, Etliic.^ lib. iii., cap. 7 ; lib. v., cap. 11. 

Herman, Disputatio de Autocheiria et pJiilosopMce et ex 
legibus Romanis considerata^ 4to, Leips., 1809. 

Madame de Stael, Reflexions sur le Suicide. 

Stoeudlin, Hist, des Opinions et des Doctrines sur le Suicide. 
8vo, Goetting., 1824. 

Tissot, Manie du Suicide. 

Adams, On Self-murder. 

Donne, Biathanotos. 
SUPRA-NATURAl.ls:il {supra-naturam^ above nature) — is 
the doctrine that in nature there are more than physical 
causes in operation, and that in religion we have the guid- 
ance not merely of reason but of revelation. It is thus 
opposed to Naturalism and to Rationalism. — q. v. In Ger- 
many, where the word originated, the principal Supra - 
naturalists are Tholuck, Hengstenberg, Guericke, &c. 
SYLiIiOOlS:?! (ffi^XAoy/o-^.oV, a putting together of judgments, 
or propositions, or reasonings ; from aw and T^oyi^stv^ colli- 
gere^ to gather together). 

This word occurs in the wntiugs of Tlato, in the sense 
2 K 



498 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

of judging or reasoning ; but not in the teclinical sense 
assigned to it by Aristotle. 

According to Aristotle {Prior. Analyt.^ lib. i., chap. 1, 
sect. 8), ''a syllogism is a speech (or enunciation) (T^oyog) 
in which certain things (the premises) being supposed, 
something different from what is supposed (the conclusion) 
follows of necessity; and this solely in virtue of the sup- 
positions themselves." 

"A syllogism is a combination of two judgments necessi- 
tating a third judgment as the consequence of their mutual 
relation.'' — Mansel, Prolegom, Log.^ p. 61. 

Euler likened the syllogism to three concentric circles, 
of which the first contained the second, which in its turn 
contained the third. Thus, if A be predicable of all B, and 
B of all C, it follows necessarily that A is also predicable of C. 

In a syllogism^ the first two propositions are called the 
premises; because they are the things premised or put 
before ; they are also called the antecedents : the first of 
them is called the major and the second the minor. The 
third proposition, which contains the thing to be proved, 
is called the conclusion or consequent; and the particle 
which unites the conclusion v/ith the premises is called the 
consequentia or consequence. "^ 

In a syllogism., '' the conclusion having two terms, a sub- 
ject and a predicate, its predicate is called the major term^ 
and its subject the minor term. In order to prove the 

*Thus: — 

" Every virtue is laudable, 
Diligence is a virtue ; 
Wlierefore diligence is laudable. 
"The two former propositions are t\vQ premises or antecedents, the last is the con- 
clusion or consequent, and the particle wherefore is the consequentia or consequence. 
" The consequent may he true and the consequence false. 
" What has parts is divisible, 
The human soul has parts ; 
Wherefore the human soul is divisible. 
'' The consequent may be true although the consequence is false. 
" Antichrist will be powerful, 
Therefore he will be impious. 
" His impiety will not flow from his power." 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 499 

conclusion, each of its terms is, in the premises, compared 
with the third term, called the middle term. By this means 
one of the premises will have for its two terms the major 
term and the middle term ; and this premise is called the 
major premise^ or the major proposition of the syllogism. 
The other premise must have for its two terms the minor 
term and the middle term ; and it is called the minor pro- 
position. Thus the syllogism consists of three propositions, 
distinguished by the names of the major., the minor., and 
the conclusion ; and although each of these has two terms, 
a subject and a predicate, yet there are only three different 
terms in all. The major term is always the predicate of 
the conclusion, and is also either the subject or predicate 
of the major proposition. The minor term is always the 
subject of the conclusion, and is also either the subject or 
predicate of the minor proposition. The middle term 
never enters into the conclusion, but stands in both pre- 
mises, either in the position of subject or of predicate." — 
Eeid, Account of Aristotle's Logic^ chap. 3, sect. 2. 

According to the various positions which the middle term 
may have in the premises, syllogisms are said to be of 
various figures. And as all the possible positions of the 
middle term are only four, the regular figures of the syllo- 
gism are also four ; and a syllogism is said to be drawn in 
the first, second, third, or fourth figure, according to the 
position of its middle term. 

There is another division of syllogisms according to their 
modes. The mode of a syllogism is determined by the 
quality and quantity of the propositions of which it con- 
sists. There are sixty-four modes possible in every figure. 
And the theory of the syllogism requires that we show 
what are the particular modes in each figure, which do or 
do not form a just and conclusive syllogism. The legiti- 
mate modes of the first figure are demonstrated from the 
axiom called Dictum de omni et de nidlo. The legitimate 
modes of the other figures are proved by reducing them to 
some mode of the first. — Christian Wolf, Sinaller Logic, ch. (). 



500 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SYIiliOOISin— 

Locke, Essay on Hum, Understand.^ b. iv., chap. 17. 

Aldrich, Wallis, Watts, and otlier authors on Logic. 
SYMBOli.— F. Myth. 
SYMPATHY (ovccTToihioc^ fellow-feeling). 

" This mutual affection which the Greeks call sympathy^ 
tendeth to the use and benefit of man alone."— Holland ^ 
Pliny ^ b. xx., Proem. 

''Sensibus refiexis annumerandus est etiam ille, qui com- 
munis dicitur ; qui ex alterius rebus prosperis gaudium, 
ex adversis tristitiam colligit, ubi nulla simultas, odium, 
inimicitia, aut turpitudinis causa detestatiointervenerat." — 
Hutcheson, Metaphys.^ part 2, c. 1. 

" Ut ridentibus arrident, ita tientibus adfient 
Humani vultus." 

'^ These sensitive cogitations are not pure actions spring- 
ing from the soul itself, but compassion (sympathy) with 
the body."— "Cudworth, Immut. Moral., book iii^, chap. 1, 
p. 18. 

"Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify 
our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy., 
though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may 
now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to 
denote our fellow-feeling with any other passion whatever. 
— Smith, Theory of More Sentim..^ part 1, sect. 1. 

Sympathy with sorrow or suffering is compassion; sympathy 
with joy or prosperity is congratidation. — V. Antipathy. 
SYNCRETISM {ovu7tpTiTiGf4.og., from GVUTc^TiTi^iiv^ according to 
Plutarch, De Fraterno amore^ to unite, like the Cretans, 
when all the rival towns of the island united against the 
common foe)— is opposed to eclecticism in philosophy. 
Eclecticism (q. v.), while it takes from various systems, does 
soon the principle that the parts so taken, when brought 
together, have a kind of congruity and consistency with one 
another. Syncretism is the jumbling together of different 
systems or parts of systems, without due regard to their 
being consistent with one another. It is told of a Roman 
consul that, when he arrived in Greece he called before him 



YOCABULArwY OF PIIILOSOrHY. 501 

SYNCRETISM— 

the philosophers of the different schools, and generousl}- 
offered to act as moderator between them, in order to bring 
about an agreement. Something of the same kind Avas 
proposed by Charles V.* in reference to the differences be- 
tween Protestants and Papists ; as if philosophy, and theo- 
logy, which is the highest philosophy, instead of bemg a 
search after truth, were a mere matter of diplomacy or 
compromise — a playing at protocols. But Syncretism does 
not necessarily aim at the reconciling of the doctrines 
which it brings together; it merely places them in juxta- 
position. 

Philo of Alexandria gave the first example of syncretism, 
in trying to unite the Oriental philosophy with that of the 
Greeks. The Gnostics tried the same thing with the doc- 
trines of the Christian religion. About the beginning of 
the seventeenth century, George Calixtus, a German theo- 
logian, attempted to set down in one common creed the 
behef of the Papists and the Protestants ; but succeeded 
only in irritating both. To him and his partizans the name 
Syncretist seems to have been first applied. — See Walch's 
Introduction to Controversies of LutJieran Church. Similar 
efforts were made to unite the metaphysics of Aristotle with 
those of Descartes. And the attempts which have fi:'e- 
quently been made to reconcile the discoveries of geology 
with the cosmogony of Moses deserve no name but that of 
syncretism^ in the sense of its being '' a mixing together of 
things which ought to be kept distinct." On the evils of 
syncretism, see Sewell, (^Christ Morals., chap. 9), who 
quotes as against it the text, Deut xxii. 9, " Tlio^i shall not 
sow thy vineyard with divers seeds.,'''' &c. 

SITNDERESIS (aw lioiipsa^ to divide, to tear asunder) — was 
used to denote the state of conviction or remorse in which 
the mind was when comparing what it had done with what 

* After his retiring from the toils of empire, Charles V. employed his leisure in 
constructing time-pieces, and on experiencing the difficulty of making their move- 
ments synclironous, he is said to have exclaimed, in reference to tlie attempt to re- 
concile Protestants and Papists, "How could I dream of making two gi'eat bodies 
of men think alike, when I cannot make two clocks to go alike!" 



502 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

SYNI>ERESIS— 

it ouglit to have done. — Aquinas, Summce Theolog.^ pars 
prima, qusest. 79, articulus 12. 
Aquinas, Opera^ torn, i., p. 1126. 

SYNEII>ESIS {avv hooi^ to know one thing in relation to 
another, joint knowledge). — Conscience, as giving know- 
ledge of an action in reference to the law of right and 
wrong, was called the Witness who accused or excused. 
The operations of conscience were represented by the three 
members of a syllogism ; of which the first contained the 
law, the second the testimony of the witness, and the third 
the decision of the judge. But conscience not only pro- 
nounces sentence ; it carries its sentence into effect. — F. 
Synderesis. 

He who has transgressed any of the rules of which con- 
science is the repository, is punished by the reproaches of 
his own mind. He who has obeyed these rules, is acquitted 
and rewarded by feelings of complacency and self-appro- 
bation. — F. Synteresis. 

^YNTEliESiS (GwrTipYKJig-, ovv mpYjO)^ to keep together, the 
conservatory). — Conscience, considered as the repository 
of those rules, or general maxims, which are regarded as 
first principles in morals, was called by this name among 
the early Christian moralists ; and was spoken of as the law 
or lawgiver. 

SYNTHESIS ((jvu haig^ a putting together, composition) — 
"consists in assuming the causes discovered and established 
as principles, and by them explaining the phenomena pro- 
ceeding from them and proving the explanation." — Newton, 
Optics. 

Every synthesis which has not started with a complete 
analysis ends at a result which, in Greek, is called hypo- 
thesis ; instead of which, if synthesis has been preceded by a 
sufficient analysis, the synthesis founded upon that analysis 
leads to a result which in Greek is called system. The legi- 
timacy of every synthesis is directly owing to the exactness 
of analysis ; every system which is merely an hypothesis is 
a vain system *, every synthesis which has not been preceded 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 503 

SYNTHESIS— 

by analysis is a pure imagination : but at the same time 
every analysis which does not aspire to a synthesis which 
may be equal to it, is an analysis which halts on the vra}-. 
On the one hand, synthesis without analysis giyes a false 
science; on the other hand, analysis without synthesis gives 
an incomplete science. An incomplete science is a hundred 
times more valuable than a false science ; but neither a false 
science nor an incomplete science is the ideal of science. 
The ideal of science, the ideal of philosophy, can be realized 
only by a method which combines the two processes of 
analysis and synthesis. — Cousin, Hist. Mod. Phil.^ vol. i.. 
pp. 277, 8. — V. A]s'Ai.Ysis, ^Iethod, System. 
SYSTe:W[ {ovGrriuoL, avu 'ioTOLG^xi^ to place together) — is a f^-ill 
and connected view of all the truths of some department 
of knowledge. An organized body of truth, or truths 
arranged under one and the same idea, which idea is as the 
life or soul which assimilates all those truths. Xo truth is 
altogether isolated. Every truth has relation to some 
other. And we should try to unite the facts of our know- 
ledge so as to see them in their several bearings. This we 
do when we frame them into a system. To do so legiti- 
mately we must begin by analysis and end with synthesis. 
But system applies not only to our knowledge, but to the 
objects of our knowledge. Thus we speak of the planetary- 
system., the muscular system., the nervous system. TTe 
believe that the order to which we would reduce our ideas 
has a foimdation in the nature of things. And it is this 
behef that encourages us to reduce our knowledge of 
things into systematic order. The doing so is attended 
with many advantages. At the same time a spirit of 
systematizing may be carried too far. It is only in so far 
as it is in accordance with the order of nature that it can 
be useful or sound. Condillac has a Trait e des Systemes^ 
in which he traces their causes and their dangerous con- 
sequences. — V. Method. 



504 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TASTE (PO\¥JERS OR PRINCIPIiES OF). 

" His tasteful mind enjoys 
Alike the complicated charms, which glow 
Thro' the wide landscape." 

Cowper, Power of Harmony^ b. ii. 

" That power of the mind by which we are capable of 
discerning and relishing the beauties of Nature, and whatever 
is excellent in the fine arts is called Taste. . . . Like 
the taste of the palate, it relishes some things, is disgusted 
with others ; with regard to many, is indifferent or dubious ; 
and is considerably influenced by habit, by associations, and 
by opinion. . . . 

'' By the objects of Taste^ I mean those qualities and attri- 
butes of things which are, by Nature, adapted to please a 
good taste. Mr. Addison {Spectator^ vol. vi.) and Dr. Aken- 
side (Pleasures of Imagination) after him, has reduced them 
to three — to wit, Novelty ^ Grandeur^ and Beauty.'''' — q. v. — 
Reid, IntelL Powers^ essay viii., chap. 1 and 2. 

The best definition of Taste was given by the earliest 
editor of Spenser who proved himself to possess any (Mr. 
Hughes), when he called it a kind of extempore judgment. 
Burke explained it to be an instinct which immediately 
awakes the emotions of pleasure or dislike. Akenside is 
clear as he is poetical in the question : — 

" What, then, is Taste hut those internal powers. 
Active, and strong, and feelingly alive 
To each fine impulse ? a discerning sense 
Of decent and sublime, with quick disgust 
From things deformed, or disarranged, or gross. 
In species ? This nor gems, nor stores of gold 
Nor purple state, nor culture, can bestow. 
But God alone, when first his sacred hand 
Imprints the secret bias of the soul.'' 

Pleasures oflmagin., b. iii., 1. 523. 

^^ We may consider Ta^^e, therefore, to be a settled habit 
of discerning faults and excellences in a moment — the mind's 
independent expression of approval or aversion. It is that 
faculty by which we discover and enjoy the beautiful, the 
picturesque, and the sublime in literature, art, and nature." 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 505 

TASTE— 

— Pleasures^ ^t., of Literature^ 12mo, Loudon. 1851, pp. 
65, 66. 

The objects of Taste have also been classed as the Beau- 
tiful, the Suhlime^ and the Picturesque. — q. v. The question 
is whether these objects possess certain inherent qualities 
which may be so called, or whether they awaken pleasing 
emotions by suggesting or recalhng certain pleasing feelings 
formerly experienced in connection or association with these 
objects. The latter view has been maintained by Mr. Ahson 
in his Essay on Tasie^ and by Lord Jefirey in the article 
Beauty in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. 

Lord Jeffi^ey has said, '* It appears to us, then, that 
objects are sublime or beautiful — first, when they are the 
natural signs and perpetual concomitants of pleasurable sen- 
sations, as the sound of thimder, or laughter, or, at any 
rate, of some lively feeling or emotion in ourselves, or in 
some other sentient beings ; or secondly, when they are the 
ai'bitrary or accidental concomitants of such feelings, as ideas 
of female beauty ; or thii'dly, when they bear some analogy 
or fancied resemblance to things with which these emotions 
are necessarily connected.*' AU poetry is founded on this 
last — as silence and tranquillity — gTadual ascent and ambi- 
tion — gradual descent and decay. 

^Ir. Stewart has observed that ''association of ideas can 
never account for a new notion or a pleasure essentiallv 
different from all others." — PTiilosvph. of Hum Mind, ch. 5, 
part 2, p. 361, 4to. 

Gerard, Essay on Taste. 

Sii' Joshua Reynolds, Discourses before Royal Society. 

Burke, On Sublime and Beautiful. 

Pa}Tie Knight, Enquiry into Principles of Taste. 

Hume, Essay on Standard of Taste. 

Brown, Lectures, 77. 

Stewart, Philosoph. Essays, part 2, Relative to Taste. 

Sir T. L. Dick, Essay on Taste, prefixed to Price on the 
Picturesque, 8vo, 18-42. — V. ^Esthetics. 
T£Ii£OIiO€;Y {Ti?^og, an end ; Ac'yoc, discourse) — is the doctrine 



506 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TEIiEOliOOY— 

of Final Causes. — q. v. It does not constitute a particular 
department of pliilosopliy ; as the end or perfection of every 
being belongs to the consideration of that branch of philo- 
sophy in which it is included. But Teleology is the philoso- 
phical consideration of final causes, generally. 
TEMPEKAlflENT (temperare., to moderate, to season). — 
"There are only two species of Temperament. The four 
well-known varieties, and the millions which are less 
known, are merely modifications of two species, and com- 
binations of their modifications. These are the active and 
the passive forms ; and every other variety may be conve- 
niently arranged under them."* 

'' As character comprises the entire sphere of the educated 
will, so temperament is nothing else than the sum of our 
natural inclinations and tendencies. Inclination is the 
material of the will, developing itself when controlled^ into 
character, and when controlling^ into passions. Temperament 
is, therefore, the root of our passions ; and the latter, like 
the former, may be distinguished into two principal classes. 
Intelligent psychologists and physicians have always recog- 
nized this fact ; the former dividing temperaments into 
active and passive, the latter classifjdng the passions as 
exciting and depressing. 

" We would apply the same statement to the affections or 
emotions. The temperament commonly denominated san- 
guine or choleric is the same as our active species ; and that 
known as the phlegmatic, or melancholy, is the same as our 
passive one."— Feuchtersleben, Dietetics of the Soul., 12mo, 
Lon., 1852, p. 85. 

Bodily endowments, as affecting the prevailing bias of the 
mind, have been called Temperaments ; and have been dis- 
tinguished into the Sanguine, the Choleric, the Melancholic, 
and the Phlegmatic To these has been added another, 

* Lavater, Zimmerman, and Von Hildebrandt adopt a similar classification. The 
author of the treatise on "Diet," included among the works of Hippocrates, take^ 
the same view of temperaments; as likewise the Brunonian school, which maintained 
two antagonist, sthenic and asthenic^ states. 



VOCABUX-AJIY OF PHLLOSOPHT. 607 

TE?1PERA?IE>T— 

::-- !:::> A' ;-- J,; ;:. According as the bodily 

i mdiyiduals can be characterized by one or 
^c^_. .. c^^-e epithets, a corresponding difference will be 
found in the general state or Disposition of the mind : and 
there will be a bias, or tendency to be moved by certain 
principles of action rather than by others. 

^Imd is essentially one. But we speak of it as having a 
constitution and as containing certain primary elements : 
and, according as these elements ai*e combined and 
balanced, there may be differences in the constitution of 
individual minds, just as there are differences of bodily 
Temperaments; and these differences may give rise to a 
Disposition or bias, in the one case, more directly than in 
the other. According as Intellect, or Sensitivity, or Will, 
prevails in any individual mind, there will be a correspon- 
dent bias resulting. 

But, it is in reference to original differences in the Pri- 
mary Desires^ that differences of Disposition are most 
observable. Any desire, when powerful, draws over the 
other tendencies of the mind to its side ; gives a colour to 
the whole character of the man, and manifests its influence 
throughout all his temper and conduct. His thoughts run 
in a particular channel, without his being sensible that they 
do 50. except by the result. There is an under-current of 
ieeling, flowing continually within him, which only manifests 
i:^ If by the direction in which it carries him. This consti- 
tutes his temper.* Disposition is the sum of a man's desires 
and feelings. 

In the works of Galen (torn, iv., Leips., 1822), is an essay 
to show Quod ardmi mores corporis iemperamenta sequuntur. 

See also Feuchtersleben, Medical Psychology, 

TEiXPERA3fCJE (ao^oouvjYi^ temperantia) — ^is moderation as to 

pleasure. Aristotle {Ethic.^ lib. iii., cap. 10) confined it 

chiefly to the pleasures of touch, and of taste in a slight 

degree. Hence, perhaps, Ponkh wiiters in treating of the 

» The balance of our anima] principles. I think, constimtes what we call a man-s 
natural temper — Reid, Actire Powers^ essay iiL, part 2, chap. S. 



508 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TEiaPERANCE— 

vices of intemperance or luxury, dwell much on those con- 
nected with the senses of touch and taste. By Cicero the 
Latin word temperantia was used to denote the duty of self- 
government in general. Temperantia est quce ut in rehus 
expetendis aut fugiendis rationem sequamur monet. 

Temperance was enumerated as one of the four cardinal 
virtues. It may be manifested in the government and regu- 
lation of all our natural appetites, desires, passions, and 
affections, and may thus give birth to many virtues and 
restrain from many vices. As distinguished from Fortitude, 
it may be said to consist in guarding against the tempta- 
tions to pleasure and self-indulgence ; while Fortitude 
consists in bearing up against the evils and dangers of 
human life. 

TENDENCY (tendere^ to stretch towards). — '' He freely moves 
and acts according to his most natural tendence and inclina- 
tion." — Scott, Christ, Life^ pt. 1, c. 1. 

" But if at first the appetites and necessities, and tenden- 
cies of the body, did tempt the soul, much more will this be 
done when the body is miserable and afflicted." — Taylor, 
Of Repent., c. vii., § 1. — F. Ls^clination. 

TERM {o^og, terminus, a Hmit). — As lines terminate a plane 
and constitute figure, so its terms are the limits of a propo- 
sition. A proposition consists of two terms ; that which is 
spoken of is called the subject ; that which is said of it the 
predicate; and these are called the terms (or extremes), 
because logically the subject is placed ^r5^ and the predicate 
last. In the middle is the copula, which indicates the act of 
judgment, as by it the predicate is affirmed or denied of the 
subject. — Whately. — V. Proposition, Syllogism. 

TESTIMONY (testis, a witness) — "is the declaration of one who 
professes to know the truth of that which he affirms." 

" The difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common 

experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash 

with the ordinary cour^ of nature, or with one another." — 

Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., book iv., chap. 16. 

If testimony were not a source of evidence, we must lose all 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 509 

TESTOIOTVlL — 

benefit of the experience and observ\ation of others. Much 
of human knoTvleclge rests on the authority of testimony. 

According to Dr. Reid, the validity of this authority is 
resolvable into the constitution of the human mind. He 
maintains (^Inquiry, ch. 6, sect. 24) that we have a natural 
principle of Veracity, which has its counterpart in a natural 
principle of Credulity — that is, while we are naturally dis- 
posed to speak the truth, we are naturally disposed to believe 
what is spoken by others. 

But says Mr. Locke (Essay on Hum. Understand.., book 
iv., ch. 15, 16), ** Testimony may be fallacious. He who 
declares a thing, 1. May be mistaken, or imposed upon. 
2. He may be an impostor and intend to deceive." 

The evidence of testimony is, therefore, only probable and 
requires to be carefuUy examined. 

The natm-e of the thing testified to — whether it be a 
matter of science or of common life — the character of the 
person testifving — whether the testimony be that of one or 
of many — whether it be given voluntarily or compulsorily. 
hastily or deliberately, are some of the circumstances to be 
attended to. 

Testimony may be oral or written. The coin, the monu- 
ment, and other material proofs have also been called Testi- 
mony. So that testimony includes Tradition and History. 

^Ir. Hiune maintained that no amount of testimony can be 
sufficient to establish the truth of a miracle. See reply to 
him by Dr. Adams,* in his Essay on Miracles.) and Dr. 
Campbell on Miracles., and Dr. Douglas on Miracles. 

It was maintained by Craig, a celebrated Enghsh Geo- 
metrician, and by Petersen, that the value of testimony 
decreases by the lapse of time. And Laplace, in some 
measure, favoured this view. But if the matter of fact be 

'' Hume told Caddell the bookseller, that he had a great desire to he introduced 
to as many of the persons \vho had written against him as could he collected; and 
requested Caddell to bring him and them together. Accordingly, Dr. Douglas, 
Dr. Adams, etc., were invited by Caddell to dine at his house in order to meet 
Hume. They came ; and Dr. Price, who was of the party, assm'ed me that they 
were all delighted with David.''— Tadfe Talk of Samuel Rogers. 



510 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TESTIMONY— 

well authenticated in the first instance, lapse of time and 
continued belief in it may add to the validity of the evidence. 
— V, Evidence. 
THEIsm (020^, Deus^ God)— is opppsed to atheism. It is not 
absolutely opposed, by its derivation, to Pantheism, or the 
belief that the universe is God ; nor to Polytheism^ or the 
belief that there are many Gods ; nor to Ditheism^ or the 
belief that there are two Divine principles, one of Good and 
another of Evil. But usage, penes quern est arhitrium et 
norma loquendi^ has restricted this word to the belief in one 
intelligent and free spirit separate from his works. " To 
believe that everything is governed, ordered, or regulated 
for the hest^ by a designing principle or mind, necessarily 
good and permanent, is to be a perfect Theist,''^ — Shaftes- 
bury, Inquiry^ book i., pt. 1, sect. 2. 

" These are they who are strictly and properly called 
Theists, who affirm that a perfectly conscious understanding, 
being, or mind, existing from eternity, was the cause of all 
other things *, and they, on the contrary, who derive all 
things from senseless matter, as the first original, and deny 
that there is any conscious understanding being, self- 
existent or unmade, are those that are properly called 
Atheists,''^ — Cudworth, IntelL Syst.^ book i., ch. 4, sect. 4. 

''Though in a strict and proper sense, they be only Theists 
who acknowledge one (xod perfectly omnipotent, the sole 
original of all things, and as well the cause of matter as 
of anything else ; yet it seems reasonable that such con- 
sideration should be had of the infirmity of human under- 
standings, as to extend the word further, that it may com- 
prehend within it those also who assert one intellectual 
self- existent from eternity, the framer and governor of the 
whole world, though not the creator of the matter ; and 
that none should be condemned for absolute Atheists merely 
because they hold eternal uncreated matter, unless they 
also deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over the matter, 
and so make senseless matter the sole original of all things." 
— Ibid, sect. 7. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 511 

THEISM— 

TJieist and Deist both signify simply one who believes in 
God ; and about the beginning of last century both were 
employed to denote one who believes in God independently 
of revelation. '' Averse as I am to the cause of Theism or 
name of Deist, when taken in a sense exclusive of revela- 
tion, I consider still that, in strictness, the root of all is 
Theism ; and that to be a settled Christian, it is necessary 
to be first of all a good Theisty — Shaftesbury, The Moralists, 
part 1, sect. 2. But from about the time of Shaftesbury, 
the term Deist has generally been applied to such as are 
indifferent or hostile to the claims of revelation. Balguy's 
First Letter to a Deist was against Lord Shaftesbury. His 
Second Letter to a Deist was against Tindal. All the 
Deistical writers noticed by Leland were unfriendly to 
revelation. 

•' The words Deist and Theist are, strictly speaking, per- 
haps synonymous ; but yet it is generally to be observed that 
the former is used in a had, and the latter in a good sense. 
Custom has appropriated the term Deist to the enemies of 
revelation and of Christianity in particular ; while the 
word Theist is considered applicable to all who believe in 
one God." — Irons, On Final Causes, app., p. 207. 

'' TheistCB generatim vocantur, qui Deum esse tenent, sive 
recte sive prave caeteroquin de Deo sentiant. Deistce voca- 
bantm* prsesertim sseculo proxime elapso philosophi, qui 
Deum quidem esse affirmabant, providentiam vero, revela- 
tionem, miracula, uno verbo, quidquid supernaturale audit, 
tollebant." — Ubaghs, Theodicece Elementa, p. 11. 
THEOCRACY (Qsog y.pacTog, rule of God). — Government under 
the Mosaic dispensation is called theocracy. 

'•'' It will easily appear," says Lowman (On Civil Govern- 
ment of the Hebrews, chap. 7), *'that the general union of 
the tribes as one body may be conceived after this manner 
— that the congregation of Israel, or the whole people 
enacted by themselves or their representatives ; that the 
great council advised, consulted, proposed ; that the judge 
presided in their councils, and had the chief hand iu 



512 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

THEOCRACY— 

executing what was resolved in tbem ; and that Jehovah, by 
the oracle, was to absent to and approve what was resolved, 
and authorize the execution of it in matters of the greatest 
importance to the whole state, so that the general union of 
the whole nation may not improperly be thus expressed. 
It was by the command of the people and advice of the 
senate, the judge presiding and the oracle approving." 

Egypt, down to a certain period, was governed by priests 
in the name of their gods, and Peru by Incas, who were 
regarded as the children of the sun, Mahomet, speaking 
in the name of God, exercised a theocratic sway, and that 
of the Grand Lama in Thibet is similar. 

''In the Contrnt Social of Rousseau, the sovereignty of 
number, of the numerical majority, is the fundamental 
principle of the work. For a long time he follows out the 
consequences of it with inflexible rigour ; a time arrives, 
however, when he abandons them, and abandons them with 
great effect ; he wishes to give his fundamental laws, his 
constitution, to the rising society ; his high intellect warned 
him that such a work could not proceed from universal 
suffrage, from the numerical majority, from the multitude : 
'A God,' said he, 'must give laws to men.' It is not 
magistracy, it is not sovereignty. . . . It is a particular 
and superior function, which has nothing in common with 
human empire." — Guizot, Hist, of Civilization^ vol. i., p. 
387. Contrat Social^ b. ii., ch. 8. 

The term theocracy has been applied to the power wielded 
by the Pope during the Middle Ages ; and Count De Maistre, 
in his work Dii Pape^ has argued strenuously in support of 
the supreme power, temporal and spiritual, of the sovereign 
pontiff. But the celibacy of the Pomish priests is an 
obstacle to their theocratical organization. " Look at 
Asia, Egypt ; all the great theocracies are the work of 
a clergy, which is a complete society within itself, which 
suffices for its own wants, and borrows nothing from with- 
out." — Guizot, Hist, of Civilization^ vol. i., p. 182. 
TIIE:oi>icy (0.oV, God; ^ikyi^ a pleading or justification) —a 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 513 

THJEODICY— 

vindication of the ways of God, — This word was employed 
by Leibnitz, who in his Essais de Theodicee^ sur la honte de 
Dieii, la liberie de Vhomme et Vorigine du mal^ published in 
1710, maintained that the existence of moral evil has its 
origin in the free will of the creature, while metaphysical 
evil is nothing but the limitation which is involved in the 
essence of finite beings, and that out of this both physical 
and moral evil naturally flow. But these finite beings are 
designed to attain the utmost felicity they are capable of 
enjoying, while each, as a part, contributes to the perfection 
of the whole, which of the many worlds that were possible 
is the very best. On this account it has been called the 
theory of optimism. — q. v. 

In Manuals of Philosophy the term theodicy is applied to 
that part which treats of the heing^ perfections., and govern- 
ment of God, and the immortality of the soul. 

In the Manuel de Philosophic^ a V usage des Colleges^ 8vo, 
Paris, 1846, Theodicee^ which is written by Emille Saisset, 
is called Pational Theology, or the Theology of Peason, 
independent of Pevelation. '' It proposes to establish the 
existence of a being infinitely perfect, and to determine his 
attributes and essential relations to the world." It treats 
of the existence, attributes, and providence of God, and 
the immortality of the soul — which were formerly included 
under metaphysics. 

According to Kant, the objections which a theodicy should 
meet are: 1. The existence of moral evil, as contrary to the 
holiness of God. 2. Of physical evil, as contrary to his 
goodness. 3. The disproportion between the crimes and 
the punishments of this life as repugnant to his justice. He 
approves of the vindication adopted by Job against his 
fi:'iends, founded on our imperfect knowledge of God's ways. 

*' When the Jewish mind began to philosophize, and en- 
deavoured to produce dialectic proofs, its theodicean philo- 
sophy, or justification of God., stopped, in the book of Job, 
at the avowal of the incomprehensibility of the destinies of 
mankind." — Bunsen, Hippolytus^ vol. ii., p. 7. 
2l 



514 VOCABULARY OK PHILOSOPHY. 

THLEOCrONY (0goV yovri^ the generation of the Gods) — is that 
part of Pagan theology which treats of the genealogy and 
filiation of their deities. It is the title of a celebrated 
Greek poem by Hesiod, which has been commented on by 
M. J. D. Guigniaut {De la Theogonie dPHesiode^ Paris, 
1835). The Works^ and Days^ and Theogomj of Hesiod 
were translated from the Greek, with remarks by Thomas 
Cooke, 2 vols., 4to, Lond., 1728. 

THEOliOOY (0£oV, God; T^oyog^ discourse). — '^ Theology^ what 
is it but the science of things divine ? What science can 
be attained unto without the help of natural discourse and 
reason?" — Hooker, Eccles. Pol.^ b. iii., sect. 8. 

" I mean theology^ which, containing the knowledge of 
God and his creatures, our duty to Him and to our fellow- 
creatures, and a view of our present and future state, is the 
comprehension of all other knowledge directed to its true 
end, i. e., the honour and veneration of the Creator, and 
* the happiness of mankind. This is that noble study which 
is every man's duty, and every one that is a rational 
creature is capable of." — Locke, On the Cond. of the 
Understand.^ sect. 22. 

The word theology as now used, without any qualifying 
epithet, denotes that knowledge of God and of our duty to 
him which we derive from express revelation. In this re- 
stricted sense it is opposed to philosophy, and is divided 
into speculative or dogmatic — and moral or practical, 
according as it is occupied with the doctrines or the pre- 
cepts which have been revealed for our belief and guidance. 
But the Greeks gave the name of (hoTioyoi) to those who, 
like Hesiod and Orpheus, with no higher inspiration than 
that of the poet, sang of the nature of the gods and the 
origin of all things. Aristotle (Metaphys,^ lib. xi., ch. 6) 
said that of the three speculative sciences, physics, mathe- 
matics, and theology — the last was the highest, as treating 
of the most elevated of beings. Among the Romans, from 
the time of Numa Pompilius to that of the emperors, the 
knowledge and worship of the gods was made subservient 
to the interests of the state. So that, according to Augustin 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 515 

THEOIiOOY— 

{De Civitate^ lib. vi., c. 1), there were three kinds of t?ieo- 
logy — the poetical, or that of the poets — the physical, or 
that of the philosophers — and the political, or that of the 
legislator. 

Among the Greeks and Romans, there being no divine 
revelation, the distinction between faith and reason was not 
taken. Christians were long unwilling to admit that any 
satisfactory knowledge of God and his attributes, and of 
the relations between Him and his creatures could be had 
independently of revelation. And it was not till after 
Descartes that the distinction of theology, as natural and 
positive, or revealed, was commonly taken. The distinction 
is rather obscured in the Essais de Theodicee of Leibnitz, 
but clearly expressed by Wolf in the title of his work, 
Theologia Naturalis Methodo Scientifica Pertractata, 2 vols., 
4to, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1736-37. He thinks it is de- 
monstrative, and calls it {Prolegom., sect. 4) '^The science 
which has for its object the existence of God and his attri- 
butes, and the consequences of these attributes in relation 
to other beings, with the refutation of all errors contrary 
to the true idea of God;" in short, all that is now com- 
monly included under natural theology or theodicy, or both. 
IVatural Theology. — This phrase has been very commonly 
employed, bat it has been challenged. 

''The name natural theology, which ever and anon we 
still hear applied to the philosophical cognition of the 
Divine Being and his existence, ought carefully to be 
avoided. Such a designation is based on a thorough mis- 
conception and total inversion of ideas. Every system of 
theology that is not supernatural, or at least that does not 
profess to be so, but pretends to understand naturally the 
idea of God, and regards the knowledge of the divine 
essence as a branch of natural science, or derives the idea 
simply from nature, is even on that account false. Missing 
and entirely mistaking its proper object, it must, in short, 
prove absolutely null and void. Properly, indeed, this 
inquiry needs no peculiar word, nor special division, and 



516 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

THEOIiOGX— 

scientific designation. The name generally of philosophy, 
or specially of a philosophy of God, is perfectly sufficient to 
designate the investigation into science and faith, and their 
reciprocal relation — their abiding discord, or its harmonious 
reconciliation and intrinsic concord." — Schlegel, PMlosoph. 
of Life ^ &c., Bohn's edit., p. 194. 

In Coleridge's Aids to Reflection^ natural is opposed to 
spiritual^ as sensuous to super -sensuous or super -natural. 

This objection might be obviated by calling that know- 
ledge of God and of his attributes and administration which 
the light of reason furnishes, Rational Theology. But this 
phrase has been of late years employed in a different sense, 
especially in Germany. Natural Theology confines itself 
exclusively to that knowledge of God which the light of 
nature furnishes, and does not intermeddle with the dis- 
coveries or the doctrines of positive or revealed theology. It 
prosecutes its inquiries by the unassisted strength of reason 
within its own sphere. But rational theology carries the 
torch or light of reason into the domain of revelation. It 
criticizes and compares texts — analyzes doctrines — examines 
traditions — and brings all the instruments of philosophy to 
bear upon things divine and spiritual in order to reduce 
them to harmony with things human and rational. — V. 
Eationalism. 
THTEOPATHLY (0£oV and -rflt^j^, feeling of Deity) — a word used 
by Dr. Hartley as synonymous yf\ih.piety,, or a sense of Deity. 
THEORY (dicj^ix^ contemplation, speculation ; Gsafinv,, to see). 
— Theory and theoretical are properly opposed to practice 
and practical. Theory is mere knowledge ; practice is the 
application of it. Though distinct, they are dependent, 
and there is no opposition between them. TJieory is the 
knowledge of the principles by which practice accomplishes 
its end. Hypothetical and theoretical are sometimes used 
as synonymous with conjectural. But this is unphilosophical 
in so far as theoretical is concerned. Theory always implies 
knowledge — knowledge of a thing in its principles or causes. 

'^ Theory is a general collection of inferences drawn from 



VOCABULARY <'F PHILOSOPHY. 517 

THEORY— 

facts and compressed into principles." — Farr, Sequel to a 
Printed Paper. 

" With Plato, dzcipii'j is applied to a deep contemplation of 
the truth. By Aristotle it is always opposed to 'Troxmi-j, 
and to 'TTonrj^ so that he makes philosophy theoretical^ prac- 
tical^ and artistical {7rQinTix.nv). The Latins and Boethius 
rendered kc^onv by speculare. With us it means a learned 
discoiu^e of philosophers of speculative use." — Trendlen- 
bui'g, Elementa Log. Aristot., p. 76. 

•'Theory denotes the most general laws to which certain 
facts can be reduced." — Mackintosh, Prel. Diss.^ p. 61, 
Whewell's edit. : and at p. 367, the distinctions between 
hypothesis and theory are thus stated: — 

1. The principles employed in the explanation (of the 
phenomena) should be knoT\^l really to exist ; in which 
consists the main distinction between hypothesis and theory. 
Gravity is a principle universally known to exist ; ether and 
a nervous lluid are mere suppositions. 2. These principles 
should be known to produce eitects like those which are 
ascribed to them in the theory. This is a further distinction 
between hypothesis and theory; for there are an infinite 
number of degrees of likeness., from the faint resemblances 
which have led some to fancy that the functions of the 
nerves depend on electricity, to the remarkable coincidences 
between the appearances of projectiles on earth, and the 
movements of the heavenly bodies, which constitute the 
Newtonian system ; a theory now perfect, though exclu- 
sively founded on analogy, and in which one of the classes 
of phenomena brought together by it is not the subject of 
direct experience. 3. It should correspond, if not with all 
the facts to be explained, at least with so great a majority 
of them as to render it highly probable that means will in 
time be foimd of reconciling it to all. It is only on this 
gi'ound that the Newtonian system justly claimed the title 
of a legitimate theory dm*ing that long period when it was 
unable to explain many celestial appearances, before the 
kboui's of a century and the genius of Laplace at length 



518 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

THEORir— 

completed the theory^ by adapting it to all the phenomena. 
A theory may be just before it is complete. 

'-'- Theory and hypothesis may be distinguished thus : an 
hypothesis is a guess or supposition, made concerning the 
cause of some particular fact, with the view of trying experi- 
ments or making observations to discover the truth. A 
theory is a complete system of suppositions put together for 
the purpose of explaining all the facts that belong to some 
one science. For example — astronomers have suggested 
many hypotheses^ in order to account for the luminous 
stream which follows comets. They have also formed many 
theories of the heavens ; or in other words, complete ex- 
planations of all the appearances of the heavenly bodies 
and their movements. When a theory has been generally 
received by men of science, it is called a system; as the 
Ptolemaic system ; the Copernican system ; the Newtonian 
system^ — Taylor, Elements of Thought. 

See a paper on Theory in BlackwoocTs Mag. for August, 
1830.— F. Hypothesis. 
TBIEO^OPnrsifl or THSOSOPHir (0soV and aoC^U, know- 
ledge of God). 

" The Theosophists^ neither contented with the natural 
light of human reason, nor with the simple doctrines of 
Scripture understood in their literal sense, have recourse to 
an internal supernatural light, superior to all other illumi- 
nations, from which they profess to derive a mysterious and 
divine philosophy, manifested only to the chosen favourites 
of heaven." — Enfield, Hist, of Phil. ^ vol. ii. 

See Tholuck (F. A. D.), Sufsmus^ sive Theosophia 
Persarum Pantheistica. 8vo, Berlin, 1821. App., 1838. 

The Theosophists are a school of philosophers who would 
mix enthusiasm with observation, alchemy with theology, 
metaphysics with medicine, and clothe the whole with a 
form of mystery and inspiration. It began with Paracelsus 
at the opening of the sixteenth century, and has survived in 
St. Martin to the end of the eighteenth. Paracelsus, Jacob 
Boehm, and St. Martin, may be called popular, while 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 519 

THEOSOPHIS:n— 

Cornelius Agrlppa, Valentine Weigelius, Robert Fludd, 
and Van Helmont, are more philosophical in their doc- 
trines. But they all hold different doctrines ; so that they 
cannot be reduced to a system. 

•'The theosophist is one who giyes you a theory' of God, 
or of the works of God, w^hich has not reason, but an inspi- 
ration of his own for its basis." — Yaughan, Hours with 
Mystics, vol. i., p. 45. 

^' Both the politics and the theosophy of Coleridge were at 
the mercy of a discursiye genius, intellectually bold, but 
educationally timid, which, anxious, or rather willing, to 
bring con\'iction and speculation together, mooting all 
points as it went, and throwing the subtlest glancing lights 
on many, ended in satisfying nobody, and concluding 
nothing. Charles Lamb said of him that he had ' the art 
of making the unintelligible appear intelligible.'" — Hunt. 
Imagination and Fancy^ 12mo, 1844, p. 276. 
TH1E:8IS (^Ti^rif^i^ to lay down) — is a position or proposition, 
the truth of which is not plain from the terms, but requires 
e^-idence, or explanation, or proof In the schools it was 
especially appUed to those propositions in Theology, Philo- 
sophy, Law, and Medicine, which the candidates for degrees 
were required to defend. 
THOUGHT AIVD THliVKlNO — " are used in a more, and in a 
less restricted signification. In the former meaning, they 
are hmited to the discursive energies alone ; in the latter, 
they are co-extensiye with consciousness." — Su* Will. 
Hamilton, Reid^s Works, p. 222, note. 

Thinking is employed by Sir \M11. Hamilton (Discus- 
siojis^ &c., append, i., p. 578) as comprehending all our 
cognitiye energies. 

By Descartes, cogitatio^ pensee^ is used to denote or com- 
prehend '' all that in us of which we are immediately 
conscious. Thus all the operations of the Will, of the 
Imagination and Senses, are thoughts^ — Resp. ad Sec. Obj., 
p. 85, Ed., 1G63. Again, in reply to the question, what is 
a thing which thinks ? he says, '^ It is a thing which doubts, 



520 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

THOUOHT— 

understands, conceives, affirms, desires, wills, and does not 
will, which imagines also and feels." — MediL ii., p. 11. 

'' Though thinking be supposed ever so much the proper 
action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it 
should be always thinJcing^ always in action." — Locke, Essay 
on Hum. Understand.^ book ii., ch. 1. 

" Thought proper, as distinguished from other facts of 
consciousness, may be adequately described as the act of 
knowing or judging of things by means of concepts.''^ — Mansel, 
Prolegom. Log.^ p. 22. — V. Train of Thought. 
TIME (tempus). — Continuation of existence is duration; dura- 
tion unlimited is eternity ; duration limited is time. 

'•' By Aristotle," time was defined to be '' the measure of 
motion, secundum prius et posterius. We get the idea of 
time on the occasion when v/e observe first and last, that is, 
succession. Duration without succession would be timeless, 
immeasurable. But how are we to fix what is first and 
last in the motion of any body ? By men in all ages the 
motions of the heavenly bodies have been made the measure 
of duration. So that the full definition of time is — ' It is 
the measure of the duration of things that exist in succes- 
sion, by the motion of the heavenly bodies.' " — Monboddo, 
Ancient Metaphys.^ book iv., ch. 1. 

^^ As our conception of space originates in that of body, 
and our conception of motion in that of space, so our con- 
ception of time originates in that of motion ; and particularly 
in those regular and equable motions carried on in the 
heavens, the parts of which, from their perfect similarity to 
each other, are correct measures of the continuous and 
successive quantity called Time^ with which they are con- 
ceived to co-exist. Time^ therefore, may be defined the 
perceived number of successive movements ; for as number- 
ascertains iha greater or lesser quantity of things numbered, 
so time ascertains the greater or lesser quantity of motion 
performed." — Gillies, Analysis of Aristotle., chap. 2. 

According to Mr. Locke {Essay on Hum. Understand., 
book ii., ch. 14). " Reflection upon the train of ideas, which 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 521 

TIME— 

appear one after another in our minds, is that which fur- 
nishes us Tvith the idea of succession ; and the distance 
between any two parts of that succession, is that we call 
duration." Xow by attending to the train of ideas in our 
minds we may have the idea of succession — but this pre- 
supposes the idea of duration in which the succession takes 
place. '^ We may measure duration by the succession of 
thoughts in the mind, as we measure length by inches or 
feet, but the notion or idea of diu-ation must be antecedent 
to the mensuration of it, as the notion of length is antece- 
dent to its bemg measured." — Eeid, Infell. Powers, essay 
iii., chap. 5. 

See also Cousin (on Locke) Coiirs de Pliilosophi., lecons 
17, 18. 

Stewart, Philosophical Essays^ essay ii., ch. 2. 

See also the Fragmeids of Koyer Collard, at the end of 
tom. iv. of (Euvres de Beid. 

Dr. Reid (ut supra) says, '• I know of no ideas or notions 
that have a better claim to be accounted simple and origi- 
nal than those of Space and Time. . . . The sense 
of seeing, by itself, gives us the conception and belief of 
only two dimensions of Extension, but the sense of touch 
discovers three ; and Reason^ from the contemplation of 
finite extended things, leads us necessarily to the belief of an 
Immensity that contains them^ 

'' In like manner, memor}' gives us the conception and 
belief of finite intervals of duration. From the contem- 
plation of these., Reason leads us necessarily to the belief of 
an Eternity which comprehends all things that have a begin- 
ning and an end,^'' In another passage of the same essay, 
chap. 3, he says, ^' AVe are at a loss to what category or 
class of things we ought to refer them. They are not beings, 
but rather the receptacles of every created being, without 
which it could not have had the possibility of existence. 
Philosophers have endeavoured to reduce all the objects 
of human thought to these three classes, of Substances, 
Modes, and Relations. To which of them shall we refer 



622 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TIME— 

Time^ Space, and Kumber, the most common objects of 
thought?" 

In the philosophy of Kant, *' Time is a necessary repre- 
sentation which lies at the foundation of all intuition. Time 
is given, a priori— \t is the form of the internal sense, and 
the formal condition, a priori^ of phenomena in general. 
Hence it will be seen that all intuition is nothing but the 
representation of phenomena ; that the things we see or 
envisage are not in themselves what they are taken for ; 
that if we did away with ourselves, that is to say, the subject 
or subjective quality of our senses in general, every quality 
that we discover in time and space^ and even time and space 
themselves would disappear. What objects may be in them- 
selves, separated from the receptivity of our sensibility is 
quite unknown to us." — Analysis of Kant's Criticism of Pure 
Reason, By the Translator, 8vo, Lond., 18-14, p. 10. 

'* One of the commonest errors is to regard Time as an 
agent But in reality Time does nothing, and is nothing. 
We use it as a compendious expression for all those causes 
which operate slowly and imperceptibly ; but unless some 
positive cause is in action, no change takes place in the lapse 
of 1,000 years : 6. (/., a drop of water encased in a cavity of 
silex." — Coplestone, Remains^ p. 123. — F. Space. 

TOPOliOQlf. — F. Memoria Technica. 

TRADlTlorv. — (tradere^ to hand down) — '-'- is anyway of deli- 
vering a thing or word to another." — Bp. Taylor, Dissuasive 
from Popery. "Tradition is the Mercury (messenger) of 
the human race." — Tiberghien, Essai des Conriaiss, Hu- 
maines^ p. 50. 

"Tradition ! oh tradition ! thou of the seraph tongue, 
The ark that links two ages, the ancient and the young." 

Adam Mickiewitz. 

Nescire quid antea quam natus sis accident, id est semper 
esse puerum. — Cicero, Orator.^ cap. 14. 

When we believe the testimony of others not given by 
themselves directly but by others, this is tradition. It is 
testimony not written by the witness, nor dictated by him 



VOCABULARY OF PHrLOSOPHY. 523 

TRADITION— 

to be written, but handed down memoriter, from generation 
to generation 

•• According to the principle of Tradition (as the ground 
of certainty), it is supposed that God himself first imparted 
truth to the world, pure and unmixed from heaven. In the 
paradisiacal state, and during the whole period from the first 
man down to the Christian era, it is said by these philoso- 
phers there was a channel of divine commimication almost 
perpetually open between the mind of man and God- Here 
accordingly, it is thought we lay hold upon a kind of truth 
which is not subject to the infirmity of human reason, and 
which coming down to us by verbal or documental tradition 
from the mind of Deity itself, affords us at once a solid basis 
for all truth, and a final appeal against all error/' — Morell, 
PhilosopJi. Tenden., p. 17. 

See Molitor (J. F.), PhilosopMe de la Tradition^ 8vo, 
Paris, 1837. 

On the necessity of Tradition^ see Irertceiis i., 10. 
TRAIN OF THOUGHT. — **The subject of the Association of 
Ideas," says Mr. Stewart {PhiL Hum. Mind, vol. i., chap. 
5). '^ naturally divides itself into two parts. The Jirst relates 
to the influence of association in regidating the succession of 
our thoughts ; the second, to its influence on the intellectual 
powers, and on the moral character, by the more indissol- 
uble combinations which it leads us to form in infancy and 
early youth." — T'. Combination of Ideas. 

While we are awake a constant succession of thoughts is 
passing through the mind. Hobbes calls it the con-sequence 
or train of imaginations, the train of tJio'/glits and mental 
discourse. He says it is of two sorts. The first is unguided, 
without design, and inconstant. The second is more con- 
stant, as being regulated by some desire and design. That 
is, it is spontaneous or intentional. 

In the Train of Thought^ or the succession of the various 
modes of consciousness, it has been observed that they suc- 
ceed in some kind of order. " Xot every thought to every 
thought succeeds indifierentlv." savs Hobbes. And it ha^ 



524 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TKAIN OF THOUOHT-- 

long been matter of inquiry among philosophers to detect 
the law or laws according to which the train or succession of 
thought is determined. 

According to Aristotle, the consecution of thoughts is 
either necessary or Jiahitual. By the necessary consecution 
of thoughts, it is probable that he meant that connection 
or dependence subsisting between notions, one of which 
cannot be thought without our thinking the other ; as cause 
and effect, means and end, quality and substance, body and 
space. This consecution or connection of thoughts admits 
of no further explanation, than to say, that such is the con- 
stitution of the human mind. 

The habitual consecution of thoughts differs in different 
individuals : but, the general laws, according to which it is 
regulated, are chiefly three, viz. : —The law of similars^ the 
law of contraries^ and the law of co-adjacents. From the 
time of Aristotle, these laws have been noticed and illus- 
trated by all writers on the subject. But, it has been 
thought, that these may be reduced to one supreme and 
universal law ; and Sir James Mackintosh expresses his sur- 
prise (Dissert. ^Y^, 348, Edit. Whewell), that Dr. Brown should 
have spoken of this as a discovery of his own, when the same 
thing had been hinted by Aristotle, distinctly laid down by 
Hobbes, and fully unfolded both by Hartley and Condillac. 

The brief and obscure text of Aristotle, in his Treatise on 
Memory and Reminiscence., has been explained as contain- 
ing the universal law as to the consecution of thoughts. 
(Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's Works., p. 897). It is pro- 
posed to call this the law of Redintegration, "Thoughts 
which have, at any time, recent or remote, stood to each 
other in the relation of co-existence, or immediate consecu- 
tion, do, when severally reproduced, tend to reproduce each 
other." In other words ; " The parts of any total thought, 
when subsequently called into consciousness, are apt to sug- 
gest, immediately, the parts to which they were proximately 
related, and mediately, the whole of which they were co- 
constituent." 



VOCABULARY OF PIIILOSOPHT, 525 

TRAIIV OF THOUOHT— 

Hobbes, Leviathan, part 1, chap. 8. Human Nat., p. 17. 

Keid, Intellectual Powers, essay iv. 
TRANSCENDENT, TRANSCENI>ENTAr. {trauscendere, to 
go beyond, to surpass, to be supreme). 

"To be impenetrable, discerptlble, and unactive, is the 
nature of all body and matter, as such ; and the properties 
of a spirit are the direct contrary, to be penetrable, indis- 
cerptible, and self-motive ; yea, so different they are in all 
\ ; things, that they seem to have nothing but heing and the 
transcendental attributes of that in common." — Glanvill, 
essay i. 

Transcendental is that which is above the praedica- 
mental. Being is transcendental. The prcedicamental is 
what belongs to a certain category of being ; as the ten 
summa genera. As being cannot be included under any 
genus but transcends them all, so the properties or affec- 
tions of being have also been called transcendental. The 
three properties of being commonly enumerated are unum, 
verum, and honiim. To these some add aliquid and res: 
and these, with ens, make the six transcendentals. But 
res and aliquid mean only the same as ens. The first three 
are properly called transcendentals, as these only are 
passions or affections of being, as being. — F. Unity, 
Truth, Good. 

'' In the schools, transcendentalis and transcendens were 
convertible expressions employed to mark a term or notion 
which transcended, that is, which rose above, and thus con- 
tained under it, the categories or summa genera of Aris- 
totle. Such, for example, is being, of which the ten cate- 
gories are only subdivisions. Kant, according to his wont, 
twisted these old terms into a new signification. First of 
all, he distinguished them from each other. Transcendent 
(transcendens) he employed to denote what is wholly be- 
yond experience, being neither given as an a posteriori nor 
a priori element of cognition — what therefore transcends 
every category of thought. Transcendental (tronscenden- 
talis) he applied to signify the a priori or necessary cog- 



526 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TBANSCENOEIVT— 

nitions which, though manifested in, as affording the con- 
ditions of, experience, transcend the sphere of that contba- 
gent or adventitious knowledge which we acquire by 
experience. Transcendental is not therefore what trans- 
cends, but what in fact constitutes a category of thought. 
This term, though probably from another quarter, has 
found favour with Mr. Stewart, who proposes to exchange 
the expression principles of common sense^ for, among 
other names, that of transcendental truths.^' — Sir Will. 
Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ note A, sect. 5. 

In the philosophy of Kant all those principles of know- 
ledge which are original and primary, and which are 
determined a priori are called transcendental. They in- 
volve necessary and universal truths, and thus transcend 
all truth derived from experience which must always be 
contingent and particular. The principles of knowledge, 
which are pure and transcendental^ form the ground of all 
knowledge that is empirical or determined a posteriori. 
In this sense transcendental is opposed to empirical. 

" There is a. pMlosopJiic (and inasmuch as it is actualized 
by an effort of freedom, an artificial) consciousness which 
lies beneath, or (as it were) behind the spontaneous con- 
sciousness natural to all reflecting beings. As the elder 
Komans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis- 
Alpine and Trans- Alpine, so may we divide all the objects 
of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on 
the other side of the spontaneous consciousness ; citra et 
trans conscientiam communem. The latter is exclusively 
the domain of pure philosophy, which is, therefore, pro- 
perly entitled transcendental^ in order to discriminate it at 
once, both from mere reflection and representation on the 
one hand, and on the other from those flights of lawless 
speculation, which, abandoned by all distinct consciousness, 
because transgressing the bounds and purposes of our in- 
tellectual faculties, are justly condemned as transcendent. '''' 
— Coleridge, Biograph. Liter. ^ p. 143. 
transference: and TRANSLATION are terms employed 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 527 

TRANSFERENCE— 

by the author of the Light of Nature Pursued^ to denote the 
fact that our desires are often transferred from primary 
objects to those which are secondary or subservient ; as 
from the desire of greatness or honour may arise, in a secon- 
dary way, the desire of wealth as a means of greatness or 
power. — Tucker, Liglit of Nature ; chapter on Trans- 
ference or Translation. — V. Desire. 

TRANSMIGRATION. — V, METEMPSYCHOSIS. 

TRIVIUIWI. — The seven Liberal Arts (so called because prac- 
tised only by free persons) were Grammar, Rhetoric, 
Logic, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music. 

Lingua, Tropus, Ratio, Numerus, Tonus, Angulus, Astra. 
Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric, constituted the Trivium — 
ires vice in umim, because they all refer to words or lan- 
guage, A rithmetic^ Geometry ^^ Miisic^ and Astronomy^ con- 
stituted the Quadrivium — quatuor vice in unum^ because they 
all refer to quantity. 

"Gramm. loquitur, Bia. verba docet, Rhet. verba colorat; 
Mus. canit, Ar. numerat, Geo. ponderat, Ast. eolit astra." 

The mechanical arts were the different trades and handi- 
crafts, as weaving, sewing, baking, &c. 
TRUTH has been distinguished by most metaphysical writers, 
according as it respects being, knowledge, and speech, into 
Veritas entis^ cognitlonis^ et signi. By others, truth has 
been distinguished as entitative^ objective^ and formal, the 
tmth of signs being included under the last. 
Veritas Entis— Transcendental or Ifletaphysical Truth. 

The pillar and ground of all ti'iith is in truth of being — that 
truth by which a thing is what it is, by which it has its own 
nature and properties, and has not merely the appearance 
but reality of being. Thus gold has truth of being, i. e., 
is real gold, when it has not only the appearance, but all 
the properties belonging to that metal. Philosophy is the 
knowledge of being, and if there were no real being, that 
is, if ti'uth could not be predicated of things, there could 
be no knowledge. But things exist independently of being 



528 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TRUTH— 

known. They do not exist because tliey are known, nor 
as they are known. But they are known because they are, 
and as they are, when known fully. 
Teritas Cognitionls. 

Truth^ as predicated of knowledge, is the conformity of 
our knowledge with the reality of the object known — for, 
as knowledge is the knowledge of something, when a thing 
is known as it is, that knowledge is formally true. To 
know that fire is hot, is true knowledge. Objective truth 
is the conformity of the thing or object known with true 
knowledge. But there seems to be little difference 
whether we say that truth consists in the conformity of 
the formal conception to the thing known or conceived 
of, or in the conformity of the thing as it is to true know- 
ledge. 
f eritas Sign!. 

The trutli of the sign consists in its adequateness or con- 
formity to the thing signified. If falsity in those things 
which imitate another consists not in so far as they imitate, 
but in so far as they cannot imitate it or represent it ade- 
quately or fully, so the trutli of a representation or sign 
consists in its being adequate to the thing signified. The 
trutli and adequacy of signs belongs to enunciation in 
Logic. 

'* Independent of the truth which consists in the con- 
formity of thoughts to things, called scientific — and of that 
which lies in the correspondence of words with thoughts, 
called moral trutli — there is a truth called logical^ depend- 
ing on the self- consistency of thoughts themselves 

Thought is valueless except in so far as it leads to correct 
knowledge of things ; a higher truth than the merely logi- 
cal, in subservience to which alone the logical is desirable. 
The reason that we sedulously avoid the purely logical 
error of holding two contradictory propositions is, that we 
believe one of them to be a fair representation of facts, so 
that in adopting the other we should admit a falsehood, 
wliich is always abhorrent to the mind. If we call the 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 529 

TRUTH— 

logical truths subjective^ as consisting in the due direction 
of the thinking subject, we may call this higher metaphy- 
sical truth^ objective^ because it depends on our thoughts 
fairly representing the objects that give rise to them." — 
Thomson, Outline of Laws o/TJiougJit^ sect. 81, 82. 

'^ Veritas est adagquatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod 
intellectus dicit esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est." — 
Aquinas, Contra. Gent.^ i., 49. 

Truths in the strict logical sense, applies to propositions 
and to nothing else ; and consists in the conformity of the 
declaration made to the actual state of the case ; agreeably 
to Aldrich's definition of a "true" proposition — vera est, 
qucB quod res est dicit. 

In its etymological sense, truth signifies that which the 
speaker "trows," or believes to be the fact. The etymo- 
loory of the word d'hrikg seems to be similar ; denoting 
non -concealment. In this sense it is opposed to a lie ; and 
may be called morale as the other may be called logical 
truth. 

" Truth is not unfrequently applied, in loose and inaccu- 
rate language, to arguments ; when the proper expression 
would be ' correctness,' ' conclusiveness,' or ' validity.' " 

" Truth again, is often used in the sense of reality., tc 
6u, People speak of the truth ot falsity of facts ; properly 
speaking, they are either real or fictitious : \t\s the state- 
ment that is ' true' or ' false.' The ' true' cause of anything, 
is a common expression ; ' meaning that which may with 
truth be assigned as the cause.' The senses of /a/^e/ioot/ 
correspond." — Whately, Logic, appendix i. 

" Necessary truths are such as are known independently 
of inductive proof They are, therefore, either self-evident 
propositions, or deduced from self-evident propositions." 
— Kidd, Principles of Reasoning.^ chap. 7. 

Necessary truths are those in which we not only leam 
that the proposition is true, but see that it must be true ; 
in which the negation is not only fiilse, but impossible; in 
which we cannot, even bv an effort of the imagination, or 



530 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TRUTH— 

in a supposition, conceive tlie reverse of what is asserted. 
The relations of number are the examples of such truths. 
Two and three make five. We cannot conceive it to be 
otherwise. 

Contingent truths are those which, without doing violence 
to reason, we may conceive to be otherwise. If I say, 
'' Grass is green," " Socrates was a philosopher," I assert 
propositions which are true, but need not have been so. It 
might have pleased the Creator to make grass blue — and 
Socrates might never have lived. 

''There are truths oi reasoning (reason) and truths oifact. 
Truths of reason are necessary, and their contradictory is 
impossible — those oifact are contingent, and their opposite 
is possible. When a truth is necessary you can find the 
reason by analysis, resolving it into ideas and truths more 
simple, till you come to what is primitive." — Leibnitz, Nou- 
veaux Essais^ iv., 2 ; Monadologie^ sect. 33. 

''Though the primary truths of fact and the primary 
truths of intelligence (the contingent and necessary truths of 
Eeid) form two very distinct classes of the original beliefs 
or intuitions of our consciousness, there appears no suffi- 
cient ground to regard their sources as different, and there- 
fore to be distinguished by different names. In this I regret 
that I am unable to agree with Mr. Stewart. See his 
Elements^ vol. ii., ch. 1, and his Account of Eeid, supra, 
p, 27, b." — Sir W. Hamilton, Reid^s Works^ note A, p. 
743. 

" Truth implies something really existing. An assertion 
respecting the future may be probable or improbable, it 
may be honest or deceitful, it may be prudent or impru- 
dent, it may have any relation we please to the mind of 
the person who makes it, or of him who hears it, but it 
can have no relation at all to a thing which is not. The 
Stoics said, Cicero will either be consul or not. One of 
these is true, therefore the event is certain. But truth 
cannot be predicated of that which is not." — Coplestone, 
Enquiry into Necessity^ preface, p. 15. 



VOC-^JBULAET OF PHILOSOPHY. 531 

TRUTH— 

•' Truvi impKes a report of something that is ; reality 
denotes the existence of a thing, whether affirmed and 
reported of or not. The thing reported either is or is not ; 
the report is either true or false. The things themselves 
are sometimes called truths^ instead of facts or realities. 
And assertions concerning matters of fact are called facts. 
Thus we hear of false facts, a thing literally impossible and 
absurd.'' — Coplestone, Rtmains. p. 105. — V. Falsity, 
Reality. 

TRUTHS (First) are such as do not depend on any prior truth. 
They cany eyidence in themselves. They are assented to 
as soon as they are understood. The assent given to them 
is so full, that while experience may confirm or familiarize 
it. it can scarcely be said to increase it, and so clear that 
no proposition contradicting them can be admitted as more 
cleai*. That a whole is greater than any of its parts ; that 
a change imphes the operation of a cause ; that qualities do 
not exist without a substance ; that there are other beings 
m the world besides ourselves ; may be given as examples 
of first truths. These truths are and must be assented to 
by every rational beiug, as soon as the terms expressing 
them are understood. They have been caUed KOf^oci huoiui. 
communes notitice^ natural judgments, primitive behefs, fun- 
damental laws of the human mind, priaciples of common 
-ense. principles of reason, principles of reasoning, &c. 

. . . "To determine how great is the number of these 
propositions is impossible ; for they are not in the soul as 
propositions ; but it is an undoubted truth that a mind 
awaking out of nothing into beiug, and presented T\*ith 
particular objects, would not fail at once to judge concern- 
ing them according to, and by the force of, some such innatt 
principles as these, or just as a man would judge who had 
learnt these explicit propositions : which indeed are so 
nearly allied to its own natiu-e. that they may be cidled 
almost a pait of itself. .... Therefore I take the 
mind or soul of man not to be so perfectly indifferent to 
receive all impressions as a rasa tabula, or white paper. 



532 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

TRUTHS— 

. . . '' Hence there may be some practical principles also 
innate, in the foregoing sense, though not in the form of 
propositions." — Watts, Pliilosopli. Essays^ sect. 4 and 3. 

''From the earliest records of time, and following the 
course of history, we everywhere find the principles of 
common sense, as universal elements of human thought and 
action. No violence can suppress, no sophisms obscure 
them. They steadily and unerringly guide us through the 
revolutions and destruction of nations and empires. The 
eye pierces with rapid glance through the long vista of ages 
amid the sanguinary conflicts, the territorial aggrandize- 
ments, and chequered features of states and kingdoms ; and 
from the wreck of all that is debasing, glorious, or powerful, 
we still recognize the great and universal truths of humanity. 
One generation passes away after another, but they remain 
for ever the same. They are the life-blood of human nature ; 
the intellectual air we breathe. Without them society could 
not for a single hour subsist; governments, laws, institu- 
tions, religion, the manners and customs of men, bear the 
indelible imprint of their universality and indestructibility. 
They are revealed in the daily and hourly actions, thoughts, 
and speech of all men ; and must ever form the basis of all 
systems of philosophy ; for without them it can only be a 
phantom, a delusion, an unmeaning assemblage of words.'' 
— ^Yan de Weyer. 

On the nature, origin, and validity of first truths^ th. 
following authors may be consulted. 

Lord Herbert, De Veritate. 

Buffier, Treatise of First Truths. 

Eeid, Inquiry and Essays on Intell. Powers. 

Sir Will. Hamilton, Reid's Works., Appendix, note A.- 

V. Common Sense, Eemlniscence. 

TYPE QrvTrog., typus^ from rvTrTSiu, to strike). 

" Great father of the ^ods, when for our crimes 
Thou send'st some heavy judgment on the times, — 
Some tyrant king, the terror of his age, 
The type and true vicegerent of thy rage ! 
Thus punish him."— Dryden, Persius, sat. 3. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 533 

TYPE— 

''So St. Hierome offered wine, not water, in the type of 
his blood." — Bishop Taylor, Of Real Presence^ sect. 6. 

Among the Greeks the first model which statuaries made 
in clay of their projected work was called rvirog. Type 
means the first rude form or fioure of anvthino^ — an adum- 
bration or shadowing forth. The thing fashioned according 
to it was the ectype^ and the type in contrast the protype. 
But arclietype was appHed to the original idea, model, or 
exemplar, not copied, but of which other things were copies. 

'' A type is an example of any class, for instance, a species 
of a genus, which is considered as eminently possessing the 
characters of the class." — Whewell, Inductive Sciences^ viii., 
ii., 10. 

For the meaning of a type in the arts of design, see Sir 
Edmund Head, Hist, of Painting^ preface, p. 39. 



UBIETY (uhi^ where) — is the presence of one thmg to another, 
or the presence of a thing in place. The schoolmen dis- 
tinguished ubiety as, 

1. Circumscriptive^ by which a body is so in one place 
that its parts are answerable to the parts of space in which 
it is, and exclude every other body. 

2. Definitive^ as when a human spirit is limited or de- 
fined in its presence to the same place as a human body. 

3. Eepletive, as when the Infinite Spirit is present 
through every portion of space. 

This last is sometimes called ubiquity^ and means the 
Divine Omnipresence. — Leibnitz, Nouv. Essais^ liv. ii., ch. 
23, sect. 21. 

i;iVCOlVl>lTlO]VEl>. — "This term has been employed m a 
twofold signification, as denoting either the entire absence 
of all restriction^ or more widely, the entire absence of all 
relation. The former we regard as its only legitimate 
apphcation." — Calderwood, Philosoph. of the Infinite^ p. 36. 
— F. Absolute, I^^finite. 

Ul¥l>£RSTAN]>INO. — '' Perhaps the safer use of the term, for 



534 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

fJNI>ERSTANI>INCJ— - 

general purposes, is to take it as tlie mind, or rather as the 
man himself considered as a concipient as well as a perci- 
pient being, and reason as a power supervening." — Cole- 
ridge, Statesman!' s Manual^ App. B, p. 264. 

''In its wider acceptation, understanding is the entire 
power of perceiving and conceiving, exclusive of the sensi- 
bility ; the power of dealing with the impressions of sense, 
and composing them into wholes according to a law of 
unity ; and in its most comprehensive meaning it includes 
even simple apprehension. Thus taken at large it is the 
whole spontaneity of the representing mind ; that which 
puts together the multifarious materials supplied by the 
passive faculty of sense, or pure receptivity. But we may 
consider the understanding in another point of view, not as 
the simple faculty of thought, which produces intuitions and 
conceptions spontaneously, and comes into play as the mere 
tool or organ of the spiritual mind ; but as a power that is 
exercised on objects which it supplies to itself, which does 
not simply think and reflect, but which examines its 
thoughts, arranges and compares them ; and this for scien- 
tific, not for directly practical, purposes. To intellectualize 
upon religion, and to receive it by means of the under- 
standing are two different things, and the common exertion 
of this faculty should of course be distinguished from that 
special use of it, in which one man differs from another, by 
reason of stronger original powers of mind, or greater 
improvement of them by exercise." — Coleridge, Aids to 
Reflection^ vol. ii., p. 38. 

'-'- The understanding is the medial faculty, or faculty of 
means, as reason on the other hand is the source of ideas 
or ultimate ends. By reason we determine the ultimate 
end ; by the understanding we are enabled to select and 
adopt the appropriate means for the attainment of or ap- 
proximation to, this end, according to circumstances. But 
an ultimate end must of necessity be an idea, that is, that 
which is not representable by the senses, and has no cor- 
respondent in nature, or the world of the senses. . . . 



VOCABULAKr OF rHILOSOPIIY. 535 

uxi>ersta:vi>ixg-- 

C/akrstanding aud sense constitute the natural mind of man. 
mind of the tlesh, ^oryj/^ua jcccko;^ as likewise v^t/^/*^ avvtuig. 
the intellectual power of the living or animal soul, which 
St. Paul everywhere contradistinguishes from the spirit, 
that is. the power resulting li'om the miion ajid co-inliuence 
of the will and reason — {70,^/iac or wisdom." — Coleridge, Xotes 
on English Dir., vol ii., p. 338. 

•• The reason and the understanding have not been 

steadily distinguished by EngUsh writers To under- 

stand an}i:hing is to apprehend it according to certain 
assumed ideas and rules : we do not include in the meaning 
of the word an examination of the gToimd of the ideas and 
niles by reference to which we understand the thuig. We 
understand a language, when we apprehend what is said, 
according to the established vocabulaiy and grammar of 
the language : without inquu*ing how the words came to 
have then- meaning, or what is the gi'oimd of the gi'amma- 
tical rules. AVe understand the sense without reasoning 
about the etymology- and s^-ntax. 

"Eeasoning may be requisite to understanding. TTe may 
have to reason about the syntax in order to understand the 
sense. But understanding leaves still room for reasoning. 
Also we may understand vrhnx is not conformable to reason; 
as when we understand a man's arguments, and think them 
imfounded in reason. 

•* We reason in order to deduce rules from hi'st principles, 
or from one another. But the rules and principles which 
must be expressed when we reason, may be only ioipUed 
when we understand. We may understand the sense of a 
speech without thinldng of rules of grammar. 

** The reason is employed both in understanding and in 
reasoning ; but the principles which are expUcitly asserted 
in reasoning, are only imphcitly applied in ujiderstanding. 
The reason inchides both the faculty of seeing first prin- 
ciples, and the reasoning lacidty by which we obtahi other 
prmciples. The understanding is the faculty of applymg 



536 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

UNI>ERSTANI>INCJ— 

principles, however obtained." — ^Vhewell, Elements of 
Morality^ Introd., sect. 11. 

Anselm considered tlie facts of consciousness under the 
fourfold arrangement of Sensibility, Will, Reason, and In- 
telligence ; and showed that the two last are not identical. 
— Matter, Hist, de la Philosoph. dans ses Rapports avec 
Religion^ p. 148. Paris, 1851. 

''There is one faculty," says Aristotle (EtTi.^ lib. 6), ''by 
which man comprehends and embodies in his belief first 
principles which cannot be proved, which he must receive 
from some authority ; there is another by which, when a 
new fact is laid before him, he can show that it is in con- 
formity with some principle possessed before. One process 
resembles the collection of materials for building — the other 
their orderly arrangement. One is intuition, — the other 
logic. One vov;^ the other hnaryiy.y}.^'' Or to use a modern 
distinction, one is reason in its highest sense, the other 
understanding.^^ — Sewell, Christ. Mor.^ chap. 21. 

" I use the term understanding., not for the noetic faculty, 
intellect proper, or place of principles, but for the dianoetic, 
or discursive faculty, in its widest signification, for the 
faculty of relations or comparisons ; and thus in the mean- 
ing in which ver stand is now employed by the Germans." — 
Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions^ &c., 8vo, Lond., 1852, p. 4, 
note. — F. Reason, Intellect. 

UNIFICATION is the act of so uniting ourselves with another 
as to form one being. Unification with God was the final 
aim of the Xeo-platonicians. And unification with God is 
also one of the beliefs of the Chinese philosopher, Lao Tseu. 

UNITARIAN (A) is a believer in one God. It is the same in 
meaning as Monotlieist. In this large sense it is applicable 
to all Christians, for they all believe in the unity of the 
Divine nature ; and also to Jews and Mohammedans. It 
may even include Deists, or those who believe in God on 
grounds of reason alone. But the name is commonly op- 
posed to Trinitarian, and is applied to those who, accept- 



VOCABULARY 6f PHILOSOPHY. 537 

UNIFACTION— 

ing the Christian Revelation, believe in God as existing in 
one person, and acknowledge Jesus Christ as his Messenger 
to men. 
UTVITY or OJVEIVESS (to gy, iiniim, one)— is a property of be- 
ing. If anything is, it is one and not many. Omne ens est 
unum. 

Unity is defined to be that property, qua ens est indivisum 
in se et divisam ah omni alio. 

Locke (Essay on Hum. Understand,^ b. ii., ch. 16) makes 
unity synonymous with number. But Aristotle (Metapliys.^ 
lib. v., cap. 6., lib. x., cap. 1), more correctly makes unity 
the element of number, and says that uyiity is indivisible- 
ness. That which is indivisible and has no position is a 
monad. That which is indivisible, but has a position, is a 
point. That which is divisible only in one sense is a line. 
That which is divisible in two senses is a plane. And that 
which is divisible in three senses is a lody in respect of 
quantity. 

According to Aristotle (Metaphys.^ lib. x., cap. 1), the 
modes of unity are reducible to four, that of continuity, 
especially natural continuity, which is not the result of con- 
tact or tie — that of a whole naturally, which has figure and 
form, and not like things united by violence — ^that of an 
individual or that which is numerically indivisible — and that 
of a universal, which is indivisible in form and in respect of 
science. 

Unity has been divided into transcendental or entitative, 
by which a being is indivisible in itself — logical^ by which 
things like each other are classed together for the purposes 
of science — and morale by which many are embodied as 
one for the purposes of life, as many citizens make one 
society, many soldiers one army. 

Unity is opposed to plurality^ which is nothing hnt plures 
entitates aut imitates. 

Unity is specific or numericcd. The former may rather 
be called similitude,, and the latter identity. — Hutcheson, 
Metapliys.^ pars. 1, cap. 3. 



538 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

UJ^ITY or ONENESS— 

" The essential diversity of the ideas unity and sameness^ 
was among the elementary principles of the old logicians ; 
and the sophisms grounded on the confusion of these terms 
have been ably exposed by Leibnitz in his critique on Wiss- 
owatius." — Coleridge, Second Lay Sermon^ p. 367. See 
also Aids to Reflection^ p. 157. — F. Distinction, Identity. 
tJNiVERSAliS. — '' The same colour being observed to-day in 
chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from 
milk, it considers that appearance alone, makes it a repre- 
sentative of all of that kind, and having given it the name 
of whiteness, it by that sound signifies the same quality, 
wheresoever to be imagined or met with, and thus universals^ 
whether ideas or terms, are made." — Locke, Essay on Hum. 
Understand.^ book ii., ch. 11. 

Universal terms may denote, 1. A mathematical univer- 
sality, as all circles (no exception) have a centre and cir- 
cumference. 2. A physical universality, as all men use 
words to express their thoughts (though the dumb cannot). 
3. A moral universality, as all men are governed by affec- 
tion rather than by reason. 
Universal (unum versus alia) — means, according to its compo- 
sition, one towards many. It is defined by Aristotle (Lib. 
de Interpret.^ cap. 5), "that which by its nature is fit to be 
predicated of many." And (Metaphys.^ lib. v., cap. 13) 
'' that which by its nature has a fitness or capacity to be in 
many." It implies unity with community, or unity shared 
in by many. 

Universals have been divided into, 1. Metaphysical^ or 
universalia ante rem. 2. Physical^ or universalia in re. 
3. Logical^ or universalia post rem. 

By the first are meant those archetypal forms, according 
to which all things were created. As existing in the divine 
mind and furnishing the pattern for the divine working, 
these may be said to correspond with the ideas of Plato. 

By universals in the second sense are meant certain com- 
mon natures, which, one in themselves, are diffused over or 
shared in by many — as rationality by all men. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 539 

By universals in tlie third sense are meant general notion? 
fi-amed by the human intellect, and predicated of mam- 
things, on the gToimd of then' possessing common proper- 
ties — as animal^ which may be predicated of man, lion, 
horse, &c. 

Realists give prominence to universals in the first and 
second signification. Nominalists hold that the true mean- 
ing o^ universals is that assigned in the third sense. While 
conceptualists hold an intermediate view. — Reid, Intell. 
Powers^ essay v., chap. 6. Thomson, Outline of Laivs of 
TJiought^ 2d edit., sect. 23. 

In ancient philosophy the universals Tvere called prcedic- 
ahles (q. v.), and were arranged in five classes, genus^ 
species^ differentia^ proprium^ and accidens. It is argued 
that there can be neither more nor fewer. For, whatever is 
predicated of many is predicated essentially or accidentally ; 
if essentially^ either of the whole essence, and then it is a 
species ; of a common part of the essence, and then it is a 
genus ; or of a proper part of the essence, and then it is the 
differentia essentialis ; if accidentally^ it either flows from 
the essence of the subject, and is its proprium^ or does not 
flow from its essence, and is its accidens. 

Or it may be argued thus — universality is a fitness of 
being predicated of many, which implies identity or same- 
ness, or at least resemblance. There will therefore be as 
many classes of universals as there are kinds of identity. 
Xow, when one thing is said to be the same with another, 
it is so either essentially or accidentally ; if essentially, it is 
so either completely or incompletely ; if completely, it gives a 
species ; ]£ incompletely, it is so mform, and gives the differ- 
entia, or in matter and gives the genus ; if accidentally, it is 
the same either necessarily and inseparably, and constitutes 
the proprium — or contingently and separably, and is the 
accidens. — Tellez, Summa, pars. 1, dis. v., sect. 1. But 
the fivefold classification of universals is censured by Dero- 
don, Log., pars. 2, cap. 6. See also Thomson, Outline of 
iKiivs of Thought, sect. 37. 



540 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

IJNIVOCAI4 WORDS (una vox^ one word or meaning) — ''are 
such as signify but one idea, or at least but one sort of 
thing ; the words book, bible, fish, house, elephant, may be 
called univocal words^ for I know not that they signify 
anything else but those ideas to which they are generally 
affixed." — Watts, Logic^ b. i., c. 4. 

'' I think it is a good division in Aristotle, that the same 
word may be applied to different things in three ways : 
univocally^ analogically^ and equivocally. Univocally^ when 
the things are species of the same genus ; arialogically^ when 
the things are related by some similitude or analogy ; equi- 
vocally^ when they have no relation but a common name." 
— Reid, Correspondence^ p. 75. 

In logic, a common term is called univocal in respect 
of those things or persons to which it is applicable in the 
same signification, as the term ''man." Whately observes 
that the " usual divisions of nouns into univocal^ equivo- 
cal and analogous., and into nouns of the first and second 
intention^ are not, strictly speaking, divisions of words, but 
divisions of the manner of employing them ; the same word 
may be employed either univocally., equivocally.) or analo- 
gously ; either in the first intention or the second." — 
Whately, Logic, b. ii., ch. 5, § 1. 

F. Analogous, Equivocal, Intention. 
UTIIilTY, said Kant (MetapJiys. des Moeurs., p. 15), "is 
nothing scarcely but a frame or case which may serve to 
facilitate the sale of a picture, or draw to it the attention of 
those who are not connoisseurs, but cannot recommend it 
to true lovers of the art, or determine its price." 

"What is useful only has no value in itself; but derives 
all its merit from the end for which it is useful." — Reid, 
Active Pouters., essay v., ch. 5. 

" Utility is an idea essentially relative, which supposes a 
higher term." — Manuel de Philosoph.., p. 344. 

The doctrine of utility in morals is, that actions are right 
because they are useful. It has been held under various 
forms. Some who maintain that utility or beneficial ten- 
dency is what makes an action right, hold that a virtuous 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 541 

UTII.ITY— 

agent may be prompted by self-love (as Paley), or by 
benevolence (as Rutlierfortb), or partly by both (as Hume). 
And the beneficial tendency of actions has by some been 
viewed solely in reference to this life (as Hume and Ben- 
tham), while by others it has been extended to a future 
state (as Paley), and the obligation to do such actions has 
been represented as arising from the rewards and punish- 
ments of that future state, as made known by the light of 
nature and by revelation (as Dwight^. 

The finidamental objection to the doctrine of utility in all 
its modifications, is that taken by Dr. Reid {Active Powers, 
essay v., ch. 5), viz., ''that agreeableness and utility are 
not moral conceptions, nor have they any connection with 
morality. What a man does, merely because it is agreeable, 
is not virtue. Therefore the Epicurean system was justly 
thought by Cicero, and the best moralists among the 
ancients, to subvert morality, and to substitute another 
principle in its room ; and this system is liable to the same 
censure." " Honestum^ igitur^ id iiitelligimns^ quod tale est, 
ut, detracta omni utilitate^ sine idlis premiis fructihusve^ per 
seipsum jure possit laudariy — De Finihus^ ii., 14. 



VEIiliElTY (velle^ to will)— is an indolent or inactive wish or 
inclination towards a thing, which leads to no energetic 
effort to obtain it, as when it is said, " The cat likes fish but 
will not touch the water." 

" The wishing of a thing is not properly the willing it, but 
it is that which is called by the schools an imperfect velleity^ 
and imports no more than an idle inoperative complacency 
in, and desire of the end, without any consideration of the 
means." — South. 

V. YOLITION. 

VERACITY is the duty of preserving the truth in our conver- 
sation. It is natural for us to speak as we think, and to 
believe that others do the same. So much so that Dr. 



542 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

VERACITY— 

Reid enumerates an instinct of veracity and a corresponding 
instinct of credulity as principles of human nature. Chil- 
dren do not distrust nor deceive. It is not till interest or 
passion prompts men, that they conceal or disguise the 
truth. The means employed for this purpose are either 
saying what is false^ or equivocation and reservation. — q, v. 

TERBAli is opposed to Real (q. v.), 1. As name is opposed to 
thing; and 2. As insincere is opposed to sincere. ^' Great 
acclamations and verbal praises and acknowledgments, 
Avithout an honest and sincere endeavour to please and 
obey him, are but pieces of mockery and hypocritical com- 
pliment." — Hale, Cent, of Afflictions. 

'' Sometimes the question turns on the meaning and 
extent of the terms employed ; sometimes on the things 
signified by them. If it be made to appear, therefore, that 
the opposite sides of a certain question may be held by 
parties not differing in their opinion of the matter in hand^ 
then that question may be pronounced verbal; or depending 
on the different senses in which they employ the terms. If, 
on the contrary, it appears that they employ the terms in 
the same sense, but still differ as to the application of one 
of them to the other, then it may be pronounced that the 
question is rgaZ— that they differ as to the opinions they 
hold of the things or questions." — Whately. 

ViRTUAli is opposed to actual. — "It is not, in this sense, the 
foundation of Christian doctrine, but it contains it all ; not 
only in general, but in special ; not only virtual^ but actual; 
not mediate, but immediate ; for a few lines would have 
served for a foundation general, virtual^ and mediate." — 
Bp. Taylor, Dissuas. from Popery.^ sect. 3. 

A thing has a virtual existence when it has all the con- 
ditions necessary to its actual existence. The statue exists 
virtually in the brass or iron, the oak in the acorn. The 
cause virtually contains the effect. In the philosophy of 
Aristotle, the distinction between ^vuoif/^ig., and 'ivTihsx^^^i 
or euspysiot^ i. e., potentia or virtus^ and actus is frequent 
and fundamental. 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 543 

VIRTUAL— 

'' A letter of credit does not in reality contain the sum 
which it represents : that sum is only really in the coffer of 
the banker. Yet the letter contains the sum in a certain 
sense, since it holds its place. This sum is in still another 
sense contained ; it is virtually in the credit of the banker 
who subscribes the letter. To express these differences 
in the language of Descartes, the sum is contained /or ma?/?/ 
in the coffer of the banker, objectively^ in the letter which 
he subscribed, and eminently^ in the credit which enabled 
him to subscribe ; and thus the coffer contains the reality 
formal of the sum, the letter the reality objective^ and the 
credit of the banker the reality eminent.''' — Rover CoUard, 
(Euvres de Reid^ tom. ii., p. 356. 
VIRTUE. — "For if virtue be an election annexed unto our 
nature, and consisteth in a mean, which is determined by 
reason, and that mean is the very myddes of two things 
vicious, the one is surplusage, the other in lacke," &c. — 
Sir T. Elyot, The Governour^ b. ii., c. 10. 

Virtus., in Latin, from vir., a man, and oL^erri in Greek, from 
"A^)7;, Mars.) give us the primar^^ idea of manly strength. 
Virtue then implies opposition or struggle. In man, 
the struggle is between reason and passion — between 
right and wrong. To hold by the former is virtue.^ to 
yield to the latter is vice. According to Aristotle, virtue 
is a practical habit acquired by doing virtuous acts. He 
called those virtues intellectual., by which the intellect was 
strengthened, and moral., by which the life was regidated. 
Another ancient di^asion was that of the cardinal virtues — 
which correspond to the moral virtues. The theological 
virtues ^ere faith., hope., and charity. 

The opposite of virtue is vice. 

Aristotle is quoted by Bacon in Seventh Book Of the 
Advancement of Learning., as saying, 

"As beasts cannot be said to have vice or virtue, so 
neither can the gods ; for as the condition of the latter is 
something more elevated than virtue^ so that of the former 
is something different from vice." — Moffet, Trans., p. 200. 



544 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

VIRTUE— 

As virtue implies trial or difficulty, it cannot be predi- 
cated of God. He is Holy. 

Kant frequently insists upon the distinction between 
virtue and holiness. In a holy being the will is uniformly 
and without struggle in accordance with the moral law. 
In a virtuous being the will is liable to the solicitations of 
the sensibility, in opposition or resistance to the dictates of 
reason. This is the only state of which man is capable in 
this life. But he ought to aim and aspire to the attain- 
ment of the higher or holy state, in which the will without 
struggle is always in accordance with reason. The Stoics 
thought the heau ideal of virtue, or the complete subjection 
of sense and appetite to reason, attainable in this life. 

F. Duty, Meeit, Obligation, Eectitude, Stan- 
dard. 
VOIilTlON (velle., to will) — '4s an act of the mind knowingly 
exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any 
part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, 
any particular action."— Locke, Essay on Hum. Under- 
stand. ., book ii., chap. 21, sect. 15. 

'' There is an error vfhich lies under the word volition. 
Under that word you include hoXh the final perception of 
the understanding which is passive, and also the^r^^ ope- 
ration or exertion of the active faculty or self-motive 
power. These two you think to be necessarily connected. 
I think there is no connection at all between them ; and 
that in their not being connected lies the difference be- 
tween action and passion ; which difference is the essence 
of liberty." — Dr. Sam. Clarke, Second Letter to a Gentle- 
man., p. 410. 

Things are sought as ends or as means. 

The schoolmen distinguished three acts of will, circa 
finem.^ Velleity., Intention., and Fruition. Gen. iii. 6 : — When 
the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that 
it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to 
make one wise (this is velleity)^ she took thereof (this is 
intention) and did eat (this is fruition). There are also 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 545 

VOIilTlON— 

three acts, circa media, viz., consent^ approving of means — 
election^ or choosing the most fit, and application, use, or 
employing of them.— F. — Election, Will. 



WJEIili-BEINO. — ''This is beyond all doubt, and indisput- 
able," says Lelghton in his Theological Lectures, "that all 
men wish well to themselves ; nor can the mind of man 
divest itself of this propensity, without divesting itself of 
its being. This is what the schoolmen mean when in their 
manner of expression they say that ' the will' (voluntas, not 
arhitrium) is carried towards happiness, not simply as will, 
but as nature.' 'I^o man hateth his own flesh.' " 

'' One conclusion follows inevitably from the preceding 
position," says Coleridge (Aids to Reflection, vol. i., p. 20, 
Edin., 1848), ''namely, that this propensity can never be 
legitimately made the principle of morality, even because 
it is no part or appurtenance of the moral vv^iU : and be- 
cause the proper object of the moral principle is to limit 
and control this propensity, and to determine in what it 
may be, and in what it ought to be, gTatified ; while it is 
the business of philosophy to instruct the understanding, 
and the office of religion to convince the whole man, that 
otherwise than as a regulated, and of course therefore a 
subordinate, end, this propensity, innate and inalienable 
though it be, can never be realized or fulfilled." — V. 
Happiness. 

inHOliE.— " There are ivJioles of different kinds ; for, in the 
Jii^st place, there is an extended whole, of which the parts 
lie contiguous, such as hody and space. Secondly, There 
is a whole, of which the parts are separated or discrete, 
such as number, which, from thence, is called quantity dis- 
crete. Thirdly, There is a whole, of which the parts do 
not exist together, but only by succession, such as time, 
consisting of minutes^ hours, and days, or as many more 
parts as we please, but which all exist successively, or not 
together. Fourthly, There is what mav be called a logical 
2n 



546 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

whole^ of which the several specieses are parts. Animal, 
for example, is a whole, in this sense, and man, dog, horse, 
&c., are the several parts of it. And Fifthly, The different 
qualities of the same substance, may be said to be parts of 
that substance." — Monboddo, Ancient Metaphys., book ii., 
chap. 12. 

'' Whole'' (oAoj/), says Aristotle (Metaphys., lib. v., cap. 
26), "is applied to what is wanting in none of the parts 
which constitute it naturally a whole ; or to what embraces 
other beings if they constitute a unity, and to the beings 
embraced if they form a unity." Under this last point of 
view, two cases present themselves — either when each of 
the beings embraced is a unity, or when unity is the result 
of their union {ensemble). Thus the universal (for the 
universal receives the name of whole, when designating an 
ensemhle) is universal, because it embraces several beings, 
to each of which it applies, and all these particular beings 
form a common unity, as man, horse, God, because they 
are all living beings. In the second case, the continuous 
determined is called a whole or ensemhle, because it is a 
unity resulting from many integrant parts — above all, be- 
cause these parts are in potentia and sometimes also in 
actu, 

" Quantities having a beginning, a middle, and an end, 
things to which position brings no change, are called 
wholes ; those which suffer change by position are called 
ensemhle QTracv), Those which can unite the two characters 
are at once ensemhle and whole {y.cci oAa x,a,i 'ttolv). Such 
are those whose nature remains the same in the displace- 
ment of their parts, but whose form varies ; as wax, a 
dress. We apply to these objects the expression de tout 
et d* ensemhle; for they have these two characters. But 
water, liquid bodies, numbers, receive only the denomi- 
nation de tout. The word ensemble does not apply to 
numbers, nor to water, unless it be by metaphor. The 
expression 'ttciutcx, applies to those bodies which you would 
call whole, considering them in unity ; if you consider them 



VOCABULAHY OF PHILOSOPHT. 547 

as divided, you speak in the plural. All this number — ail 
these monads.'' — Did. Des Sciences Philosoph, 

A ichole is either divisible or indivisible. 

Ever)' whole as a whole is one and imdivided. But though 
not divided, a ichole may be divisible in thought, by being 
reduced to its elements mentally, or it may be altogether 
indivisible even in thought. This latter is what metaphysi- 
cians call Totum perfectionale^ and is only appKcable to 
Deity, who is wholly in the universe, and wholly in ever)' 
part of it. 

A divisible whole is distinguished as potential^ or that 
which is divisible into parts by which it is not constituted, 
as animal may be diiided into man and brute, but is not 
constituted by them ; and actual^ or that which is divisible 
into parts by which it is constituted, as man may be divided 
into soul and body. 

An actual ichole is either physical or metaphysical. A 
physical whole is constituted by physical composition, and is 
integral when composed of the integrant parts of matter, or 
essential when composed of matter and form. A metaphy- 
sical whole is constituted by metaphysical composition, which 
Ls fourfold : 1. A whole made up of genus and differentia 
is an essentiaV specific whole — as man, in so far as he is a 
species of animal, is made up of the genus (animal) and the 
differentia (rational). 2. A ichole made up of the specific 
nature and the individual differentia, is an essential numeri- 
cal whole. 3. A whole of existence contains a singular 
essence and existence added. 4. A whole of subsistence has 
subsistence added to existence. — Baronius, Metaphys. Gen- 
eralise sect. 15. 

According to Derodon {Log.^ 3 pars., p. 70), an essential 
whole is that from which if any part be taken the being 
perishes — as man in respect of his body and soul. An inte- 
gral whole is that from which, if any part be taken, the 
being is not entire but mutilated. Man with aU his mem- 
bers is an integral whole ; cut off a limb, he is not iin inte- 
gral^ but still an essential whole. 



548 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

WHOIiE— 

" A loliole is composed of distinct parts. Composition may 
be physical^ metaphysical^ or logical. 

'•'- A. physical whole is made up of parts distinct and sepa- 
rate and is natural^ as a tree, artificial^ as a house, morale 
or conventional^ as a family, a city, &c. 

''A metaphysical ivhole arises from metaphysical composi- 
tion, as potence and act, essence and existence, &c. 

''^ A. logical ivhole is composed by genus and differentia, and 
is called a higher notion^ which can be resolved into notions 
under it, as genus into species, species into lower species. 
Thus, animal is divided into rational and irrational^ know- 
ledge into science, art, experience, opinion, belief. 

" Of the parts into which a whole is divisible, some are 
essential^ so that if one is wanting the bemg ceases, as the 
head or heart in man ; others are integrant., of which if one 
or more be wanting the being is not entire, as in man, an 
eye or arms ; others are constituent., such as concur to 
form the substance of the thing, as oxygen and hydrogen 
in water." — Peemans, Litrod. ad Philosoph.., p. 72, 
WHY? — As an interrogative, this word is employed in three 
senses, viz., — '' By what proof (or reason) ?" '' From what 
cause?" "For what purpose?" This last is commonly 
called the '•'final cause.,'''' — e. ^., '' Why is this prisoner 
guilty of the crime?" '' Why does a stone fall to the 
earth?" Why did you go to London?" Much confusion 
has arisen from not distinguishing these different inquiries. 
— Whately, Logic, appendix 1. 
l?rir.li. — Some modern philosophers, especially among the 
French, have employed the term activity as synonymous 
with will. But the former is of wider signification than the 
latter. Activity is the power of producing change, what- 
ever the change may be. Will is the power of producing 
acts of willing. — F. Volition. 

"Everyman is conscious of a power to determine," says 
Dr. Keid (Active Powers., essay ii., ch. 1), " in things which 
he conceives to depend upon his determination. To this 
power we give the name of wilV 



VOCABriARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 649 

'• TI7// is an ambiguous word, being sometimes put for 
the faculty of willing ; sometimes for the act^ of that faculty, 
besides other meanings. But volition always signifies the 
act of willing^ and nothing else. Willingness, I think, is 
opposed to unwillingness or aversion. A man is willing to 
do what he has no aversion to do, or what he has some 
desire to do, though perhaps he has not the opportunity : 
and I think this is never called volition." — Correspondence 
of Dr. Eeid^ p. 79. 

''By the term will I do not mean to express a more or 
less highly developed faculty of desiring ; but that innate 
intellectual energy which, unfolding itself from all the other 
forces of the mind, Kke a llower from its petals, radiates 
through the whole sphere of om' activity — a taoulty which 
we are better able to feel than to define, and which we 
might, perhaps, most appropriately designate as the purely 
practical faculty of man.-" — Feuchtersleben, Dietetics of tJie 
Soul 

*' Appetite is the 2ciirs solicitor, and the ivill is appetite's 
controller ; what we covet according to the one, by the 
other we often reject." — Hooker. Eccles. Pah, book i. 

On the diiference between desiring and willing^ see Locke. 
Essay on Hum. Understand.^ book ii., ch. 21. 

Dr. Reid, Active Powers., essay ii., ch. 2. 

Mr. Stewart, Active and Moral Powers^ append., p. 471. 

By some philosophers this difiference ha^ been overlooked, 
and they have completely identified desire and volition. 

'' AYliat is desii'e,-' says Dr. Priestley (Philosoph. Necess.. 
p. 35), '• besides a -svish to obtain some apprehended 
good ? And is not every wish a vohtion ? Every volition 
is nothing more than a desire, viz., a desire to accomplish 
some end, which end may be considered as the object of 
the passion or affection." 

'' Yolition," says Mr. Belsham, ''is a modification of the 
passion of desire." Mr. James Mill, in his Analysis of the 
Hum. Mind, holds that the will is nothing but the desire 
that is most powerful at the time. Dr. Tliomas Brown, 



550 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

in his Lectures on Mor. Philosophy^ lias not spoken of the 
faculty of will or of acts of volition as separate from our 
desires. And in his Essay on Cause and Effect^ sect. 3, he 
has said, '' Those brief feelings which the body immediately 
obeys are commonly termed volitions, while the more 
lasting wishes are simply denominated desires." 

The view opposed to this is strongly asserted in the follow- 
ing passage: — ''We regard it as of great moment that the 
will should be looked on as a distinct power or energy of the 
mind. Not that we mean to represent it as exercised apart 
from all other faculties ; on the contrary, it blends itself with 
every other power. It associates itself with our intellectual 
decisions on the one hand, and our emotional attachments 
on the other, but contains an important element which 
cannot be resolved into either the one or the other, or into 
both combined. The other powers, such as the sensibility, 
the reason, the conscience, may influence the will, but they 
cannot constitute it, nor yield its peculiar workings. We 
have only by consciousness to look into our souls, as the 
will is working, to discover a power, which, though inti- 
mately connected with the other attributes of mind, even 
as they are closely related to each other, does yet stand 
out distinctly from them, with its peculiar functions and 
its own province. We hold that there cannot be an 
undertaking more perilous to the best interests of philo- 
sophy and humanity, than the attempt to resolve the 
will into anything inferior to itself. In particular it 
may be, and should be distinguished from that with which 
it has been so often confounded, the emotional part of 
man's natnre." 

According to Ritter (Hist, of Anc. Philosoph.^ vol. iii., 
p. 555), ''it was a principle with the Stoics that will and 
desire are one with thought, and may be resolved into it." 
Hence their saying, Omne actum est in intellectu. And 
hence they maintained that passion was just an erroneous 
judgment. But this is to confound faculties which are 
distinct. By the intellect we know or understand, by the 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 551 

Wllili— 

sensitivity we feel or desire, and by the will we determine 
to do or not to do, to do this or to do that. 

Intellectus est prior voluntate, non enim est voluntas nisi 
de bono intellecto. — Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol.^ ii., 1, 
qusest. 83. 

Ea quae sunt in Intellectu sunt principia eorum quae sunt 
in affectu, in quantum scilicet bonum intellectum movet 
affectum. — Ibidem^ ii., 2, quaest. 7, art. 2. 

In what sense the understanding moves the loill is shown 
by Aquinas. — Sum. TJieol.^ ii., 1, qusest. 9, art. 1. 

" Whether or no the judgment does certainly and infalli- 
bly command and draw after it the acts of the will, this is 
certain, it does of necessity precede them, and no man can 
fix his love upon anything till his judgment reports it to the 
will as amiable." — South, Sermon on Matlh. x., 37. 

On the question, whether the connection between the 
intellect and the will be direct or indirect ? see Locke, Essay 
on Hum. Understand.^ b. i., ch. 21 ; Jonathan Edwards, 
Inquiry ., part i., sect. 2 ; Dr. TurnbuU, Christ. PhilosopJi.^ 
p. 196. 
Will (Freedom of). — '' This is the essential attribute of a will^ 
and contained in the very idea, that whatever determines 
the will acquires this power from a previous determination 
of the will itself. The will is ultimately self-determined, or 
it is no longer a will under the law of perfect freedom, but 
a nature under the mechanism of cause and effect." — 
Coleridge, Aids to Reflection^ vol. i., p. 227. 

" We need only to reflect on our own experience to 
be convinced that the man makes the motive, and not 
the motive the man. What is a strong motive to one 
man, is no motive at all to another. If, then, the man 
determines the motive, what determines the man to a good 
and worthy act, we will say, or a vu'tuous course of con- 
duct ? The intelligent will^ or the self- determining power? 
True, in part it is ; and therefore the will is pre-eminently, 
the spiritual constituent in our being. But will any man 
admit, that his own will is the only and sufficient deter- 



552 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 

minant of all lie is, and all he does? Is nothing to be 
attributed to the harmony of the system to which it be- 
longs, and to the pre-established fitness of the objects and 
agents, known and unknown, that surround him, as acting 
on the will^ though, doubtless, with it likewise ? a process 
which the co -instantaneous yet reciprocal action of the air and 
the vital energy of the lungs in breathing, may help to render 
intelligible." — Coleridge, Aids to Reflection^ vol. i., p. 44. 

'' It is very true that in willing an act, or in any act of 
self-determination, I am or may be induced by a variety of 
motives or impulses — my will may be moved ; but this does 
not exclude the power of origination, for the consent even 
to the outward inducement or stimulus, still requires this 
unique act of self-determination in order to the energy re- 
quisite to the fulfilment of the deed. That it is so, who 
shall doubt who is conscious of the power ; or if he believe 
that he has not this consciousness he belies his own nature. 
The actuation of the individual will not only does not ex- 
clude self-determination, but implies it — implies that, though 
actuated, but actuated only because already self-operant, 
it is not compelled or acting under the law of outward 
causation. How often do we not see that a stern resolve 
has produced a series of actions, which, sustained by the 
inward energy of the man, has ended in its complete 
achievement. Contrast this with the life and conduct of 
the wayward, the fickle and the unsteady, and it is impos- 
sible not to find the inward conviction strengthened and 
confirmed, that the will is the inward and enduring essence 
of man's being." — Green, Mental Dynamics^ p. 54. 

''The central point of our consciousness — that which 
makes each man what he is in distinction from every other 
man — that which expresses the real concrete essence of the 
mind, apart from its regulated laws and formal processes, is 
the will. Will expresses power, spontaneity, the capacity of 
acting independently and for ourselves." — Morell, Philo- 
sopK of Relig.^ p. 3. 

'•'• Will may be defined to be the faculty which is appro- 



VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 553 

hendecl in the consciousness, as the originating power of the 
personal self. ISTot that it can be seen to be an absolute 
power of self-origination, it is possible that it may always 
be determined by subtile forces which do not fall within the 
sphere of consciousness. But so far as apprehension can 
reach, the phenomena of the ivill appear to have their 
origin in an activity of the personal self." — Thompson, 
Christ, Theism^ book i., ch. 3. — V, JS^ature, Feee-will, 
Liberty, Necessity. 
WISI>0]fI, says Sir W. Temple, '' is that which makes man 
judge what are the best ends, and what the best means to 
attain them." 

''True wisdom^'''' says Lord Shaftesbury, ''comes more 
from the heart than from the head." 

Wisdom is the right use or exercise of knowledge, and 
differs from knowledge, as the use which is made of a power 
or faculty differs from the power or faculty itself. 

The word corresponding to icisdom was used among the 
Greeks to designate philosophy. And in our translation of 
the Scriptures, the word wisdom frequently denotes the 
religious sentiment, or the fear and love of God. 







INDEX. 






Page 




Page 


Ability (Nat. and Mor.), 


1 


Antinomy, 


31 


Absolute, 


2 


Antipathy, 


32 


Abstinence, 


4 


A Parte Ante, A Parte Post, 


. 33 


Abstract, Abstraction, 


4 


Apathy, 


33 


Abstractive and Intuitive 


. 10 


Aphorism, 


33 


Absurd, Ad Absurdum E 


eductio, 1 


Apodeictic, 


. 35 


Academics, 


. 10 


Apologue, 


. 35 


Acatalepsy, 




11 


Apology, 


. 55 


Accident, 




. 12 


Apophthegm, 


. 35 


Acroamatical, 




. 13 


Apperception, 


36 


Act and Action, 




. 14 


Appetite, . 


37 


Active, 




16 


Apprehension, 


38 


Actual, 




. 16 


Apprehension and Comprehen- 




Adage, 




. 16 


sion, . . . . 


39 


Adjuration, 




16 


A Priori, A Posteriori, 


. 3'9 


Admiration, 




. 17 


Archaeus, 


. 42 


Adscititious, 




. 17 


Archelogy, 


. 43 


Esthetics, 




. 17 


Archetype, 


43 


Affection, 




17 


Argument, 


43 


Affinity, 




. 18 


Argumentation, 


. 44 


Affirmation, . 




. 18 


Art, .... 


45 


A Fortiori, 




. 18 


Asceticism, 


47 


Agent, 




. 19 


Assent, 


. 48 


Allegory, v. Myth, 




. 331 


Assertory, 


. 49 


Ambition, 




. 19 


Association, 


. 49 


Amphibology, 




. 19 


Assumption, . 


. 61 


Amphiboly, 




. 19 


Atheism, 


51 


Analogy, 




. 19 


Atom and Atomism, 


53 


Analogy and Metaphor, 


. 23 


Attention, 


53 


Analogy and Example, 


. 24 


Attribute, 


55 


Analogy and Experience, 


. 24 


Authentic, , 


56 


Analogy and Induction, 


. 25 


Authority (Principle of), 


57 


Analysis and Synthesis, 


. 25 


Autocrasy, 


57 


Analytics, 


, 27 


Automaton and Automatic, 


. 58 


Anima Mundi, 




. 27 


Automatism, 


59 


Animism, 




. 27 


Autonomy, . 


. 69 


Antecedent, 




. 29 


Autotheists, . 


59 


Anthropology, 




. 29 


Axiom, 


. 59 


Anthropomorphism, 


. 30 






Anticipation, 




. 30 


Beauty, 


. 61 





INDEX. 




Page 




Being, 


62 


Consent, . . . . 


Belief, 


63 


Consent, Universal 


Benevolence, 


64 


Consequent, v. Antecedent, 


Blasphemy, . . . . 


65 


Consilience of Inductions, 


Body, 


66 


Contemplation, 


Bonuni, . . . . 


66 


Continence, . . . . 


Bonum, Morale, . 


67 


Contingent, . . . . 


Bonum, Suramiim, 


67 


Continuity, Law of 


Brocard, 


68 


Contract, . . . . 
Contradiction (Principle of), . 


Capacity, 


68 


Contraries, . . . . 


Cardinal Virtues, . 


69 


Cosmogony, . 


Casuistry, . 


70 


Cosmology, v. Metaphysics, . 


Catalepsy, ... 


71 


Craniology, v. Phrenology, 


Category, . 


. 72 


Cranioscopy, v. Organ, . 


Cause, ... 


. 74 


Creation, . . . . 


Causality, 


. 76 


Credulity, . . . . 


Causation, 


. 80 


Criterion, . . . . 


Causes, Final, 


. 80 


Cumulative (The Argument), 


Causes, Occasional, 


83 


Custom, . . . . 


Certainty, Certitude, 


. 83 


Cynic, . . . . 


Chance, 


87 




Charity, 


. 89 


Daemonist, . . . . 


Chastity, . 


. 89 


Data, 


Choice, 


. 89 


Deduction, . . , , 


Chrematistics, 


. 90 


Definition, . . . . 


Civility, Courteousness, . 


. 90 


Deist, 


Classification, 


. 90 


Demiurge, . . . . 


Coenosthesis, v. Sensation, &c. 


457 


Demonstration, 


Colligation of Facts, 


. 92 


Denomination, External, v. 


Combinations of Ideas, . 


. 93 


Mode, . . . . 


Common Sense, . 


. 94 


Deontology, 


Common Sense (Philosophy of 


), 94 


Design, . . . . 


Common Term, 


. 96 


Desire, . . . . 


Comparison, 


. 96 


Destiny, . . . . 


Compassion, v. Sympathy, 


. 500 


Determinism, 


Complex, 


. 96 


Dialectics, . . . . 


Comprehension, 


. 97 


Dianoiolog}^, v. Noology, 


Conceiving and Apprehending 


, 97 


Dictum de Omni et Nullo, 


Concept, 


. 98 


Difference, . . . . 


Conception, . 


. 99 


Dilemma, . . . . 


Conceptualism, 


. 103 


Discovery, v. Invention, 


Conclusion, . 


. 104 


Discursus, . . . . 


Concrete, 


. 104 


Disposition, v. Temperament, . 


Condition, 


. 105 


Distinction, . . . . 


Conjugate, . 


. 106 


Distribution, 


Connotative, 


. 106 


Ditheism, 


Consanguinity, 


. 106 


Division, . . . . 


Conscience, . 


. 107 


Dogmatism 


Consciousness, 


. 108 


Doubt, . . . . 



555 



556 


INDEX. 






Page 




Page 


Dreaming, . c . . 


145 


Fable, v. Apologue, 


. 35 


Dualism, Duality, 


145 


Fact, . 


. 183 


Duration, . . . . 


146 


Factitious, . 


. 183 


I>"ty, 


146 


Faculty, 


. 184 


Dynamism, . . . . 


146 


Faculties of the Mind, 


. 188 


Eclecticism, 


146 


False, Falsity, 


. 190 


Economics, . . . . 


149 


Fancy, 


. 191 


Ecstasy, . . . . 


149 


Fatalism, Fate, . 


. 193 


Ectype, . . . 


633 


Fear, . 


. 195 


Education, . . . . 


150 


Feeling, 


. 195 


Effect, . . . . 


151 


Fetichism, 


. 197 


Ego, 


151 


Fitness and Unfitness, 


. 197 


Egoism, Egoist, . 


151 


Force, . 


. 198 


Election, . . . . 


152 


Form, . 


. 199 


Element, . . . . 


153 


Formally, v. Virtual, 


. 643 


Elicit, 


154 


Fortitude, 


. 202 


Elimination, 


154 


Free Will, . 


. 202 


Emanation, . . . . 


154 


Friendship, . 


. 202 


Eminently, v. Virtual, . 


543 






Emotion, . . . . 


155 


Generalization, 


. 203 


Empiric, Empiricism, 


156 


General Terms, . 


. 203 


Emulation, . . . . 


157 


Genius, 


. 203 


End, 


157 


Genuine, v. Authentic, 


. 56 


Ens, . . . . . 


158 


Genus, 


. 207 


Entelechy, . . . . 


159 


God, . 


. 208 


Enthusiasm, 


160 


Good (The Chief), 


. 208 


Enthymeme, 


161 


Grammar, 


. 209 


Entity, . . . . 


161 


Grandeur, 


. 210 


Enunciation, 


161 


Gratitude, . 


. 211 


Equanimity, v. Magnanimity, 


296 


Gymnosophist, 


. 211 


Equity, . . . . 


161 






Equivocal, . . . . 


162 


Habit, 


. 211 


Equivocation, 


163 


Happiness, . 


. 215 


Error, 


164 


Harmony, Pre-establish( 


3d, . 216 


Esoteric and Exoteric, . 


164 


Harmony of the Spheres 


, . 217 


Essence, . . . . 


165 


Hatred, v. Love, . 


. 294 


Eternity, . . . . 


167 


Hedonism, . 


. 218 


Eternity of God, . 


168 


Hermetic Philosophy, 


. 218 


Ethics, . . . . 


169 


Hylozoism, . 


. 218 


Ethnography and Ethnology, 


170 


Hypostasis, v. Subsisten 


tia, . 493 


Ethology, . . . " . 


170 


Hypothesis, . 


. 218 


Eudemonism, 


170 






Evidence, . . . . 


170 


I, . . . 


. 221 


Evil, 


172 


Idea, , 


. 221 


Existence, . . . . 


175 


Ideal, . 


. 228 


Expediency, 


176 


Idealism, 


. 231 


Experience, . . . . 


176 


Idealist, 


. 232 


Experimentum Crucis, . 


180 


Identical Proposition, 


. 232 


Extension, . . . . 


181 


Identism or Identity, 


. 232 


Externality or Outness, 


182 


Identity, 


. 233 



INDEX. 



657 





Page 




Page 


Identity (Personal), 


233 


Intuition, 


. 269 


Identity (Principle of), . 


235 


Invention, . 


. 272 


Ideology or Idealogy, . 


235 






Idiosyncrasy, 


236 


Judgment, . 


. 273 


Idol, . '. 


236 


Jurisprudence, 


. 275 


Ignorance, . . . . 


237 


Justice, 


. 278 


Illation, . . . . 
Imagination, 


237 

238 


Knowledge, . 


. 279 


Imagination and Fancy, 


239 


Language, . 


. 283 


Imagination and Conception, . 


241 


Laughter, 


. 283 


Imitation, . , . 


241 


Law, . 


. 283 


Immanent, 


242 


Lemma, 


. 287 


Immaterialism, 


243 


Libertarian, . 


. 287 


Immateriality, 


244 


Liberty of Will, 


. 288 


Immortality of the Soul, 


244 


Life, . 


. 290 


Immutability, 


244 


Logic, . 


. 292 


Impenetrability, . 


244 


Love and Hatred, 


. 294 


ImperateAct, 


14 






Imperatiye Categorical, . 


245 


Macrocosm and Microcosm, . 295 


Impossible, . . . . 


245 


Magnanimity and Equanimity, 296 


Impression, . . . . 


246 


Manicheism, 


. 296 


Impulse and Impulsiye, . 


247 


Materialism, 


. 297 


Inclination, . . . . 


247 


Matter, 


. 298 


Indefinite, . . . . 


247 


Matter and Form, 


. 299 


Indifference (Liberty of). 


248 


Maxim, 


. 300 


Indifferent Action, 


248 


Memory, 


. 300 


Indifferentisra or Identism, 


248 


Memoria Technica 


or Mnemon- 


Indiscernibles, v. Perceptions 




ics, 


. 305 


Obscure, . . . . 


372 


Mental Philosophy 


. 306 


Indiyidual, . . . . 


248 


Merit, . 


, 307 


Individuality, 


250 


Metaphor, 


. 307 


Individuation, 


250 


Metaphysics, 


. 308 


Individualism, 


250 


Metempsychosis, 


. 313 


Induction (Process of), . 


250 


Method, 


. 314 


Induction (Principle of), 


253 


Metonomy, v. Intention, . 268 


Inertia, .... 


254 


Microcosm, v. Macrocosm, . 295 


In Esse, In Posse, 


254 


Mind, . 


. 317 


Inference, .... 


254 


Mnemonics, v. Memoria Tech- 


Inference and Proof, 


255 


nica, 


. 305 


Infinite, .... 


255 


Modality, 


. 318 


Influx (Physical), 


257 


Mode, 


. 319 


Injury, . . . . 


258 


Molecule, 


. 320 


Innate Ideas, 


258 


Monad, 


. 320 


Instinct, .... 


261 


Monadology, 


. 321 


Intellect, .... 


264 


Monogamy, . 


. 322 


Intellection, <•,... 


265 


Monotheism, 


. 322 


Intelligence, 


265 


floral, 


. 322 


Intellectus, Patiens, A gens, . 


266 


Moral Faculty, v. ( 


Conscience, 107 


Intent or Intention, 


267 


iSIorality, 


. 323 


Intention, First and Second, . 


268 


Moral Philosophy, 


. 324 



558 


INDEX. 




Moral Sense, v. Senses Re- 


Page 


Pact, V. Contract, 


Page 
118 


flex, .... 


460 


Pantheism, . . . . 


366 


Motion, . . . 


325 


Parable, . . . . 


366 


Motive, . . . . 


325 


Paradox, . . . . 


367 


Mysticism, . . . . 


330 


Parcimony (Law of). 


367 


Mystery, . . . . 


330 


Paronymous, v. Conjugate, . 


106 


Myth, . . . . 


331 


Part, 


367 


Mythology, . . . . 


331 


Passion, . . . . 
Passions (The), . 


368 
368 


Natural, , . 


332 


Perception, . . . . 


369 


Naturalism, 


333 


Perceptions (Obscure), . 


370 


Nature, . , . . 


334 


Perfection, . . . . 


373 


Nature (Course of), 


336 


Perfectibility, 


373 


Nature (Plastic), . 


337 


Peripatetic, . . . . 


375 


Nature (Philosophy of), 


337 


Person, Personality, 


375 


Nature (Law of). 


337 


Petitio Principii, . 


377 


Nature (Human), 


339 


Phantasm, v. Idea, 


226 


Necessity, .... 


339 


Phenomenology, v. Nature, . 


336 


Negation, . . . 


342 


Phenomenon, 


377 


Nihilism, . . . . 


342 


Philanthropy, 


378 


Nihilum, or Nothing, 


343 


Philosophy, .... 


379 


Nominalism, 


343 


Phrenology, . . . . 


381 


Noogonie, . . . . 


344 


Physiognomy, 


382 


Noology, .... 


344 


Physiology and Physics, 


383 


Notion, . . . . 


345 


Picturesque, 


383 


Notiones Communes, 


349 


Pneumatics, 


384 


Noumenon, . . . . 


349 


Pneumatology, 


384 


Novelty, .... 


350 


Pollicitation, v. Promise, 


402 


Number, . . . . 


351 


Polygamy, . . . . 


385 






Polytheism, . . . • 


386 


Oath, . . . . 


351 


Positivism, . . . • 


386 


Object, V. Subject, 


490 


Possible, . . . • 


387 


Objective, , . . . 


351 


Postulate, . . . . 


388 


Obligation, . . . 


353 


Power, .... 


389 


Observation, 


355 


Prsedicate, .... 


392 


Occasion, .... 


357 


Prsedicable, .... 


392 


Occasional Causes, v. Causes, 


83 


Prasdicament, 


393 


Occult Qualities, v. Quality, . 


412 


Prse- Pr aedicamenta. 


393 


Oneiromancy, v. Dreaming, . 


145 


Prejudice, . . . . 


393 


Ontology, .... 


358 


Premiss, . . . 


394 


Operations of Mind, 


359 


Prescience, .... 


394 


Opinion, .... 


360 


Primary, . . . . 


395 


Opposed, Opposition, 


361 


Principia Essendi, 


395 


Optimism, .... 


361 


Principle, .... 


395 


Order, .... 


362 


Principles of Knowledge, 


396 


Organ, .... 


363 


Principles Express or Opera- 




Organon, .... 


364 


tive, .... 


397 


Origination, 


365 


Principles of Action, 


397 


Oughtness, v. Duty, 


146 


Privation, . . . . 


399 


Outness, .... 


365 


Probable, . . . . 


400 



INDEX. 



659 



Page 



Problem, 




. 


. 401 


Progress, v, '. 


Perfectibility, 


. 373 


Promise, 




. 402 


Proof, . 






. 403 


Property, 






. 403 


Proposition, 






. 403 


Propriety, 






. 404 


Proprium, 






. 404 


Protype, 






. 533 


Proverb, 






. 405 


Prudence, 






. 406 


Psychism, 






. 407 


Psychology, 






> 407 


Psychopann} 


xhism. 


. 410 


Pyrrhonism, 


V. Academics, 


. 10 


Scepticism 


, 


. 448 


Quadrivium, 


V. Trivium, 


. 527 


Quality, 


. 


. 410 


Quality (Occult), . 


. 412 


Quantity, 


. 


. 413 


Quantity, Discrete, &c., 


. 415 


Quiddity, 


. 


. 416 


Quietism, 






. 416 



Race, V. Species, . . .481 
Ratio, .... 417 

Ratiocination, . , .417 
Rationale, . . . .418 
Rationalism, . . .419 

Rationalists, . . .419 

Real, 419 

Realism, . . . .420 
Reason, . . . .420 
Reason (Spontaneity of), . 422 
Reason and Understanding, . 422 
Reason (Impersonal), . .427 
Reason (Determining), . .430 
Reasoning, . . . .430 
Rectitude, .... 431 
Reflection, . . . .433 
Reflex Senses, • Senses (Reflex), 460 
Relation, .... 434 
Relative, . . . .437 
Religion, . . . .437 
Remembrance, . . .438 
Reminiscence, . . .439 
Reservation or Restriction, . 442 
Retention, . . . . 443 
Right, .... 443 

Rule, .... 446 



Sabaism, 

Same, . 

Sanction, 

Savage, 

Scepticism, . 

Scholastic, . 

Scholastic Philosophy, 

Science, 

Scientia (Media), 

Sciolist, 

Sciomachy, . 

Selfishness, . 

Self-love, 

Sematology, 

Sensation, 

Sensation and Perception, 

Sense, . 

Senses (Reflex), 

Sensibility or Sensitivity, 

Sensibles, Common and Proper, 

Sensism, Sensualism, Sensuism, 

Sensorium, . 

Sensus Communis, 

Sentiment, . 

Sentiment and Opinion, 

Sign, . 

Singular Term, 

Socialism, 

Society (Desire of) , 

Society (Capacity of). 

Somatology, v. Nature, 

Sophism, Sophister, Sophistical, 

Sorites, 

Soul, 

Soul, Spirit, Mind, 

Soul of the World, v, Anima 

Mundi, 
Space, 
Species, 

Species in Perception, 
Specification (Principle of), 
Speculation, 
Spirit, 

Spiritualism, 
Spontaneity, 
Spontaneous, 
Standard of Virtue, 
States of Mind, . 
Statistics, 
Stoics, 



560 


INDEX. 




Page 




Subject, Subjective, 


490 


Topology, V. Memoria Technica, 


Subjectivism, 


492 


Tradition, . . . . 


Sublime (The), . 


. 492 


Train of Thought, 


Subsistentia, 


492 


Transcendent, 


Substance, . 


493 


Transcendental, 


Substance (Principle of j. 


494 


Transference, Translation, 


Subsumption, 


495 


Transmigration v. Metempsy- 


Succession, . 


495 


chosis, .... 


Sufficient Reason, 


495 


Trivium, .... 


Suggestion, . 


496 


Truth, .... 


Suicide, 


497 


Truth (Necessary), 


Supra-naturalism, 


497 


Truth (Contingent), 


Syllogism, . 


497 


Truths (First), 


Symbol, v. Myth, . 


. 331 


Type, 


Sympathy, . 


500 




Syncretism, . 


. 500 


Ubiety, .... 


Synderesis, , 


501 


Unconditioned, 


Syneidesis, . 


502 


Understanding, 


Synteresis, . 


. 602 


Unfitness, v. Fitness, 


Synthesis, 


502 


Unification, .... 


System, 


503 


Unitarian, .... 
Unity or Oneness, 


Taste, . . 


504 


Universals, .... 


Teleology, . 


505 


Uni vocal Words, 


Temperament, 


506 


Utility, .... 


Temperance, 


507 




Tendency, 


508 


Velleity, .... 


Term, , . . [ 


508 


Veracity, .... 


Testimony, . 


508 


Verbal, .... 


Theism, 


510 


Veritas Entis, 


Theocracy, . 


511 


Veritas Cognitionis, 


Theodicy, 


512 


Veritas Signi, 


Theogony, . 


. 514 


Virtual, .... 


Theology, 


. 514 


Virtue, .... 


Theology, Natural, 


515 


Volition, • . . • 


Theopathy, . 


. 516 




Theory, "... 


. 516 


Well-being, .... 


Theosophism, Theosophy, 


. 518 


Whole, . . . - 


Thesis, 


. 519 


Whv, .... 


Thought, Thinking, 


. 519 


Will, . . . . 


Time, .... 


. 520 


Wisdom, .... 



si 



BELL AND BAIN, PfilNTEKS, GLASGOW. 



